ATO

ANTITERRORISM TRAINING
TACTICS , TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

KESHAV MAZUMDAR
Antiterrorism Officer

PART 1

TERRORISM

To counter terrorism, the authority must fully understand terrorism. Additionally, he must know the countermeasures that decrease the possibility of a fruitful terrorist assault against establishments, units, and work force.

This part talks about terrorism and endeavors by the administrator to stop the risk of terrorism. It additionally displays measures and precautionary measures that ought to be implemented over the operational continuum. The target should be to prevent a terrorist attack before it happens. This objective can be attained by rendering conditions unfavorable to the terrorist. The success is measured by not having a death toll, or destruction of military gear, material , infrastructure through a demonstration of terrorism.

1-1. DEFINITION

The DOD characterizes terrorism as "the unlawful utilization - or risk - of power or brutality against individuals or property to force or threaten governments or social orders, frequently to accomplish political, religious, or ideological destinations." A terrorist's mode of warfare does’nt complies with principles or laws of fighting. His techniques incorporate prisoner taking, capturing, damage, death, illegal conflagration, deceptions, bombings, assaults, seizures, utilization of NBC weapons, et cetera. Casualties are most often noncombatants, typical persons and places, and political/military figures. Regularly the casualties have no part in either bringing about or adjusting a terrorist's grievance.

1-2. NATURE OF TERRORISM

The utilization of terrorism is not restricted to the early phases of a confrontation. It can and most likely will happen in any level of contention from peace through general war. Terrorist strategies are portrayed as slippery, astonishing, and brief savage activities.

1-3. Regular STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

The regular attack system of the terrorist is to submit demonstrations of savagery. These demonstrations draw the consideration of the individuals, the legislature, and the world to his reason. The media has pivotal influence in this system by giving terrorists worldwide acknowledgment. The peril is that this sort of consideration has a tendency to actuate demonstrations of viciousness by other terrorist groups.

a. Inflicting casualties , sometimes enmasse is the terrorists objective. The objective, or point of convergence, all the more frequently incorporates the overall population, government, military installation/troops or a business area.

b. Some basic strategies terrorists employ incorporate the following:

(1) Bombing. The strategy basic to most terrorist attacks is bombing. Of all terrorist occurrences recorded amid the 1980s, 67 percent came about because of the terrorist bomb. The bomb is a prominent weapon, in light of the fact that its constituent materials are easily available , simple to make, has variable uses, and is hard to recognize and execute follow-up after the incident as terrorists are very adaptive and use newer and newer combinations of chemicals/explosives. The increment in shelling action and the refinement of gadgets utilized brought about the NATO EOD Standardization Committee to order all terrorist bombs to be labeled as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The term IED is currently utilized by numerous law enforcement offices and also military counter terror and ant terror units. Some IED sub classifications include:

(a) Delivery implies techniques for getting the bomb to the objective.

Vehicle bombs- - booby-caught vehicles, joined gadgets, and auto bombs (autos loaded with explosives).

Laid charges- - bombs set by hand.

‘’Projectile’’ bombs- - bombs tossed by hand or launched by a mortar gadget.

Postal bombs.

Bike bombs.

(b) Activation . Three approaches to actuate an IED.

Initiation - by radio, electric leads, force wire/mechanical strikers.

Activation by the subject/target- - excursion wire, weight gadget, light touchy gadget, electric.

Time delay- - clock, blazing breaker, concoction delay, environmental weight.

Strategic extemporized hazardous gadgets (IED)- - typically viewed similar to those utilized against a person. These incorporate nail bombs, claymore gadgets, and secret bombs. In fact, any IED can be delegated as a strategic IED.

Key IEDs- - thought to be those utilized unpredictably to increase global concern/fear - for instance, in swarmed strip malls, on airplane, et cetera. They are those bombs intended to strike at society, the legislature, and the present framework.

(d) Hoaxes. Whatever the sort of IED, the terrorist regularly utilizes an opportunity to raise fear. His acknowledgment and to show he is not kidding. When he has once set up a typical mode of attack successfully , he can keep on using psychological techniques like hoax calls so as to upset, however not wreck, the administration and public by well-made and well placed scam bombs. The utilization of tricks with live IEDs can keep security strengths possessed, disturb counterterrorist operations and induce a sense of carelessness by invoking the notion that the next call (which could very well turn out to be a terrorist attack and not a deception) is just another hoax call. Another primary objective of such calls/deception methods is to waste counterterror resources and test the counterterror mechanisms readiness and loopholes.

(2) Arson. Although not a prominent strategy among terrorists, pyromania can pulverize and upset such areas of interest as open utilities, political home office, and, all the more normally, monetary/mechanical targets (shops, industrial facilities, inns). The most well known strategy for beginning an attack is with time-delay flammable gadgets, frequently conveyed in a cigarette bundle or tape holder. These gadgets are anything but difficult to disguise and hard to recognize. Like IEDs flammable gadgets are shoddy and simple to make.

(3) Hijacking. Hijacking and skyjacking were basic amid the 1960s, 1970s, and mid 1980s. Commandeering of vehicles conveying staple sustenance’s was a favored strategy of the Supemaros and suited their style of outfitted purposeful publicity. The seizing would be followed by the free dispersion of the vehicle's freight to the poor and destitute alongside terrorist purposeful publicity that publicized the terrorists' reason. In any proceeding with terrorist movement, for example, in Spain or Northern Ireland, the seizing of a vehicle will probably be connected with a future outrage. Case in point, a captured fuel truck may later be used as a 50,000-pound benzine bomb set up with explosives. Likewise, seized "honest to goodness" vehicles give the terrorist a simple intends to pick up passage to a shut military post.

(4) Ambush. Well-arranged ambushes at times are very successful. Ambushes include diversionary tactics and an early warning system of incoming security forces .Insurgent HUMINT elements from within the local sympathetic portion of the population and agents from the ranks of insurgents themselves constitute this EWS. Appropriately practiced, they are executed with accuracy. The terrorist has time on his side and puts in weeks or months TO get ready for an operation and sitting tight for the right opportune moment. The terrorist can pick his own time and spot of operation and, if his expected victim/victims frequently traverse the same route, the terrorist can then carry out sufficient rehearsals and dry runs before the act.

(5) Kidnapping. Not all ambushes are geared towards kinetic killing .The intent to ambush so as to take valuable prisoners who can pave the way for a good ransom is also an option the terrorist seeks. A survey found that 8% of ambushes had this objective as a priority over killing. The victim is kept captive in a secure hideout and the terrorist relays his financial or other demands (release of prominent terrorists , political figures sympathetic to the terrorists cause , a safe passage out of the AO/Country , weaponry etc)via a chain of intermediaries , most often it is not possible to trace the terrorist or hideout due to strict compartmentalization in the intermediary circle. If the intended objective of kidnapping for ransom fails and the security forces close in on the terrorist then the situation degenerates into a case of hostage taking , with both the terrorist and security forces being forced to adopt different tactics than that thought earlier for ransom specific terrorist act.

(6) Hostage taking. The contrast between prisoner taking and taking hostage is negligible. The prisoner taker brazenly affronts the government security machinery and the govt itself and the element of violence to be inflicted on the prisoner coupled with the high desperado nature of the terrorist keeps the security forces and negotiators on the edge during the first quarter of the hostage taking cycle. The terrorist looks for the best payoffs from this transaction and will go to any length including killing his hostages sequentially to achieve his target and also to instill fear so much so that it acts as a deterrent against counter terror operations. The terrorist plays a mind game and his intent is to build up the tension rapidly and seize the opportunity fast before the tempo fizzles out , even after killing the hostages as he is well aware continued negotiations are a ploy on the part of the administration to buy time , test his defenses and set him up. Prisoner taking is another and well known terrorist strategy. By its temperament, prisoner taking pulls in the media; the way that live prisoners are included builds the dramatization of the occasion. The prisoner is in fact a resource means who can aid in getting good concessions for the terrorist , politically or with the intent to cause widespread publicity for the terrorists cause. . In this way, terrorists can apply weight to drive concessions that generally cannot be made. Through prisoner taking, terrorists can get huge concessions at insignificant expense, in spite of the fact that dangers are included.

(7) Assassination. Assassination is an age old terrorist strategy . Targets are well nominated in advance , their daily routines studied in depth and the timer and place for execution of the act is rehearsed in keeping with the targets movement patterns and other characteristics. The killing is usually attributed to the terrorists group within 24 hours of the act. Targets are regularly unsurprising, and terrorist gatherings claim them after the occasion. Targets include government authorities, corporate administrators, police, military personnel, and security authorities. The targets are carefully chosen so as to impact the morale of the administration and the security forces very adversely and hamper any imminent counter terror operation by removing a lead actor .The elimination of a high profile personality automatically generates widespread publicity by the media and publicity is in fact the primary objective of the terrorist in most of his kinetic attacks.

(8) Other tactics. Whatever strategies terrorists use, they are easy to apply, creates socio-political dynamic ripples, the attack being essentially of the asymmetry type with an hit-and-run arrangement , taking care not to engage the security forces for any duration more than the most minimum required , surprise and speed of the attack are primary factors and all this , as per the terrorists unwritten doctrine , depends a great deal on rehearsals (dry runs) and this is the time that despite the entire operation from being conceived and put to reality , the terrorist surfaces and is vulnerable to security forces HUMINT/CI scanning. Other conceivable strategies incorporate the utilization of chemicals, provocation, surprise kinetic , seizures of chemicals , armaments , even nuclear materials etc.

1-4. Global NETWORK

Terrorist assembles today don't work alone and uninformed of each other. A worldwide system exists that gives extraordinary advantages to the individuals who have paid their "participation expense." It is not proposed that some universal base camp arrangements terrorist acts over the globe. Notwithstanding, it is demonstrated that a sort of universal terrorists' bolster system does exist. The advantages picked up from such a system appear to be unlimited: arms, ammo, cash, knowledge, explosives, safe houses. Most imperative is the experience and help given in preparing and bolster offices. Alongside the resultant prepared labor, the system develops.

1-5. Classifications OF TERRORIST GROUPS

A terrorist bunch's decision of targets and strategies is likewise an element of the bunch's administration alliance. They are sorted by government connection. This helps security organizers predict terrorist targets, and his modern insight and weaponry. Terrorist gatherings are partitioned into three classes:

a. Nonstate bolstered - a terrorist gather that works self-sufficiently, getting no backing from any legislature.

b. State upheld - a terrorist bunch that works alone however gets support from one or more governments.

c. State coordinated - a terrorist amass that works as an operators of an administration, getting significant knowledge, logistic, and operational backing.

1-6. TERRORIST OBJECTIVES

The prompt target of any terrorist assault ordinarily consents to one or more classifications. The objectives may be either prompt or long range. Terrorists exhibit gathering force, interest reprisal, get logistic bolster, and reason a legislature to go overboard. They are perceived by pressure, intimidation, and incitement. In the meantime, terrorists addition support for themselves or an uprising.

a. Prompt Goals.

(1) Obtain around the world, national, or nearby acknowledgment for their reason.

(2) Force government response, overcompensation, and restraint prompting quick open dispute.

(3) Harass, debilitate, or humiliate government, military, or other security strengths.

(4) Obtain cash or gear.

(5) Show an administration's failure to secure its nationals.

(6) Disrupt or devastate essential method for portability or interchanges.

(7) Demonstrate force or risk validity.

(8) Prevent or deferral choices or enactment.

(9) Cause strikes or work log jams.

(10) Discourage approaching remote speculations or outside government help programs.

(11) Free detainees.

(12) Seek retribution.

b. Long-Range Goals.

(1) Cause emotional changes in government, for example, upset, common war, or war between countries.

(2) Disrupt and dishonor a built up base in backing of an uprising.

(3) Influence nearby, national, or global approach choice making.

(4) Gain political acknowledgment as the lawful body speaking to an ethnic or national gathering.

1-7. TERRORIST TARGETS

Anybody or anything can be an objective or casualty of a terrorist demonstration. Then again, to the terrorist, the military speaks to a wellspring of arms and material and additionally a political or national body. This places the military at incredible danger. The rundown underneath contains some conceivable military focuses of terrorists; it gives a few regions of concern. Targets may change as security is expanded.

Touchy night vision and correspondence things.

Arms.

Ammo.

Order and control offices.

Explosives.

Military officer preparing offices.

Regions pander to individual needs (mess corridors, sleeping enclosure, post trade, supermarket, rec centers, religious exercises, bars, group focuses).

Hydroelectric plants, dams, gas pipelines, atomic office locales.

Correspondence lines/offices, PC offices.

Compound stockpiling locales.

Hardware distribution centers.

Transportation focuses, parking garages, airplane terminals, railheads, transport stops, rail lines, shipyards.

Individuals from military power and their wards.

Key pioneers of the military.

Post workplaces and mail trucks.

PART II

ANTITERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Fighting terrorism comprises of two noteworthy classifications. The authority must build up an arrangement that incorporates the parts of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The arrangement ought to decrease the powerlessness of establishments, units, and faculty amid peacetime, predeployment, organization, and redeployment. It ought to likewise incorporate measures for avoiding, preventing, and reacting to terrorism.

3-8. ANTITERRORISM

Establishments, units, and people utilize antiterrorism measures to diminish the possibility of succumbing to a terrorist demonstration. These measures are viewed as both dynamic and detached, intended to keep a terrorist occurrence. They must include every individual from the military group - military, regular citizen, and relatives. The foundation for this system incorporates gathering and dispersing opportune danger data, directing data mindfulness projects, and actualizing sound guarded measures. Three sorts of efforts to establish safety to consider are physical security, OPSEC, and individual security.

a. Physical Security. Physical efforts to establish safety ensure data, material, and persons, and also counteract criminal acts. In spite of the fact that terrorist exercises are criminal acts, a few distinctions must be considered when giving physical security against terrorists. Terrorists are liable to be more sorted out, better prepared and taught, and more profoundly energetic than different culprits. They are intensely outfitted and refined in their capacity to crush physical efforts to establish safety. To give physical security against terrorists, pioneers must consider the terrorist whose objective may incorporate his own self-annihilation. This is not quite the same as security against different lawbreakers or a traditional adversary. A few activities can help figure out what physical efforts to establish safety are required.

(1) Review wrongdoing counteractive action studies/assessments. These reviews consider the whole establishment and in addition the impact on the encompassing non military personnel area.

(2) Provide photographs of known terrorists to key faculty. These photographs can be acquired through nearby regular citizen and military powers. The photographs can likewise be conspicuously shown in like manner territories so that all work force have admittance to them.

(3) Review physical security overviews/examinations. This review prescribes activity as an aftereffect of on location investigation of boundaries, watchman strengths, interchanges, transportation, possibility bolster, defensive lighting, interruption lighting, interruption recognition framework, and other physical efforts to establish safety. These activities shield establishments from misfortune, burglary, pulverization, damage, or trade off.

(4) Review status of work requests; build up the need of work taking into account risk appraisal.

(5) Determine if the establishment is shut or open. It is shut if ground and water access is restricted by an edge wall, controlled passage focuses, or other physical obstructions. If not, the officer must remunerate by assigning confined zones, giving section control, and keeping up emergency course of actions to secure or close all or some piece of the establishment.

(6) Consider physical security perspectives.

Defensive deterrents and hindrances.

Electro-optical and night vision hardware.

Bomb dangers.

Shut circuit TV.

Interchanges.

Passage control.

Interruption discovery frameworks.

Lighting.

Bolt and key control.

Bundle and mail control.

Faculty dependability.

Area of confined zones.

Review of water and nourishment.

Review of key work force vehicles.

The physical security arrangement must be adjusted in its introduction, with equivalent accentuation on forestalling criminal goes about and in addition terrorist acts. The leader must upgrade his arrangement persistently taking into account risk appraisal.

b. Operational Security. Protecting data is the foundation of the OPSEC program. The OPSEC project facilitates everything activities needed to keep an adversary or terrorist from finding out about arrangements and operations. Methods of trickiness, physical security, SIGSEC, and data security are interrelated and happen in the meantime. All arranging must incorporate measures to keep the potential terrorist from acquiring data that could help in a terrorist episode. Four ranges of data that terrorists can adventure are as per the following:

(1) Human insight. HUMINT includes utilizing individuals to accumulate data about military capacities and goals to incorporate establishment regular exercises. HUMINT sources can incorporate apparently insignificant bar or eatery discussions concerning operations, or the arrival of telephone numbers and locations of key staff. This risk can be countered by holding fast to physical security and data security rehearses, and by utilizing countersurveillance and counterintelligence exercises.

(2) Signal insight. SIGINT concerns all types of correspondences and sign discharge hardware. Terrorists will be unable to trade off refined hardware, however they can influence routine regular correspondences exercises. For instance, police or flame division frequencies are not changed when radios are stolen, or phones in delicate zones are not checked for bothering gadgets. This risk is countered by building up correspondences security and data security.

(3) Photo insight. Terrorists use PHOTOINT to pick up data through scope from airplane, high landscape components, vehicles, et cetera. PHOTOINT can be countered through counterintelligence and countersurveillance programs.

(4) Operational examples. Operational examples of military associations give data to a terrorist. To counter this danger, pioneers must wipe out examples when conceivable. Else, they ought to utilize double dealing measures to cover the set up example.

c. Personal Security. No individual is insusceptible to the danger of terrorism. Delegates of the US Government are conceivable focuses of terrorist exercises. Terrorists might preselect workplaces, assembling plants, or other establishment resources as focuses for bombarding, damage, shows, snatchings, and homicides. Who possesses these structures may be of little concern to the terrorists. Measures that may be valuable in stopping such acts are as per the following:

(1) Control access to touchy territories and charge workplaces, both day and night.

(a) Prevent direct access to touchy territories well on the way to be focuses of terrorism. Try not to find summon workplaces on the ground floor.

(b) Equip doorways to delicate zones and summon workplaces with an alert.

(d) Ensure direct-security power work force weigh charge zones in their twilight visit.

(e) Lock all restrooms on floors where summon workplaces are situated (and in addition others in a multistory office building) to prevent community.

(f) Lock ways to janitorial and other support storage rooms at all times.

(g) Lock ways to phone and electrical hardware rooms. Offer access to upkeep and phone work force just when they have such need.

(2) Select an inside safe space for utilization if terrorists assault; don't distinguish it as a protected room.

(3) Maintain crisis supplies, for example, emergency treatment hardware, bomb covers, candles, apportions, water, lamps, et cetera. Illuminate key staff as to where supplies are kept, and the area of crisis exits and departure courses.

(4) Restrict the individual history information on key work force since this data could be utilized by terrorists to choose casualties or to recognize their homes and families.

(5) Recommend key faculty stopping regions not be recognized by name yet rather by number.

(6) Limit data on travel motivation and arrangements of order or key staff to just need-to-know work force.

(7) Increase the impact of charge and key work force defensive measures by empowering them- -

(a) To keep up a position of safety.

(b) To be taught to perceive the indications of reconnaissance by outsiders.

(d) To change courses to and from work.

(e) To go to cautious and shifty driving school.

(f) To review vehicles before moving.

(g) To utilize defensive vests.

(h) To maintain a strategic distance from likely terrorist focused on territories.

(i) To drive with windows shut and entryways bolted.

(j) To know key expressions in the local dialect.

(k) To precisely screen all local help.

(l) To know terrorist systems and techniques for operation.

(m) To perform guide surveillance to maintain a strategic distance from suspected terrorist focuses when venturing out to new destinations (eateries, lodgings, shopping, etc).

3-9. TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS

The accompanying terrorist risk conditions depict dynamic levels of terrorist danger to US military offices and staff. As Joint Chiefs of Staff-affirmed phrasing, these terms, definitions, and efforts to establish safety actualize an institutionalized terrorist ready framework all through the DOD. MACOMs and subordinate summons are not approved to change the fundamental framework; on the other hand, supplements to the framework may be distributed. The determination of suitable reactions to terrorist dangers remains the obligation of the administrator having purview or control over undermined offices or work force.

a. Danger Condition Alpha(Low).

(1) Definition. A general danger of conceivable terrorist action against establishments and work force, of unusual nature and degree, when circumstances don't legitimize full usage of measures contained in a higher risk condition. Chosen measures from higher risk conditions may be actualized as required.

(2) Measures To Be Taken.

(an) At normal interims, remind all work force, including wards, to be suspicious and curious about outsiders, especially those conveying bags or different holders; to be ready for unidentified vehicles on or close US establishments; and to be ready for surrendered bundles or bags, or for any unordinary movement.

(b) Keep the obligation officer or other named staff accessible to clear structures and ranges, and to close territories where a blast or assault has happened. Keep key faculty accessible as needs be to actualize security arranges.

(d) Increase security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering establishments and nonclassified territories under the ward of the US summon and organization.

(e) Limit access focuses for vehicles and work force.

(f) As an impediment, apply one of the accompanying measures from danger condition Bravo separately and haphazardly:

Secure and routinely examine all structures, rooms, and capacity regions not in normal utilization.

Toward the starting and the end of every workday, and at other consistent and continuous interims, assess the inside and outside of structures in normal utilization for suspicious movement or bundles.

Check all conveyances to establishment exercises and encourage wards to check every single home deliverie.

To the extent assets permit, expand reconnaissance of local facilities (schools, wreckage heaps, clubs, and other vulnerable objectives) to enhance prevention and safeguard, and to fabricate certainty among the staff and wards.

(g) Review all arrangements, orders, staff subtle elements, and logistic prerequisites identified with the presentation of the higher risk condition.

(h) Review and execute efforts to establish safety for high-chance staff.

b. Risk Condition Bravo (Medium).

(1) Definition. An expanded and more unsurprising risk of terrorist action despite the fact that no specific danger has been distinguished.

(2) Measures to be Taken.

(a) Remind all faculty to be mindful and curious about suspicious persons, vehicles, and exercises. Caution staff of any type of assault to be utilized by terrorists.

(b) Keep all faculty accessible as needs be who are included in actualizing antiterrorist emergency arrangements.

(d) Where conceivable, move autos and different articles no less than 25 meters from structures, especially those structures of a touchy or prestigious nature. Consider the utilization of unified stopping.

(e) Secure and consistently review all structures, rooms, and capacity regions not in general utilization.

(f) Make consistent and successive assessments of the inside and outside of structures for suspicious bundles.

(g) Thoroughly look at all mail for letter or package bombs.

(h) Check all conveyances to establishment exercises and encourage wards to check every home deliverie.

(i) As far as assets permit, expand observation of local facilities (schools, wreckage heaps, clubs, and other vulnerable objectives) to enhance discouragement and resistance, and to manufacture certainty among the staff and wards.

(j) Keep the staff and wards educated of the general circumstance to stop bits of gossip and avoid pointless caution.

(k) At an early stage, educate individuals from neighborhood security boards of any move being made and why.

(l) Upon section of guests to the unit, physically assess them and a rate of their bags, bundles, and different compartments.

(m) Wherever conceivable, work irregular watches to check vehicles, individuals, and structures.

(n) Protect off course military work force and military transport as per arranged arrangements. Remind drivers to bolt stopped vehicles and to organization a positive arrangement of checking before they enter and drive an auto.

(o) Implement extra efforts to establish safety for high-hazard work force.

(p) Brief staff who may enlarge the watchman power on mandates and regulations concerning the utilization of lethal power.

(q) Conduct an arbitrary pursuit of vehicles entering the establishment.

c. Danger Condition Charlie (High).

(1) Definition. A terrorist occurrence has happened or knowledge has been gotten demonstrating that some type of terrorist activity is inevitable.

(2) Measures to be Taken.

(a) Continue all danger condition Bravo activities or present those not effectively actualized.

(b) Keep all staff on obligation who are in charge of actualizing antiterrorist arranges.

(d) Strictly uphold control of passage and pursuit all vehicles.

(e) Enforce brought together stopping of vehicles far from delicate structures.

(f) Issue weapons to monitors. (Neighborhood requests ought to incorporate particular guidelines on issue of ammo.)

(g) Increase watching of the establishment.

(h) Protect all assigned powerless focuses and give extraordinary consideration regarding helpless focuses outside military foundations.

(i) Erect hindrances and impediments to control activity stream.

d. Danger Condition Delta (Imminent).

(1) Definition. Terrorist assault has happened in the prompt region or insight has been gotten that terrorist activity against a particular area is likely. Ordinarily, this danger condition is announced as a restricted cautioning.

(2) Measures To Be Taken.

(a) Continue or present measures recorded for danger conditions Bravo and Charlie.

(b) Augment monitors, as required.

(d) Search all vehicles entering the complex or establishment and additionally vehicle substance.

(e) Control all entrance and actualize constructive distinguishing proof of all work force.

(f) Search all bags, attachés, and bundles brought into the complex or on the establishment.

(g) Enforce measures to control access to all regions under the locale of the US charge or office concerned.

(h) Check regularly the outside of structures and of stopping ranges.

(i) Minimize every single authoritative voyage and visits.

(j) Consult neighborhood powers about shutting open (and military) streets and offices that may make locales more defenseless against terrorist assault.

e. Risk Assessment Guidelines. The taking after general rules accommodate uniform usage of security ready conditions. Appraisal components are characterized as- -

(1) Existence. Applies when a terrorist gathering is available in a zone of concern. The gathering need not have represented a risk to US or DOD intrigues previously.

(2) Capability. Applies when a terrorist gathering can actualize an operation against US intrigues in territories of concern. This incorporates assets, for example, knowledge, versatility, work force, and hardware (explosives, arms, and ammo).

(3) History. Applies when a bunch's history of terrorist acts and conduct mirrors a hostile to US stand or incorporates past assaults against US intrigues.

(4) Trends. Applies if the gathering has, over the previous year, showed terrorist action that has all the earmarks of being proceeding with or expanding. Action require not have been vicious; terrorist assaults against US or DOD intrigues may be just undermining explanations.

(5) Targeting. Applies if there are known plans or affirmed expectations of a terrorist gathering to target US or DOD intrigues. Focusing on can be either particular or nonspecific. In the event that focusing on is not against US or DOD intrigues, this variable ought not be considered.

A blend of positive responses to any or the majority of the above evaluation components will deliver a danger level of either low, medium, high, or unavoidable. These rules apply just to the evaluation of terrorist danger against US or DOD intrigues.

f. Danger Condition Reporting Procedures. Department of the Army obliges MACOMs that claim establishments to actualize a reporting framework inside of their individual orders. This framework will give DA and senior Army pioneers current data on the antiterrorist pose with the goal that assets are devoted where they are generally required. (See applicableregulations for reporting methodology.)

3-10. COUNTERTERRORISM

Counterterrorism incorporates the full scope of hostile measures to avert, deflect, and react to terrorism. This is the last stage in fighting terrorism. It is receptive and accepts the broad arrangement, arranging, and reaction measures set up in terrorism neutralization arranges. The kind of strengths and charge and control relations utilized as a part of counterterrorism operations rely on upon the area, sort of occurrence, and level of power needed. Power determination criteria are represented by legitimate and political limitations. Some military operations executed by US drives because of terrorist acts may be done by customary strengths, However, ordinarily these powers give backing to an uncommonly composed, prepared, and prepared counterterrorism unit. In executing counterterrorism activities, pioneers ought to guarantee authoritative arranging addresses the accompanying errands:

a. Intelligence. A very much arranged, sorted out, all-source insight project is crucial with a specific end goal to distinguish the risk and to give auspicious danger knowledge. (See Chapter 6.) This incorporates assessing terrorist capacities, strategies, and technique.

b. Prisoner Negotiations. Due to jurisdictional contemplations, prisoner transactions are ordinarily the obligation of another US government office or the host country.

c. Prisoner Rescue. Specially sorted out, prepared, and prepared work force and units are kept up to save and ensure prisoners.

d. Attack of Terrorist Positions. An goal of national arrangement is to stop the terrorist through the risk of countering. At the point when this gets to be fundamental, US military staff regularly direct the operation. This mission could be doled out to either uncommon operations powers, traditional powers, or both. In the event that SOFs are utilized, the US military officer must at present arrangement to build up an internal security border of MP units. He likewise sets up an external security edge of officers and a unique response component to react to other segregated episodes inside of the AOR.

Segment III.

Battling TERRORISM IN LIC

Commandants must make a move to counter terrorists. Amid peacetime, they must create and utilize antiterrorist arranges. The measures to stop, counteract, and react to risk are in view of the terrorist danger conditions. The arrangement must relate to and be incorporated in the security arrangement. This incorporates physical security, OPSEC, and individual security. As the unit conveys for COIN operations, PKOs, or PCOs, the shots of a terrorist demonstration increments. Taking into account the danger, officers must monitor unit work force and hardware.

3-11. Sending IN CONTINGENCIES

An administrator with an arrangement mission must diminish the helplessness of his unit to terrorist assault. These precautionary measures must be incorporated amid predeployment, sending, and redeployment.

a. Predeployment. The administrator must build up his unit's security to confound the terrorist's choice making. As he arranges his idea of the operation, he surveys the risk. From this, the operational arrangements, gear, and unique aptitudes can be picked that build danger to the terrorists.

(1) The idea ought to -

(an) Include security against terrorism in all requests, arranges, and preparing.

(b) Include security in the leader's direction.

(2) The arranging procedure must incorporate -

(a) Mission investigation.

By what means can the mission be influenced by a terrorist assault?

What are the security parts of both indicated and inferred assignments?

Keep on looking into unit shortcomings all through predeployment, arrangement, and redeployment.

(b) Threat evaluation.

Distinguish terrorist gatherings working in the arrangement region.

Add to a rundown of PIR: strategies for operation, assault strategy, and preattack sign.

Distinguish wellsprings of data on terrorist gatherings; know how to get to them rapidly and routinely.

Routinely incorporate danger evaluation in insight gauges.

Obtainment of uncommon security gear

Security of capacity and dissemination regions.

Upkeep of uncommon gear.

Security of upkeep unit if separate from fundamental body.

Security amid development (in light of risk).

Security in arranging ranges.

Contact with security offices that bolster the move or with controlling ranges that move (host nation).

(d) Combat bolster contemplations.

Designing need of work in light of the mission and terrorist risk.

Unique specialist hardware for leading countermine and EOD; defensive snag emplacement; developing barricades; basic site, resource, and troop security.

Unique specialist hardware.

Specialist preparing to move units on visual identification/acknowledgment of mines/booby traps.

MP check/examine/enhance unit physical security.

MP contact with nearby police/security faculty.

MP help with security arranging and preparing.

Host country security strengths helped by MP screen non military personnel and host country representatives.

No procuring of non military personnel representatives, if conceivable.

In the event that utilized, uncommon security methodology for screening and observing regular citizens.

In numerous nations, a charge for data is normal. Coordinate with the State Department for an intends to pay for data.

(e) Operational contemplations.

Unit arranges. Incorporate security in every arrangement, SOP, OPORD, and development request.

Security arranges. Get ready, audit, and redesign unit security arranges (physical security, wrongdoing anticipation, et cetera), and singular security arrangements (watchman orders).

Security programs. Create particular security projects, for example, risk mindfulness and OPSEC.

Extraordinary groups. Because of the terrorist risk, consider an alternate errand association (pursuit groups, unique response groups, defensive administration groups).

Extraordinary aptitudes. To counter the terrorist risk, add exceptional abilities to units (investigators, etymologists, FAOs, EOD work force, open issues, SOF contact, CA officer). Some may need to run with cutting edge parties.

Summon and bolster connections. These may contrast from the normal (State Department, host country, nation group, SOF groups). Resolution order and bolster connections between the development gathering of the JTF and the detachment and different offices before arrangement.

(f) Specialized aptitudes preparing. Institutional preparing for specific abilities (teacher capability, equivocal driving, uncommon response groups, risk mindfulness, look systems, prisoner transaction, barricades, sentry obligations, joint police activity with host nation).

(g) Transit to arrangement range.

Consider general security of the unit all through the whole development: crisis activity methods, option courses or preoccupations, and natural security groups with every development component.

Actualize on the way arranging and preparing.

Instantly upgrade insight/danger appraisal before landing.

b. Deployment. Deployment is the second phase of the mission. As units move and build up operation bases, administrators should not make lucrative targets.

(1) Advanced gathering contemplations.

(a) Composition. More staff are required for security and contact with host country security organizations, in light of the fact that a methods for included insight terrorism is needed.

(b) Deployment. The essential security thought for the propelled party is whether it ought to be standard or low profile (uniform or regular clothes, military or non military personnel transport).

(c) Validation. The propelled party must approve the mission and PIR. Obliged errands incorporate figuring out whether the terrorist risk evaluation tracks with genuine danger and if the risk from in nation influences the achievement of the mission; and, finding the mission, on the off chance that it is the same as the commander's.

(d) Rules of engagement. The propelled party must affirm arranged principles of engagement. It must figure out whether they are the same as those amid the predeployment stage. Issues must be determined before the primary body arrives.

(2) OPSEC measures in sending.

(an) Avoid setting aside a few minutes and spot of entry; generally, build security.

(b) Avoid setting examples of conduct/operation.

(3) Pass strategy. On augmented operations, the spirit of officers must be considered. A pass arrangement may be set up in the mission region. Be that as it may, officers must stay under the radar. Administrators ought to do the accompanying:

(a) Provide troop data briefings on the danger.

(b) Establish pass approaches utilizing the amigo framework.

(4) Force security. In setting up working bases and in everyday operations, leaders must consider the security of his powers. This is a noteworthy concern when the guidelines of engagement are prohibitive. A few contemplations are as per the following:

(a) Coordinate with security compels that ensure strengths (MP, host country powers, coordinating staff).

(b) Avoid giving lucrative targets (troop fixations, engine pools, expansive static logistic establishments).

(d) Continue danger appraisal along courses for every development.

(e) Include security in all development orders.

(f) Provide security at flight and landing focuses.

(g) Employ security strengths amid travel.

(h) Establish contact and direction with all security offices along course.

(5) Security improvement. Leaders ought to utilize TOE and specific gear to give security in light of danger evaluation.

(an) Assign the executive marshal or a military cop the obligation regarding physical security.

(b) Ensure all faculty know the administering regulations (gatekeeper requests, tenets of engagement, nearby limitations).

(d) Include power/base insurance when organizing unit positions (great guard/obstruction arrangement, scattering of high-esteem targets far from access streets, edge wall).

(e) Maintain a position of safety (limit passes).

(f) Restrict access of unassigned faculty to the unit's area. Limit the quantity of vehicles inside of edges and continue stopping far from structures. Perform stringent distinguishing proof checks.

(h) Constantly depict a picture of polished skill and status.

(i) Continue to reassess the earth.

c. Redeployment. During the redeployment stage, get ready for a terrorist assault is as key as amid alternate stages. Truth be told, units have a tendency to unwind after an operation. Redeployment relies on upon the mission, the reputation, and the worldwide response. It might be the most defenseless stage for aterrorist assault.

(1) The development party must keep a security alarm and mindfulness stance until the greater part of the unit has returned. The development gathering ought to create PIR for come back to home station.

(2) Stay-behind work force are most open to terrorist assault subsequent to the outfitted vicinity is less. They must keep a security pose that mirrors the shot of a more noteworthy danger. Activities incorporate keeping up contact with security strengths, adding to efforts to establish safety, and keeping tight controls on work force.

(3) The accompanying ought to be considered for opposite organization:

(a) The security of the port of passage and lines of interchanges for the arrival excursion.

(b) If the mission has changed the circumstance at home. A disagreeable political choice may open the unit to a risk upon its arrival to the US.

(c) To receive the efforts to establish safety utilized amid travel to, and development inside of, the sending region. Coordinate response capacity with security organizations along the course.

(4) A facilitated PAO approach ought to be produced to fuse the accompanying:

(a) Control of data discharged to the media guarantees exactness and culmination.

(b) Troops ought to be advised as to arrival of data to outside offices. Just open undertakings staff have discharge power.

(5) Debriefing ought to be directed. The anxiety increment in fighters amid serious arrangement operations must be permitted to die down. This serves to alter once more into a peacetime domain. These debriefings include:

(a) Briefing fighters to change their introduction from LIC obligation back to peacetime.

(b) Updating fighters in regards to new strategies, occurrences, or dangers that created following the sending operation.

(6) A careful after-activity report ought to be arranged. It gives two imperative administrations to units that direct future operations. It gives future leaders an advantage from lessons learned. Likewise, it serves as an asset for approving terrorism balance methodology for future operations.

3-12. Need INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND LOCAL TERRORISM INDICATORS

Fighting terrorism, more than some other type of fighting, obliges information of the adversary's objectives and capacities. Knowledge officers, supporting a conveying unit, should constantly consider the terrorist's worries when creating EEIs and a rundown of neighborhood terrorism markers.

a. Need Intelligence Requirements. The taking after terrorist concerns can help the knowledge officer in creating PIR:

Association, size, and piece of gathering.

Inspiration, long-extend objectives, and short-go objectives.

Religious, political, ethnic association, or a blend of these.

Worldwide and national bolster (moral, physical, budgetary).

Selecting systems, areas, and targets (understudies).

Characters of gathering pioneers, go getter, and visionaries.

Bunch knowledge capacities.

Wellsprings of supply/backing.

Imperative dates (religious occasions, affliction commemorations).

Arranging skill.

Level of control.

Favored strategies and operations.

Eagerness to murder.

Eagerness for benevolence( (pronounced or illustrated).

Bunch abilities (killing, destructions, masquerade, fashioned reports, modern damage, plane/pontoon operations, burrowing, submerged electronic reconnaissance, harms/contaminants).

Gear and weapons available and needed.

Transportation close by and needed.

Therapeutic backing accessible.

Opportunity of access to media and ability in utilizing it.

b. Neighborhood Terrorism Indicators. Some conditions that may show politically persuaded brutality in specific areas are as per the following:

(1) Dissent for political, social, or ethnic reasons. Charges brought against nearby government.

(2) Formation of radical gatherings, branches of national subversive gatherings, or mystery social orders.

(3) Antigovernment, against US unsettling; distinguishing proof of government or US as the foundation of the issues.

(4) New representatives for the individuals' reasons rising; away coordinators arriving.

(5) Meetings, arouses, and exhibits being sorted out; grievances taking political suggestions; incendiary addresses and charges made; incitement of powers to intercede, or go overboard; police or military ruthlessness charged.

(6) Appearance of rebellious notices, handouts, underground squeeze; taking individuals' worry into political stadium; politicization of social reasons.

(7) Use of referred to identities as draws for energizes, particularly those that have been related to radical reasons.

(8) Demonstrations, common insubordination, or challenge walks with reasons eclipsed by political talking points.

(9) Increased selecting, by known front gatherings and radical associations; support looked for among specialists.

(10) Increased activism in political circles at schools and colleges.

(11) Speeches and correspondences expressing viciousness as the main method for arrangement.

(12) Identification of remote impact or help.

(13) Threats against open works, utilities, or transportation; dangers of brutality against unmistakable identities.

(14) Agitation in evacuee, minority, or outside groups; polarization; furnishing portions of society.

(15) Reports of stolen guns and explosives; assaults on ordnances, and donning merchandise stores.

(16) Violence against property, plundering, annihilation, and torching; for the most part amid exhibitions, walks, or crowd activities.

(17) Violence against persons, homicides, endeavored killings, beatings, dangers, snatchings, or open focusing of individuals.

(18) Increased buys of elite weapons; appearance of programmed weapons, mostly of outside production.

(19) Discovery of weapons, ammo stores, and explosives; sign of terrorist preparing; expanded terrorist reconnaissance.

(20) Open assaults on police, military, and different powers.

(21) Reports of stolen distinguishing proof cards, participation cards, etc.

3-13. OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES

Leaders can execute certain measures to abstain from stereotyping and to deny knowledge data to the adversary.

a. Leaders ought to hold fast to the accompanying OPSEC measures:

(1) Use EEFI to control the OPSEC program. Create EEFI- - those things/exercises of arranging that terrorists can utilize.

(2) Present irregular activity in unit working techniques (change watch calendars, courses, check focuses, sentry, or gatekeeper positions.

(3) Avoid any set example for authorities, gatherings, dinner calendars, resupply action, religious administrations, or sentry or gatekeeper reliefs.

(4) Employ defensive obstructions (edge and interior).

(5) Check recognizable proof of all work force entering and leaving the border or establishment.

(6) Employ added security to limited zones (interchanges posts, correspondence focuses, engine parks, high-thickness troop ranges).

(7) Control appropriation of schedules of VIPs/high-hazard faculty.

(8) Establish descent focuses and stopping regions far from structures. On the off chance that conceivable, these ought not be seen from outside the base.

b. The accompanying are cases of insight pointers that may help a terrorist in social occasion knowledge on a unit. This is a specimen posting and ought not be translated as complete.

(1) Operation Indicators.

(a) Troops confined to the post before a move or operation.

(b) Increased watching/air surveillance.

(d) Increased development between areas brought on by assignment associations before an operation.

(e) Special demands to expand apportions, transport, and ammo.

(2) HUMINT Indicators.

(a) Newspaper or other media scope.

(b) Farewells and a minute ago visits by VIPs or senior officers.

(d) Bulletin notification expressing that authorized rest is obliged; dispensary hours are changed.

(e) Public signs declaring changes in strategies (limiting non military personnel travel/access).

(f) Photography created by nearby builders indicating in-camp scenes and arrangements.

(3) Communication Indicators.

(a) Change in call signs and frequencies before an operation.

(b) Movement of assistant correspondence hardware (new aerials) to another territory.