TACTICAL QUESTIONING

Framed to ask local civilians on detention , suspected insurgent informers/agents and insurgents. Questions can be phrased in simple language and ground soldiers like Cobra troops need no extensive special training.This is not interrogation but tactical questioning-to gain information of possible intelligence value on the spot.

 

Collecting Information

Soldiers patrol the same area day after day. Sometimes they go in for deep area patrolling and reconnaissance. All this is done with the intent to collect combat information.In any operational environment soldiers should always be primed , alert to collect information.Of particular mention here is te word ‘’change’’.While patrolling the soldiers may discern a ‘’change’’ in normalcy of the surroundings. While studying the surroundings , like the people,terrain,infrastructure the soldier should recognize any changes in the environment.Often than not these changes are important indicators cof enemy activity or intent.The soldier may not be able to find out the reason behind the change , still it’s very important he report it to the intelligence personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as

 

• Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.

• Homes and Buildings: What is the condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock?

• Infrastructure: The presence of functioning stores, service stations, etc.

• People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

• Contrast: Has anything changed?

 

If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the information requirements. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the information requirements and their responsibility to observe and report

 

While handling detainees and EPWs keep the following in mind:

 

1. Segragate the detainees and EPWs based on nationality , sex , profession , ethnicity (civilians) and rank , insignia , and regiment (may be belonging to enemy intelligence unit , thus game for special interrogation )

 

2. While searching the person of the detainee or EPW search thotoughly.Keep separate the records of documents , seized equipments and weapons(capture tags).Describe all documents,equipments and weapons as completely as possible.This is not DOCEX or Captured equipment exploitation in its entirety—that will later be done by trained HUMINT personnel and with help of technical assistants.What is being done here is tactical exploitation , just like tactical questioning—on the spot intelligence extraction.

 

3. Intelligence is perishable and combat intelligence is highly perishable , action is required as soon as possible and for that the intelligence must reach the targeting platform without any delay.But there are procedures.The prisoners and detainees who are felt will yield more information on further questioning must be moved as soon as possible to the rear where interrogators are waiting.Bear in mind that with time the detainee/EPW emboldens , the initial panic which he had on point of capture wears away , he gets time to think and also harbors escapist thoughts—escape from captivity.We are here talking about the duties of secondary collectors , the line troops who must move them fast to rear after ascertaining that they do have information of value.There are mobile interrogation teams to handle cases right on the spot at forward areas and copmposed of a mix of HUMINT/CI but that is tactical HUMINT and will be dealt within my book on Counterintelligence.

 

4. Kep a tab on the detaines , EPWs and all others so that they do not communicate with each other.

 

5. Remember the personal safety and protection of all detained for questioning can be a cause for concern under certain circumstances and hence they must be safeguarded.For example someone from the line troops may vent his personal anger on the enemy by attempting rough handle the detainees or prisoners.Sexual harassment is also an issue.Whatever be the case , they must be treated humanely.

 

Key Considerations for Talking

• You must be aware of the existence, nature and type of threat in your area and the vulnerabilities of the protection measures taken by your commander which are liable to be tapped. Overall you should know the force protection measures taken by your unit.

• Be careful about the local culture, traditions, customs.

 

• Your body language should project a friendlier flavor, not an intimidating one. Point weapons away from the accosted person.

 

• Talk to people in normal surroundings.Dont lead them to an isolated area, an alley or any place which will make them suspicious. Always be polite. Remove sunglasses.

• If you are speaking to a woman know local courtesies.

 

 

Questions

Questions should be so structured so as to be simple, straightforward, should open and maintain the conversation, should start with an interrogative, and should prompt a narrative answer. Interrogatives are what, why, when, who and where. Questions should not be closes provoking only an ‘’yes’’ or ‘’no’’ as answer but should be ‘’open’’.Avoid asking questions that are confusing. Characteristics of open questions:

• Act as an invitation to talk.

• Prompts the person to answer comfortably and feel encouraged to continue with the conversation.

• Not too specific but broad in nature.

• Encourage discussion.

• Creates a situation favorable for the soldier to be the listener(and observer) for a major part of the conversation.

• Does not cause the person to feel intimidated or threatened.

• Invokes curiosity of others and allows them to get involved in the discussion spiritedly.

• Gives the person the opportunity to tell his opinions, his judgment, what he feels is important, what he feels should be done.

• Should invoke a conversation, not a question-answer scenario.

Be subtle, don’t just jot away on paper the answers –that is not conversation and always be friendly, cooperative, observing him carefully but not arousing any suspicion, studying his body language and be courteous and reserved.

 

 

 

 

Questioning to Fill Out the Capture Tag

You are manning a check post or roadblock..Before being deployed to do so your unit commander has briefed you about the intelligence requirements as per current mission. The Battalion prioritized intelligence requirements lead to the generation of intelligence requirements for each company and subunits. These intelligence requirements as spelled out to you will guide you in framing the questions to be asked of individuals at the check post/roadblock. Once you, the soldier, have screened and detained a person categorized either as a detainee or EPW you must now obtain all possible details from him so that on subsequent questioning/interrogation of the person by the HUMINT or CI agent, the latter is well prepared initially with the information you have supplied. You must fill out a capture tag which will facilitate further questioning/interrogation. The capture tag must include:

What is your job? What is your speciality? Are you a combatant? If so what is your rank, number and unit? Who are in your chain of command? Whom do you report—that is who your immediate superior is? What is the mission of your unit? Are you a civilian? Then why are you here? Who is your immediate boss and what is the name of your company? At the time, place and point of capture, detention what was your immediate mission—that is to say why were you there and what were you doing or what were your plans? Were you supposed to conduct any mission/job when you were captured/detained? What are your future plans and what is the future mission of your unit/company? You might note he is carrying documents, maps, identification papers; photographs.Here is where you might find things out of the ordinary. The map might be of another place or even this place: Why are you carrying this map? The photo/s might be of someone else: Who is this person and why are you carrying his photograph? The ID papers may belong to other persons and hence you ask him why is he carrying other peoples identification papers and why. And where are these persons as they are in a disturbed area and that too without identification papers. All these exploitable documents can now be handed over to the MI section together with the detainee/EPW.

 

Remember your questions should be guided by your unit’s intelligence requirements and as briefed to you but on no count should the person being questioned get a whiff of these requirements or your mission. Everything should be done in an atmosphere of normal conversation.

Example Questions

Questions must be framed in such a manner so as not to elicit vague or misleading answers. They should be direct, pointed but at the same time broad so that the person being questioned does not misinterpret it or has any room for maneuver. For example the following questions were designed for soldiers manning check posts/roadblocks. Modify them to accommodate EPWs/detainees, local population as per your mission, situation and unit requirements.

 

• What is your name (Match this with any identification document found on his person) Cross-check with CI White list, Black list and Grey List)

• Where do you live and full address, where were you going and why, how did you arrive here. From here to your final destination point—what will be the route and why? In what way is it safer or convenient for you? Who will facilitate your journey? That reminds me, who facilitated your journey till here, financially or otherwise? (All these must be specifically answered or obtained)

• What is your present occupation, your specialty-if any and your qualifications (see if he has any technical expertise)?

• What was the type of physical terrain you travelled to get here? During your travel what all obstacles you faced and how did you manage to overcome/circumvent them. While travelling did you observe anything out of ordinary in your surroundings? Or any unusual activity?

• What currency are you carrying and how much? What is the money intended for (if found to be a big sum)?

• Can you name anyone whom you know personally who is averse to Indian security measures/ops here in this area? On being answered immediately follow with ‘’who else’’.Do you know or are you aware of the nature and type of any anti-Indian security operation/any other activity here or anywhere else and dates or time of such activities? Can you tell me the reason for our forces to be here? Do you support our activities?

DO NOT’s

• Ask questions which might reveal your intent or which might make him aware of your units mission, intelligence requirements.

• Jot down answers before him.

• Don’t resorts to quid-pro-quo.They are not permanent sources to be given goods/money in exchange for information and neither are you an intelligence specialist. The same goes for EPWs and detainees.

• Do not resort to coercion. You may be reported to social media. Or the police. Remember we are all governed by Geneva Conventions.

• If you are handling EPWs and detainees escort them to the interrogation center as soon as possible. You are only supposed to ask basic questions to civilians in conversational mode. Yes if situation is fluid, like in battle and yu accost suspicious civilians you may resort to interrogation based tactical questioning, but only to ascertain if they are of interest to HUMINT/CI personnel and carefully examine any captured documents. In such cases escort them quickly to detention centers from where the MP will take them to interrogation centers. • Pay money for information.

• Do not be so cooperative so as to tell them their rights that can be handled later. First the information from them.

 

Reporting

 

For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit intelligence section to factor in all useful tactical information gained during the small units activities in the overall planning of the mission (and also update ISR planning):

Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical value.The soldier may resort to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to arrive at his judgment.•

• Normal reporting

• Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.

• Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.

 

Document Handling

When there are documents on the person of the detainee efforts should be immediately made to:

· Classify them

· Seize , Impound or return them

· Determine if they contain information which can be exploited further by trained intelligence personnel (DOCEX).

Remember that any document, even though it may seem irrelevant on first sight , may on close inspection reveal information of interest , might satisfy intelligence requirements and with other seized documents give a bigger picture of enemy intent.

 

Classification:

Documents can be Personal such as letters, diaries, photographs, flyers posted in cities and towns, etc ,Identity such as identity cards , passport, drivers license , ration cards or Official such as documentation government/military information , for example military books , field manuals, military reports,files,maps etc.

CED (Captured enemy document) is a piece of recorded informnation seized from the captured person belonging to the enemy forces or any civilian in collusion with the latter.We can also name our own military documents CED that were in the possession of the enemy.DOCEX of such documents can rev eal what they know about us , or if anyone was involved on our side in transferring these documents to the enemy then we are alerted to the fact and going by the nature of the document or its origin we can put our CI agents to track him down.CEDs can be found on the person of EPWs/detainees , abandoned military areas , on the bosies of killed enemy personnel , old enemy command posts , destroyed enemy forward tactical headquarters.

A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs can also be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can be found almost anywhere; some locations include abandoned training sites, old enemy command posts, deceased persons, cafes, town squares, or in the possession of EPWs/detainees.Written or typed material, drawings, audio, and/or video recordings, computer disks,etc can constitute the content of a CED.

Once you have critically studied the CED you have to decide on three actions:

· Return them to the owner as they are very personal items and do not contain any military or governmental information

 

· Impound the CED with the intent to return them later as these documents being of personal nature contain information pertaining to the military but which after examination is found not to have any bearing on current situation or having any affiliation with the enemy. Still they will be sent for DOCEX and if the initial assumptions are true , they will be returned.

 

· Confiscate the CED as it contains military or governmental information (all official documents)

 

Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred for DOCEX.

The capture tag should contain the

 

1. Unit details who captured the CED

2. Location of capture : Grid coordinates

3. Time and date of Capture

4. Identity of the person from whom it was captured including brief description (Rank , unit etc)

5. Prevailing circumstances under which the capture was made

6. Description of the CED

 

APPENDIX

TACTICAL HUMINT

HUMINT is collected information which we term positive intelligence after processing.HUMINT collectors access human sources and multimedia to gain information about enemy intent,composition,disposition,capabilities,table of order and equipment, command control nodes, centers of gravity,leadership,personnel—this is also called Order of Battle when conducted prior to a combat situation. The Commander specifies his intelligence requirements explicitly and going by these requirements , prioritized , human sources,informants,and other human elements possessing information compatible with the said requirements are utilized by application of specific techniques like tactical questioning,debriefing,document exploitation, eliciting and interrogation and reconnaissance and surveillance. The HUMINT collectors are not intelligence operatives with general intelligence education and training but specialists. 

Counterintelligence is also a collection oriented discipline like HUMINT but not an intelligence discipline in the strictest sense. It is concerned with enemy intent while HUMINT is concerned with collection part only so as to satisfy Commanders intelligence requirements in order to answer certain information gaps.CI attempts to prevent sabotage,assassination,terrorism,subversive and enemy intelligence activities , deny the enemy access to installations and sensitive information , acts as a protective shield for the Commander by supporting OPSEC and force protection and acts in an advisory capacity recommending countermeasures to enemy intelligence activities.CI is a protection component in the Commanders repository of defensive tactics and techniques and CI also protects the intelligence cycle. Several definitions exclude personnel, physical, document or communications security programs from CI purview , but on close inspection it will be seen that CI invariably is resorted to while implementing force protection and denial/deception measures (information warfare) thus bringing in play the security aspects of personnel , physical,documents.CI support tio physical security , infrastructure, technology protection, military security,HUMINT –all these some way or the other involve those elements that are kept out of general definitions.

Definitions can be very confusing, may render doctrine imperfect and lead to redundancy. For example the Army ten ds to maintain a general perspective on threat—statements like our forces are prepared to deter /attack/defend against a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from criminal activity in our jurisdiction which may abet our main enemy, terrorism , subversion to small wars, wars and battles. Now this generalized concept is fine in that we can have several security programs, each tending to one specific threat type in the entire spectrum. But the disadvantage in this approach is we cannot focus on the main threat, say terrorism, and as security concepts like force protection, deception operations, physical security, military security,etc all have certain elements in common we land up with redundant programs designed to handle these security concerns. For example antiterrorism and force protection both have in common physical security as a passive defensive subcomponent where the installation critical points are protected after vulnerability assessments and red teaming. The same subcomponent is the major component in a physical security program. Thus there occurs good redundancy if we do not have a focused view of the threat and counter threat measures become diffused over the broad spectrum.

 

The same goes with the definition of intelligence and CI. Or rather I should say the general p[perspectives held by most Commanders and even intelligence officers.

 

The main idea is to remove uncertainty and gain a decision advantage. This should be the prime objective of the Commander.HUMINT and CI are both shaping operations but with a critical difference.HUMINT shapes the Commanders view of the battle space by providing him accurate intelligence about enemy order of battle. Plus other information requirements when ops are in progress.CI on the other hand penetrates the enemy commanders decision cycle and shapes his views ‘’like the way’’ our Commander desires by denying the enemy commander access to our operations, plans and information systems , and using offensive methods like penetration , infiltration and also denial/deception operations. Both shaping operations have one thing in common as goal. To act as force enabler. To heighten the Commanders situational understanding. In other words to gain that ‘’decisive ‘’ advantage. .To get a ‘’positional’’ advantage. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces.

HUMINT shapes the understanding of the ‘’Blue forces’’ with respect to the ‘’Red forces’’ while CI does the reverse. True both use several techniques which are in common like interrogation and other low level source operations but going by what has been discussed CI is not HUMINT and not in the least a subset of HUMINT. Being a subset would mean CI operations would be counter-HUMINT only. But CI looks beyond that, by conducting offensive operations, denial and deception operations , exploiting enemy intelligence activities ,neutralizing them through collection of evidence and subsequent prosecution for national security crimes, and supporting tactical and theater operations by feeding inputs to the decision cycles. Thus we see CI goes far beyond Counter-HUMINT operations.

Interrelationship

CI also provides positive intelligence about the enemy as a byproduct of its operations.CI and HUMINT operations overlap in that very similar techniques are often used. In fact in tactical operations a mix of HUMINT and CI operators plus a linguist carry out tactical HUMINT operations where the roles of both are more overlapping and confusion arises when either may operate like the other. We should not always justify HUMINT source operations..this leads to the mistaken impression that CI only lends support to HUMINT and has no other function and that HUNMINT and CI are the same thing.NO.Whereas HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s organization,composition,capabilities and decision making without any focus on the intent of collection , only collecting all require information laid down in the commanders prioritized intelligence requirements order , and reporting it through proper channels (and here full stop) CI will go much further , exploiting , neutralizing the enemy intelligence activities or doing both…CI is concerned with enemy ‘’INTENT’’.HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s decision making cycle to gain information for the Commander whereas CI attempts to ‘’INFLUENCE’’ that decision cycle and shape it the way we want it in order to achieve winning objectives. Thus the HUMINT operative tasking end after detecting and identifying enemy intelligence activities while the CI agents tasks begin afresh.

From all this discussion we can derive two things:

 

1. HUMINT and CI are different.CI is not a subset of HUMINT.

 

2.As HUMINT and CI have many similar lines of operation , if both can be combined to satisfy tactical requirements ,(during theater or national-level requirements they can revert to individual role-this capability must be retained) , we will have an intelligence operator who will be more versatile,adaptable.and can confirm easily to all army requirements at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence formations can execute this tactical HUMINT asset (the operator) to satisfy commanders requirements. Merging the capabilities of HUMINT and CI results in a task organization of skills for the Commander—definitely an improvement over either HUMINT or CI enabled operations. Tactical HUMINT operations are most suitable for developing and maintaining an excellent informant/source base that provides timely, specific and accurate information. Tactical HUMINT operations combine both HUMINT and CI techniques and together with linguist assistance , are more capable of developing and maintaining contacts than only HUMINT or CI ops.For example , the Tactical HUMINT team comes across few individuals of interest near the forward area , the HUMINT operators conduct tactical questioning to extract information of intelligence value and then pass them over to their CI colleagues for further interrogation if they discern any information of interest to the CI operators. This can be switched to and fro and the application of the combined faculties of both results in more refined, relevant and timely/accurate information. If the individuals are of the witting type or have voluntarily offered to deliver information or are community members sympathetic to the forces, then they can be inducted into the source repository by establishing rapport/giving incentives etc and then later their assistance taken for more information. Tactical HUMINT teams can act as mobile interrogation teams at forward areas, quickly disposing off sources after tactical questioning and interrogations, thereafter detailing escort for those who may render more information or who, it appears are suppressing tactical information, sending them to detention centers and collocated interrogation areas near forward areas or in the rear. The standard procedure of detaining and escorting to rear interrogation areas is hereby bypassed as in this procedure , the time taken to assess , detain , segregate , and transport to rear areas can negate the availability of timely intelligence—intelligence is highly perishable ,. Especially combat intelligence, where time is of essence.

Hence as the repository of sources grows, the quality and content of available information is enhanced and for the commander tactical intelligence, most of the time, is at his fingertips. Compare this to the situation where earlier, HUMINT or CI operations had to be complemented by intelligence from theater or national agencies, and it so happens they cannot provide real time, ground intelligence always for combatant commanders.

The soldiers will be given language training, Basic CI training, operational debriefing training so that as and when required they can shift from tactical to operational briefing to CI functions. The focus of training should be cultivating the capability to conduct contact and informant operations, recognize information of CI value, and execute tactical questioning of civilians, and screen EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter.

 

Tactical HUMINT team functions:

1. Tactical tasks with Language training

2. HUMINT Ops=Strategic Debriefing

3. CI

Here it should be stressed that intelligence nowadays is tactical—the focus should be at tactical level as soldiers fight wars nowadays more than battles. Small-wars in fact. Hence the dire need for actionable intelligence/tactical intelligence. Here the players are combatant commanders who must move swiftly in their maneuver and strike decisively. Higher echelons are there for planning, average intelligence support, but it is for the ground based Tactical HUMINT teams to do most of the work. And they do it—as their composition is quite what the modern day warfare demands.

 

CI/HUMINT

 

Counterintelligence functional services are provided to promote the Commanders situational understanding.

 

· Define and analyse mission

· Execute CI Surveys

· Prepasre a brief on CI Awareness

· Execute CI Vulnerability Assessment

· Execute CI Threat assessment

· Execute CI Inspections

· Execute CI Reviews

· Execute CI Evaluations

 

Conduct CI support to HUMINT activities

 

Identify, exploit and counteract foreign intelligence activities across the full spectrum of HUMINT activities. CI activities include, but are not limited to, identifying friendly and hostile capabilities and vulnerabilities; providing CI review of HUMINT activities; conducting CIdamage assessments; providing support to Counter Espionage (CE) investigations; conducting and/or assisting in asset validation by physical and technical means.

Perform CI/HUMINT operational planning.

 

1. Supervise the preparation of CI products, as required.

2. Obtain necessary approvals.

3. Supervise CI support to HUMINT operation.

4. Supervise asset validation procedures.

5. Conduct post-mission analysis.

6. Disseminate required reports/products.

 

CI/HUMINT Collection management

 

The CI/HUMINT officer/JCO will match the requirements with the collection assets in hand , checks availability , usage by other adjacent units , deployable possibilities etc and then determines the best collection plan.

 

· Receive prioritized intelligence requirements from higher headquarters or collection manager , conduct analysis

· Create the collection plan

· Study all CI/HUMINTcollection assets available and match them with the requirements

· Decide on the course of action to fulfill collection objectives

 

Docex

 

The CI/HUMINT officer/Jco must be acquainted with the exploitation setup and the units exploitation SOP so that he may, after receiving, accounting and sending the captured materials he may be able to follow-up for results and give future feed inputs to the exploitation cell/agency.

· Understand exploitation agency infrastructure

· Identify exploitable materials

· Categorize them as Biometric Examination or Forensic Examination.

· Take possession of exploitable materials

· Account for and categorize exploitable materials

· Prepare catalogues

· Dispatch the materials to exploitation agencys custody

· Followup with the agencies for results

·  

Identify orders of battle in given Area of operations

 

Identify Ground military attack and defense capability, Air-defense and attack capability, naval capability and all associated military weaponry systems and equipment, such as ground combat systems, antiaircraft systems, naval vessels, etc.Study the enemy infrastructure and locate/identify the keys areas.

 

Intelligence support to Targeting.

This includes identifying enemy targets , both high value and high payoff , nominating in order of priority , recommending kinetic or non kinetic attacks, and thus assist the Commander to destroy, neutralize or exploit the target in a manner which is in line with the units mission and in keeping with the Commander and his staffs requirements.

The Unit intelligence supervisor who controls the target intelligence collection and associated ops/recommendations to the Commander must be as thorough as possible, evaluating all factors and intelligence inputs carefully, studying imagery data and compiling and organizing target information efficiently so that while nominating to the Commander and making recommendations there is absolutely no ambiguity. Target descriptions including composition, location, importance, imagery, graphics, construction—all of these are spelled out correctly and particularly for HVTs/HPTs their location, significance, all associations determined and influence with respect to the leaderships decision cycle/battle space situation.

Identify:

· Targeting Categories

· HVTs/HPTs

· Areas of Target value

· Build a list of targets

· Locational factors of each target

· Associations of each target(COIN)

· Social circles of each target (COIN)

· Assess target significance/value

· Determine whether to employ kinetic or non kinetic attack

· Contribute to attack guidance

· Assess effect of removal of targets on battle space

· Create and maintain target folders

· Decide on target intelligence requirements

· Create target nomination list

· Combat assessment

· Update target folder based on combat assessments.

· Contribute to IO

· decide on restrike options

·  

Evaluate the Threat

Determine threat intent, capabilities, vulnerabilities, possible courses of action and the most dangerous course of action.

It is of prime importance to study enemy activity and indicators to assess his capability to attack, defend, withdraw, reinforce. Focus on the intelligence gaps and this focus can determine the direction of collection of intelligence. Enemy activity patterns should be studied.

Factors influencing the intelligence product are the time available for collection, assets available, unit size, the intelligence requirements, AO features and the mission. The enemy, terrain, weather, local populace are taken into consideration. Identify:

· Enemy Intent

· Enemy Capability

· HVT

· HPT

· C.G.

· Critical areas: Capabilities,Requirements

 

 

 _______________________________________________________________

 

 FP

 

COUNTERINSURGENCY BASES

COIN forces must have a base from which to operate and also project. Bases are secure areas

from which the COIN objective is to isolate the insurgents from the support facilities and protect

the local populace/communities. The base must be carefully selected, reinforced and rendered

fully defendable. Command relationships should be clearly defined. Bases can be of 3 types:

Forward operating bases, Combat outposts, and Patrol bases. The nature of the mission and size

of the unit (Company etc) determines the size and location of the base.

FORWARD OPERATING BASES

Sometimes the nature of operations, the terrain, the size of the AO as well as the size of the units

necessitate a separate forward placed operating base for the Battalion which itself commands

controls, communicates and supports deployed units. It provides intelligence support, sustainment,

replenishment and personnel support as well as functions also as staging area. Each area of

operation may have one forward base. A forward operating base acts as a secure location for the

planners and command staff so as to plan operations, provides security to the local populace and

acts as a deterrent for the insurgents nearby by hampering their mobility and subjecting them to an

increased threat. We can have both Brigade FOBs and Battalion Fobs. In the case of Bde FOBs

they act as rear areas for Bn Companies which are forwardly deployed. FOBs should maintain

either secured road/water or air sustainment capability.

COMBAT OUTPOSTS

Observation posts are reinforced with fire power and combat teams and hence take the shape of a

combat outpost. They are positioned at strategic points inside insurgent-dominated areas , are

company or platoon sized, possess the ability to conduct combat operations on a limited scale and

are in contact with base headquarters as well as horizontally with other combat outposts , in effect

networking both horizontally and vertically so as to:

Cut of insurgent logistical lines

Provide security to the local populace in the immediate neighborhood of the COP

Maintain direct contact with the local populace and hence keep an eye on the activities / strangers

These are not possible from remote bases operating from outside insurgent dominated areas. The

negative factors in this type of arrangement are increased risk to the soldiers and limited area of

operations , nevertheless proper networking among the combat outposts helps greatly in keeping

a grip on the insurgency and the kill ratio as well as protecting the populace. It is very important to

plan the position of the outpost, the emplacement, complete with secure logistical lines,

communication systems and reinforcement capability. Each COP is assigned a sector of the AO.

Outposts may be employed—

• To secure key lines of communication or infrastructure.

• To secure and co-opt the local populace.

• To gather intelligence.

• To assist the government in restoring essential services.

• To force insurgents to operate elsewhere.

Priorities of Work

Certain factors need to be considered while establishing combat outposts.

 The selected area must be free of noncombatants , civilians and the like.

 To hinder the enemy’s movement , obstacles to his entry to streets , underground

passages,marked areas in rough/jungle terrain should be emplaced.

 Carefully choose positions to set up weapons to cover likely avenues of approach.

 Clearing fields of fire

 Cover and camnouflage.

 Obstacles/barriers may be integrated with weapons so as to be auto-triggered.

 There should be easy access between positions and the routes must not hinder

speed.

PATROL BASES

Patrol bases are secured areas which serve as long period halting points for patrols. They may be

permanent or temporary.

1. Sometimes it is important for patrols to remain hidden or halt all operations as

information is received that they are liable to be detected.

2. Again detailed study of an area requires long periods of reconnaissance so they

need a place to hide,and then later launch recce ops.

3. After long periods of recce operations,the troops get exhausted and hence retire to a

patrol base for food,sleep or rest,weapons/equipment maintenance

4. After detailed reconnaissance the patrol commander needs to sit down with his

senior NCOs and devise future course of action.

5. In cases when the patrol is in enemy area after infiltrating the area,in small groups ,

they set up temporary patrol bases where they can later meet and regroup and make

further plans.

6. Finally a patrol base is a good launching pad for consecutive or concurrent

operations such as

7. raids,reconnaissance,surveillance and ambush.

 

Purposes

In counterinsurgency operations, collocating patrol bases in population centers enables

combined forces—

• To deny the insurgent access to the local population.

• To influence and assist the local government.

• To provide security.

 

Methods of Establishment

The same priorities of work described for combat outposts apply also to patrol bases:

• Move in with the indigenous population. The advantages are that Soldiers

will have more direct contact with the local administration, the locals will identify the

forces with the government.

The disadvantages insurgent sympathizers from among the masses may inform insurgents about

patrol movements with relative ease, attacks on the base will have collateral damage effects, and

houses cannot be really hardened against attacks..

• Build a new patrol base. Although more isolated from the population, new patrol bases are

usually on chosen ground and, therefore, easier to defend. Additionally, they are far more

resource and personnel intensive during construction. It is generally advisable to set aside

detailed planning time before sending a combined force to occupy the terrain.

 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BASE DEFENSE

TERRAIN

Key terrain factors to consider include the following:

 The terrains may add to defense by virtue of its natural characteristics.Hence

conduct a thorough study of the terrain.To enhance its natural defensive characteristics

more utilize artificial obstacles/barriers.

 The patrol bases must have all access routes to it , by road or waterways , under

control.The same applies for all lines of supply and communication and civilian access.

The best technique for base defense is the perimeter defense.

RSTA AND ISR OPERATIONS

Intelligence drives operations and vice versa. In effect the enemy situation drives operations. For

the enemy situation to drive operations we must have perfect intelligence about the enemy. To this

end Reconnaissance , Surveillance and Target Acquisition should work hand in hand with ISR SO

AS TO ACHIEVE PERFECT SYNCHRONIZATION in the deployment and operation of sensors,

assets and processing, exploitation and dissemination of intelligence.RSTA/ISR should focus on

the priority intelligence requirements.Recconnaisance and Surveillance confirm or deny threat

actrivities,plans,courses of action which were gauged by the Commander and his staff during

planning , war gaming and sessions with the collection manager and counterintelligence

specialists.By focusing RSTA/ISR on the commanders needs, his critical and priority intelligence

requirements we can deploy and use RSTA/ISR sensors and assets in the most optimum fashion ,

totally integrated and synchronized resulting in timely and accurate information, combat

information and intelligence to be disseminated to the targeting platforms.

Every operation is initiated as per plan and this planning has certain decision points.RSTA/ISR

should take these critical decision points in perspective , primary perspective and focus all

collection platforms and assets on these points and see to it that al information linked to these

decision points are gathered , nothing left out and disseminated in time to the commander. Again

for this synchronization is essential. Targeting requires proper detection of the target and

evaluation of its importance. Further there should be sufficient reason to nominate the target to the

attack platforms. To this end synchronized RSTA/ISR operations collect all possible information

about the target and pass it on for evaluation and thereafter if the target satisfies the criteria for

nomination the intelligence on the target is passed on to the targeting platform. After an attack on

the target, kinetic/nonkinetic attack or exploitation operations, RSTA/ISR is required to assess the

effectiveness of the attack.

DETECT

HPTs need to be detected and located accurately in order to engage them and here is where all

assets available to the Commander must be used to maximum efficiency.HPTs are critical nodes in

the insurgent network.Engaging and destroying them successfully can render the mission of the

insurgent group unsuccessful.

The priority intelligence requirements associated with the HPT should be carefully defined and

resources allocated accordingly to get intelligence on the target. As time goes on and collection

assets bring in information in line with the priority intelligence requirements the situation

development for the commanders needs is more accurate and continuously updated. Detect the

HPT involves tracking him as movement is a factor. Detecting involves assets like HUMINT

source,

an anonymous tip, UAS, a combat patrol, SIGINT, DOMEX, rotary wing aircraft, military working

dog teams. The best means of detecting a target during an insurgency is HUMINT, such, the

detect activity requires a detailed understanding of social networks insurgent networks, insurgent

actions, and the community’s attitude toward the counterinsurgent forces. For a target that must be

engaged by nonlethal means, the detect function may require patrols to conduct reconnaissance

of a leader’s home to determine if they are there, an assessment of a potential project, or

attendance at a greeting to meet with a leader.