Full text of "FM 19-10 Military Police Law and Order Operations"

See other formats

FM 19-10 



MILITARY POLICE 



MILITARY POLICE 



LAW AND ORDER 



Operations 



SEPTEMBER 1987 



APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 



30 September 1987 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 



PART ONE THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 5 

CHAPTER 1 . THE PROVOST MARSHAL'S LAW AND ORDER PURVIEW 7 

Implementing MP Operations 9 

Organizing the PM Office 9 

2. EXTENDING MP SUPPORT 17 

Augmenting Resources on the Battlefield 17 

Enhancing Support on the Installation 18 

3. RESOURCING MP OPERATIONS 28 

Understanding the Command Budget Process 28 

Developing the Installation Command Operating Budget 34 

4. MANAGING MILITARY POLICE INFORMATION 35 

Understanding the Criminal Intelligence Cycle 36 

Collecting and Releasing Information 37 

Using Military Police Management Information Systems 39 

Developing and Using MP Information Files 40 

Using Other Information Sources 42 

PART TWO LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 44 

CHAPTER 5. HAVING AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION 45 

Exercising Authority and Jurisdiction 45 

Protecting Legal Rights 49 

6. UNDERTAKING PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 55 

Crime Prevention 55 

Absentee/Deserter Program 70 

Wildlife Law Enforcement Program 70 

MP Customs Information Services 70 

Disaster Relief and Area Damage Control 72 

7. PLANNING ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 73 

Collecting, Compiling, and Using Selective Enforcement Data 74 

Acquiring Data from MP Reports and Forms 77 

Preparing MP Reports 78 

8. OPERATING PATROLS 83 

Community Protection and Assistance 83 

Patrol Methods and Means •. 84 

Patrol Distribution 86 

Patrol Shift Design 92 

9. CONDUCTING SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 93 

Determining Scope of an Authorized Search 93 

Determining Articles Subject to Search and Seizure 96 

Conducting Entry and Search to Protect Persons or Property 97 

Conducting an Identification Search 97 



FM 19-10 

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 



Page 

Conducting an Automobile Search 98 

Conducting an Area Search 99 

Conducting a Consent Search 1 00 

Conducting a Search of Abandoned Property 100 

Conducting a Trash and Garbage Container Search 100 

Conducting a Search of Premises Without Right to Privacy 100 

Conducting a Fire Search 101 

Maintaining Status Quo or Freezing the Situation 101 

Conducting a Body Cavity Search 101 

Seizing Body Fluids 101 

Conducting a Frisk 101 

Conducting Inventories 102 

Conducting Inspections 102 

Conducting Raids 103 

10. CONDUCTING APPREHENSIONS 108 

Authority to Apprehend 1 08 

Apprehension of Juveniles 1 09 

M ea ns of Apprehension 1 09 

Execution of an Authorization to Apprehend 111 

Search in Relation to an Apprehension 112 

11. EMPLOYING MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAMS 114 

Patrol Dog Teams 114 

N arcotics Detector Dog Teams 116 

Explosives Detector Dog Teams 117 

12. ENFORCING CUSTOMS LAWS AND REGULATIONS 119 

Military Customs Inspectors 1 20 

Customs Operations Procedures 121 

PART THREE INVESTIGATIONS 124 

CHAPTER 13. LAW AND ORDER INVESTIGATIONS 126 

Investigating Domestic Disturbances 126 

Investigating Drug and Controlled Substance Abuse 129 

Investigating Possible Rape Offenses 129 

Investigating Possible Child Abuse and Neglect 131 

Investigating Suicide Threats and Attempts 137 

Investigating Reports of Abnormal Behavior 1 38 

Investigating Customs Violations 139 

14. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 141 

Determining Purview 141 

Conducting Criminal Investigations 142 

Preserving the Custody of Evidence 1 44 

Disposing of Evidence 1 45 

Supervising M ilitary Police Investigators 148 

15. INVESTIGATIVE MEANS AND MEASURES 151 

Gathering Criminal Intelligence 151 

Using and Providing Criminal Intelligence . .153 

Conducting Interviews and Interrogations 1 53 

Performing Surveillance and Covert Operations 156 



FM 19-10 



Page 



PART FOUR CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 159 

CHAPTER 16. FIELD CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 160 

Operating Field Detention Facilities 160 

Operating Field Confinement Facilities 1 61 

Expediting Disposition 1 62 

17. INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT AND US ARMY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 164 

Installation Confinement Facilities 164 

US Army Confinement and Correctional Facilities 166 

PART FIVE TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 1 67 

CHAPTER 18. PLANNING TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 168 

Antiterrorism 1 68 

Counterterrorism 171 

19. PROTECTIVE SERVICES 1 74 

US Army Protective Services 174 

Protective Services Details 1 75 

Protective Services Principles : 1 78 

Protective Services Defense Fundamentals 179 

Protective Services Operations 1 80 

Protective Services Detail Responsibilities 1 84 

Protection on Foot 1 88 

Protection On-Site 1 89 

Protection During Travel t 1 89 

20. BOMB THREATS 1 90 

Telephone Bomb Threats 1 90 

Mail Bombs 192 

Suspicious Items 1 93 

Personnel to Notify 1 93 

Emergency Operations Center 1 93 

After-Action Procedures 1 97 

21 . SPECIAL REACTION TEAM 198 

Emergency Operations Center 1 99 

Equipment 201 

APPENDIX A MP STATION DESIGN 207 

B MILITARY POLICE FIREARMS QUALIFICATION 211 

C PRESENTING STATISTICAL DATA 215 

D EXTRACT OF A LOCAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAIL EQUIPMENT LIST 219 

GLOSSARY 221 

REFERENCES 225 

INDEX 230 



FM 19-10 



Field Manual 
No. 19-10 



*FM 19-10 

HEADQUARTERS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Washington, DC, 30 September 1987 



MILITARY POLICE LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^— Preface 

One of the most important missions the Army has is to maintain its 
readiness. Unit readiness rests on the morale, discipline, and training of its 
soldiers. It rests equally on having quality soldiers and their families feel 
good about life in the Army community. Our soldiers and their families must 
nave a safe and secure environment in which to live, work, and train. The 
military police (MP) accept that challenge daily. 

MP protect the Army's assets through active physical security measures. 
And MP undertake a vigorous economic crime program. They guard the 
Army's people and installations against terrorist threats. Their initiatives 
in crime prevention and family advocacy and their "work friendly" attitude 
show they care about soldiers and their families. MP unstintingly fulfill 
their law and order mission, knowing it to be vital to the Army's success in 
combat. 

This field manual (FM) discusses each element of the MP law and order 
mission. It addresses law enforcement operations, investigations, 
confinement of US military prisoners, and terrorism counteraction. This 
FM will assist MP in understanding how each of these elements is an 
essential part of their law and order mission. Commanders will find it useful 
in understanding how MP help support the fulfillment of command 
responsibilities. 

Because many aspects of the MP law and order mission are undertaken 
largely to provide a safe environment for the total Army community, much 
of the discussion in this FM is devoted to MP law and order responsibilities 
in a peacetime environment. 

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters, US Army Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Submit changes for improving this 
publication on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended 
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commandant, 
US Army Military Police School, ATTN: ATZN-MP-DML, Fort McClellan, 
Alabama 36205-5030. 

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used both men 
and women are included. 

*This publication supersedes FM 19-10, 30 September 1976. 



PART ONE 
THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



The MP Corps provides the Army a wide 
range of diverse support. On the battlefield 
MP provide commanders combat, combat 
support, and combat service support. Both 
"an Arm and a Service/' the MP Corps plays 
an important role in battle. But MP also play 
an important role in supporting commanders 
beyond the successful resolution of battle. 
Through their law and order mission MP 
continue their active support of Army 
commanders by ensuring the existence of the 
lawful and orderly environment units need to 
maintain combat readiness. MP performing 
law and order operations extend the 
commander's command and control. They 
aid commanders in obtaining and 
maintaining combat proficiency. They 
prevent diversion of military resources. They 
suppress the chance for criminal behavior; 
they protect and assist the military 
community. And they help commanders 
ensure US forces are disciplined troops of 
high morale. 

In a theater of operations MP conduct law 
and order operations only when the combat 
commander requires it and when battle 
intensity permits. During intense continuous 
combat, like that expected near a main battle 
area or in a developing theater of operations, 
MP are most needed to expedite and conserve 
vital resources for combat forces. In intense 
combat the commander's priority of need is 
most often for MP combat and combat 
support operations. MP are employed more 
often for battlefield circulation control (BCC), 
area security, and enemy prisoner of war 
(EPW) operations and less often for law and 
order operations. But a commander's need for 
law and order operations depends on the 
tactical situation. And it depends on the level 
of command involved and the location of the 
command on the battlefield. 



In a peacetime environment MP conduct 
extensive law and order operations. These 
operations support commanders' order and 
discipline in the field and on installations 
around the world. The performance of these 
operations impacts even beyond the 
maintenance of law and order. Many 
peacetime law and order operations and 
subelements embody basic methods, 
measures, and techniques MP use to carry out 
their BCC and area security missions. For 
example, operating a traffic control post 
(TCP) is a measure basic to the MP missions 
of BCC and area security. Operating TCPs is 
also basic to the MP law and order mission. 
MP conducting law and order operations in a 
peacetime environment are consistently 
exercising battlefield skills. 

In peacetime as well as in combat MP 
provide commanders with a well-armed, 
communications-intensive, and highly 
mobile asset. While combat ready, the MPs' 
professional orientation ensures their ability 
to operate with restraint and authority, 
within probable cause, and with a minimum 
use of force. This makes MP ideally suited as 
a response force in civil confrontations or 
disorders, in terrorist counteractions, and in 
low-intensity conflicts in a noncombat area. 

Away from conflict, wherever US forces are 
located, the MP Corps is the protector and 
assistor of the military community. MP 
efforts are directed to ensuring a lawful and 
orderly environment. MP nelp ensure 
commanders have troops, equipment, and 
supplies when and where they need them to 
maintain readiness. By their efforts to 
preserve the law, MP help the commander 
ensure a high standard of order and 
discipline within the commander's units. By 
their efforts to assist and protect the military 
community, MP help ensure a hieh level of 
well-being among the commander s troops. 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION- 



MP provide commanders with the support 
they need wherever and whenever it is 
needed. In peace and war MP help 
commanders ensure a lawful and orderly 
military environment. MP enforce laws. Mr 
investigate disorders and suspected crimes. 



MP confine US military prisoners. MP take 
counteractions against terrorism. And 
always, MP are prepared to quickly expand 
their law and order operations into their 
full-scale battlefield range of combat, combat 
support, and combat service support operations. 




Military police help the commander get his people, supplies, and equipment where he needs them 
when he needs them.TVIP help relieve the commander's burden of providing security and protection for 
critical persons, facilities, and equipment. MP are the initial response force to criminal and enemy 
attempts to demoralize, terrorize, or sabotage the military community or its operation. MP relieve 

commanders of the responsibility for detaining and safeguarding prisoners and MP reduce 
opportunities for crime. Only the magnitude and purpose inherent in each operation changes from 
peace to war. 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 1 
The Provost Marshal's Law and Order Purview 



The provost marshal (PM) for each 

command is that command's advisor on MP 
combat, combat support, and combat service 
support operations. 

In a theater of operations and in tactical 
units the senior Mr officer at each echelon is 
the commander's advisor for MP operations. 
He is a member of the command s special 
staff. For example, the theater army PM is 
the theater's senior MP. He is responsible for 
staff supervision of MP matters at theater 
army level. In theater army area commands 
(TAACOMs) and corps, the MP brigade 
commanders are their commands' PM. As 
PMs they serve on their commanders' special 
staff as planners for MP operations. At 
division level the senior MP officer is the 
division PM. 

On military installations outside a theater 
of operations the installation PM is the 
installation commander's advisor for MP law 
and order operations. As the chief law 
enforcement officer on the installation the 
PM provides the installation commander 
with professional and technical advice 
concerning law and order objectives, policies, 
and directives. 

The installation PM— 

• Advises the commander and staff about 
MP abilities. 

• Prepares plans and policies. 

• Directs and reviews MP operations. 

• Maintains liaison with United States 
Army Criminal Investigation Command 
(USACIDC) support elements. 

• Assists and supervises interaction of 

supporting and supported units. 

• Coordinates with civilian law enforcement 
agencies, allied forces, and host nation 
(HN) military and civil police. 



CONTENTS 


Page 

9 

9 


IMPLEMENTING MP OPERATIONS 




ORGANIZING THE PM OFFICE . . 




Military Police Company 




9 

10 

12 

12 


Operations Section 


Administrative Section| . . 


Physical Secruit 
Prevention Sectic 


y/ Crime 
>n 








13 

14 


Absentee/Deserter 
Apprehension Section 






| Juvenile Section 








15 

15 




Installation Confinement Facility 


Military Police Investigation 
Section 










Patrol Sectionl 




Game Warden 


16 




Traffic Section 


16 




Military Working Dog Section . 


16 




Special Reaction Team . 













• Provides staff supervision for the 
installation confinement facility. 

If an Office of Command Provost Marshal 
is established, the command PM would, in 
addition to the above, be responsible for 
command and control of operations to 
include administration, logistics, training, 
and administering of military justice for all 
assigned and attached MP units in the 
command. 

On installations the commander 
determines the degree of law and order 
needed to support order and discipline. The 
PM advises the commander on the means 
and methods needed to achieve the 
commander's needs. The PM implements the 
commander's law and order policies and 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



plans. The PM ensures MP plans and 

operations supporting the commander's plan 
are carried out. The r M recommends when 
and where to concentrate the command's MP 
assets. The PM supervises MP support on the 
installation or within the command's area of 
operation. The PM coordinates matters of MP 
concern on a daily basis. 

The PM keeps the commander advised on 
MP operations. The PM ensures that MP 
provide protection and assistance to the 
military community. The PM ensures MP 
enforce laws with objectivity. And the PM 
sets the example in community relations that 
reflect and enhance the MP image. 

The PM establishes command and control 
procedures to effectively manage MP 
resources and provide law enforcement when 
and where needed. The PM's management 
and contingency planning are the key 
elements to ensuring effective law and order 
operations. 

Planning MP support is a continuous 
process at every echelon. In the absence of 
specific directions or orders, the PM plans the 
use of MP assets. The PM evaluates current 
operations and projects future courses of 
action. The PM bases his plans on 
assumptions consistent with sound judgment 
and a thorough knowledge of the situation 
and mission. 

The PM ensures MP planning is practical 
and flexible. The PM ensures that plans are 
coordinated with staff sections and 
subordinate commands. And the PM ensures 
plans reflect manpower and resources needed 
by MP. (This includes needs for command 
and control, fire support, equipment, and 
supplies. It also includes construction, 
communication, transportation, and 
aviation support.) As new information is 
received, the PM reviews, updates, and 
modifies plans. The PM ensures that the 
commanders get the MP support they need. 

The PM ensures that MP show mutual 
respect and maintain a professional, working 
relationship when working with local 



civilian police. Civilian police are normally 
led and directed by persons with many years 
of experience in dealing with people and law 
enforcement. In coordination with the local 
civilian police executive, the PM establishes 
policies to guide MP when dealing with 
civilian police. For example, sometimes direct 
telephone lines for liaison are established 
between an MP station and a civil police 
station. Arrangements may be made for the 
use of the civil police radios and their 
telephone call box facilities. But use 
ordinarily is limited to emergencies or special 
situations, and care is taken not to overload 
the civil police networks. (Requests for this 
type of service are coordinated with the local 
communications-electronics officer or civil 
affairs officer.) MP must be familiar with the 
civilian police department's manual of 
procedures. 

When MP are assigned to work directly 
with foreign national police, their actions are 
governed hy the prevailing status of forces 
agreements. The PM ensures that MP 
maintain a professional attitude and that 
they are not critical of how other nations do 
things. 

Large installations may have a deputy 
provost marshal (DPM). The DPM may aid 
the PM by supervising general MP activities 
and services. The DPM may manage 
physical security, crime prevention, and 
investigations for the PM office. Often a DPM 
makes work assignments and reviews work 
for compliance with policies, standards, and 
regulations. The DPM may review and 
improve work methods, organizational 
structure, and position assignment to achieve 
optimum efficiency. The DPM may manage 
the civilians assigned to the PM office. The 
DPM can assist subordinate supervisors in 
meeting civilian personnel requirements. 
The DPM can ensure issues like merit promo- 
tion, performance appraisals, equal employ- 
ment opportunity, career development, and 
labor-management relations are addressed. 
The DPM often writes job descriptions, 
counsels civilians, and communicates with 



8 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



the civilian personnel office to obtain further 

fuidance on managing civilian personnel, 
he DPM may also manage civil law 



enforcement operations, commercial 
activities programs, and reserve component 
support for the PM office. 



IMPLEMENTING MP OPERATIONS 



The primary focus of MP law and order 
operations on a military installation is the 
MP station. MP station personnel implement 
the PM's plans and operations. 

MP stations are the center of activity for all 
MP functions, especially law enforcement. A 
station should be located as near as possible 
to a point that provides effective direction 
and centralized control of all MP operational 
elements. Wherever possible, existing 
facilities are used for the MP station. But 
consideration is given to the mission, 
available transportation route, communica- 
tions facilities, and proximity to troops or 
facilities. Commanders may establish MP 
stations in any area where the incident rate 
or offense experience indicates a need for a 
permanent Mr presence. 

The MP station operates 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week to provide law enforcement 
assistance and information whenever 
needed. The general public invariably turns 
to the MP for assistance and information. 
When dealing with the public, MP must be 
able to provide the correct information 
needed. And they must be courteous when 
providing assistance and information. MP 
posts and patrols often have available maps 
of the post or city to provide the public. MP 



must know where hospitals, fire 
departments, and neighboring police 
agencies are located. MP are careful not to 
provide restricted police information or 
classified military information to 
unauthorized persons. But when information 
or assistance by the public is requested, MP 
determine exactly what is wanted. Then they 
give a clear and concise answer. If MP do not 
have an answer, every effort is made to 
obtain the answer. Or the person is referred to 
an appropriate agency to obtain assistance. 
The PM provides information to information 
centers. This information is similar to that 
available from the MP station. Information 
centers may be located in transportation 
centers, centers of troop concentrations, main 
traffic routes, or gates of military 
installations. 

The MP station may also operate any 
number of substations depending on 
distance, volume of activity, or mission 
requirements. MP functions center around 
patrol operations, traffic control, 
absentee /deserter return to military control, 
apprehension/detention of offenders, and 
control and accountability of evidence. (See 
Appendix A for more information on MP 
stations.) 



ORGANIZING THE PM OFFICE 



In a theater of operations PM functions 
are under a table of organization and 
equipment (TOE) (IAW AR 310-31). On 
installations PM functions are organized 
under a table of distribution and allowances 
(TDA) (IAW AR 5-3). A TDA may contain 
civilian and military positions, whereas a 
TOE contains only military positions. And a 
TDA organization can be tailored to suit the 
needs of a particular MP organization. A 
TDA organization can be used outside the 



continental US (OCONUS) as well as in the 
continental US. 

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY 

The MP company provides command 
management, administrative support, and 
logistics for assigned military personnel. The 
MP company provides discipline, house - 
keeping, welfare activities, and food services. It 
also provides training (see Appendix B for 
information on MP firearms qualification). 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



EXAMPLE OF PM OFFICE ORGANIZATION 



POLICE 

administration 
branch/section: 



PM OFFICE* 



MP COMPANY 



SPECIAL REACTION 
TEAM (SRT) 



MP 
OPERATIONS 



DESK 
OPERATIONS 



TRAFFIC 



PATROL 



POST ENTRY CONTROL 

1 

GUARD SERVICES 



INSTALLATION 

CONFINEMENT 

FACILITY (ICF) 



CIVILIAN LIAISON/ 

AWOL 

APPREHENSION 



MILITARY 
WORKING DOG 



PHYSICAL 

SECURITY/ CRIME 

PREVENTION 



MP 
INVESTIGATION 



GAME WARDEN 



CRIMINAL INTEL 



JUVENILES 



Operational Command 



"" Operational Control 



*This office may include the Office of the Command Provost Marshal, 
Law Enforcement Command, or Director of Law Enforcement 
IAW AR 5-3 and MACOM supplements. 

* Branches and sections are determined SAW AR 5-3 



OPERATIONS SECTION 

All MP stations have an operations 
section. This section is the primary control 
point for all MP operations. The pivotal duty 
position of desk sergeant is part of the 
operations section. The desk sergeant is the 
key individual in this hub of operations. He 
receives and records complaints. He provides 
quick response to calls for assistance where 
crimes have been committed. He ensures 
traffic is controlled and that traffic accidents 
are investigated. He informs the PM of 
serious incidents that deal with personnel, 
installation security, threats to military 
operations, and so forth. He processes, 
detains, feeds, and prepares disposition of 
offenders. And he maintains continual 



observation of confinement facilities when 
occupied. He receipts for and secures personal 
effects of offenders and prepares required 
reports. He maintains DA Form 3997 
(Military Police Desk Blotter) and DA Form 
1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's 
Log). And he prepares DD Form 460 
(Provisional Pass). He obtains medical aid 
tor an offender, complainant, or witness who 
is physically ill or who seems to be in shock, 
in a coma, or heavily intoxicated. The desk 
sergeant maintains communications with 
patrols, directs actions of patrols, and 
reviews patrol reports. And he furnishes 
information, as authorized, to military 
personnel and the public. He keeps the duty 
officer informed of pertinent matters and 



10 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



EXAMPLE OF ALTERNATE PM OFFICE ORGANIZATION 



PM OFFICE 



POLICE 

ADMINISTRATION 

BRANCH 



INSTALLATION 

CONFINEMENT 

FACILITY" 



LAW 

ENFORCEMENT 

BRANCH 



CIVILIAN 
LIAISON/AWOL 
APPREHENSION 



PHYSICAL 

SECURITY 

BRANCH 



DESK OPERATIONS — i 



MILITARY WORKING 
DOG PROGRAM 



PATROL SECTION 



POST ENTRY CONTROL 

I 



Operational Command 



"Where applicable 



TRAFFIC SECTION 



MPINVESTIGATION 



CRIME PREVENTION 



JUVENILES 



dispatches reserves in the absence of the duty 
officer. The desk sergeant maintains a lost 
and found property service, or coordinates 
this service with the adjutant section, as 
directed by local regulations. Also in the 
operations section is the radio operator who 
operates the communications net control 
station. Some station operations sections 
have subelements for administration, 
communications, and records and reports. 

The operations section ensures all law 
enforcement and investigative activities are 
implemented, coordinated, and controlled as 
directed by the PM. This section ensures that 
police liaison and public relations activities 
are established and maintained with the 



military and civilian communities served. 
The operations section provides support to all 
installation contingency plans. It plans for 
the use of resources and provides operational 
control of the special reaction team (SRT). 
The operations section maintains control of 
all MP investigations, criminal intelligence 
data collection, and physical security 
operations. The operations section ensures 
all traffic operations are coordinated, 
planned, ana directed in coordination with 
the traffic section. Entry and exit of the 
installation is controlled by the operations 
section. The operations section dispatches 
patrols, maintains communications with 
patrols, establishes traffic control points, and 
mans these points, as required. 



FM 19-10 



11 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



The operations section establishes patrol 
areas, policies, and responsibilities for MP 
personnel while on duty. Personnel 
requirements and employment of the 
supporting MP company are determined in 
coordination with the supporting unit. The 
daily required distribution of personnel is 
determined the operations section. The 
number of personnel by grade, job 
assignment, and required skill is given to the 
Mr unit commander as soon as the 
requirement is known. 

The operations section determines MP 
training requirements and recommends them 
to the MP unit commander. The operations 
section serves as an evaluation center for MP 
personnel to determine additional training 
and equipment requirements. These 
requirements are furnished to the supporting 
Mr company. Job site training is coordinated 
between the PM and unit commander to 
facilitate continuous development of 
technical skills of assigned personnel. 
Inexperienced personnel are paired with 
experienced personnel. Duty assignments 
must be appropriate to grades. If personnel 
are not qualified for assignments in 
accordance with their grades, training must 
be initiated to correct the deficiencies oefore 
individuals perform such duties. 

In some stations other sections, like MP 
investigation, absentee /deserter apprehen- 
sion, protective services (when authorized), 
juvenile, military working dog (MWD), and 
wildlife conservation enforcement, may be 
organized to operate independently or the 
operations section, but they maintain close 
coordination. 



ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION 

The administrative section performs all 
administrative functions for the PM office. 
This section maintains administrative 
liaison with other staff sections and the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC). 
It maintains files and safeguards classified 
documents. It controls correspondence, 
records, and forms. This section plans and 



conducts research to include multiyear 
planning and budget and manpower 
projections; it is responsible for 
implementing the automated Offense 
Reporting System (ORS) and the Vehicle 
Registration bystem (VRS). (See DA Pam 5-3 
for information on work method techniques.) 

The administrative section prepares 
serious incident reports (SIRS) for the PM. 
Serious incidents are communicated through 
the chain of command to ensure commanders 
are knowledgeable of such events. SIRS will 
be processed in accordance with Army 
Regulation (AR) 190-40 and AR 27-50. 

The PM ensures that the commander is 
notified when such incidents occur. 
Procedures for notifying the chain of 
command of incidents and their seriousness 
are usually set by the installation 
commander. Often this is done during his 
inbriefing with the PM. The PM ensures the 
intent or the commander's directives are 
reflected in the standing operating procedure 
(SOP). The SOP outlines the notification 
procedures to be used by the desk sergeant 
and MP duty officer (MPDO). The PM 
ensures that information is factual and 
passed on in its entirety. The SOP provides 
the immediacy in which the installation 
commander will be notified. Generally, the 
commander is given the facts of the case 
verbally as soon as possible. The commander 
is given a copy of the military police report 
(MPR) whicn contains all information 
relevant to the SIR. 

PHYSICAL SECURITY/CRIME 
PREVENTION SECTION 

The physical security/crime prevention 
section oversees the installation's physical 
security and crime prevention programs. The 
section coordinates policies and procedures 
for these programs. It ensures that the 
programs are administered and maintained. 
The personnel in this section help unit 
commanders and staff sections formulate 
and administer security plans and 
procedures and crime prevention programs. 



12 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



MP in the crime prevention section support 
the commander in his responsibility for 
ensuring the welfare of members of the 
command. They oversee the development of 
the Army crime prevention program. The 
objective of this program is to reduce criminal 
activity and improve the readiness posture of 
all commands. By suppressing the 
opportunity for criminal benavior, Mr help 
the commander maintain a fighting force in a 
state of high morale and discipline. 

Physical security personnel establish and 
maintain a current priority listing approved 
by the commander of critical activities and 
facilities within the command. They provide 
input to the PM and the command staff on 
budgeting, inspection results, and the 
installation physical security plan. 

Specific responsibilities of the physical 
security section include— 

• Developing and updating installation 
physical security plan. 

• Reviewing physical security SOP. 

• Reviewing work orders to ensure 
compliance with physical security 

requirements. 

• Performing technical assistance visits. 

• Conducting physical security classes. 

• Establishing and monitoring intrusion 
alarm procedures. 

• Providing members for installation 

command inspection team. 

Installation physical security programs 
are tailored to the local threat. Security 
requirements are determined by the 
installation PM; USACIDC field offices; 
military intelligence units, agencies, and 
activities; local civilian law enforcement 
agencies; annual DA physical security threat 
statement; and operations security (OPSEC) 
evaluations ana surveys. The installation 
physical security program is described in a 
comprehensive physical security plan. This 
plan addresses specific detection, 
assessment, response, delay, and 
communications measures taken to 



safeguard personnel, materiel, and 
equipment. These include lock and key 
control; protective barriers, lighting, and 
sensors; MP patrols, vehicle checks, and 
searches; community relations programs; 
and neighborhood crime watch. 

Physical security surveys and inspections, 
crime prevention surveys, and personal 
security assessments for high-risk personnel 
identify existing or potential conditions 
conducive to criminal or terrorist activity. 
Specific guidance for conducting physical 
security surveys is contained in AR 190-13. 

Specific questions used by the person 
conducting an inspection are developed from 
regulatory procedures governing the 
operation of the activity or facility being 
examined, pertinent internal security 
requirements, and experience. See FM 19-20, 
FM 19-30, and AR 190-13. 

ABSENTEE/DESERTER 
APPREHENSION SECTION 

An absentee /deserter apprehension 
section is established if justified by AR 5-9 
and the absentee /deserter program (see 
Chapter 6). Justification depends on caseload 
and geographic and demographic data. The 
PM resources the section based on historical 
caseloads and area of responsibility as 
designated in AR 5-9. The section may be 
organized with an officer in charge (OIC)/ 
noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) 
and one or more two-man apprehension 
teams chosen in accordance with AR 190-9. If 
the caseload is small, this function may be 
performed as an additional duty by MP patrol 
personnel or the MP investigation section. 

The absentee /deserter apprehension 
section conducts investigations of absent 
without leave (AWOL)/ deserter personnel. 
The section compiles and distributes all 
documents pertinent to AWOL /deserter 
personnel. The status of individuals is 
verified through United States Army 
Deserter Information Point (USADIP), and 
all regulatory reporting requirements 
involving AWOL /deserter personnel are 



FM 19-10 



13 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



included when reports are processed. The 
absentee/ deserter apprehension section aids 
apprehensions by distribution of 
AW OL/ deserter material in person or by 
telephone. Coordination is maintained with 
civil law enforcement agencies to aid in 
AWOL or deserter personnel apprehension. 
The absentee /deserter apprehension section 
processes DD Form 629 (Receipt of Prisoner 
or Detained Person) in accordance with AR 
190-45, processes transportation requests, 
and takes other administrative actions to 
transport AWOL or deserter personnel. 

The team must first coordinate with the 
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and then with 
civilian police before entering the civilian 
community to apprehend an absentee /deserter. 
The absentee/deserter apprehension team 
briefs the local civilian police on the team's 
specific mission. They brief the civilian police 
on the results of the team's mission before 
leaving the jurisdiction. If local civilian 
police apprehend an absentee or deserter, the 
team provides documents for obtaining the 
reward or reimbursement offered by the 
Army per AR 190-9. 

The absentee \ deserter apprehension team 
can request that civilian police accompany 
the team. If local civilian police cannot 
accompany the team, the absentee /deserter 
apprehension team requests advice and 
guidance from them. The absentee \ deserter 
apprehension team must coordinate with the 
SJA when the local civilian police cannot 
accompany the team. 

The absentee /deserter apprehension team 
is tactful and courteous when dealing with 
the civilian community. The team's 
professionalism must be evident. Friends, 
family, relatives, and local police are 
contacted for help in developing leads. An 
absentee /deserter apprehension team must 
keep in mind that their jurisdiction extends to 
the subject only. It does not extend to those 
who aid the subject or other civilians. The 
team will not pressure the family or friends of 
an absentee into furnishing information or 
assistance. 



Techniques to be employed by 
absentee /deserter apprehension teams in 
making apprehensions must be clearly 
outlined in an SOP. The SOP must state what 
is to be done, how it is to be done, and why it is 
necessary. Team personnel must be familiar 
with these procedures. Further guidance can 
be obtained from AR 630-10 and AR 190-9. 

The absentee /deserter apprehension 
section handles the administration of the 
program. The section handles the initial 
reporting requirements concerning 
absentees/deserters. The section processes 
absentees /deserters being returned to 
military control. 

And the absentee /deserter apprehension 
section maintains the administrative 
working files. This includes individual case 
files in "active," "inactive," and "closed" 
categories, as well as a suspense file. Each 
case file includes documents received, leads 
developed, actions taken, and persons or 
agencies with whom coordination was made. 
Memorandums for record are used for most 
actions, or information not shown on MP 
reports, statements, work sheets, or other 
documents. 

JUVENILE SECTION 

PMs with significant juvenile problems 
can set up a separate juvenile section if 
resources are available. This section handles 
juvenile crime, delinquency, and 
misbehavior. 

MP and MP investigators (MPIs) assigned 
to this section can be volunteers. The number 
of people assigned depends on availability of 
personnel, extent of the juvenile problem, and 
degree of command interest. PMs try to select 
Mr or MPIs who have a counseling or social 
work background, or who have been involved 
in volunteer work with the young. Personnel 
assigned to this section deal with delinquent 
youths, make appropriate referrals to social 
agencies, and provide knowledgeable 
recommendations for disciplinary action and 
preventive measures. 

By closely monitoring juvenile activities 
MPand USACIDC personnel can aid in 



14 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



establishing an effective delinquency 
prevention program, identifying potential 
problems, and solving juvenile offenses. 
Elements of a juvenile delinquency 
prevention program are— 

• Determining juvenile group hangout 
areas. 

• Making note of juvenile identities and 
activities. 

• Developing sources of information. 

• Determining current feelings of unrest or 
boredom. 

• Identifying group leaders. 

• Paying special attention to parking lots, 
schools, or vacant buildings as hangout 
areas or targets for delinquent acts. 

INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT 
FACILITY 

The presence of an installation 
confinement facility and its personnel 
promotes law and order. It assists the 
commander in maintaining unit discipline 
and strength. It is an integral part of the 
military justice system. It provides limited 
counseling, administrative services, and 
custodial supervision for pretrial prisoners, 
short-term posttrial prisoners, casual 
prisoners, and posttrial prisoners awaiting 
transfer to a correctional facility. 

MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION 
SECTION 

The MP investigation section investigates 
disruptive incidents and suspected offenses 
for the PM. MPIs conduct those criminal 
investigations for which the PM is 
responsible. MPIs may also be called upon to 
provide personal security when needed for 
ligh-risk persons visiting or leaving the area. 
MPIs are selected in accord with AK 190-30 by 
the local commander responsible for law 
enforcement operations. The MPI supervisor 
is normally a company grade commissioned 
officer or a senior noncommissioned officer. 
MPIs are normally under the control of the 
operations officer. 



MPIs wear the duty MP uniform, to include 
the appropriate components of distingushing 
MP equipment. However, local commanders 
may authorize MPIs to wear the military 
uniform devoid of distinguishing Mr 
accessories, or civilian clothing when it is 
essential to the successful completion of a specific 
investigation. MPIs authorized to wear 
civilian clothing may request a civilian cloth- 
ing allowance in accordance with AR 700-84. 
MPIs are armed with either the .45-caliber 
pistol, the 9-mm pistol, or the .38-caliber 
revolver, depending upon equipment 
authorizations and local directives. 

Individuals selected to become MPIs must 
complete formal training. One formal course 
is the MPI course conducted at the United 
States Army Military Police School, Fort 
McClellan, Alabama. Formal training also 
can be received through an MPI course 
established by a major command authorized 
to award an additional skill identifier. 
Individuals may receive OJT in conjunction 
with formal training. 

Upon receipt of a favorable written 
response from the US Army Crime Records 
Center (USACRC) and completion of formal 
training, the individual can be awarded the 
additional skill identifier V5 and be issued 
MPI credentials. Credentials are issued to 
MPIs by the local PM or a designated MP unit 
commander. DA Forms 3837 and 3837-1 
(Military Police Investigator Credentials) are 
the only authorized credentials for MPIs. 
Credentials are serially numbered, 
containing the name, description, date of 
birth, color photograph, and signature of the 
MPI to whom they are issued. The credentials 
are authenticated by the PM and are issued 
for a period not to exceed 24 months. 

To ensure positive controls are used for the 
issuance and accountability of MPI 
credentials, the PM ensures the following 

actions, as a minimun, are taken: 

• Appointment on orders of a commissioned 
officer as credential control officer and a 
commissioned officer as alternate 
credential control officer. 



FM 19-10 



15 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



• Establishment of a credential control log. 

• Establishment of controls over unissued 
credentials and the establishment of 

adequate inspection procedures. 

• Development of procedures for the 
temporary and permanent withdrawal of 
credentials. 

Once credentials are issued to an 
investigator, he becomes responsible for 
keeping them in a safe place. If credentials 
are lost, the investigator reports this loss 
immediately to his supervisor. 

PATROL SECTION 

The patrol section responds to incidents 
received by the MP desk or observed by the 
MP. MP patrols report and investigate all 
suspicious activities, apprehend persons who 
have or are in the process of committing an 
offense, and ensure the security of the 
military installation. The primary objective 
of MP patrols is to protect, assist, and provide 
high visibility of MP in areas subject to 
criminal activity. MP patrols— 

• Ensure physical security of military 
installations, personnel, property, and 
equipment. 

• Secure crime scene. 

• Enforce laws, orders, and directives on 
military installations or areas under 
military control. 

• Provide information and assistance to 
members of the military community and 
the general public. 

• Control the flow of military and civilian 
traffic subject to their jurisdiction. 

• Control crowds of military and civilian 
personnel subject to their jurisdiction. 

GAME WARDEN SECTION 

MP actively support the conservation of 
installation wildlife. The MP support of the 



Army's wildlife conservation is managed by 
the installation game warden. 

The game warden is often times organized 
under the patrol section. The game warden's 
duties are set by the PM to meet the wildlife 
conservation laws and needs of the local area. 
MP game wardens are the liaison between the 
military installation and the federal fish and 
wildlife service, state fish and game agency, 
and local law enforcement agencies for fish 
and game control. (See AR 420-74 and DA 
Pamphlet 420-7.) 

TRAFFIC SECTION 

The traffic section provides accident 
reporting and investigation services for 
motor vehicle accidents. This section 
coordinates with the Directorate of 
Engineering and Housing and the Safety 
Office concerning traffic patterns and flow. 
(See FM 19-25.) 

MILITARY WORKING DOG 

SECTION 

The MWD section manages and operates 
MWD facilities. It provides advice on MWD 
matters. It trains and maintains proficiency 
of MWD teams to support MP and other 
agencies. It maintains the health and welfare 
or MWDs. And it maintains kennels, related 
facilities, and equipment. (See FM 19-35.) 



SPECIAL REACTION TEAM 



in 



The SRT, through intensive trainin 
combat in built-up areas, marksmansKip, 
rappelling, physical training, first aid, and 
the use orspecialized equipment, is designed 
to neutralize or apprehend a barricaded 
offender with a minimum of danger to 
hostages, team members, other MP, and 
others. All team members receive cross- 
training in the specialized duties of other 
members. For additional information see 
Chapter 21. 



16 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 2 
Extending MP Support 



The specific operations MP perform at a 
given time are determined by the need of the 
echelon or installation commander and by 
the availability of MP resources. On the 
battlefield the echelon commander's 
priorities of need determine which MP 
operations are accomplished. In a peacetime 
environment the installation commander's 
priorities determine which MP operations 
must be accomplished. In either case MP 
assets are limited, thus all assets are 
committed at all times. 

The PM must consider ways to extend his 
resources. Even on the battlefield, for 
example, courtesy patrols may be performed 
by non-MP personnel when authorized by the 
commander. In peacetime, when dictated by 
the situation, the PM may request assistance 
in the form of additional manpower and 
equipment from general purpose tactical MP 
units assigned to the installation. These units 
include, but are not limited to, corps MP 
companies, heavy division MP companies, 
and light division MP companies. Assets like 
unit reserve and ready reserve forces and 
MWD teams are readily available to the PM. 
Some installation alternatives like 




AUGMENTING RESOURCES ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 



.17 



ENHANCING SUPPORT ON THE 
INSTALLATION 



.18 



|Using Reserve Forces 



.18 



I Using Military Working Dog Teams] 18 



Using Contracted Services 



.19 

Chain of Command I...! 20 

Statement of Work| 20 

.22 

.23 



Using DOD Guard/Police Force 



Using Volunteers 



Recruiting 24 



Conducting Orientation and Training) .25 

Coordinating! 26 

[Maintaining Program 26 



contracting services and Department of 
Defense (DUD) guard /police rorce require 
extensive planning, coordination, and 
justification. Other assets, like volunteers, 
require some expenditure of existing MP 
resources, but this loss is more than offset by 
the gain in productive assistance. 



AUGMENTING RESOURCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD 



On the battlefield the PM, aware that not 
all MP operations can be accomplished all of 
the time, continuously effects a trade-off 
between the number and kind of MP 
operations that the commander requires and 
the number and kind of MP operations that 
can be resourced. But in some circumstances 
augmentation assets may be required to 
accomplish the mission. 

If the division PM needs more assets to 
accomplish missions, he uses his technical 
link with the corps PM. He requests X number 
of MP assets to do the mission. He explains 



that his division MP assets are totally 
committed. The corps PM then assesses his 
own assets to see if he can provide the 
requested support. He informs the division 
PM of his decision. If the corps PM agrees to 
provide support, the problem of how to do the 
mission is solved. However, the corps PM 
may say he cannot offer support at that time. 
The division PM then reconsiders the 
division commander's desires and goals 
(criticality of the missions). He must decide 
whether or not to request support throueh the 
official chain of command. If he deciaes to 



FM 19-10 



17 



161-016 0-94-2 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



make the request, he notifies the division 
chief of staff or the G3. He tells him that he 
has not been able to get support from the 
corps PM. He asks for commander-to- 
commander contact to get the needed 
support. The chief of staff or the G3 informs 
the division commander. He, in turn, talks to 
the corps commander. If they decide support 



should be provided, the corps commander will 
direct the corps PM to provide the assets. But 
they may decide corps assets cannot be used 
to support the division's mission. In that case 
support for those missions is delayed until 
division or corps MP assets are free to do 
them. 



ENHANCING SUPPORT ON THE INSTALLATION 



In considering enhancing support on the 
installation, there are questions that must be 
answered. Will the majority of duties consist 
of protection or enforcement? And how 
critical is the mission to national security? 
The answers to these questions can make a 
difference in the composition of the work 
force. The PM may decide that a reserve force 
is needed or that an MWD team would better 
suit the needs of the installation. Or the PM 
may decide that contracting services, a DOD 
guard/police force, or volunteers could be 
used to supplement the MP. 

USING RESERVE FORCES 

Reserve forces such as unit reserves and 
ready reserves can provide the PM with 
added personnel. To respond to emergency 
situations the size and makeup of the MP unit 
reserve force depends on the situation and 
MP resources available. The unit reserve is 
made up of MP who are off duty, who have 
just completed a tour of duty, or who are 
assigned to later tours of duty. The unit 
reserve is used only when ordered by the PM 
or his authorized representative. Vehicles 
and emergency equipment are required when 
this force is used. An MP unit reserve is used 
for specific purposes, such as control of 
disasters or civil disturbances. 

A ready reserve force is a small motorized 
reserve patrol force. This force is available to 
meet minor emergencies, reinforce details, 
and handle special events. This force is either 
stationed at the MP station or on call in the 
MP unit area. 



USING MILITARY WORKING DOG 
TEAMS 

Use of MWD teams also extends. PM 
resources. The teams, consisting of one dog 
handler and his dog, can often function in 
place of a two-man MP team. 

All dogs and their handlers are trained at 
Lackland Air Force Base. All dog handlers, 
even those working with narcotics /explo- 
sives detector dogs, are first trained as patrol 
dog handlers. Patrol dog handler training 
teaches handlers how to care for and feed 
their assigned dog and the importance of 
obedience and proficiency training. This 
training helps handlers to develop a complete 
understanding of their role in the MWD 
program. 

All dog handlers receive training on the 
drug abuse problem, techniques of searching, 
the law of search and seizure, custody of 
evidence, and other subjects as deemed 
necessary. 

The dog handler must be qualified with 
the .45-caliber pistol, the 9-mm pistol, the 
.38-caliber revolver, and /or the Ml 6 rifle 
before he may carry the weapon. No other 
weapon will he used nor may any weapon 
be carried concealed. 

The length of tours of duty for MWD teams 
is determined by the needs of the command. 
Schedules must also consider the climate and 
terrain conditions that can enhance or reduce 
a dog team's effectiveness. Scheduling must 
include the time necessary for training the 
dog, caring for and feeding the dog, and 
kennel sanitation and maintenance. 



18 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



The standard for employment is 

approximately 30 hours per week. Proficiency 
training is mandatory. And at least four 
hours or proficiency training per week are 
required in performing patrol dog techniques 
and tasks. 

Dual-trained MWDs will require four hours 
of training in patrol tasks and four hours of 
training in specialty tasks (drug or explosives 
detection). The minimum standard of 
proficiency to maintain certification as a 
narcotics detector dogteam is a 90 percent or 
better detection rate. The minimum standard 
of proficiency to maintain certification as an 
explosives detector dog (EDD) team is a 95 
percent or better detection rate. Narcotics or 
explosives dog teams must maintain an 
average proficiency that meets or exceeds the 
minimum proficiency standard. Failure to do 
so for three or more consecutive months will 
result in automatic recertification of the 
narcotics or EDD team. The team is 
recertified only after retraining and 
consistent demonstration of the minimum 
standard of proficiency. An appointed 
certification authority or the instructor staff 
of the Air Force training activity can then 
recertify the team. 

The effectiveness of narcotics and 
explosives detector dog teams depends on 
continual reinforcement of their detection 
ability through proficiency training. During 
a handler's extended absence, a minimum of 
four hours of proficiency training must still 
be conducted each week. This training can 
be performed by the kennel master, a dog 
trainer, or a qualified narcotics or explosives 
detector dog handler. 

It may be necessary to periodically increase 
the frequency or length of proficiency train- 
ing to compensate for or correct training or 
operational deficiencies. When proficiency 
training is increased, there will be some 
trade-on with utilization. However, it should 
be possible to maintain the utilization and 
proficiency training ratio. When both 
training and utilization consistently fall 
below the employment standard, a reduction 
of MWD team authorizations is indicated. 



Authorizations are reduced to the numbers 
that can maintain the standard. Excess 
MWD teams are reassigned to areas where 
they are needed. 

There is no need to withdraw MWD teams 
from their posts during inclement weather. 
The dog's ability to detect an intrusion will 
still exceed that of his handler or many other 
physical, mechanical, or electrical intrusion 
detection systems. MWDs stationed in cold 
weather areas should be acclimated to their 
boots and blankets during training. As a 
result, the dogs do not resist wearing 
protective equipment when weather 
conditions necessitate its use. 

If a narcotics or explosives detector dog is 
unable to continue detector duties, or fails 
recertification, and retraining fails to correct 
the situation within 45 days, the 
circumstances will be throughly documented. 
(See Chapter 11 for more information on 
MWD teams.) 

USING CONTRACTED SERVICES 

The Army has PM activities that are or 
may be are subject to the Commercial Activi- 
ties (CA) Review Program (see AR 5-20). 
Under tne CA program privately owned 
civilian firms compete with in-house 
government activities. The CA program 
requires that a local point of contact (POC) be 
designated at each installation to coordinate 
the installation CA program. This POC is 
generally designated within the Directorate 
of Resource Management (DRM). 

An example of a service a PM may consider 
for contracting is police /guard training. 
When considering contracting the PM 

must— 

• Identify the need for the contractor 

services. 

• Coordinate with the installation 
Directorate of Contracting (DOC). 

• Determine if the services to be contracted 
can be performed by a civilian company. 

• Decide if contracting for the services will 
be cost effective. 



FM 19-10 



19 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



• Decide if the services can be performed 
more efficiently by a contractor. 

The PM should coordinate with the local 
CA point of contact prior to contracting any 
services. This coordination is to determine if 
these services are subject to a CA review. 

Once these decisions are made, the local 
Resource Management Office (RMO) is 
contacted to determine if funds are available 
for contract services. If funds are available, a 
recommendation is made to higher 
headquarters to contract for the required 
services. A program analyst, your DRM 
POC, signs a DA Form 3953 (Purchase 
Request and Commitment) indicating the 
availability of funds. 

Chain of Command 

The chain of command is an essential 
ingredient for a successful contract. The 
chain of command includes — 

• The contracting officer (KO), who holds 
the position which governs all government 
contracts on an installation. The KO is 
appointed by the major command. 

• The contract officer representative (COR), 
who is usually the author of the statement 
of work (SOW). The COR represents the 
contracting officer and the interests of the 
United States government. 

• The contractor, who manages the contract, 
and the contract employees, whom the 
contractor has hired. 

Statement of Work 

The solicitation package becomes the SOW 
and part of the contractual package. For a 
PM services contract, the individual most 
knowledgeable and most familiar with the 
types of services required and with the 
mission is the likely candidate to develop the 
SOW for the contract. 

The SOW consists of tasks, conditions, and 
standards for the services to be performed. 
The task statement tells what job is to be 
performed. The conditions statement tells 
what is required to perform the services and 
under what circumstances the services are to 
be performed. The standards statement 



specifies to what degree the services are to be 
performed; that is, how well, to what degree, 
and how accurately. 

The SOW contains paragraphs which 
address: 

Scope of Work. This paragraph is a brief, 
simple, and concise overview of what 
the contractor services will involve. 

Objective. This paragraph identifies the 
goal to be accomplished by the contracting 
service. 

Phase-In. This paragraph states how 
many days the contractor has to 
commence the work. This may involve 
time for training of employees and for 
obtaining the necessary equipment. The 
phase-in time begins the day the contract 
is awarded. 

• General. This paragraph is an overview of 
the services that are going to be performed 
by the contractor and under what 
condition (for example, weekly, monthly, 
first, second, or third shift). 

• Contract Personnel. This paragraph 
addresses the specifics for each task the 
contractor is to perform. It is written in the 
SOW as "The contractor shall/ , 

• Quality Assurance Plan. This paragraph 
addresses the specifics of the tasks to oe 
performed by the contractor and 
eventually becomes an appendix of the 
contractual package. The quality 
assurance plan should specify that a 
written response from the contractor is 
required for all written deficiencies noted. 

• Government-Furnished Items or 
Notification. This paragraph addresses 
those items that the government will 
provide to the contractor for the 
performance of services. The equipment 
will be listed specifically and separately. It 
will be a technical exhibit during the 
negotiation phase and will eventually 
become an appendix of the contractual 
package. The notification addresses 
occasions that require government 
notification to the contractor to include 
changes in negotiations. 



20 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



• Contractor Furnished Items/Equipment. 
This paragraph addresses what the 
government requires the contractor to 
furnish for performance of services to 

standard. 

• Contractor Responsibilities. This 
paragraph states exactly what services 
are to be performed. 

• Contract Performance Period. This 
paragraph states the period of time the 
contractor has to perform the services 
required by the contract (for example, 
1 October 87-30 Sepember 88). 

• Attachments. The attachments may 
include known companies and the 
evaluation plan. The known companies 
will include institutions, companies, and 
organizations that already perform the 
services being considered for contracting. 
The evaluation plan identifies the 
specifics that the technical review board 
looks for in each bidder's package. 

• Evaluation Factors and Subfactors. This 
paragraph lists specific areas in which 
total points are awarded. These factors 
and sub factors are given numerical value 
and used by the technical review board to 
determine who is awarded the contract. 

There is no publication that tells how to 
develop a particular contract since 
requirements and specifications for each 
contract are different. When developing the 
SOW the COR can use Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FARs), SOPs, and other 
publications. The COR may ask for guidance 
from the chain of command. Quality contract 
service is totally dependent on a quality 
SOW. If a task is not outlined in the SOW it 
will not be accomplished by the contractor. 
The FAR outlines the areas required in the 
SOW. The Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy publishes the Guide for Writing and 
Administering Performance Statements of 
Work, which outlines the details for 
development of SOWS. 

After the SOW is drafted, it is staffed with 
the local DOC. The DOC will staff the SOW 
with the local SJA for legal advice. After the 



SOW is approved, it is announced in the 
Commerce Business Daily, to which many 
companies subscribe. The contract at this 
point is open to the public for bids. Potential 
contractors have 15 days after the date of 
publication of the Commerce Business Daily 
in which the announcement of the SOW 
appeared, to make a request for proposal to 
the DOC. 

If a company decides to bid on the contract, 
which means to offer all services required by 
the SOW for a certain price, the company 
prepares a solicitation package. The 
solicitation package provides a brier history 
of the company, descriptions of previous 
government contracts awarded it, and 
resumes of their key personnel. 

When one or several solicitation packages 
have been received by the DOC, a technical 
review board is conducted. The technical 
review board consists of the COR, a DOC 
representative, an SJA representative, and 
others who are technically proficient in the 
descriptions outlined in the SOW. All 
individuals making up the board must be 
disinterested parties to the companies 
providing solicitation packages. 

A method of conducting the technical 
review board is to begin with the lowest 
bidder and work your way up in dollar 

amounts. The bidder, when selected by the 
KO becomes the contractor. A meeting then 
takes place between the contractor and the 
chain of command to "fine tune" the SOW. 

A COR may be the most technically 
proficient person in the area for which a 
contract is proposed. Sometimes a PM serves 
as a COR. The COR is appointed in writing 
bytheKO. 

The COR represents the interests of the 
United States government and carries out 
each aspect of contracting duties in a 
professional manner. The COR also 
represents the KO, who governs all 
government contracts on an installation. 
The KO is the only person authorized to enter 
into contracts for the government or change 
a contract on behalf of the government. 



FM 19-10 



21 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



The contractor is the manager of the 
contract. The contractor plans, controls, and 
allocates available resources. The KO/COR 
administers the contract. Contract 
administration covers all actions from award 
of contract to close of contract. The resolution 
of problems that arise after awarding of a 
contract is a major concern in contract 
administration. The largest single challenge 
in administering contracts is to ensure that 
products or services paid for are in fact 
received. 

The COR ensures the requirements are 
carried out in accordance with the 
specifications of the contract. The COR is 
responsible for spot checking and inspecting 
the contractor's performance of work. A 
quality assurance evaluation plan is 
developed and acts as a checklist for the COR 
or a technical assistant appointed by the KO. 

When a deficiency is noted, a written notice 
of deficiency is forwarded to the contractor. A 
copy is provided to the KO. The contractor 
keeps the COR informed in writing of actions 
taken to correct the deficiency. Copies are 
provided to the KO. 

The COR's file contains but is not limited 
to— 

• A copy of the contract and all changes and 
modifications. 

• Purchase requests and commitments 
(PR&Cs), which indicate to RMO that 
services are rendered for a fee to be paid at 
a later date. 

• Copies of obligations of monies, which are 
received from KMO. 

• A duplicate copy of the COR appointment 
letter, the original of which is maintained 
by the DOC. 

• All correspondence between the KO, COR, 
and the contractor. 

• Names, titles, and positions of individuals 
functioning for the COR as technical and 
administrative assistants. 

• Phone conversation records between the 
COR and the contractor. 

• Records of inspections performed. 



When services are not performed or are not 
performed according to the terms of the 
contract, the DOC takes one of the following 
actions: 

• Criminal. 

• Civil. 

• Administrative. 

• Contractual. 

In resolving contractual problems, the 
DOC can issue a "cure notice." This notice 
states that the contractor is not performing in 
accordance with the contract and that the 
situation must be corrected. The DOC can 
also issue a "show cause" letter. This letter 
states that the contractor has a certain 
amount of time to show cause why the 
government should not terminate the 
contract. The contractor must then prove that 
the problem is beyond his control. 

When contracts are terminated, the 
defaulting contractor becomes responsible 
for paying all reprocurement costs. In some 
cases a contractor can be made to pay a 
predetermined amount based on failure to 
provide products or services by a given date. 

USING DOD GUARD/POLICE 
FORCE 

The responsibilities of a DOD guard force 
and a DOD police force have similarities and 
differences. To understand these similarities 
and differences, supervisors and managers 
need to compare and contrast the 
responsibilities of each force. 

A DOD guard force is established primarily 
to protect government property from hazards 
such as sabotage, espionage, theft, fire, and 
accidental or willful damage and destruction. 
As a secondary responsibility, guards 
maintain law and order and control the 
movement of persons and materials into, 
within, and from government property being 
protected. 

A DOD police force is established primarily 
to promote law and order. It protects the life, 
property, and civil rights of persons. It 



22 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



preserves the peace; prevents, detects, and 
investigates accidents and crimes; 
apprehends violators; and provides aid and 
comfort in emergency situations. As a 
secondary responsibility, DOD police protect 
government property. 

Guards and police, as well as MP, are 
designated as military law enforcement 
officials by the Manual for Courts-Martial 
(MCM), United States 1984. Each is fully 
empowered by the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) to apprehend military 
members while in the execution of their 
official law enforcement duties. Members of 
each category share the same restrictions 
over apprehension of persons not subject to 
the UCMJ. Differences between DOD 
personnel assigned as civilian police or 
guards lie in the duties performed, not in their 
authority. Additionally, members of each 
series serve as agents of the installation 
commander in the preservation of peace. 
Persons not subject to the code may be 
apprehended ana detained by personnel in 
either series and turned over to the 
appropriate civilian authorities. 

Further, guards, police, and MP have the 
ordinary right of citizens to assist in the 
maintenance of peace. This assistance 
includes the right to make a citizen's arrest of 
civilian violators on military installations. 
Since no federal citizen's arrest statute exists, 
care is taken not to exceed the citizen's arrest 
authority of the locality. In some states 
citizens may make arrests for felonies but not 
for misdemeanors. In other states a private 
citizen may make arrests for any crime 
committed in his presence. Personnel should 
become familiar with the provisions of the 
citizen's arrest authorization granted by the 
law in their locality. 

Administrative restrictions may be 
imposed locally requiring DOD guards to 
detain violators pending the arrival of 
specific law enforcement personnel. Law 
enforcement duties can be expected of guard 
force personnel. If so, they may be deputized, 
commissioned, or appointed as special police 



officers to exercise arrest authority granted 
by statute. As special officers, guards may 
have the same power as sheriffs and /or 
constables on federal property to— 

• Enforce the laws enacted for the protection 
of persons and property. 

• Prevent breaches of the peace. 

• Suppress affrays and unlawful 
assemblies. 

• Enforce rules and regulations established 
by proper authorities. 

The jurisdiction and authority of these 
special police officers does not extend to the 
serving of civil processes. They are restricted 
to federal property where the United States 
has exclusive or concurrent criminal 
jurisdiction. Guards are prohibited from 
receiving extra compensation for exercising 
this additional arrest authority. 

DOD police in federal jurisdiction enforce 
a wide variety of federal and state statutes, as 
well as agency rules and regulations. 
Authorized under the rules governing the 
armed forces, persons serving in the police 
series are expected to exercise authority to— 

• Apprehend, under warrant, any person 
accused of having committed any offense 
against the laws of the United States or 
against any rule or regulation prescribed 
under pertinent law. 

• Apprehend, without a warrant, any person 
committing any such offense in their 
presence. 

• Apprehend, where applicable, without 
warrant, any person in a situation in 
which there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that person has committed a 

felony. 

See AR 190-56 for more information on 
Army DOD guard/police forces. 

USING VOLUNTEERS 

To enhance the operation of a PM activity, 
PMs may seek to use volunteers. Department 
of the Army policy on volunteers is that they 
will be used to the maximum extent possible 



FM 19-10 



23 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



within legal restrictions. Federal law (31 
United States Code [USC] 1342) prohibits the 
United States government from accepting 
most types of voluntary services. But the 
Comptroller General of the United States has 
rendered decision B-204336 which approves 
the limited use of volunteers in Army crime 
prevention programs. Before performing any 
services, volunteers must sign a DA Form 
471 2-R (Volunteer Agreement) to agree to 
perform their duties without pay. Volunteers 
are not government employees. They must 
have their own volunteer chain of command 
headed by a volunteer coordinator. 

Military and civilian retirees perform 
efficiently as part of an installation crime 
prevention or crime analysis section. They 
have the interpersonal skills, work habits, 
and attitudes needed to be effective members 
of the crime prevention staff. Volunteers may 
perform many crime analysis support 
: : unctions. They may prepare and distribute 
'. iterature to support crime prevention 
campaigns. They may make presentations on 
crime prevention and assist in organizing 
and operating neighborhood watch or other 
crime prevention programs. Volunteers may 
not answer telephones, register vehicles, or 
perform any other functions which paid 
civilian or active duty personnel nave 
historically performed. Any other duties 
must be approved by Department of the 
Army. 

Organizing and administering a volunteer 
program requires an investment in time, 
volunteers require work space, equipment, 
and other support to do their jobs effectively. 
How the volunteer program is organized will 
determine how much time the PM's staff 
must expend on the program. There are at 
least three different organizational models 
which may be employee Which model is best 
will depend on the local situation. 

On many military installations, the Army 
Community Service has already established 
or can establish a volunteer program. The 
Army Community Service recruits 
volunteers and administers the program. The 



demands on the PM's staff are minimal. For 
this reason, this is the preferred option. See 
DA Pamphlet 608-28 for details. 

Another option to consider is a volunteer 
coordinator to recruit participants and 
administer the volunteer program. The PM's 
staff assists in recruiting and training 
volunteers and in any other way necessary to 
make the program a success. The volunteers 
and the coordinator develop a strong sense of 
identity with the PM office, and there is a 
built-in flexibility and responsiveness that 
may not exist when working through the 
Army Community Service volunteer 
program. 

An outside service organization can 

administer the volunteer program. This option 
is preferable when a recognized service 
organization desires to setup a volunteer crime 
prevention program for both the installation 
and the local civilian community. This 
program ties together the Army and civilian 
programs, but the PM has relatively little 
control over this volunteer program. 

Recruiting 

The PM and installation commander must 
understand the importance of the volunteer 
program. One of the most important issues in 
creating a volunteer program is to decide 
exactly what needs to be done. There must be 
a specific, immediate need for volunteers. 
Positions are not created, then individuals 
recruited to do the work. Job descriptions 
must be developed for each position. Job 
descriptions define a task and its subtasks, 
and explain how the task will benefit the 
overall mission. See DA Pamphlet 608-28 for 
guidance in preparing job descriptions. 
However, any format that clearly defines the 
task, skills needed, reporting system, and 
time requirements is acceptable. 

The American Association of Retired 
Persons has local chapters in most towns. 
Their rolls are usually filled with retirees who 
desire to maintain a relationship with the 
military community. Retirees almost always 
have the character traits and stability 
required for the crime prevention program. 



24 



FM 19-10 



Because they are permanent residents of the 
community, they offer a potential source of 
continuity to any operation. 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



There may be other local community 
service organizations having likely 
volunteers. Examples include the United 
Way, Red Cross, Noncommissioned Officer's 
Association, and Retired Officer's 
Association. 

Volunteers should be interviewed several 
times. One interview is usually a group 
meeting. At this time, volunteers are given 
application blanks to take home and to return 
by mail. The program is explained, and it is 
announced whether or not a background 
check will be conducted on specific jobs. If a 
background check is required, local PM and 
civilian police department records, NCIC 
files, and USACRC files are checked. The 
group meeting allows the volunteers to be 
discreetly assessed and preliminary 
judgments made as to their suitability. 

The most effective interview is one-on-one. 
This interview is the best way to learn 
individual interests, assess talents, and 
develop support of potential volunteers for 
the program. Guidelines are developed before 
the interview is conducted to ootain the 
information wanted from the interviewee. 
Interviewers must know what jobs are 
available and the hours available for 
volunteer work. Volunteers are given the 
chance to select the hours they want to work. 

One of the best assets for a volunteer 
program is to have a motivated coordinator. 
A motivated coordinator can greatly 
facilitate recruiting. Coordinators need— 

• Some managerial or supervisory skills. 

• Good communications skills. 

• Ability to work under minimal 

supervision. 

• Dynamic, pleasing personality. 

• Ability to identify and solve problems. 

The coordinator is a key figure in 
maintaining the integrity of the program. 
The coordinator schedules volunteers for 



work tours. This includes scheduling backup 
personnel if the scheduled volunteer does not 
report for work. The coordinator sets work 
standards. And minor breaches of work 
standards are documented by the 
coordinator. Persons who fail to meet 
standards are counseled. Active duty and 
paid civilian personnel offer advice on how to 
perform tasks correctly. They must intervene 
directly when a volunteer causes a safety 
violation. But volunteers are disciplined only 
by the coordinator. Volunteers must meet the 
same basic standards as paid employees. 
They must report for work on time and act 
professionally while on the job. And their 
after-duty conduct must not reflect adversely 
on the installation law enforcement activity. 

Volunteers seldom work a full day. It is 
necessary to recruit enough people to assure 
the work load is not too great. But it is also 
important not to have too many volunteers. 
Recruiting is a continuous process. A current 
inventory, showing where volunteers are 
needed, and a list of people who have 
expressed interest in becoming volunteers 
are useful. 

All support required is identified and 
arranged before the volunteers report for 
duty. To the maximum extent possible, 
volunteers are provided the same working 
conditions as paid staff. As a rule, they 
are not segregated, but work closely with 
full-time staff so that a productive 
relationship develops. 

Because volunteers will not usually work a 
40-hour week, it is often not possible to assign 
each volunteer an individual desk. However, 
when volunteers share work space, at least 
part of it (for example, one desk drawer) is 
designated for each person's use. 

Conducting Orientation and Training 

Orientation is important. There is a 
general orientation to the MP Corps and the 
rM office. Volunteers are also taken on a tour 
of the MP station. They are told how their 
particular job fits into the overall scheme and 
provided general information common to all 



FM 19-10 



25 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



new employees. There is also a specific 
orientation on the volunteer program. 

Volunteers are provided an explanation of 
the job and the job setting. Step-by-step 
procedures to be followed in the performance 
of tasks are carefully explained. Volunteers 
will perform required tasks under the 
supervision of a paid employee or 
experienced volunteer. The volunteer is given 
more freedom in small increments as he 
demonstrates his ability to accept the added 
responsibility. 

Formal training must be provided when 
the need is identified and as determined by 
the PM. Lesson plans are developed for all 
formal instruction. Classes are brief and, 
whenever possible, scheduled to coincide 
with volunteer work periods. 

Volunteers are also used to organize 
neighborhood watch programs or similar 
activities outside the office. If so, the need for 
government transportation and government 
drivers' licenses must be considered. If the 
installation requires vehicle registration, 
arrangements must be made to provide 
decals to volunteers to register their privately 
owned vehicles. 

Coordinating 

Once the decision has been made to use 
volunteers and the organization model has 
been chosen, it is important to coordinate 
with other installation activities which may 
be affected. It is essential that appropriate 
commanders and staff organizations are well 
informed about the program so they can 
respond to inquiries. As a minimum, the 
following people are briefed: 

• The installation commander. 

• The garrison commander. 

• The Director of Personnel and Community 
Activities. 

• The civilian personnel officer. 

• The public affairs officer. 

• The staff judge advocate. 

• The Army Community Service 
coordinator. 



To ensure that an effective working 
relationship develops between employees 
and the volunteer organization selected, all 
supervisors, civilian employees, and soldiers 
must be briefed on the program. 

Included in the briefing are the specific 
functions volunteers will perform. The 
briefing must clearly state that volunteers 
will not replace full-time staff and that their 
participation will have no impact on career 
advancement, job stability, or any other job 
conditions. The briefing should define the 
relationship between volunteers and paid 
staff, especially as it relates to supervision 
and discipline. 

The briefing should also address the 
benefits that will accrue as a result of the 
volunteer program. It is essential that 
everyone understands that volunteers will 
enhance the staffs ability to provide 
first-rate law enforcement support to their 
installation. 

Maintaining Program 

The PM must ensure that volunteers 
receive the feedback necessary to maintain 
their morale and commitment to the 
program. There are several ways to ensure 
this goal is met. Volunteers and line 
personnel must get acquainted. One way to 
do this is to include volunteers in all social 
functions in the office that are scheduled 
during duty hours. 

Volunteers must understand what types of 
information and procedures enhance 
successful police operations. One way to get 
this information to volunteers is to allow 
them to sit in on unclassified briefings. 

Service award certificates are developed to 
present to volunteers for active participation 
in the program. Awards are keyed to the 
number ornours contributed; for example, 
500, 1,000, or 5,000 hours. (The volunteer 
coordinator should accurately record hours 
of service performed and notify the PM when 
a service award is due.) Award ceremonies 
are held to present certificates and to 
recognize the contributions of the volunteers. 



26 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



A luncheon or dinner may be planned to 
honor the volunteer staff at least annually in 
one of the installation clubs. Members or the 
installation command group may attend, as 
well as key members of the PM/ security 
office. 

Volunteers are removed from the program 
for poor performance. Removal from the 
program is accomplished formally. The 
volunteer coordinator must have 
documented proof of such performance, 
including counseling statements showing 



that corrective actions were attempted. If the 
removal is for one incident of unacceptable 
behavior or a violation of trust, the incident is 
fully investigated in order that the 
volunteer's rights are protected. The 
situation is thoroughly investigated by the 
volunteer coordinator and discussed with the 
crime prevention officer and PM. When the 
decision is made to remove a volunteer from 
the program, the decision is relayed to the 
volunteer personally by the PM or a 
designated representative. 



FM 19-10 



27 



CHAPTER 3 
Resourcing MP Operations 



The proper management of resources is 
an important aspect of a PM's operation. The 
PM is responsible for providing the input that 
will ensure MP operations can oe carried out. 
Hence, PM familiarity and involvement with 
budget development is critical. The execution 
of the budget requires a clear understanding 
of the buaget cycle. It also requires close 
scrutiny of requirements and monitoring of 
the commitment, obligation, and dis- 
bursement of funds. 

MP programs compete for funding. 
Effective planning, programming, and 
budgeting of funas to ootain resources 
requires knowledge of the system. 
Programming of resources is usually planned 
two to five years ahead. The PM's resource 
plan serves as an overall resource 




UNDERSTANDING THE COMMAND 

BUDGET PROCESS 



.28 



Obtaining Fundd 28 

Participating in the Resource ProcessJ 31 



e Resource Process] . 
Using Available Funds! T . .31 



Obtaining Funds for Unexpected 
Requirements 



.32 



DEVELOPING THE INSTALLATION 
COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET. . . 



.34 






management document for law and order 
activities for the installation. It represents 
the summation of existing resources, their 
application, and new initiatives that require 
resourcing. 



UNDERSTANDING THE COMMAND BUDGET PROCESS 



The program analysis and resource review, 
which major Army commands (MACOMs) 
submit to Headquarters (HQ) DA, indicates 
the missions, issues, or initiatives that the 
MACOMs would like to see included in the 
Army program objective memorandum 
(POM). The POM conveys the Army's pro- 
posed program to the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. It addresses resource levels for 
five fiscal years beginning with the biennial 
program. 

A major objective during budgeting and 
execution is to maintain program and budget 
consistency. Acceptance or any change to 
program levels in the approved POM requires 
determining program trade-offs to achieve a 
zero-sum change. Adjustments during budget 
formulation must remain within the levels 
approved as depicted in the Army's total 
obfigational authority (TO A). 



OBTAINING FUNDS 

The PM obtains funds through the Army's 
strategic management system known as the 
planning, programming, budgeting, and 
execution system (ProES). The Army 
PPBES establishes and maintains the 
Army's portion of the DOD Five-Year 
Defense Program and Defense Budget. The 
Army PPBES is influenced by both the DOD 
PPBES and the joint strategic planning 
system. These systems provide input to the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Through its disbursement of funds the 
Army PPBES carries out guidance from 
higher HQ. It influences policies, strategy, 
force objectives, materiel acquisition, and 
other considerations. And through its request 
requirements, the PPBES allows for policy 
participation by the Army staff, Army field 
operating agencies, and MACOMs. (AR 1-1 
contains additional information. ) 



28 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



MANAGEMENT DECISION PACKAGE 



SAMPLE FYs 




Year 



'NOW" 

-BIP" 




PPBES architecture allocates program and 
budget resources to products described by 
management decision packages (MDEPs), 
which collectively establish Army force 
capability in terms of— J ~ 

• Missions of TOE units. 

• Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of 
systems. (Linkage to units exists through 
off-line decision support systems main- 
tained by the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition.) 

• Activities of the support and mobilization 
base. 

• Operations of Army installations. 

• Special functional areas (program and 
budget packages that cut across two or 
more other management areas in order 
to define and protect resources having 
high-level interest during a specific 
period). 

MDEPs have two components. One com- 
ponent is a program development increment 
package (PDIP), which is managed by the 
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation. 
The PDIP covers five years and helps build 
the Army program. The PDIP helps the 
decision-making process accommodate either 
decreases or increases to the TOA and 
manpower levels. It provides discrete, 
executable levels that can be readily 
extrapolated to unit equipping. The PDIP is 
managed by functional areas (equipping, 



3 4 

PDIP 



sustaining, manning, Information 
management, training, managing, and 
facilities) with an Army staff point of contact 
designated to defend and manage the PDIP. 

The other component of the MDEP is a 
budget increment package (BIP) managed by 
the Director of Army Budget. The BIr com- 
plements the PDIP and covers the prior year, 
current year, and budget year. 

Fund sources, known as "appropriations/' 
in the PPBES are geared to meeting specific 
types of needs. For more information on 
PPBES, see AR 1-1 and DA Pamphlet 5-9. 

The PM will obtain most resources through 
the Operations and Maintenance Appropria- 
tion (OMA) of the PPBES. OMA subelements, 
called programs, are drawn on for base 
operations, training, and property main- 
tenance, among other needs. Program 11 
monies are divided into functional areas as 
"lettered" accounts. 

It is the "T" account in Program 11 of OMA 
that is important to PMs. The T-account 
monies are designated for the preservation of 
order. The T account is subdivided into 
separate elements of resource: 

• Civilian pay. 

• Contracts. 

• Travel. 

• supply. 

• Equipment. 



FM 19-10 



29 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



Civilian pay is based on compensation 
rates and authorized strength levels. 
Contractual elements of resource are based 
on a schedule of itemized contracts currently 
in effect and updated to reflect deletions of 
contracts not expected to be renewed and 
anticipated new contractual requirements. 
Travel and temporary duty (TDY) reflect a 
schedule of trips to include place to be 
visited, length and purpose of visit, mode of 
transportation, and per diem rate or total 
estimated cost per individual trip. Supplies 
are separated into two types: consumable 
and nonconsumable. Consumable supplies 
are those items of supply required by section 
chiefs or subactivities. These items, such as 
stationery and batteries, are priced out and 
compared with historical supply records. 
Nonconsumable supplies are durable items 
such as equipment. The basis for the 
nonconsumable supply element is the 
equipment replacement schedule which is 
derived from the expected life of the 
individual item. Within certain limits 
reprogramming may occur between the 
elements (except for civilian pay). This 
action reallocates resources from, for 
example, the consumable supply element to 
the travel element. 

The PM must stay informed about com- 
mitments and obligations of the T account. 
The installation commander may reprogram 
money from the T account to another 
installation account within certain limits. 
These limits differ from MACOM to 
MACOM. A reprogramming action should be 
a cooperative effort which examines all law 
enforcement programs to ensure program 
interests are protected. The budget analyst 
within the Directorate of Resource 
Management will be able to give local 
guidelines. 

The PM can obtain other funds, however, 
through other appropriations. For equipment 
such as night-vision devices or voice-secure 
radios, PMs may address Other Procurement, 
Army (OPA) funding requirements to their 
MACOMs. Approved OPA funds are pro- 
vided to the MACOMs by the Army Materiel 



Command item manager. OPA funds are also 
provided as a "tail" to Major Construction, 
Army (MCA) projects to furnish intrusion 
detection systems as government-furnished 
equipment to a contractor. PMs must 
understand that OPA funds are identified for 
the purchase of specific items and cannot be 
reprogrammed. For example, OPA funds for 
an installation MCA project to upgrade a 
fence cannot be used to buy automatic data 
processing (ADP) equipment for the MP 
station. PMs must evaluate and identify the 
appropriate resource for the requirement 
being considered. When in doubt, PMs should 
contact their local budget analysts or 
MACOM PM office for advice. 

Funds in support of MP investigations are 
available through USACIDC confidential 
funds to the PM. These funds, known as 
.0015 funds, are used in support of infor- 
mation gathering, investigative activities, 
covert operations, and other related 
activities. All MPI personnel must be 
thoroughly briefed on the conditions and 
procedures under which .0015 funds can be 
used for payment or reimbursement. 

The PM obtains .0015 funds by submitting 
a letter of request to the approving official. 
The letter of request explains who 
(specifically) will be obtaining and using the 
funds. After the .0015 funds have been 
approved by the approving official, the fund 
custodian requests and actually obtains the 
money. The fund custodian must account for 
all advanced and expended funds. 

MPIs obtain .0015 funds in support of 
specific operations. They must then provide 
the fund custodian with an accurate 
accounting of all expenditures. This 
accounting is documented on DA Form 5070-R 
(Justification Statement for .0015 
Contingency Funds). The form is submitted 
to the fund custodian for his records. MPIs 
must be aware that funds are for authorized 
expenditures only and are subject to 
disapproval otherwise. Guidelines are 
contained in AR 195-4. 



30 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



PARTICIPATING IN THE 
RESOURCE PROCESS 

The PM must effectively participate in the 
PPBES to resolve and follow up resourcing 
issues. The PM must identify needs based on 
the requirements, activities, and tasks to be 
performed. (See DA Pamphlet 5-3 for more 
information on activity and task analysis.) 

The justification of need is a critical 
element in resourcing. Justification must 
reflect the importance of the need and the 
impact on the mission if the need is not met. 
Resources must be identified and justified in 
a resource plan. 

At each installation the PM must learn 
who develops resource priorities and what 
committee makes recommendations. 
Examples of such committees are the 
program resource advisory committee 
(PRAC) and the installation planning board. 
The PRAC and installation planning board 
make decisions that affect the PM's mission 
performance. 

The PRAC recommends to the installation 
commander which programs are to be 
funded. Major activity directors (MADs), 
who are members of the installation s 
PRAC, are in the best position to make 
meaningful financial estimates to support 
their missions and to provide relevant 
justification for the required funds. The PM 
must be able to participate or, at a minimum, 
provide input to the installation PRAC 
regarding those issues of utmost concern to 
the PM missions. 

The installation planning board decides 
the priority of installation work orders. For 
example: Will the requirement for kennels be 
funded this year? Will permanent or tem- 
porary kennels be constructed? Where will 
they be located? The PM may not be a voting 
member of these decision-making groups, 
but he may attend the meetings. (The budget 
analyst should be aware of when the 
meetings are conducted.) It is more difficult 
for the committee to reprogram PM funding 
if the PM is present and armed with defense 
for PM requirements. 



The next step is to get involved with 
resource management in the early stages. 
Then the PM should follow each action 
through to completion. At each step in the 
process decisions will be made and priorities 
will be set. For example, during the first 
stage of the decision process, a given PM 
requirement may receive a high priority. But 
during the second stage, this requirement 
may be given a lower priority because of 
changing priorities, unprotected require- 
ments, and emergencies. The funding 
process is not predictable. The PM must 
realize that no decision is final until the 
funds are actually obligated. 

The final step is to do the necessary 
homework. Even though the PM plans, 
programs, and identifies present needs, the 
amount of time required for the process to 
evolve full circle is agonizing and frus- 
trating, but important. Continuous evalua- 
tion of all law enforcement requirements, 
threat assessments, and problems should 
funding not be received must occur on a 
regular oasis. The PM should implement a 
time-phased plan for the phases of the law 
enforcement needs program. 

Using Available Funds 

PMs can keep informed about com- 
mitments and obligations of the T account 
through the budget analyst. A commitment 
is the first step toward spending dollars. A 
commitment indicates to the PM's MAD an 
anticipated obligation of dollars. Since a 
commitment constitutes an administrative 
reservation of funds, committed funds 
should not be used for making future budget 
decisions. Once the procurement cycle is 
complete, and a contract awarded or services 
rendered which recmire programmed 
periodic payment, the dollars are con- 
sidered obligated. Obligation rates provide 
a measure from which to assess a 
well-managed budget execution program. 
Once obligated, the execution of contracts, 
delivery of equipment, or provision of 
services should be monitored and evaluated 
to determine if obligations will require 
adjustment. 



FM 19-10 



31 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



PMs may receive a monthly account status 
report from the budget analyst. The account 
status is reported on any locally designed 
form that will assist the budget analyst in 
monitoring obligation of funds. The report 
transmits budget information about 
underutilization of funds, indicates the 
possibility of reprogramming funds, and 
indicates when funds are low. The monthly 
account status is an important document for 
the PM because it provides a history that can 
be used for future budget guidance and 
decision making. 

The relationship between the PM and the 
budget analyst is critical. The PM and budget 
analyst must communicate openly about 
budget matters to provide the commander 
accurate information to make fiscal 
decisions. Failing to keep the commander 
informed invites decisions that can have 
negative implications on existing and 
planned law enforcement programs. 

Obtaining Funds For Unexpected 
Requirements 

Important to the success of any instal- 
lation s law enforcement effort is the PM's 
acquisition of dollars for unprogrammed, 
unfunded requirements. These requirements 
are referred to as unfinanced requirements 
(UFRs). UFRs may result from an 
unexpected need arising from a change in 
policy, situation, or resource. Or UFRs may 
also result from an earlier reduction in 
funding. PMs identifying a UFR should 
immediately contact the budget analyst for 
advice. PMs should provide the budget 
analyst complete rationale and justification 
to support the UFR. A UFR will normally be 
reviewed by the program director and 
appropriate staff elements for authorization, 
prioritization, and potential trade-offs. 

A UFR may be submitted for consideration 
anytime during the fiscal year. However, the 
most appropriate times are during three 
formal budget processes. First, the command 
operating budget (COB), developed midway 
through the current year for the following two 



fiscal years, serves as the base document for 
identifying installation resource 
requirements for the budget year. This is 
followed by the contract process which 
involves the installation and MACOM 
commanders. Finally, the budget execution 
review (BER) occurs midway through the 
current year. PMs should anticipate potential 
requirements and identify their needs early 
in the budget process. PMs should also 
continuously monitor their programs and 
identify possible alternatives that could serve 
as a means for providing resources for 
unanticipated requirements. In the future 
installations will review budget execution 
through the review and analysis process. 
This process will allow commanders 
throughout the chain of command to have 
continuous monitoring of each COB. 

When addressing UFRs, PMs must be 
thorough in determining if the requirement 
can be accomplished if funds are made 
available. The requirement and supporting 
justification for UFRs must be clear and 
specific. The UFR status lists are prioritized 
and continually updated at the MACOM 
level. The lists are then forwarded to the 
Office of Army Law Enforcement (OALE) 
resource manager. 

The MACOM PM must ensure an open 
channel of communication with the OALE 
resource manager. And the MACOM PM 
should provide a copy of the individual 
UFRs to the OALE resource manager. 
During the programming, budgeting, and 
execution phase of PPdES, the OALE 
resource manager interfaces with MACOM 
budget analysts. The OALE resource 
manager translates PM requirements to 
"budgetese." This provides for a more 
thorough understanding by the MACOM 
and higher level budget analysts who "edit" 
the UFRs and other documents. 

Most important, the OALE resource 
manager will speak for the MACOMPM when 
opportunities arise allowing DA to provide 
extra funds to MACOMs. The suspense 
requirement to obtain the extra funds is 



32 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 







CONTINUOUS BUDGETING PROCESS 








IDENTIFY UFRs 


^^^# 












X 






REPROGRAM FUNDS 




J IDENTIFY OTHER 
J FUNDING SOURCES 






/ 


P ■ 










\ 






COORDINATE WITH 
INSTALLATION 
PLANNING BOARD 






EVALUATE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
REQUIREMENTS AND 
ASSESS THREAT 






t 


"I PM l 




\ 






COORDINATE 
WITH PRAC 








IDENTIFY 

AUTHORIZATIONS/ 
OBLIGATIONS/ 
COMMITMENTS 






\ 


.... 














JUSTIFY NEED AND 
NEEDED RESOURCES 


I IDENTIFY NEED 






\* 






y 






CONTACT PROGRAM 
ANALYST 























normally very short— sometimes a matter of 
hours. The short response time prohibits 
coordination between the OALE resource 
manager and the MACOM PM. The OALE 
resource manager must be armed with the 
justification to present and defend the 
MACOM PM's UFRs against the competition 



of other activity MACOM UFRs. The OALE 
resource manager must be prepared at the 
time the opportunities arise for extra funds. 
Keeping the OALE resource manager 
informed with dependable rationale and 
justification for UFRs is paramount in the 
successful awarding of extra dollars. 



FM 19-10 

161-016 0-94-3 



33 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



DEVELOPING THE INSTALLATION COMMAND 
OPERATING BUDGET 



The systematic development of a COB is 
not a regulatory process that must be 
followed at the installation. But the use of 
such a procedure ensures a well-coordinated 
operating budget that reflects the major 
mission director s recommendations. It also 
reflects the installation commander's 
decisions on how the financial resources will 
be used to accomplish the mission. 

The COB contains detailed costing of the 
approved program as well as administrative 
schedules to be used in support of the Army 
budget estimates. The COB addresses two 
fiscal years: The execution year and the 
budget year. The budget year data are used 
primarily for reprogrammmg actions and the 
apportionment request to the Office of 
Management and Budget. The biennial 
program years are the two years following 
the budget year. 

To develop the COB the comptroller 
receives budget and manpower guidance 
(BMG) from the MACOM and distributes it to 
the MADs. During the interim, the comp- 
troller reviews the BMG from the MACOM 
and develops a time-phased schedule for 
completion of the COB. MADs review the 
BMu, giving special attention to their area of 
responsibility. They prepare recommenda- 
tions to the MACOM BMG and forward these 
recommendations to the Comptroller, 
Directorate of Resource Management. 

The comptroller evaluates the recom- 
mendations, makes his own recommenda- 
tions, and coordinates with the MADs for 
development of their recommended dollar 
targets. The comptroller then prepares a draft 
installation BMG directive which includes 
dollar targets and distributes it to the MADs. 
Next, the PRAC resolves any differences 



between the comptroller and the MADs and 
prepares the installation BMG. The PRAC- 
recommended installation BMG is then 
presented to the installation commander, 
normally in the form of an oral briefing. The 
commander then directs, changes, and /or 
approves the PRAC-recommended 
installation BMG and returns it to the 
comptroller for final copy and publication. 
The comptroller distributes the final 
installation BMG to the MADs. The MADs 
then break out dollar guidance to the activity 
level and furnish operating activities with 
BMG and funding targets. The activity chiefs 
prepare their portions of the installation 
COB. An activity may comprise subactivities, 
and the activity chief will further break out 
the funding targets. The MADs receive input 
and applicable supporting schedules from 
each activity chief. Each MAD reviews, 
evaluates, and adjusts the activity portions. 
The MAD then prepares a summary 
schedule, UFR list, and decrement list. The 
comptroller receives, reviews, evaluates, and 
prepares recommendations and /or 
adjustments to the summary schedules, 
UFRs, and other supporting schedules. The 
comptroller then completes all schedules 
required in the draft installation COB and 
assembles them for presentation to the 
PRAC. The PRAC reviews the installation 
draft COB to ensure compliance with the 
BMG from the MACOM, resolves any 
differences among the PRAC members, and 
makes necessary adjustments. The chairman 
of the PRAC presents the recommended 
installation draft COB to the installation 
commander. The commander, after directing 
any necessary changes, approves the 
installation COd, signs it, and returns it to 
the comptroller for transmittal to the 
MACOM. 



34 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 4 
Managing Military Police Information 



Military police success in effecting law 
and order relies upon acquisition, processing, 
and application of certain essential 
information. Police information aids in crime 
prevention and criminal investigations. 
Police information supports the commander 
in administering his unit or installation. 
Police information in the US Army is one of 
the elements of command intelligence. 

The primary purpose for gathering police 
information is to support the commander or 
PM and to support the enforcement elements 
of MP units. The information system in law 
enforcement includes recording, reporting, 
evaluating, and managerial tasks associated 
with MP reports, criminal investigations 
reports, traffic accident reports, and armed 
forces traffic tickets. The information 
system can contribute in great measure to 
selective enforcement. 

In correctional administration, police 
information includes many of the recording 
and managerial tasks for confinement 
facilities, nospital prisoner wards, 
rehabilitation training centers, and 
correctional facilities. MP develop and 
exchange police information and criminal 
intelligence with otherpolice forces in their 
area of operations. Police information, 
including criminal intelligence, is obtained 
through daily contact with people, MP, and 
other law enforcement and security forces. 

In physical security, police information 
includes recording and managerial tasks 
associated with security of individual rooms 
or buildings, structures, facilities, and 
installations. In conducting and monitoring 
physical security, MP will develop and 
exchange police information with other 
police forces, private security agencies, 
industrial representatives, and other 




CONTENTS 



Page 



UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL 
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 



.36 



COLLECTING AND RELEASING 
INFORMATION 



.37 



USING MILITARY POLICE MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 



.39 



Offense Reporting System 39 

| Vehicle Registration System]. . 39 

| Correctional Reporting System| 39 



DEVELOPING AND USING MP 
INFORMATION FILES 



.40 



Area Filesl... 40 



Activity Filesl. 40 



Individual Filesl 41 

42 



USING OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES 



National Crime Information Center| 42 

Crime Records Centerl 42 



Federal Bureau of Investigation! 43 



Drug Enforcement Administration 43 



security elements, to include tactical 
military forces. (See FM 19-30.) 

In preserving public order, police 
information includes many of the recording 
and managerial tasks associated with civil 
disturbances, disorders, and natural 
disasters. MP conducting the normal 
functions involved with occurrences of these 
types will develop and exchange police 
information with local police and security 
agencies, national police forces, and military 
forces involved. However, military agencies 
cannot be used for collecting, reporting, 
processing, or storing civil disturbance 
information unless specific approval is 
obtained from Headquarters, Department of 
the Army. FM 19-15 discusses intelligence 
operations in civil disturbance situations, 
including the critical items of information, 



FM 19-10 



35 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



sources of information, and collection by 
individuals. 

In certain situations, such as countering 
terrorism, police information may go beyond 
the field of law and order and extend into 
tactical and other types of intelligence. And 
the information can include recording 
command and staff activities associated with 
planning, organizing, and executing MP area 
combat operation support. MP contribute to 
the intelligence required by the area 
commander with particular respect to the 
threat situation. (See FM 90-14.) 

In operations against insurgent elements 
the police information system includes re- 



cording command and staff actions assoc- 
iated with stability operations. FM 100-20 
discusses these operations and the MP 
support to such operations, including police 
intelligence. 

Disciplinary control boards rely heavily on 
police information. In overseas areas, data 
generated by well-directed police information 
efforts can contribute greatly to political 

Elanning relevant to relations between 
nited States forces and the local population 
or government. In CONUS, data generated 
by police information-gathering operations 
can often be more valuable than pure military 
intelligence in planning local public 
relations. 



UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 

CYCLE 



The criminal intelligence cycle is a con- 
tinuous process. Planning ensures that 
intelligence collectors are provided a logical, 
orderly system for conducting the collection 
effort. Ideally, it ensures that all needed 
intelligence is collected in time to be of use 
and that all possible sources of intelligence 
are exploited by appropriate collection 
agencies. Planning includes establishment of 
priority areas of interest, allocation of 
resources, and alternate means of 
intelligence gathering. The establishing of 
priority areas of interest is normally required 
because of resource limitations. It is virtually 
impossible to collect all criminal intelligence 
in all areas of MP responsibility. Resources 
are directed to criminal intelligence 
considered most critical. Priorities are not 
permanently fixed but may vary with the 
situation. 

The need to exploit all sources of criminal 
intelligence requires resourceful, flexible, and 
aggressive direction and coordination of the 
intelligence collection effort. Commanders 
and MP personnel involved in gathering 
criminal intelligence must be aware of the 
capabilities ana limitations of all available 
resources to make the best use of them. 
Among the collection techniques employed 



are standard procedures and expedients, 
improvisations made necessary by local 
conditions and resources, and the 
employment of available specialized 
personnel and equipment. 

If criminal intelligence is to be useful it 
must be recorded and capable of being 
rapidly retrieved when needed. Such records 
include journals, files, tapes, reports, maps, 
photographs, and automatic data processing 
tiles. 

Evaluating criminal intelligence involves 
determining the reliability of the source and 
the pertinence and accuracy of the 
information. The determination of a source's 
reliability is dependent upon past experience 
with the source. Accuracy concerns the 
truthfulness of the information and the 
likelihood that such information may be 
true. The fact that a source may be 
completely reliable does not mean that all 
information from him is accurate. The 
information must be evaluated in its relation 
to other information on hand and the 
prevailing circumstances of its collection 
(see FM 19-20). 

Criminal intelligence is analyzed 

singularly before being integrated with other 



36 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



information. This affords an opportunity for 
information to be viewed on its own merit. 
After analyzing information for its own 
worth, it is then included with other data and 
integrated with related information. This 
allows an examination of all available 
information and presents the greatest 
possibility of deriving criminal intelligence. 
Analysis is conducted at all levels of MP 
information activities. The best basis on 
which to conduct analysis is experience. 



Formally or informally many types of logic 
can be applied, as well as new methods of 
statistical analysis, operations research, 
systems analysis, and computer analysis. 

The timely distribution of available data is 
of vital importance to MP operations. 
Criminal intelligence is useless unless placed 
where it can be used. Distribution is made at 
the most advantageous time, by the most 
rapid means available, considering the 
classification of the material. 



COLLECTING AND RELEASING INFORMATION 



The collection and release of information 
pertaining to US citizens is governed by law. 
The Freedom of Information Act allows 
citizens to obtain information and records 
that have been gathered on them by various 
governmental agencies. The Privacy Act 
restricts the kind of information about 
citizens that government agencies can 
collect. For more information on records 
administration and release of information, 
see AR 190-45. 

AR 340-17 governs the procedures the 
Army will follow when a freedom of 
information request is received. Each 
installation has aTreedom of Information 
Act officer with whom coordination is 
made when acting on requests. Some 
MP /investigative records are exempt from 
disclosure. Denial of information can be 
made only by designated initial denial 
authorities who are generally heads of the 
DA staff agencies. 

AR 340-21 governs the procedures the 
Army will follow concerning the Privacy 
Act. AR 340-21 provides guidance on the 
various law enforcement information 
systems of USACIDC and the MP. Some 
investigative and internal control records in 
the law enforcement field are exempt from 
disclosure. Some of these exempt records are 
informant registers, accreditation files, 
reports of investigation, MP reports, and SIR 
files. Each record-release request must be 
handled on an individual basis. 



It is a requirement of the Privacy Act that 
people be informed of the purpose for 
obtaining information. Individuals are not 
required to disclose their social security 
numbers. However, the authority to obtain it 
for DA forms is contained in 10 USC 3012. If 
an individual refuses to disclose his social 
security number, it will be obtained from 
official personnel records. The law places 
restrictions on transferring information 
concerning an individual to other agencies or 
organizations, particularly those outside the 
federal government. In accordance with 
status of forces agreements (SOFAs) or local 
laws, transfer of investigatory information 
may be allowed to local; state, and foreign 
police (see AR 340-21). Coordination with SJA 
is made concerning questions and problems 
involving this act and release of information 
to other law enforcement agencies. 

All records pertaining to juvenile 
offenders must be safeguarded from 
unauthorized disclosure. They are released 
only on a need-to-know basis. They must be 
maintained in a secure file in the juvenile 
office or PM office, with very limited access. 
See AR 190-45 for more information on how 
to store juvenile records. 

During juvenile proceedings, information 
on the juvenile and the circumstances of the 
offense may be furnished only to the court, 
counsel for the juvenile, the government, or 
others entitled to review sealed records. 



FM 19-10 



37 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



Records may also be released to a treatment 
facility to which a juvenile has been com- 
mitted by the court if the director submits an 
inquiry in writing. And sometimes records 
may be released to an agency considering 
the subject for a position involving law 
enforcement work or affecting national 
security. 

Records should give detailed listings of 
regulations the juveniles have violated. And 
they should include the disposition made by 
civilian authorities. But permanent records 
of nonessential minor incidents or situations 
resolved in conference with parents or the 
juvenile are not made. If trie juvenile is 
found innocent, the records are destroyed, 
sealed by the court, or otherwise disposed of 
in accordance with local directives. Juvenile 
records transmitted outside the MP station 
or PM office will be assigned protective 
markings as specified in AR 340-17. 

MP may, at times, come in contact with 
the news media. Establishing a cooperative 
relationship with the news media can 
eliminate misunderstanding between the 
military community and the news media. 

MP do not release information to the news 
media. If asked to give information, MP 
decline. The requestor is referred to where 
the information may be obtained. A 
definitive policy as to what news is to be 
made available, through what channels, 
and under what circumstances it is to be 
released is established by the PM in 
coordination with the public affairs officer 
(PAO) of the installation. 

The PAO, like the PM, also is a staff 
officer of the commander. The PAO keeps 
the community informed about unit 
operations or developments that ma y impact 
on the military community. The PAO also 
keeps the commander advised of community 
opinion and the probable community 
reaction to impending operations and 
developments. 

The PAO may release to the press 
information concerning the post that is not 



classified or libelous. The PM and MP unit 
commanders must be familiar with 
ARs 360-5 and 360-61. 

The PM, in coordination with the PAO, 
uses all available public information media, 
such as television, radio, newspapers, and 
posters to— 

• Introduce MP and their mission so there 
will be understanding and cooperation 
between MP and the military and civilian 
communities. 

• Explain enforcement plans, policies, 
programs, and changes so members of the 
military community know the law 
enforcement programs and govern 
themselves accordingly. 

• Explain pertinent provisions of 
agreements entered into with local civil 
police. 

• Explain the role that all members of the 
military community must play to prevent 
crimes and offenses, and actions they are 
to take to assist MP if they become 
victims of crimes and offenses. 

• Publicize outstanding accomplishments 
of MP and other members of the military 
community in preventing crimes and 

offenses. 

The sources of departmental information 
available to the press are strictly controlled, 
standardized, and reduced to a minimum. 
When stories are misinterpreted, the 
responsible reporter is contacted and the 
proper interpretation given. MP must be 
careful not to exaggerate occasional petty 
criticisms that are printed in the papers, as 
long as general press relations impact 
positively on the military community. In 
this respect, MP must remember that the 
press is usually a good barometer of 
community opinion and wields a great 
influence upon it. Good press relations can 
mean that favorable stories will be given 
front page coverage and unfavorable stories 
will be presented in a less damaging light, 
consistent with the facts. 



38 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



USING MILITARY POLICE MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 



In an effort to standardize automated in- 
formation management throughout the MP 
Corps, specific systems have been created for 
use Armywide. Under the umbrella Military 
Police Management Information Systems 
(MPMIS), the ORS, the VRS, and the 
Correctional Reporting System (CRS) 
support the law enforcement mission of the 
MP. Each system is designed to provide data 
query and report capability in response to 
managerial or investigative requirements. 

OFFENSE REPORTING SYSTEM 

The information used by the ORS is taken 
from each DA Form 39/5 (Military Police 
Report). Information is stored in the 
computer until it is requested through a data 
query or in the form of a standard report. 
Automation of this information does not do 
away with the requirement to prepare and 
store hard copy MP reports and associated 
case documents. These documents must be 
available for court or court-martial 
proceedings. However, ORS provides rapid 
access to detailed information as well as 
broad statistical analysis. 

Standard reports generated through ORS 
may be requested and used as needed at the 
installation level, or they may be used to 
satisfy a regulatory requirement for 
standard information such as the law 
enforcement and discipline report. Features 
of ORS include computer-generated reports 
that identify crime by location, summarize 
all offenses by type, profile adjudication of 
persons apprenended by the MP, and 
produce separate reports on any cases 
involving juveniles. Additionally, ORS 
monitors the status of all open MP reports 
referred to MPIs, USACIDC, traffic, or other 
investigative agencies. It further recognizes 
overdue suspenses for DA Form 4833 
(Commander s Report of Disciplinary or 
Administrative Action). ORS is beneficial in 
assisting MP in the identification of problem 
areas or units on an installation. For 



assistance on how to use the ORS, see the 

2mse Reporting System Functional Users 
mal. 

VEHICLE REGISTRATION SYSTEM 

The VRS is a stand-alone system, indepen- 
dent of other MPMIS systems, that can 
provide useful vehicle data to the MP and 
unit commanders. It entirely automates the 
registration of vehicles authorized on any 
installation. The necessity for the timely 
retrieval of vehicle information is 
fundamental and can most efficiently and 
effectively be achieved through automation. 
VRS complements the registration process 
by meeting the increasing demands of law 
enforcement for timely information. 
Whether or not the actual registration 
process is conducted by personnel assigned 
to the PM is not important. Information 
stored through VRb is equally valuable 
through the process of data query and 
standard reports. 

Reports are requested as required by the 
MP. The types available include registration 
by decal number, state license number, or 
personnel type. Additionally, VRS monitors 
the status or driving privilege suspension 
and revocation as well as validation of 
safety inspections, insurance, and post 
decals. For assistance on how to use the 
VRS, see the Vehicle Registration System 
Functional Users Manual. 

CORRECTIONAL REPORTING 
SYSTEM 

The CRS assists in the management of the 
Army's confinement facilities. Information 
on each prisoner is taken from confinement 
orders, release orders, personal history 
documents, and other sources. This 
information assists the correctional facility 
staff in monitoring the custody and control 
of all prisoners assigned. The data base is 
used to generate various types of daily, 
monthly, and quarterly reports as required 
by regulation. Reports provide information 



FM 19-10 



39 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



on the status of the prisoner population. 
Reports make it possible for prisoner gains 
and losses to be tracked. Reports also make it 
possible for statistical analysis to be 



performed on the information in the data 
base. For assistance on how to use the CRS, 
see the Correctional Reporting System Users 
Manual 



DEVELOPING AND USING MP INFORMATION FILES 



MP information files must contain as 
much information as possible, cover as 
many years as possible, and be efficiently 
organized, consistent with the limitations 
imposed by AR 380-13. Information files are 
retained indefinitely. (To request modifica- 
tion of the Army filing system and method of 
storage and retention, see AR 25-400-2.) 
These files must be excluded from general 
inspection or review by anyone other than 
designated persons except upon authori- 
zation from the commanding general or 
installation commander. Cross-referencing of 
files is mandatory. Automatic data 
processing is used to the maximum extent 
possible. 

The sensitive nature of these files must be 
understood by all persons concerned. Files 
contain offense charts, statistical 
summaries, blotters, DA Forms 3975, and 
information from MP and criminal 
investigations. These files also include 
rumor, supposition, conjecture, and gossip; 
this information may be damaging to 
otherwise innocent persons. These files may 
also contain information on friends, 
relatives, or fellow MP. From contacts made 
with other MP and MPIs and information 
already contained in the files, MP can 
pinpoint establishments, activities, friends, 
and problems. 

MP patrols and their supervisors are alert 
and observant for all items of interest. They 
report such items fully and promptly. They 
question the identities of persons 
encountered in unusual places at unusual 
times. They ask their reasons for being in 
those places at those times. And they may 
ask for other information as well. Interview 
information, if it does not lead to an 



immediate apprehension, is reported by 
patrol personnel. Usually a locally devised 
field interview card is used for this purpose. 
It should contain spaces for complete 
identification of the individual (and vehicle 
if applicable), the time and place of the 
interview, the reason for the interview, and 
the person's stated reasons for being in the 
area. Additional space can be provided for 
any remarks of the IMP and for nis signature. 
Data compiled from field interview cards are 
transferred to information cards filed in the 
police information file. 

AREA FILES 

Area files include information on any 
definable geographic area that has activities 
of police interest. On a CONUS installation, 
it may include housing areas, supply and 
storage areas, and recreational or training 
areas. Off post, it may include bar, hotel, or 
pawn shop areas, or any area of potential 
civil disturbances. With only slight 
modifications, the same considerations 
apply in overseas areas. In overseas areas 
where units or specific groups move into an 
area and more or less claim it as their own 
area, files become very revealing and 
extremely important. In rear area protection 
or in stability operations, areas of police 
interest may include those areas where 
populations are known to be unfriendly to 
the United States or allied forces, areas 
suitable for guerrilla training or bases, and 
areas that may provide potential sources of 
supply and equipment for insurgent forces. 

ACTIVITY FILES 

The activity files contain all information 
of interest to the MP. The categories in this 
system vary, and the information is not 



40 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



limited by the area of influence or by 
jurisdictional considerations. 

All activities that can pose a threat to 
military personnel, functions, or property 
are included in an activity file. Information 
concerning persons and organizations not 
affiliated with the Department of Defense 
may be acquired, reported, processed, and 
stored under the authority of AR 380-13 only 
if in the judgment of the commander 
concerned there is reasonable basis to 
believe that one or more of the following has 
or is likely to occur: 

• Theft, damage, or sabotage of weapons, 
ammunition, equipment, facilities, or 
records belonging to DOD units or 
installations. 

• Compromise of classified defense 

information by unauthorized disclosure or 
espionage. 

• Demonstrations occurring on or 
immediately adjacent to Active or Reserve 
Army installations which are of such size 
or character that they are likely to 
interfere with the conduct of military 
activities, as defined in AR 380-13. 

• Direct threats to DOD military or civilian 
personnel regarding their official duties or 

o other persons authorized protection by 
X)D resources. 

• Activities or demonstrations endangering 
classified defense contract facilities or key 
defense facilities. 

• Acts occurring on Active or Reserve Army 
installations in violation of laws or 
regulations. 

• Subversion of loyaltv, discipline, or 
morale of military and DOD civilian 
personnel (18 USC 2387). 

A distinction must be recognized between 
the various restrictions governing the 
collection, storage, and dissemination of 
information in a peacetime environment and 
the need to gather information in support of 
tactical operations. Normally, the 



restrictions of AR 380-13 do not apply in the 
theater of operations. 

INDIVIDUAL FILES 

Any individual identified as being of 
special significance to the MP, either 
because of activities, leadership, contacts, or 
even as a symbol of some nature, has a 
dossier withm the restrictions of AR 380-13. 
This dossier is nothing more than a complete 
biography to include information on habits, 
income, friends, weaknesses, and personal 
history. The individual's police record, 
disciplinary record, and details of other 
contacts with law enforcement agencies are 
included. See AR 340-17 and AR 380-13 for 
guidance regarding non-DOD-affiliated 
personnel. 

INVESTIGATORY FILES 

Investigatory files compiled for enforcing 
civil, criminal, or military law are considered 
exempt from mandatory release provisions 
of the 1974 Freedom of Information Act 
(5 USC 552). Information requests 
concerning data determined to be releasable 
by the PM and SJA are honored in 
accordance with the provisions of AR 340-17. 
Requests for information from representa- 
tives of the press will be processed through 
the appropriate command information 
officer. Information is not released to 
representatives of the press if it is likely to— 

• Interfere with law enforcement 
proceedings. 

• Deprive an individual of fair and 

impartial justice. 

• Invade the personal privacy of an 

individual. 

• Disclose nonroutine investigation 

techniques and procedures. 

• Disclose confidential investigative 
information and sources of information. 

• Reveal information that might endanger 
the lives or physical safety of law 
enforcement personnel. 



FM 19-10 



41 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



USING OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES 



NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION 
CENTER 

The NCIC is a computerized information 
system established by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) as a service to all law 
enforcement agencies — local, state, and 
federal. The system operates by means of 
computers, data transmission over 
communication lines, terminal devices, and, 
most important, people. Its objective is to 
improve the effectiveness of law enforcement 
through the efficient handling and exchange 
of documented civil and military police 
information. 

The NCIC makes centralized criminal 
data rapidly available to law enforcement 
agencies. Patrol tactics and investigative 
habits must be reviewed in light of this 
capability if the system is to attain optimum 
use. The success of the system will depend on 
the extent to which patrols, supervisors, and 
investigators use it in daily operations. 

The US Army participates in the NCIC 
system in conjunction with other law 
enforcement agencies. The system affords 
the Army timely police information 
regarding deserters; wanted persons; and 
stolen, missing, and recovered automobiles, 
boats, securities, license plates, weapons, 
and other identifiable property. 

The NCIC provides data on military 
absentees and deserters as provided in 
AR 190-9 and AR 190-27. Data are 
obtained from DD Form 553 (Test) 
(Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed 
Forces) forwarded by PMs to the USADIP at 
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The 
USADIP, staffed by MP and personnel 
specialists, ensures that information 
received is current and correct, and that it is 
entered into the NCIC and disseminated to 
all appropriate law enforcement agencies. 

The Office of Army Law Enforcement, 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 



(DCSPER), is responsible for overall Army 
participation in the NCIC. In addition to 
operating the Army's central terminal in the 
NCIC system, it maintains liaison with the 
FBI on NCIC matters. Currently, Army field 
terminals in the NCIC are located at 
designated installations and the Military 
District of Washington. AR 190-27 specifies 
procedural requirements for Army users of 
the NCIC system. The FBI publishes a 
manual containing standards, procedures, 
and instructions for NCIC participants. 
PMs maintain and update a copy of the 
NCIC operating manual and refer to this 
manual when questions arise concerning 

F roper procedures for using the NCIC 
M 19-2(5, AR 190-9, and AR 190-27 provide 
further details concerning the NCIC. 

CRIME RECORDS CENTER 

The USACRC receives and maintains the 
permanent files of USACIDC reports and 
investigations and designated MP reports. 
USACRC ensures retention of these records 
and supplies data and copies of files or 
documents to agencies authorized to request 
such information. USACRC also maintains 
liaison with other federal intelligence 
agencies as prescribed in AR 195-2. 

The function of the USACRC is to — 

• Receive and file all USACIDC reports of 
investigation. 

• Receive and file MP reports acquired 
under the provisions of AR 190-45. 

• Operate and maintain criminal data 
reference files. 

• Provide record checks, both emergency 
and routine, for USACIDC elements, 
other federal investigative agencies, and 
other authorized users. 

• Develop specialized statistics and reports 
on crime within the Army as required by 
Headquarters, Department of the Army. 



42 



FM 19-10 



THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION 



• Transmit, upon reqest, copies of 
USACIDC reports of investigation and 
MP reports to USACIDC elements, 
Department of the Army, federal 
investigative agencies, and other 
authorized users. 

The USACRC will, upon request of 
authorized users, conduct a search of 
available files for information on a 
particular individual. File searches can be 
made as part of a crime survey check of 
employees at a particular establishment. 
Such checks are considered routine. 
Requests for immediate record checks may 
be forwarded by telephone, telecopier, or 
teletypewriter. Telephonic format is 
contained in AR 195-2. Letter or message 
requests are addressed to Director, US Army 
Crime Records Center, 2301 Chesapeake 
Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21222. 
Requests contain, if available, the name, 
date of birth, place of birth, social security 
number, and military service number. 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION 

The FBI investigates all violations of 
federal laws, with the exception of specified 



violations, such as counterfeiting and 
internal revenue violations. The FBI 
classifies and maintains fingerprint files on 
all present and past federal employees 
(including military personnel) and all 
persons apprehended for the commission of 
serious crimes. The bureau also maintains 
the NCIC. 

The 1984 Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Department of Justice and the 
Department or Defense relating to the 
investigation and prosecution of certain 
crimes (see AR 27-10) provides guidance on 
investigative responsibility between the FBI 
and military criminal investigative 
organizations. 

DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 

The Drug Enforcement Administration 
has prime responsibility for enforcing laws 
and statutes relating to narcotic drugs, 
marihuana, depressants, stimulants, and 
hallucinogenic drugs. The agency will assist 
federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies in the exchange of information and 
training to control the use and trafficking of 
narcotics and other drugs. 



FM 19-10 



43 



PART TWO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Military police law enforcement operations 
help the commander keep his command 
combat ready and combat efficient. The 
enforcement of military laws, orders, and 
regulations is a function of command. 
Commanders, by enforcing laws and 
regulations, ensure order and discipline. 
Each commander is responsible for 
maintaining order and discipline in his unit. 

Leaders are the key to order and discipline. 
From on-the-spot corrections to referrals for 
action under the Manual for Courts-Martial, 
leaders execute their responsibilities through 
the chain of command. To assist the chain of 
command, MP are empowered by division, 
corps, and echelons-above-corps command- 
ers to exercise control over soldiers who 
violate military laws, orders, and regula- 
tions. MP at all levels support the com- 
mander in his responsibility for command 
and control by ensuring that his directives 
are complied with. 

Sometimes it is not in the commander's 
best interest to employ MP assets 
specifically on law enforcement operations. 
Yet even then MP efforts continue to reduce 
the opportunity for crime. All MP missions 
contribute to the preservation of law and 
order. Law enforcement is an implied factor 
in all MP operations. In the course of any 
operation MP perform, MP operate in a 
manner and with intent to encourage 
support and to enforce the commander's 
discipline and military law. 

Even in a theater of operations when the 
intensity of battle dictates the need to 
concentrate MP efforts on combat support 
operations, the opportunity for crime is 
nonetheless reduced as a result of MP 
missions. MP battlefield combat support 
operations and peacetime law enforcement 
operations use many of the same measures. 
Sometimes the purpose for using the 
measures is the same. TCPs and checkpoints 



are used on and off the battlefield to help 
ensure critical personnel, equipment, and 
supplies arrive where they are needed. 
Sometimes the purposes for using the 
measures differ. In a peacetime 
environment, MP use physical security 
measures to reduce the opportunity for 
crime. In a theater of operations, the 
measures are used to protect critical facilities 
and supplies from the enemy. Yet the 
measures still suppress the opportunity for 
crime. (Battlefield uses for traffic control and 
physical security measures are discussed in 
FM 19-4 under Battlefield Circulation 
Control and Area Security.) 

It is, however, recognized that most MP 
efforts that directly enforce laws and support 
order are undertaken mainly in a peacetime 
environment. These efforts include both 
proactive and reactive measures. MP 
undertake and support preventive programs 
to remove conditions promoting crime and to 
reduce opportunities allowing crime. MP 
enforcement efforts encourage voluntary 
compliance by all personnel with laws, 
orders, regulations, and directives of the 
commander. 

Military law enforcement is best served by 
achieving the greatest compliance with rules 
with the least amount of punitive action. MP 
accomplish much at potential trouble spots 
by encouraging law-abiding persons to 
cooperate actively in helping fellow soldiers 
act properly. Friends and buddies are 
encouraged to remove troublemakers from 
the scene. And proprietors are encouraged to 
call MP when there may be disorders. But 
when necessary, MP undertake active 
enforcement measures. MP take immediate 
action to halt crimes in progress, to 
apprehend perpetrators, and to aid victims. 
Mr undertake enforcement measures that 
range from conducting raids and seizing 
illegal drugs to patrolling roadways and 
regulating traffic. 



44 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 5 
Having Authority and Jurisdiction 



Military police carry out their law 

enforcement operations with strict regard for 
the needs of the Army and the safety of the 
military community. At the same time, MP 
maintain a strict regard for the rights of the 
individuals making up that military com- 
munity. Just as Mr undertake their law 
enforcement operations in the military com- 
munity to protect and preserve the life of the 
community, they also protect and preserve 
the legal rights of members of the military 
community. In so doing, MP carry out the 
Army policy of equality before the law. 

EXERCISING AUTHORITY 
AND JURISDICTION 

All military personnel performing police 
work operate within their jurisdiction and 
authority. Jurisdiction and authority are not 
the same. MP may have the authority to 
apprehend a suspect, but the military 
may not have jurisdiction to try the suspect. 
Authority is tne lawful right of designated 
persons or agencies to exercise governmental 
power or control. Military jurisdiction is the 
extent of and limitation on the right of an 
armed force to exercise authority and control 
over persons and offenses. 

AUTHORITY 

The authority of MP to enforce military 
law, orders, and regulations, by appre- 
hension if necessary, is derived primarily 
from the President of the United States as 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. MP 
must familiarize themselves with the 
contents of the articles of the UCMJ if they 
are to perform their duties effectively. 
National Guard and Army Reserve MP 
usually exercise no authority overactive duty 
military unless they are themselves subject to 
the UCMJ. In a clomestic territory under 
martial rule, the authority of the MP over 
persons other than those subject to the UCMJ 
is derived from policies and orders of the 



CONTENTS 



EXERCISING AUTHORITY AND 
JURISDICTION 



[Authority 



Page 



.45 

.45 



Authority Over Persons Subject 
toUCML 



Authority Over Persons not Subject 

toUCMT 

Posse Comitatusl 



Jurisdiction 



.46 

.46 
.47 

.47 



jMilitary Jurisdiction 48 

| Civil Jurisdiction| . 49 

I PROTECTING LEGAL RIGHTg 49 






Rights Warninel 



Temporary Detention 



,53 



military commander which must be based 
upon federal law. 

The authority of MP in a friendly foreign 
nation or territory may be, and in most cases 
is, different from MP authority in the US. 
This difference arises from the law of the 
country concerned (except as otherwise 
provided by agreement) being applicable to 
all persons, including MP in that country. 
Consequently, in the absence of an 
international agreement to the contrary, US 
troops in a friendly foreign nation are subject 
to the UCMJ and the laws of the nation in 
which stationed. 

An agreement to resolve jurisdictional 
conflicts is the status of forces agreement. 
Basically, the SOFA authorizes one 

government to take action in cases where 
oth governments could take action. A 
formula decides which government will act in 
a particular case. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) SOFA was the first 
significant agreement negotiated and has 
become the model for most later agreements. 
For example, during joint NATO operations 
US Army MP can be tasked to be a part of a 
NATO combined MP detachment (see NATO 
Standardization Agreement [STANAG] 2085). 



FM 19-10 



45 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Authority Over Persons Subject to 
UCMJ 

MP have authority to take appropriate 
action with persons subject to the UCMJ. 
This authority is not limited to military 
reservations or federal property. All active 
duty military personnel are subject to the 
provisions of the UCMJ. It also pertains to 
some retired members and other personnel 
enumerated in Article 2, UCMJ. 

The UCMJ, as established by Congress, 
provides one basic code of military justice 
and law for all services. The code authorizes 
the President of the United States to set rules 
of evidence; pretrial, trial, and posttrial 
procedures; and maximum punishments for 
violations of the UCMJ. Under this 
authority, the President has issued the MCM. 
The MCM is a primary source document for 
matters relating to military justice. It is an 
executive order implementing the provisions 
of the UCMJ. It establishes the military law 
of evidence. 

Ordinarily in the US, MP have the same 
authority to apprehend friendly foreign 
military personnel as they have to apprehend 
civilians. On post this authority arises from 
the installation commander's inherent 
authority to maintain order on the 
installation. However, after authorization by 
the President and upon request of the 
commanding officer of a friendly foreign 
force having service courts in this country, 
MP may apprehend a designated member of 
the friendly foreign force and deliver him to 
US military authorities for delivery to the 
requesting force. 

Authority Over Persons Not Subject to 
UCMJ 

In areas under military jurisdiction or 
control, MP in some cases may take persons 
into custody whether or not they are in the 
military services: 

• Persons not subject to the UCMJ who are 
found committing a felony or a 
misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the 
peace on a military reservation may be 



apprehended and detained long enough to 
be turned over to civil authorities. 

• Civilians not subject to the UCMJ also 
may be apprehended for violation of 
properly promulgated post regulations. 
These persons then maybe escorted to the 
entrance of the post and may be forbidden 
reentry by the installation commander. 

• Civilians not subject to the UCMJ may be 
cited for violations of the Assimilative 
Crimes Act not amounting to felonies or 
breaches of the peace (such as fishing 
without a valid permit) and referred to a 
US magistrate. 

• Civilians not subject to the UCMJ may be 
subject to military authority in situations 
involving martial law or hostilities. 

Thus, commanders and MP have authority 
to apprehend civilians in many circum- 
stances; they may also detain civilians for a 
reasonable period of time in order to effect 
their arrest by civilian law enforcement 
authorities. The local SJA is consulted 
regarding the applicable rules. AR 600-40 
provides general guidance regarding 
apprehension and restraint of persons not 
subject to military law. 

Commanders have the authority to eject 
trespassers on the installation and to enforce 
the ejection of any person previously barred 
from entry. This authority comes from 18 
USC 1382, which provides that "whoever, 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, 
goes upon any military, naval, or Coast 
Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, 
station, or installation, for any purpose 
prohibited by law or lawful regulation; or 
whoever reenters or is found within any such 
reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, 
or installation, after having been removed 
therefrom or ordered not to enter by the 
officer in command or charge thereof, shall be 
fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not 
more than six months or both/ 

The US Magistrate System provides the 
Department of the Army witn a means of 
processing and disposing of certain minor 



46 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



offenses and traffic violations. A minor 
offense is defined as one in which punish- 
ment would not exceed imprisonment for one 
year, a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 
DD Form 1805 (United States District Court 
Violation Notice) will be used to refer minor 
offenses to the US Magistrate Court. 

If a case is referred to magistrate court, the 
individual is given the option of either paying 
a fine or appearing before the court to contest 
the charges. For only the most serious 
offenses is a court appearance mandatory. 
The court frequently sits on the military 
installation. An advantage to such a system 
is the prompt and expeditious disposition of 
minor offenses without resort to a federal 
district court. 

Posse Comitatus 

MP authority does not extend to civilians 
outside areas under military jurisdiction or 
control. The military cannot be used to help 
execute civilian law. The Posse Comitatus 
Act provides that whoever, except in cases 
and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or by act of 
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army 
to execute civil law shall be fined not more 
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 
two years or both. This act applies to 
enforcement of federal, state, county, or local 
law. And a related statute makes it an offense 
to have military personnel at a place where 
elections are being held, except when such 
force is necessary to repel armed enemies of 
the US (18 USC 592 and 593). 

Military forces acting in civil disturbances 
under the provisions of 10 USC 331-333 are 
not in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Nor does this prohibition extend to 
employing federal military forces to protect 
federal functions and property or to acting in 
an emergency. Acts having a primary 
military purpose and only incidentally 
enforcing civilian law are not prohibited. 

Note that the Posse Comitatus Act does 
not prohibit military assistance to protect 
public safety as opposed to law enforcement. 



Thus, it does not prohibit the use of Army 
bomb disposal experts in deactivating and 
destroying explosives found in civilian 
communities. Nor does it prohibit Army 
medical personnel from rendering medical 
care to persons injured in a natural disaster. 
Further, this law does not prohibit an 
individual member of the Army from 
making a citizen's arrest for a felony or 
breach of the peace committed in his 
presence. The act does not prohibit 
development and maintenance of effective 
working relationships between MP and their 
civilian counterparts nor the loan to civilian 
authorities of certain types of equipment. 

But the law does prohibit concerted use, 
under orders, of units or individuals of the 
Army to execute the law. The Posse 
Comitatus Act does not prohibit investiga- 
tion of offenses committed by civilians if 
there is an Army interest. The SJA should be 
consulted on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether or not there is an Army 
interest and the measures to be taken during 
the investigation. 

The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply 
when a state activates its National Guard in 
accordance with state law. Such a force can 
be used to enforce the laws of the state. 
However, if the National Guard is called into 
federal service, the Posse Comitatus Act 
applies. 

JURISDICTION 

Jurisdiction limits the exercise of 
authority. The jurisdiction of every offense 
or incident depends upon the status of the 
suspect, international agreements and 
treaties, the "service connection" of the 
offense, and other factors. The SJA is 
always consulted where questions exist 
about jurisdiction. 

The term "exclusive jurisdiction" refers to 
the power granted to Congress by the United 
States Constitution to exercise legislative 
authority. It also applies to similar power 
acquired by the US through cession by a 
state, or by a reservation made by the US 



FM 19-10 



47 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



upon the admission of the state into the 
Union. In the exercise of exclusive 
jurisdiction, the federal government 
assumes sole jurisdiction over the 
designated area. For example, many 
military installations have exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. The federal government then 
exercises its executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over that area and the 
personnel within it. To avoid the difficult 
task of enacting and maintaining a code of 
criminal laws appropriate for all areas under 
its legislative jurisdiction, Congress passed 
18 USC 13, commonly referred to as the 
Assimilative Crimes Act. In this statute, 
Congress provided that all acts or omissions 
occurring in an area under federal 
jurisdiction, which would constitute crimes if 
the area were under the state jurisdiction, 
will constitute similar crimes, similarly 
punishable, under federal law. This act does 
not assimilate crimes based on state statutes 
that are contrary to federal policy and law, 
such as civil rights legislation, nor does it 
assimilate state law if there is an existing 
federal statute or law on the subject. 

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when the 
US is granted authority that would 
otherwise amount to exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction over an area, but the state in 
which the area is located retains the right to 
simultaneously exercise its authority along 
with that of the federal government. It is an 
area of dual jurisdiction. Under concurrent 
jurisdiction, state criminal laws are 
applicable in the area and can be enforced by 
the state. The same laws can be enforced by 
the federal government under the 
Assimilative Crimes Act, which is applicable 
to areas under concurrent as well as 
exclusive jurisdiction of the US. Federal 
criminal laws also apply. Many crimes fall 
under both federal and state sanction, and 
either the federal or state government, or 
both, may take jurisdiction over a given 
offense. 

Proprietorial interest applies to instances 
in which the federal government has 
acquired some right or title of ownership to 



an area in a state but has not obtained 
jurisdiction. Where the federal government 
has no legislative jurisdiction over its land, 
it holds such land in a proprietorial interest 
only and has the same rights as any other 
landowner. In addition, there exists a right 
of the federal government to perform the 
functions delegated to it by the Constitution 
without interference from any source. It may 
resist — by exercising its legislative or 
executive authority, or through court 
proceedings— any attempted interference by 
a state instrumentality of its exercise of 
constitutional responsibilities. Congress 
also has authority to enact laws for the 
protection of US property. Subject to these 
conditions, when the US acquires only a 
proprietorial interest, the state retains all the 
jurisdiction over the area it would have if a 
private individual rather than the US owned 
the land. The Assimilative Crimes Act does 
not apply to areas of federal proprietorial 
jurisdiction. In such areas, MP exercise 
authority in compliance with the 
instructions of the appropriate commander. 

Military Jurisdiction 

Military jurisdiction is exercised through 
the application of military law, the law of 
war, military government, martial law, and 
military orders and regulations - 

• Military law regulates the entire military 
establishment of the US. 

• Law of war is that segment of treaty and 
customary international law applicable to 
warfare. 

• Military government is the administra- 
tion by which an occupying power 
exercises executive, legislative, and 
judicial authority over occupied territory. 

• Martial law or martial rule is the 
temporary exercise of control over 
domestic territory by a military 
commander as authorized by the 
President. 

• Military orders and regulations are used 
in a military organization for its internal 
direction. 



48 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Military jurisdiction extends to military 
personnel whether or not they are in an area 
under military control. The military has 
exclusive jurisdiction to try persons subject 
to the UCMJ for offenses purely military in 
nature, such as unauthorized absences. The 

Supreme Court has abandoned the 
requirement of showing a "service 
connection" for off-post offenses before a 
service member can be tried. A service 
member may now be tried in a court-martial 
regardless of any service connection. It is 
Army policy that a service member will not 
ordinarily be prosecuted under civil 
jurisdiction and later under military 
jurisdiction for the same offense. The 
military rarely has jurisdiction to try 
civilians. 



Civil Jurisdiction 

Civil jurisdiction is exercised through the 
application of state and federal law. Under 
the Constitution the states retain the right to 
regulate conduct of persons within their 

boundaries. Penal laws, which declare 
certain acts to be unlawful, are defined and 



enforced by state, county, and local 

governments and their regulatory agencies. 
For example, traffic regulations, liquor laws, 
and closing hours are usually set by local 
law. Some penal laws pertain to specific 
matters or areas within the civil jurisdiction 
of the federal government. Such federal law, 
like customs regulations and counterfeiting 
laws, is enforced by federal agencies. 

Under international law, a friendly foreign 
power normally has primary jurisdiction to 
prosecute nonmilitary offenses committed 
within its borders by members of a visiting 
force. This power may be further defined or 
surrendered to military authorities through 
SOFAs and other treaties or agreements 
depending upon the nature and circum- 
stances or the offense. This limitation to 
prosecute does not prohibit commanders 
from taking administrative action against 
suspects. Guidance on the exercise of 
military jurisdiction subsequent to action by 
civilian authorities is found in AR 27-10. 
When doubt exists on jurisdiction over a 
particular individual or offense, consult the 
§JA. 



PROTECTING LEGAL RIGHTS 



An MP can make contact with a person in 
any place the MP is lawfully situated. 
Examples of lawful contacts include 
questioning of witnesses to a crime and 
warning a pedestrian that he is entering a 
dangerous area. These types of contacts are 
reasonable, permissible, and within the 
normal activities of MP and commanders. 
They are not detentions in any sense. MP 
may inspect or walk through barracks or the 
unit area. MP may be any place where 
consent has been given by a person who has 
the power to give consent. Tney may be any 
place with the consent or authorization of a 
commander, or any place where they are 
present to effect a lawful apprehension. 

An MP may make a contact when the 
person is not subject to the Fourth 



Amendment. This is a proper activity of a 
commander or MP. Every contact between 
the police and a citizen is not a detention, 
and does not demand a basis for the contact. 
Many contacts between MP (and commanders) 
and other persons are not based on suspicion of 
criminal activity. However, some contacts may 
result in finding evidence of a crime. 

Contacts between MP and others may 
occur without thought of criminal activities. 
MP assist disablea people, untangle con- 
gested traffic, and escort intoxicated persons 
to shelter. MP perform other helping 
activities as required. 

RIGHTS WARNING 

The law requires that a military member 
who questions a military or civilian suspect 



FM 19-10 

161-016 0-94-4 



49 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



or accused must be exercising some form of 
police or disciplinary power before he is 
required to read the person his rights. If an 
apprehending MP considers it important to 
question a suspect while in the field, the 
MP must advise the suspect of his rights. 
Any individual can be read rights before 
even the most innocent questioning. 
However, a commander or MP who is 

Questioning a suspect is performing a 
isciplinary role ana has to read the person 
his or her rights. When in doubt, read the 
rights. 

When a law enforcement official or 
commander intends to question an accused 
or suspect of an offense and knows, or 
reasonably knows, that counsel either has 
been appointed for or retained by the 
accused or suspect with respect to that 
offense, the counsel must be notified of the 
intended interrogation and given a 
reasonable time in wnich to attend before the 
interrogation may proceed. A suspect or 
accused who is intoxicated or who is 
suffering from a serious injury or illness 
should not be interrogated. Nor should a 
suspect or accused be interrogated who is 
hysterical or emotionally upset. In these 
cases the court may rule that the suspect 
could not give an intelligent, knowing 
waiver of his rights. During an interrogation 
the questioner will not attempt to persuade, 
trick, or threaten the suspect or accused into 
waiving his rights. The suspect or accused 
will maKe his own decisions. The questioner 
will not subject the suspect or accused to 
prolonged questioning without a break. The 
questioner will not threaten the suspect or 
accused into confessing and will not 
physically abuse the suspect or accused. 

A suspect or an accused must be warned 
whenever answers are wanted to questions. 
If a person will be asked to perform an act 
that might be the equivalent of speech, such 
as pointing to a coat worn on a specific date, 
the rights must be read. It is not necessary 
for the warning to be given before 
conducting a lawful search of the suspect. 
But if any doubt exists, the rights are read. 



On many occasions, an individual may 
approach an MP, a commander, or a 
noncommissioned officer and furnish in- 
formation concerning criminal activities. 
Listening never requires a warning. 
However, any time the listener wants to 
interrupt the person giving the statement 
and clarify some information, questioning 
does take place and a warning is required. 

A warning is not needed before question- 
ing a person who is merely a witness to a 
crime. Nor is it needed to question someone 
who may know something about a crime but 
who is not a suspect. For example, asking a 
witness to a crime which way the perpetrator 
went requires no warning Nor would asking 
someone to show his identification card if 
the identification card is not suspected to be 
evidence. 

The warning is repeated any time there is 
a significant delay in questioning. If 
questioning a person who after waiving his 
rights and agreeing to answer questions has 
been released for the night, the next day that 
person must be rewarned of his rights. But if 
the person is released for lunch or is released 
to go back to the unit to get some clothing, a 
new warning is not required. And if it is 
known that an accused or a suspect has been 
warned by another officer and has chosen to 
waive his rights, there is no need to give 
another warning when there is no 
significant delay in questioning. The 
warning also is repeated to a suspect if he 
indicates that he did not understand the first 
warning or that he might want to change his 
mind about answering questions. 

If a suspect remains silent after he has 
been given the required warnings and has 
been asked if he wants a lawyer and is 
willing to make a statement, he is not 
questioned further. However, if the person 
merely indicates that he will not sign a 
waiver form but is willing to waive his 
rights, the questioning can continue. When a 
person waives his rights but objects to note 
taking by the questioner, the questioning 
can continue; but the note taking stops for 
practical reasons. 



50 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



If the accused or suspect first agrees to 
answer questions and then says that ne does 
not want to talk or say anything more, the 
questioning stops. If the accusea or suspect 
answers some questions, then stops and 
requests a lawyer, the questioner must stop 
asking questions until a lawyer has been 
proviaed or the accused or suspect initiates 
further questioning. 

When a lineup will be used, the suspect 
must be warned of his lineup rights and his 
right to counsel. If a suspect is under any 
form of pretrial restraint, or if charges have 
been preferred against him, then before 
placing him in a lineup at the MP station, 
the Mr must warn the suspect of his right to 
counsel. 



"Although you do not have a right to 
refuse to appear in a lineup, you have 
the right to have a lawyer present when 
the witnesses to the crime view the 
lineup. If you wish, a military lawyer will 
be appointed for you to represent you 
free of charge/' 



To ensure the pretrial lineup is not 
suggestive, the following steps are taken: 

• There are at least four fillers in the lineup. 

• MP are not to be used as fillers in lineups. 
Additionally, fillers in a lineup are not 
informed of who the suspect is otherwise 
nonverbal communication by them may 
be communicated to the witness. Fillers in 
the lineup resemble the suspect. When the 
characteristics of the suspect cannot be 
matched, it may be better to use some sort 
of photographic identification. 

• The person conducting the lineup is not to 
be involved with the specific 
investigation. The person is not to make 
any suggestions because they may 
adversely affect the integrity of the lineup. 

• Witnesses must be separated before and 
after any identification of the suspect. 
One witness may have an unfavorable 
influence on another. 



• Witnesses to the lineup are not allowed to 
make an identification in the presence of 
one another. 

• The suspect or his counsel is allowed to 
determine the suspect's position in the 
lineup. The suspect is allowed to change 
his position after each viewing. 

• When individuals in the lineup are 
required to try on clothing or to perform 
other acts, all individuals perform these 
acts, not just the suspect. 

• The suspect's counsel may request certain 
changes in the lineup procedures; 
however, he has no right to dictate how 
police will conduct the lineup. See FM 19-20 
tor more information on lineups. 

The warning must be given by using the 
warning shown on the back of DA Form 3881 
(Rights Warning Procedure /Waiver 
Certificate). A service member's rights under 
the self-incrimination clause and Article 31 
ensure that he cannot be forced to answer 
any incriminating questions or to make any 
incriminating pnysical acts equivalent to 
speech (for example, soldiers cannot be 
ordered to point out the clothes that were 
worn at the time of a rape offense). The 
taking of such evidence is considered to be 
requesting a statement within the meaning 
of Article 31. 

Correct use of DA Form 3881 requires the 
narrative warning on the reverse or the form 
be read verbatim to the suspect. (See FM 19-20 
for a detailed discussion for issuing rights 
warnings.) Warning the individual or his 
rights means more than just reading the 
warning found on the back of DA Form 3881. 
To waive his rights, the suspect must show 
some understanding which ordinarily will 
require, after each warning, an answer on 
the suspect's part that proves his 
understanding. The individual must state, 
first, that he is willing to make a statement, 
and second, that he does not wish to have an 
attorney present nor to consult with an 
attorney before questioning can continue. 
The suspect is then asked to execute the 
waiver portion of the form documenting his 



FM 19-10 



51 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE 



SECTION B RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE 



THE WARNING 



1 WARNING Inform the suspect/accused of: 

a. Your official position. 

b. Nature of offense(s). 

c. The fact that he/she is a suspect/accused. 

2. RIGHTS Advise the suspect/accused of his/her rights as 
follows. 

"Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your 
rights." 

a "You do not have to answer my questions or say 
anything." 

b. "Anything you say or do can be used as evidence against 
you in a criminal trial." 

c (For personnel subject to the UCMJ) "You have the right 
to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after 
questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during 



questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian you arrange for 
at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer de- 
tailed for you at no expense to you, or both." 

or 
(For civilians not subject to the UCMJ) "You have the 
right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after 
questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during 
questioning. However, you must make your own arrange- 
ments to obtain a lawyer and this will be at no expense to 
the Government. If you cannot afford a lawyer and want 
one, arrangements will be made to obtain a lawyer for 
you in accordance with the law." 

d "If you are now willing to discuss the offense (s) under 
investigation, with or without a lawyer present, you have 
a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak 
privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if 
you sign a waiver certificate." 
Make certain the suspect/accused fully understands his/her rights 



THE WAIVER 



"Do you understand your rights?" 

{If the suspect /accused says "no," determine what is not under 
stood, and if necessary repeat the appropriate rights advisement 
If the suspecl/accused says "yes," ask the following question ) 

"Do you want a lawyer at this time?" 

(If the suspect/accused says "yes," stop the questioning until 
he/she has a lawyer If the suspect/accused says "no," ask 
him/her the following question.) 



"At this time, are you willing to discuss the offenw(s) under 
investigation and make a statement without talking to a lawyer 
and without having a lawyer present with you?" 

(If the suspect/accused says "no," sti>p the interview and have 
him/her read and sign the no n waiver section of the waiver 
certificate on the other side of this form. If the suspect says 
"yes," have him/her read and sign the waiver section of the 
waiver certificate on the other side of this form ) 



SPECIAL 

WHKN SUSPECT/ ACCUSED REFUSES TO SIGN WAIVER 
CERTIFICATE: If the suspect/ accused orally waives his/her 
rights but refuses to sign the waiver certificate, you may proceed 
with the questioning. Make notations on the waiver certificate 
to the effect that he/she has stated that he/she understands 
his/her rights, does not want a lawyer, wants to discuss the 
offense(s) under investigation, and refuses to sign the waiver 
certificate. 

IF WAIVER CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE COMPLETED 
IMMEDIATELY. In all cases the waiver certificate must be 
completed as soon as possible. Every effort should be made to 
complete the waiver certificate before any questioning begins. 
If the waiver certificate cannot be completed at once, as in the 
rase of street interrogation, completion may be temporarily 
postponed Notes should be kept on the circumstances. 



INSTRUCTIONS 

I PRIOR INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS: 

(1) If the suspect/accused has made spontaneous incriminating 
statements before being properly advised of his/her rights, 
he/she should be told that such statements do not obli- 
gate him/her to answer further questions 

(2) If the suspect/accused was questioned as such either with- 
out being advised of his/her rights or some question 
exists as to the propriety of the first statement, the 
accused must be so advised The office of the serving 
Staff Judge Advocate should be contacted for assistance 
in drafting the proper rights advisal. 

NOTE: If (1) or (2) apply, the fact that the suspect/accused 
was advised accordingly should be noted in the comment section 
on the waiver certificate and initialed by the suspect/accused. 



COMMENT (Continued) 



Revene of DA Form 338 J 



$V.S. fc.*.0. l»«S-*«1'0SS/*70*» 



desires concerning questioning. If the 
suspect agrees to answer questions but 
refuses to sign the waiver portion of 
DA Form 3881, the heading blocks of the 
form and the rights portion are completed as 
usual. The investigator then prepares a 
statement for the waiver block of the form. 
The statement must state that the suspect 
understands his rights, does not want a 
lawyer, wants to discuss the offense under 
investigation, but refuses to sign the waiver 
certificate. The statement is added to the 



form (waiver block) and the investigator 
signs the form where indicated. The suspect 
is asked to initial the investigator's state- 
ment, but initials are not essential. Guidance 
for preparing DA Form 3881 can be found in 
FM 19-20. When a suspect consents to 

guestioning, the statement is recorded on 
)A Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). When 
questioning is completed, a DA Form 3975 is 
filled out and the required entries made on 
DA Form 3997 and DA Form 3998 (Military 
Police Desk Reference). 



52 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The individual requesting a statement or 
conducting the interrogation will probably 
do so in the English language. If there 
appears to be a language barrier, the 
interrogator must ensure that the individual 
is aware of his rights in his native language, 
The understanding of the rights also comes 
into play when an individual is grossly 
intoxicated. Such an individual cannot 
make a voluntary waiver. 

TEMPORARY DETENTION 

Detention is temporary. It is not used for 
purposes of confinement. Persons are 
detained only when military necessity, the 
safety of the individual, or the safety of 
others makes it necessary. 

Juveniles are detained only if all or some 
of the following conditions are met: 

• The detainment is authorized by the 
installation commander. 

• The juvenile is suspected of a serious 
criminal offense requiring the exercise of 
jurisdiction by civilian law enforcement 
authorities. 

• The parents or other suitable relatives are 
not available to take custody of the 
offender at the time of apprehension. 

• The detainment is for the purpose of 
transferring custody of the juvenile, at the 
earliest possible time, either to the child's 
parent or to the appropriate state or 
federal agency having jurisdiction. 

If a juvenile must be detained until the 
appropriate juvenile authorities are 
contacted, the MP will then notify the 
military sponsor's unit commander. In cases 
where the juvenile has no military sponsor, 
the MP will follow the directions given by 
the juvenile authority. Because or special 
protections accorded juveniles under many 
state statutes, MP may not obtain 
fingerprints or photographs of a juvenile 
without written consent of the juvenile 
judge. Nor may names or pictures of the 
juvenile be released to the public. 



The youth must be kept entirely away from 
operational activities or the MP station. The 
area where juveniles are detained must be 
comfortable, private, and out of public view. 
Unless there is another suitable area, the 
PM's office may have to be used. Since 
juveniles are not subject to the UCMJ, the 
detainment of juveniles in correctional 
custody, detention cells, or hospital prisoner 
wards is forbidden. A detention cell may be 
used for juveniles when there is a threat to 
the community, the juveniles, or MP 
involved and authority has been obtained 
from the installation commander through 
legal channels. (See Chapters 6 and 10 for 
more information on juveniles.) 

Facilities for temporary detention of 
adults apprehended by MP are located 
within the MP station. These facilities are 
close enough to the desk for continuous 
observation. They are sufficiently removed 
so normal operations will not be hindered. 
These facilities must not be open to casual 
view by visitors. If the cell location does not 
permit desk personnel to maintain 
observation when occupied, a guard or an 
MP must be posted. Closed circuit television 
can be used as an alternative method of 
observation. In detaining females, female 
MP must be present for security and 
observation purposes. Male and female 
detainees are not placed in the same cell. 

Detention of suspects requires a blotter 
entry that shows who ordered the detention, 
the reason, the time detention began, and the 
time of release. Detainees are furnished 
normal amounts of food and water. Bedding 
is provided if detained more than 12 hours. 
Normally, detention does not exceed 24 
hours. However, the installation commander 
may extend the period to 72 hours. Use of 
showers and latrine facilities for women is 
determined by individual PMs per AR 190-38 
and available facilities. 

If the decision is made by the PM or 
responsible MP supervisor to place a 
suspect in detention, a thorough search 
must be made. Personnel performing the 
search and those acting as witnesses must 



FM 19-10 



53 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



be of the same sex as the offender being 
searched. After the search has been 
conducted, the offender is then placed in a 
cell. Money, other valuables, and personal 

property (other than individual clothing and 
wedding rings) are taken from the offender, 
inventoried in his presence, and secured. 
Items of clothing that could be used to inflict 
bodily injury are taken from the suspect if 
deemed necessary by the responsible MP 
supervisor. The suspect is given a receipt, 
DA Form 4137 (Evidence /Property Custody 
Document), for all items taken. The reason 
for and degree of any use of force required is 
also recorded in either the desk blotter or the 
DA Form 1594. 

A DA Form 3975, DA Form 3998, and 
DA Form 4137 must be prepared on any 
detention involving an offense. This 



includes suspicions or allegations of 
offenses. The suspicion or allegation is 
described in the report, whether or not it is 
derogatory to the person detained. Entries 
are made on the Mr blotter on all temporary 
detentions. 

Persons who are under the influence of 
drugs, injured, or ill must be examined by a 
meaical officer before or immediately after 
being placed in detention. A blotter entry is 
made indicating time, diagnosis, disposition, 
and the name, rank, and organization of the 
medical officer or physician's assistant. 
Minor injuries requiring simple first aid, 
such as cuts and abrasions, are treated by 
MP unless the suspect specifically requests 
a medical officer. Written certification must 
be filed by the medical officer concerning the 
person's health if an examination is 
required. 



54 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 6 
Undertaking Preventive Programs 



Military police law enforcement 
programs support command strength, 
readiness, and well-being. And they help 
assist and protect the military community. 
Most MP programs are proactive. 
Preventing crime by suppressing the 
opportunity for it is at the oase of aH law 
enforcement planning. MP programs are 
diverse. Major programs are directed toward 
supporting military law enforcement needs. 
But a number of efforts like customs 
information services and wildlife conser- 
vation are equally supportive of civilian law 
enforcement needs. And often the liaison 
and interaction between MP and the civilian 
community that makes a program effective 
is, in itself, proactive for law and order. 

CRIME PREVENTION 

Crime prevention is a primary goal for all 
Army law enforcement elements. Strong 
installation physical security programs and 
vice control programs support installation 
crime prevention programs. The DA crime 
prevention program goal is to provide a 
secure environment for service members and 
their families, government employees, and 
the general public. Crime prevention is a 
command responsibility Tiaving a con- 
tinuing command emphasis. 

Crime prevention employs proactive 
measures aimed at protecting persons and 
their property and the property of the federal 
government. Basic policies of crime 
prevention are presented in AR 190-31. Use 
of specific preventive techniques is made 
after a carerul review of a prohlem and its 
causative factors. Concern is focused on the 
number and types of crimes being committed 
and where crimes are being committed. 

Crime prevention is an ongoing process of 
planning, implementing measures, evaluating 




CRIME PREVENTION 



Providing Physical Security 
Controlling Vice Activities 



Prostitution and Gambling 



Alcohol and Drue Abuse 



57 

58 

59 

60 

Preventing Juvenile Delinquency 62 

Diagnostic Interview 62 

Police and School .Liaisonri 63 

64 



Juvenile Council 



Controlling Traffic 64 



Installation Traffic Controlj 65 

Traffic Offenses 1 66 



I ABSENTEE/DESERTER PROGRAMl 70 



WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 70 



MP CUSTOMS INFORMATION SERVICES ..70 



DISASTER RELIEF AND AREA 
DAMAGE CONTROL 



their effectiveness, modifying measures, and 
developing further information. During the 
planning step of the crime prevention 
program development, the PM must 
generate sufficient, accurate, and up-to-date 
information with which to organize a viable 
prevention plan. A series of priorities must 
3e established to determine wnere MP assets 
are needed. 

One of the principal means for developing 
information on the extent of a criminal 
threat is the use of a crime prevention 
survey. This is an examination of all 
physical and geographical features within 
and adjacent to military facilities in order to 
determine any conditions that may ease or 
encourage criminal acts that will be 
detrimental to the command. This thorough, 
complete, and continuing report includes the 
composition of both military and civilian 
populations, a review of the state of order 
and discipline in the command, and a study 
of any physical features of the military site. 



FM 19-10 



55 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



It becomes the principal guide for 
determining the personnel, equipment, and 
direction or the crime prevention program. 
Military peculiar offenses, such as disrespect 
and disooedience to orders, are command 
concerns and must be prevented by the unit 
commander. Installation crime prevention 
efforts focus on preventing the more violent 
crimes, such as murder, rape, and assault, by 
active enforcement and patrolling activities. 
In a mature theater of operations crime 
prevention program, the major effort of the 
D M is toward detecting organized criminal 
behavior that threatens the command as a 
whole. These areas include organized vice 
activities, wholesale pilferage of arriving 
supplies, black-market operations, currency 
manipulation, organized deserter bands, and 
narcotics activities. Such areas are a 
command-wide concern and require 
command-wide participation in their sup- 
pression and prevention. 

The crime prevention plan is placed into 
action; orders, plans, and operational 
procedures are published. Education 
programs are implemented to alert members 
of the command to any criminal threat that 
exists. Organized task forces may be 
employed to aggressively move against 
those criminal threats considered by the 
commander to be the most threatening to 
good order and discipline within the 
command. 

Most often when crime does occur, the 
Crime Prevention Branch, augmented by 
MP investigators, conducts a crime analysis 
to identify problem areas. The areas are then 
targeted by crime prevention and MPI 
personnel in a manner which makes 
apprehension highly possible. This permits 
the uniformed patrol to remain in their 
patrol area, deterring crime through 
maximum visibility. 

The system may require additional 
personnel to be assigned to the Crime 
Prevention and /or MP Investigation 
sections based on an increased role in 
targeting high crime areas. However, the 



high visibility of uniformed patrols usually 
results in a decrease in crime rates. 

Evaluation is made as a result of analysis 
and review developed through statistical 
data on the effectiveness of the command 
program. Based upon the analysis and any 
change of priorities by the commander, the 
initial program is altered to become more 
effective. The cycle then begins again. 

The PM, as the chief law enforcement 
official of the command, has primary staff 
responsibility for crime prevention. His 
efforts are supported by staff members, 
subordinate commanders, members of 
governmental and law enforcement agencies 
within the civilian community, ana other 
agencies. The installation crime prevention 
council meets to review findings of physical 
security and crime prevention inspections 
and corrective actions taken. They also 
review the financial impact of installation 
crime and preventive measures. They 
address crime trends and conditions 
conducive to crime. And they discuss the 
effectiveness of existing crime prevention 
programs. The counciflooks for ways to 
increase the usefulness of the program. The 
council is chaired by a member of the 
installation command element. The PM or 
security officer serves as the coordinator. 
The council includes delegates from the in- 
stallation staff, major unit commanders, and 
delegates from tenant or attached units. 

A crime prevention officer, appointed in 
writing by the installation commander, 
manages the installation crime prevention 
program (AR 190-31). MP with extensive 
experience in physical security or MP 
investigators are normally assigned as 
crime prevention specialists. Unit crime 
prevention officers (E6 or above) are 
designated in writing at all levels of 
command. Unit crime prevention officers— 

• Conduct announced or unannounced 
crime prevention inspections of unit 
areas. 

• Ensure electro-stylus etching markers are 
available to the military community for 



56 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



marking government and personal 

property. 

• Develop crime prevention themes for 
installation and local command 

information programs. 

Crime prevention personnel support the 
installation council oy performing crime 
data analysis, drafting programs for the 



council's consideration, inspecting the 
implementation of council-mandated 
measures, and coordinating the efforts of 
unit/ activity crime prevention officers in 
implementing the installation crime 
prevention program. For a state-of-the-art 
discussion of crime analysis, crime 
countermeasures, and community crime pre- 
vention programs, see DA Pamphlet 190-31. 



EXAMPLES OF CRIME PREVENTION LITERATURE 



^ Prevention been 

cr ;rvo^- ha,0,,,ce ,,„, 

neatest onU>"' > y t . ai ap > h , 

ca r is headed ^ ^ p Nev 

mugger nPe d iu 

' ' nilU . youH take 

MaKe lied ««" M M ^ fe Q^<^ atU 

Goby c J °* kho^ »W V ° U ' 

someone else Kno* 

'° ,noW ,0n ° wlt nano.he. 

Wways w^ u y ^ h(end ,t« Q( 

„ it uoU '" ( koi rid muvjy 

P«' son ' " yon. nsK ol being 
na ,i y reduce yj 



McGROFF S/HS- 

Hereaie5ways 
x to play it safe! 



WiifHii yi ni'rv pl.'V/in.^, 



;,tr;.u :,>-■. : '! .■■.( :;:if lie 



TAKE A BITE OUT OF 



ho 



ho "ie. Mai 



*ne. in 



ly rd Pes Qccu 



(he\ 









)ef apisf m a 



w »«*no : s ""- 



oth ers. an'dfrarkPm 

c e So ° f 'eoMhe 



wa ys topr 



'event sr 



'ome / n 
;s for 



nidi 



assault, 



fet: ' your home 

-■ ' d, n locks 



^C':r s -^«<o,, e , em) 



artrrient 



rt o^e into 



' new house or 



~^£ 



PROVIDING PHYSICAL SECURITY 

An effective physical security program 
supports installation crime prevention. A 
strong physical security program helps 
identity, reduce, eliminate, or neutralize 
conditions favorable to criminal activity. 
Physical security inspections and surveys 
are conducted as a part of the overall 
program. Physical security inspections and 
surveys reduce the opportunity, and desire, 
for engaging in criminal acts. Physical 
security inspections and surveys are made 
on designated mission-essential or 



vulnerable activities within a command. 
This includes reserve centers and Reserve 
Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) activities 
that a command supports. The results of 
physical security inspections are reported on 
DA Form 2806- 1-R (Physical Security 
Inspection Report). Physical security 
surveys are reported on DA Form 2806-K 
(Physical Security Survey Report). (See 
AR 190-13.) Activities examined may be 
internal (such as cash flow procedures) or 
external (such as lighting intensity or door 
security). 



FM 19-10 



57 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Physical security inspectors are selected 
by the PM, security officer, or installation 
commander. Inspectors must hold military 
occupational specialty (MOS) 95B and meet 
the qualifications listed in AR 190-13. 
Civilian inspectors must meet Office of 
Personnel Management qualification 
standards. (These standards can be found in 
the local civilian personnel office.) Qualified 

Bhysical security inspectors are issued 
A Form 4261 and DA Form 4261-1 (Physical 
Security Inspector Identification Card). 

Before conducting inspections the inspec- 
tors must know the function or mission of 
the area, facility, or activity being inspected. 
They must be familiar with the regulations 
and directives required for the operation of 
the activity. They should know of offenses or 
incidents that nave occurred in the past. 
They review prior surveys or inspections 
conducted and who conducted them. They 
also note deficiencies found and if any 
personnel changes have occurred. 

Inspectors check to see if adequate 
security safeguards are provided. They note 
practices or conditions that contribute to the 
commission of crimes. They look for changes 
or additions required. That is, they see what 
personnel, regulations or directives, pro- 
cedures, or equipment is needed to satisfy 
security requirements. And they note the 
actions needed by the commander, PM, or 
other staff officers to provide required 
security. 

After inspecting, the inspector makes a 
thorough analysis of findings. He or she 
weighs deficient measures, factors, or 
conditions against existing standards and 
requirements. The inspector balances 
manpower and financial costs of 
recommended measures against the 
protection provided. Then the inspector 
briefs the PM on the findings using maps, 
plots, sketches. He recommends corrective 
action. If necessary he makes on-site visits 
with the PM to clarify the recommendations. 

Following the inspector's final briefing, 
the PM reports the findings of the survey 



with recommended actions to the com- 
mander. Upon receipt of the commander's 
decision, a written report is provided to the 
responsible office for action and reply. If 
extensive time is needed for the corrective 
action, target dates for completion are 
established and reported in the reply. 

Follow-up inspections should be made of 
the facility, activity, or area inspected after 
a lapse of not more than three months. This 
will show if recommendations have been 
carried out. It will also show if major 
changes in mission or personnel may make 
further study and evaluation necessary. 
Specific guidance in establishing and 
maintaining a practical, economical, and 
effective physical security program is 
contained in AR 190-13. For activities that 
may require surveys and inspections, see 
FM 19-30, AR 195-2, and AR 190-13. 

CONTROLLING VICE ACTIVITIES 

An effective vice control program helps 
ensure a command's strength, readiness, 
and well-being. Vice activities have adverse 
effects on the health, welfare, and morale of 
a command. Prostitution, gambling, nar- 
cotics, and other types of vice can lower the 
command's readiness or contribute to 
criminal incidents. MP suppression of vice 
helps the commander maintain discipline 
and order. 

On post, the control of vice is a PM 
responsibility. Off post, the control of such 
activities rests in the hands of the civil 
authorities. But MP may assist in the 
prevention of offenses outside a military 
installation by enforcing off-limits 
regulations. And they can warn military 
personnel to avoid known trouble spots and 
areas. 

The provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act 
prohibit participation by MP in raids, 
searches, and seizures of establishments off 
post conducted by civil police. However, in 
overseas areas where this act does not apply 
MP may participate in such action if 
requested by civilian authorities and when a 



58 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



military member is involved. Since SOFAS 
and international law will apply, the local 
SJA office is contacted before participating 
in any such activity. 

Prostitution and Gambling 

AR 190-24 and AR 210-10 provide that 
prostitution will be suppressed by all 
commanders in areas under Army control 
and among persons subject to Army 
jurisdiction. The regulations specify that 
places of prostitution will be placed ofr-limits 
to military personnel. Commanders are 
enjoined to cooperate with agencies engaged 
in activities designed to suppress 
prostitution affecting military personnel. 

The suppression of prostitution is an 
established policy of the Department of the 
Army in its program for the welfare of 
personnel, the development and guidance of 
character, and the control of venereal 
disease. The policy applies to all overseas 
commands as well as those commands 
within the continental United States. It is 
the responsibility of all commanders to 
secure compliance with this policy. All 
practices that can in any way be interpreted 
as fostering or condoning prostitution will be 
prohibited. Violations will be handled 
through appropriate disciplinary actions. 
Identified houses of prostitution will be 
declared off-limits to all US military 
personnel. Action taken in this connection 
will be coordinated with proper authorities of 
the other services. In the United States, the 
civil authorities have complete control over 
the suppression of prostitution off the 
military installation. The policy of 
suppression is accomplished through 
cooperation with civilian law enforcement 
agencies and health organizations. Full 
cooperation will be given civilian and other 
government agencies engaged in the 
suppression or prostitution and the 
elimination of sources of venereal infection. 
Where local authorities fail to cooperate, the 
commander may appeal to higher authority 
to negotiate improvement of conditions. The 



commander may also take necessary 
countermeasures, such as temporarily 
declaring the affected area or establish- 
ments off-limits to soldiers. 

The May Act, 18 USC 1384, was initially 
enacted by Congress in 1941 as an 
emergency measure to prohibit prostitution 
within such reasonable distances of military 
and /or naval establishments as the 
Secretaries of the Army and Navy should 
determine to be needed for the efficiency, 
health, and welfare of the Army and Navy. 
The act makes it unlawful within such 
"reasonable distance" to engage in 
prostitution, to aid or abet prostitution, or to 
procure or solicit for the purpose of 
prostitution. Persons or organizations not 
subject to the articles of the UCMJ who are 

fuilty of violating the May Act will be 
eemed guilty of a misdemeanor punishable 
by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by 
imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or both. 

Department of the Army policy stresses 
control of gambling rather than suppression. 
But Army regulations prohibit gambling in 
service clubs (AR 215-1) and gambling by 
disbursing officers (AR 37-103). Excessive 
losses because of gambling may lead to 
commission of other crimes and offenses, 
such as robbery, burglary, and embezzle 
ment. The PM is familiar with the gambling 
situation within his jurisdiction and 
adjacent areas. The PM studies its impact on 
offense rates and the conduct of personnel 
who are off duty. When appropriate, the PM 
recommends to the commander that 
consideration for off-limits action be 
presented to the Armed Forces Disciplinary 
Control Board. Information on dishonest 
gambling practices is made available to civil 
agencies concerned with controlling 
gambling. 

Preventive action against gambling is 
implemented through appropriate command 
channels. Publicity relating to gambling is 
used to inform all personnel of me inherent 
dangers of gambling. 



FM 19-10 



59 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Alcohol and Drug Abuse 

The introduction, sale, possession, and use 
of alcoholic beverages are permitted on Army 
installations as authorized by AR 215-2. But 
commanders must ensure that persons under 
21 years of age are not permitted to use, 

gossess, buy, or introduce intoxicating 
everages in any form to an activity unless 
the laws of the state allow it. Persons under 
21 years of age must not be employed in any 
capacity for the sale, handling, dispensing, 
or serving of any intoxicating beverages. 
Nor may intoxicating beverages be sold, 
used, consumed, or permitted in, on, or about 
the premises of any service club, crafts 
facility, or youth activity facility. The PM 
enforces the command's adherence to this 
regulation. 

The costliness of drugs and difficulty in 
obtaining them can result in the user 
resorting to criminal acts to obtain them. 
Commanders and PMs at all levels curb the 
use or sale of narcotics and other prohibited 
drugs through education, detection of 
trafficking, and prompt apprehension and 
disposition of users and suppliers. 

In areas where narcotics, marihuana, and 
other dangerous drugs are readily available 
to military personnel, information on the 
dangers of using these drugs, the aid that 
can be given to police authorities, and the 
progress made in prosecuting sellers and 
users of narcotics is disseminated through 
command, public information, and human 
self-development program channels. For 
example, specially trained personnel may 
speak to assembled troops on the dangers of 
drug use. 

Public awareness is an important factor in 
the prevention of alcohol and drug abuse. 
Coordination with civilian law enforcement 
and Alcoholics Anonymous can help to 
formulate and implement drug and alcohol 
abuse awareness programs. These programs 
also can help identify on- and off-post 
conditions that contribute to the 
installation's alcohol and drug problem. 



Installation commanders, with the help of 
the post MP, will maintain an alcohol safety 
action program (ASAP) and an alcohol 
countermeasures program patterned after 
the Department or Transportation Alcohol 
Safety Action Projects. These programs are 
designed to help identify alcohol and drug 
abusers. Rehabilitation programs require 
extensive planning, coordination, 
supervision, and an understanding of the 
offender to be effective. Evaluations of 
accident rates, driver's license suspension 
and revocation actions, public opinion, and 
feedback from counseling and medical 
personnel are used to enhance these 
programs. 

The public must be aware of the alcohol 
and /or drug problem, the behavior of an 
intoxicated driver or drug user, and the 
impact these problems have on the 
community. Individual actions that may be 
taken by the public need to be emphasized. 
To enhance the MP enforcement effort 
against alcohol and drug abuse, the public 
must be educated in the— 

• Nature of the ASAP and its objective. 

• Enforcement and countermeasures 

employed. 

• Implied consent provision. 

• Blood alcohol content index and its 
applicability. 

• Legal and administrative consequences of 
driving while intoxicated. 

The PM analyzes past and present alcohol 
and drug offenses. Traffic studies, as 
described in FM 19-25, maybe undertaken to 
determine factors such as voluntary 
compliance with speed limits, effectiveness 
of traffic control devices, and accident 
patterns. The PM then attempts to isolate 
areas requiring additional traffic 
supervision and enforcement beyond 
normally available resources. Once the PM 
identifies the factors that contribute to 
alcohol and /or drug problems, counter- 
measures are adopted and corrective actions 
taken. 



60 



FM 19-10 



. LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Countermeasures will be proportionate to 
the resources available for the mission and 
to the nature of the specific problem. Some 
effective countermeasures include — 

• Checkpoints at installation entrances to 
check vehicle registrations /driver's 
licenses and to determine if the driver is or 
has been drinking. 

• Traffic patrols dedicated solely to 
detecting and apprehending drinking 
drivers. 

• Concentrated public education programs. 

The PM is concerned with all aspects of 

these programs, but other staff agencies 

such as installation medical authorities, the 

alcohol and drug counselor, the chaplain, the 



SJA, the information officer, and the unit 
commander will have an active part in these 
programs as well. 

The unit commander will ensure military 
personnel are referred to the installation 
alcohol and drug program for evaluation 
when convicted of, or subject to, official 
administrative action for any offense 
involving driving while under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs. The person's past history 
of such offenses will determine if referral to a 
mandatory drug-alcohol education or 
rehabilitation program is required. Driving 
privileges will be revoked in accordance with 
AR 190-5 for all drunk driving convictions as 
well as for those individuals who refuse to 
submit to chemical intoxication tests. 



ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE COUNTERMEASURES 




FM 19-10 



61 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



PREVENTING JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY 

Military sponsors are responsible for the 
proper conduct of their dependents. 
Investigation into the causes of misconduct 
and the collection of background data are 
limited to essential information. But MP 
may extend their investigation to include the 
conduct of the child's military sponsor if that 
conduct is dangerous or harmful to the child. 
Depending upon the frequency and nature of 
the juvenile's offenses, a number of 
corrective measures may be taken. 

In CONUS the commander has several 
administrative options that may be used 
separately or collectively. The commander 
may find it sufficient to accept payment for 
property that was damaged, destroyed, or 
stolen. The juvenile may be barred from using 
specific post facilities in which the offense took 
place. Hospital, dental, and other statutory 
privileges can be denied only under 
extraordinary circumstances (10 USC 1076). The 
commander also may order the youth off the 
post and barred from reentry. The com- 
mander may take more serious administra- 
tive measures for youths who reside on post 
by terminating the sponsor's government 
quarters. When OCONUS the commander 
may reduce or suspend the juvenile's 
privileges, officially reprimand tne sponsor, 
or return the sponsor and dependents to the 
United States. 

In CONUS the commander's judicial 
options include considering the 
circumstances of the crime, jurisdiction, and 
prior offenses of the juvenile. Close liaison 
must be established between the PM, SJA, 
and civil authorities. 

State and local juvenile courts are the 
desired agencies for handling minorjuvenile 
cases as prescribed by 18 USC 5032. If an 
offense committed by a juvenile is a state 
crime and not committed in an area of 
exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction, 
local police and courts may assume 
jurisdiction. 



If a juvenile offense is committed on a post 
where there is concurrent jurisdiction and 
MP investigation reveals that a dependent 
juvenile has committed a state crime, final 
disposition could include administrative 
action or trial by the appropriate civilian 
court or both. Many state statutes do provide 
for appeal of an adjudication of delinquency. 
If a state provides tor an appeal, the juvenile 
court will provide the PM's juvenile section 
this information and further guidance. 

Damage to federal property is a federal 
crime, when juveniles commit serious 
federal offenses, the appropriate 
coordinating agencies may include the FBI, 
US Marshals, and the US Attorney's Office. 
The ability to prosecute juveniles in federal 
district court is limited by 18 USC 403. 
According to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, a juvenile has no con- 
stitutional right to appeal. When the offense 
takes place OCONUS the juvenile may be 
prosecuted in HN courts if the case is serious 
and upon the advice of the SJA. 

Diagnostic Interview 

When an offense has occurred that in- 
volves a juvenile as a suspect, a juvenile 
officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) 
conducts a diagnostic interview as soon as 
possible after the offense is committed. The 
purpose of the interview is to seek an answer 
as to why the offense occurred, and to gather 
information to determine what disposition 
would be in the best interests of the youth, 
the family, and the military community. 
Investigation into the causes of the 
misconduct and the collection of background 
data are limited to essential information. 
But MP may investigate the conduct of the 
child's military sponsors if that conduct is 
dangerous or harmful to the child. 

The diagnostic interview is conducted with 
the juvenile, with one or both parents 
present. The intent is to deal with the 
problem in a family context if possible, 
rather than as the youth's problem alone. 
The interview may be conducted in private if 



62 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



parents are uncooperative, domineering, or if 
their presence has an adverse effect upon the 
juvenile. While commanders have every 
right to monitor the situation and to receive 
reports of diagnostic interviews, they are not 
allowed to actively participate in counseling 
sessions. 

During the interview the juvenile officer 
attempts to find out if the juvenile has a 

grevious history of delinquency and 
ehavior problems and, if the youth was a 
runaway, where he or she went and what 
happened. The juvenile officer attempts to 
find out the youngster's feelings about the 
family and behavior at home as well as the 
parents' feelings about the youth and their 
perception or the current problem. The 
juvenile officer also attempts to find out 
what actions, if any, the parents and the 
juvenile are taking to solve the behavior 
problems. Guidance on investigating 
juvenile delinquency and conducting 
juvenile interviews and interrogations is 
found in FM 19-20. 

Based on the interview, the juvenile officer 
may counsel the juvenile and the family if a 
satisfactory solution appears to have been 
agreed upon. The youth may be referred to 
the school guidance counselor, a chaplain, or 
other social service personnel if the youth 
and family express a desire to seek 
professional help for their family problems. 
Or the youth may be referred to the mental 
hygiene clinic, an Army social worker, or 
other appropriate aeency if it appears that 
deeply rooted problems are impairing the 
youth s normal functioning in the famfly or 
community. The juvenile officer may 
recommend to the PM that administrative 
action be taken against the youth. Normally, 
this is reserved for repeat offenders. Or the 
juvenile officer may recommend that the 
juvenile be referred to the appropriate civil 
juvenile court system. 

MP overseas often must contend with both 
juvenile dependents of United States mili- 
tary and civilian personnel and non- 
dependent juvenile citizens of the host 



nation. This calls for great discretion and 
tact. Delinquent behavior off the installa- 
tion may affect relations with the host 
nation. In incidents occurring on the 
installation, MP become involved in the 
investigation on referral of the incident to 
the proper social service activity for 
disposition. Minor incidents may be 
disposed of without formal action. The 
parents are counseled and the youth 
reprimanded, with a warning as to the 
consequences of future delinquency. More 
serious incidents involving juvenile 
dependents which are detrimental to the 
command may result in administrative 
action being taken. 

Police and School Liaisons 

Police and school liaison programs include 
MP visiting installation schools to create 
ongoing communication between the PM, 
the MP, the school faculty, and the student 
body. 

The PM can establish good relations with 
local school officials by — 

• Becoming acquainted with school officials 
on both a formal and informal basis. 

• Reviewing the school delinquency preven- 
tion program and tactfully recommending 
improvements and offering other 
assistance. 

• Working with the school guidance 
counselor or other school staff to 
determine disciplinary problems and 
other relevant data. 

• Offering to speak and show films to the 
students on bicycle safety, drug and 
alcohol information, and other programs 
that will aid in creating a feeling of trust 
and friendship. 

• Making MP assets available for school 
functions or affairs, such as open house 
displays, career days, athletic programs, 
and tours of military facilities. 

Meetings between parents and the MP and 
school staff can do much to educate the 
parents to the causes of delinquency. The 



FM 19-10 



63 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



development of a close working relationship 
with area schools will increase the 
effectiveness of any plan for delinquency 
prevention and control. The active 
assistance of school officials is necessary if 
plans for the welfare of the students are to be 
successful. 

In a school environment the MP may serve 
as a resource person for school counselors. 
Depending on local policy, the MP may even 
become a part of a carefully structured 
school counseling and referral team. The MP 
may present safety and other lectures and 
advise school authorities on means of 
controlling theft and vandalism. The MP is 
not used to enforce school regulations, 
maintain order within classrooms, or 
become directly involved in ordinary school 
behavioral problems. 

Juvenile Council 

The juvenile council maintains an ongoing 
liaison with federal, state, and local juvenile 
systems and planning agencies. The juvenile 
council seeks to coordinate the juvenile 
welfare services of all installation agencies. 
It makes the system responsive to the child's 
needs by eliminating jurisdictional disputes 
and misconceptions. The juvenile council 
reduces duplication of juvenile services and 
provides for efficient delivery of such 
services through systemwide planning. 
Planning must be flexible and responsive to 
community needs. 

Members of the council review juvenile 
cases, dispositions, and follow-up treatment 
to ensure proper handling. The council is 
also responsible for the formulation and 
review of post delinquency programs. 
Representation on the council by the 
installation commander will allow juvenile 
problems and trends to be closely monitored 
and can generate interest within the 
command for juvenile programs. 

CONTROLLING TRAFFIC 

MP control traffic to enable the safe 

movement of personnel and supplies. On the 



battlefield, control of traffic is a part of the 
main MP mission of BCC. In combat MP use 
many of the same basic measures for BCC 
that in a peacetime environment are used to 
accomplish their law and order mission. 
Traffic control is accomplished as main 
supply route regulation enforcement. The 
traffic control measures used for BCC 
include measures of— 

• Operating traffic control posts. 

• Operating mobile patrols. 

• Emplacing temporary route signs. 

Other, more specialized, measures include 
operating— 

• Holding areas. 

• Roadblocks. 

• Checkpoints. 

• Defiles. 

• Straggler control posts. 

• Straggler collecting points. 

See FM 19-4 for detailed discussion of traffic 
control as part of BCC. 

In a peacetime environment on military 
installations, in addition to the measures 
used routinely to control circulation on the 
battlefield, MP enforce installation traffic 
laws. They investigate motor vehicle traffic 
accidents within their jurisdiction. They 
assist civilian agencies investigating traffic 
accidents involving military personnel or 
military vehicles. As part of their traffic 
control measures, MP may coordinate 
convoy movements with civil police 
authorities or provide convoy escort. They 
may also conduct vehicle registration. They 
may supervise the installation's vehicle im- 
poundment lot. And to help ensure 
movement of traffic, MP often employ speed 
and intoxication detection equipment to 
screen for unsafe drivers . 

MP conduct traffic control studies to 
obtain information on specific traffic 
problems and usage patterns unique to 
an installation. Traffic control studies 
(see FM 19-25) provide information on types 



64 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



of accidents that occur most frequently, the 
time of day when accidents are most 
frequent, the place where accidents are most 
likely to occur, and driving offenses and 
other factors that tend to cause accidents. 
ADP equipment used for storage, retrieval, 
interpretation, and validation of traffic 
control information has greatly improved 
the usability of traffic data. These data, once 
collected and analyzed, can be used to 
prevent traffic accidents. The PM can use 
these studies to determine present and future 
needs concerning traffic control and 
associated traffic programs. 

The PM can also use these studies to 
analyze past and present alcohol and drug 
offenses. The PMthen attempts to isolate 
areas requiring additional traffic 
supervision ana enforcement beyond 
normally available resources. Once the PM 
identifies the factors that contribute to 
alcohol and /or drug problems, counter- 
measures are adopteaand corrective actions 
taken, 

Results of traffic studies provide MP with 
methods to prevent accidents. One method is 
to distribute MP effectively during the hours 
and days when, and at points where, 
congestion is greatest or where accidents are 
most likely to occur. MP must give particular 
attention to the types of violations that are 
causing accidents. MP also evaluate 
effectiveness of traffic enforcement 
measures and emphasize driver training and 
pedestrian education. MP recommend more 
effective uses for traffic control devices and 
safeguards. They also coordinate traffic flow 
with facilities engineers. They recommend 
engineering improvements to eliminate 
hazards that cause frequent traffic 
accidents. 

Installation Traffic Control 

The basis for a well-planned and 
organized traffic control plan is a traffic 
enforcement program and educational and 
safety programs. MP traffic control plans 
provide for the safe and efficient movement 



of military and civilian vehicles. These plans 
are coordinated with headquarters, staff 
offices, and civil authorities before 
implementation. Plans will include accident 
investigation and prevention and the 
conduct of traffic control studies and 
surveys. When developing plans, movement 
of military convoys, emergency medical 
vehicles, and fire trucks will take precedence 
over all other vehicular traffic. 

MP are responsible for implementing the 
installation traffic control plan. These 
responsibilities include— 

• Enforcing all traffic laws, regulations, 
and orders. 

• Reporting and investigating traffic 
accidents. 

• Operating traffic control posts on the 
installation. 

• Reporting traffic conditions. 

• Performing escort and convoy escort 

duties. 

• Recommending type and location of 
traffic control devices. 

• Advising facility engineer of traffic signs 
and control devices that need repairing 
or replacing. 

Whenever possible, traffic signs and 
devices are used to indicate routes and 
dangerous points and to direct or control 
traffic. Unmanned traffic control equipment 
aids in providing maximum control using a 
minimal number of MP assets. MP post 
temporary signs and route markings. 
Luminous paint or other appropriate 
material may be used for night illumination 
consistent with safety or blackout 
regulations. Information concerning signs 
can be found in the Manual on uniform 
Traffic Control Devices. 

The making and posting of permanent 
signs and devices is a facility engineer 
function. MP on patrol report to the facility 
engineer the location of traffic control 
equipment needing repair. MP report to the 
PM control points requiring signs. 



FM 19-10 

161-016 0-94-5 



65 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Speed-measuring devices are used to 
conduct speed studies and increase 
compliance with traffic laws. When 
planning to use speed-measuring devices, 
the device or method best suited for the 
situation must be considered. These 
considerations are— 

• Cost. 

• Local recognition by judicial authorities. 

• Training required for persons to use 

devices. 

• Maintenance requirements. 

• Mission and environment of unit 

employing the devices. 

Speed-measuring devices or methods used 
by the MP are- 

• Stopwatches. 
» Radar. 

• Aircraft. 

• Pace method. 

See FM 19-25 for more information on 
speed-measuring devices and methods. 



Traffic Offenses 

MP ensure military vehicles are operated 
only by authorized military or civilian 
personnel. MP efforts are directed toward 
serious traffic offenses. Serious offenses 
include speeding, reckless driving, drunken 
driving, overloading, and transporting 
civilians without authority. The driver or the 
senior passenger, or both, if charged with a 
serious offense, may be apprehended and the 
vehicle impounded. Minor offenses not 
referable to the magistrate system may be 
referred to the unit commander using 
DD Form 1408 (Armed Forces Traffic Ticket) 
or DA Form 3975. All other traffic offenses 
will be handled using DD Form 1805. 

If the installation commander tasks the 
PM to have vehicles registered on post, then 
DA Form 3626 (Vehicle Registration/Driver 
Record) must be filled out and maintained. 

DA Form 3626 is prepared on each 
registrant of a car. A separate form is 
prepared on persons who also drive the car 
and are involved in a chargeable traffic 
offense or receive a moving traffic violation. 



EXAMPLE OF VEHICLE REGISTRATION/DRIVER RECORD (FRONT) 



BA 2994 

1 . DECAL NUMBER 



4. SOCIAL SECURITY 
NUMBER 

438-48-26/7 



S706O3 

2. ISSUE DATE 



JONES, THOMAS R. 

3. NAME (Last, first, middle, initial) 



5. GRADE 

E4 



8. ORGANIZATION 

Co C 21* SI6 BN 
8Z 4 ABN DIVISION 



1. VEHICLE LICENSE NUMBER 



NC 



8EH 1920 67 



6. CATEGORY 



RR OF SV C 

AIWV 



□other (Specify) 

MA 



7. ADDRESS '!n< ludv ZIP code) 



1465 BLAIR. RO*D 
FAYETTEVIUE.NC 2.6522 



9. VEHICLE DESCRIPTION 



'86 



b, MA KE 



FORD \MUSTAN6 



SEDAN 



e. C OLOR 



BLACK 



12. OPERATORS PERMIT 



NC 



295 - 2723 



10. VEHICLE ID NUMBER 



II5I10IZAL 



13. INSPECTION DATE 



67 06 03 



14 CERTIFICATE 

I certify that I now possess, and will continue to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance for motor vehicles registered in 
my name, in an amount not lower than the minimum limits prescribed in the financial respons.bility, or compulsory, law 
of the State in which the installation is located. I further certify that I understand that the operation oi a privately owned 
motor vehicle on a military installation is a privilege extended by the installation commander subject to conditions establish- 
ed in paragraph 2-1, AR 190-5. The failure to comply with these conditions may subject me to an administrative suspension 
or revocation of driving privileges and/or termination of installation registration. 

3 Jurxe 87 spfer&?/!frhf£Jh?A4- . ff ' ffvwunr^-- 

m»n-> ^^ 'Rottstrttnf* &fnnturr) V ^ .'W«//h-.ss*s signature) 



DA 1 MAR 73 3626 



EDITION OF 1 AUG 70 IS OBSOLETE. REPLACES 

DA FORM3S62.I OEC 69, WHlCHlS 0»40iETE, 



VEHICLE REGISTRATION/DRIVER RECORD 

For us* of this form, see AR 190-5 & 190-5-1 ; the 
proponent agency is Office ot the Proyost Marshal General- 



66 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



EXAMPLE OF VEHICLE REGISTRATION/DRIVER RECORD (BACK) 



15. RECORD OF ACCIDENTS MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 


R F P O R T NO. DATE 


TYPF ACCIDENT VIOLATION 


INSTL 


VE HIC LE 


DISPOSITION 


POINTS ASSF SSE D 


ON 


OF F 


GOV T 


POV 


C HAKG- 

F- [ : 


C '.IM'll A- 


A37381I/8907ZZ 


SPEEDING it 15) 


X 






X 


FORFEIT COLLATERAL 
i 25 ^ US MAGISTRATE 


4 


4 


A379/05/87/003 


IMPROPER PASSING 


X 






X 


FORFEIT COLLATERAL 
i 15 -2P US MAGISTRATE 


4 


8 





































































































'6 HE-. MARKS .'/n. hidv information otu<-rning su^pcns ion, revocation of driving pr iv : Iv gv s . drwvr imprnvrmrn! mru^or,^. .,!<■■! yarto ,!*,!, on in 
■.. hot-iln.no.n o, :: <:>!nu.-nt program,.) 



It is made out in one copy. If the form 
indicates suspension or revocation of the 
registrant's driving privileges or shows 
accumulation of points, the form is to be 
mailed to the PM of the gaining command 
upon permanent change of station (PCS) of 
the soldier concerned. 

The forms of military personnel who are 
being separated from the service and civilian 
personnel who terminate employment will be 
destroyed. Information concerning decals 
and control procedures is outlined in AR 190-5. 

DD Form 1805 is used by law enforcement 
agencies in conjunction with the US 
Magistrate System to cite individuals with 
minor offenses. PMs must coordinate with 
the US magistrate of his area for — 

• A list of minor offenses for which mail-in 
procedures are authorized. 

• The amount of the fine for each specific 
offense. 

• A list of minor offenses which require a 
mandatory appearance of the violator 
before the magistrate. 



Two copies are returned to the PM office 
for transmittal to US District Court. A copy 
is returned to the PM office for filing. And a 
copy is issued to the violator or placed on the 
violator's vehicle. All violation notices 
require: 

• Social security number of issuing MP. 

• Date of notice. 

• Description of violation, including place 
and time if applicable. 

• Violation code number and issuing 
location code number. 

DD Form 1408 is used for reporting minor 
traffic offenses. A copy of the form is 
forwarded through command channels. 
DD Form 1408 is administratively processed 
in accordance with AR 190-5. The form does 
not require any supporting forms or letters of 
transmittal. A copy is filed in the office of the 
PM. A copy is given to the violator. Or in the 
case of an unattended vehicle violation, this 
copy will be placed under the windshield 
wiper of the vehicle or otherwise 
conspicuously affixed to the vehicle. 



FM 19-10 



67 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



DD Form 1408 may also be used as a 
warning notice. Void traffic tickets will be 
marked VOID in large letters and all copies 
turned in to the desK sergeant. 

DD Form 1920 (Alcoholic Influence 

Report) is used to record observations of an 
individual apprehended for an offense in 
which alcoholic influence, such as drunken 
driving, is a factor. This form is made out in 
sufficient copies to satisfy local 
requirements. At least one copy will be 
attached to each copy of the DA Form 3975. 

Detecting an intoxicated driver is both the 
most difficult task in the enforcement effort 
and the most important. If MP fail to detect 
violations, other countermeasure programs 
will also fail. Several methods may be used 
to deter violators. An effective installation 
intoxicated driving prevention program may 
include the use of systematic gate 
inspections, a cone maze, or regular, trained 
patrols. 

Systematic gate inspections may be used 
to deter violators. These inspections may be 
conducted to ensure security, military 
fitness, or good order and discipline. Gate 
inspections must be coordinated with the 
local SJA and authorized by the installation 
commander. Gate inspections must be 
documented, and signs must be displayed to 
warn personnel that they are liable to search 
upon entry, exit, or while on the installation. 
Incoming personnel who object to being 
inspected are not searched over their 
objections. In this case they can be denied 
the right of entry. Personnel exiting the 
installation cannot refuse inspection. MP 
selected to participate in the inspection are 
thoroughly briefed. MP maintain a log 
recording all significant events. 

The cone maze is setup in an S shape and 
also is an effective detection aid. Normally, 
the unimpaired driver will see the cones at a 
reasonable distance, perceive the problem, 
slow down, and carefully adjust to the 
challenge. An impaired driver, on the other 
hand, because of inadequate perception, 
unusually fast vehicle speed, or the inability 



to make multiple turning movements within 
the lane of travel, will Knock down or run 
over cones. 

The MP observes visual clues when the 
suspect is operating a vehicle. An effective 
detection program begins with the 
recognition that those who drive under the 
influence have certain behavior patterns 
that can be identified. 

The typical contact involves three 
separate and distinct phases. It should be 
emphasized that MP will probably not go 
through all three phases with every 
suspected violator. Probable cause must be 
established to apprehend. Many times this is 
readily apparent by phase two. 

In phase one the MP observes the vehicle 
in motion to note any initial clues of a 
possible violation. The major decision is to 
determine if there is sufficient cause to stop 
the vehicle. The MP observes the manner in 
which the suspect responds to the signal to 
stop and notes any additional evidence of a 
violation. The Mr looks for clues such as 
driver— 

• Attempting to elude the stop. 

• Stoping vehicle in roadway where 
shoulder is available. 

• Useing the wrong turn signal. 

• Obstructs other traffic. 

Once the vehicle is stopped, phase two 
begins. In phase two the MP observes the 
driver during initial contact. The major 
decision is to determine if the suspect should 
exit the vehicle for field sobriety testing. The 
MP observes the driver exit the vehicle and 
notes any additional evidence of 
impairment. The MP looks for more obvious 
clues such as the driver — 

• Fumbling through his billfold. 

• Leaning on the automobile for balance, 

• Slurring his speech. 

• Stumbling. 

• Seeming to lack orientation. 

• Having a flushed face. 

• Having bloodshot eyes. 



68 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



If the MP is still undecided at this point, 
phase three begins. In phase three the MP 
administers a preliminary breath test and 
formal psychophysical field sobriety tests 
consistent with state law to evaluate the 
extent of the suspect's impairment. The MP 
must take adequate traffic control measures 
during the testing phase to ensure the 
suspect's safety at all times. The major 
decision is to determine if the driver is to be 
apprehended. Tests will help determine 
probable cause. Once the decision to 
apprehend has been made, the successful 
prosecution depends upon the MP's ability to 
organize and present all relevant 
information to the court. The MP's 
observations are critical. 

Blood withdrawal is the most accurate 
method of determining different levels of 
alcohol and /or drug intoxication in the 
blood. This procedure is done by authorized 
medical personnel. However, breath 
analysis has been accepted as a substitute 
for blood withdrawal for alcohol testing. 
Evidential blood alcohol testing equipment 
is critical to the actual evaluation and 
subsequent prosecution of violators. The use 
of the portable breath tester may provide 
sufficient evidence for probable cause. Each 
installation is authorized one chemical 
breath-testine device by Common Table of 
Allowances (CTA) 50-909. Chemical breath 
analysts are selected and trained to use the 
device. The device provides rapid, reliable, 
and judicially acceptable test results. For 
judicial purposes, the device used must be 
one that is authorized for use in the host 
state. Chemical breath-testing devices and 
the percentage levels of alcohol impairment 
are outlined in AR 190-5. 

If the chemical breath-testing device is not 
available or is not legally usable in the area, 
then the formal psychophysical field 
sobriety tests are used. The one-leg stand, 
the walk and turn, and the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test (HGNT) have been 
developed by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, using many years of 
experience throughout the country, and have 



been refined by scientific research to make 
them as accurate and discriminating as 
possible. When properly administered and 
interpreted, these tests are highly reliable 
tools used to evaluate a suspect's degree of 
alcohol impairment. But the HGNT is a 
difficult and complex test to train. This test 
can only be used if the MP has been trained 
and certified competent by a qualified 
trainer. PMs can send MP to the Driving While 
Intoxicated (DWI) Law Enforcement/Instructor 
Training Course at Lackland Air Force 
Base, Texas, to receive training in HGNT 
procedures. MP who are trained can then 
train unit members. 

The MP must use his or her judgment to 
determine which test is used. The one-leg 
stand test and the walk and turn test are 
divided attention tests because they require 
the suspect to divide his attention between 
mental tasks and physical tasks. Both tests 
require the suspect to balance and listen. The 
MP must demonstrate the one-leg stand and 
the walk and turn test before requiring the 
suspect to perform the test. 

The one-leg stand test requires the suspect 
to balance while counting out loud. The walk 
and turn test requires the suspect to — 

• Comprehend verbal instructions. 

• Process information. 

• Recall memory. 

While administering this test, the MP 
determines if the driver — 

• Keeps his balance while listening to the 
instructor. 

• Starts before instructions are finished. 

• Stops to steady himself while walking. 

• Touches heel-to-toe. 

• Steps off the line. 

• Uses arms to balance. 

• Loses balance while turning. 

• Takes the incorrect number of steps or 
just cannot do the test. 



FM 19-10 



69 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



ABSENTEE/DESERTER PROGRAM 



MP pursue an aggressive absentee /deserter 
program that is preventive as well as 
reactive. The reduction of absenteeism is 
primarily within the sphere of command 
leadership. But the PM as advisor to the 
commander emphasizes the preventive 
measures available to commanders to reduce 
absenteeism in the Army. He also does this 
through his participation as a member of the 
Army Community Service Council, the 
Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, 



and other related activities in accordance 
with AR 190-9. Absentee /deserter 
investigations are undertaken to provide the 
command a broad-reaching ability to return 
absentees /deserters to military control. And 
because good coordination and communica- 
tion between military and civilian law 
enforcement agencies is basic to the 
absentee /deserter program, the program 
also serves to enhance MP /civilian police 
relationships. 



WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 



The Wildlife Law Enforcement Program 
operates to enforce laws pertaining to water 
pollution, litter, forestry, recreational 
facilities, and boating. The intent is also to 
protect government property such as range 
buildings, construction or range equipment, 
and telephone and power lines. Measures 
used to accomplish the program range from 
check stations at roadblocks and 
checkpoints to publicity and administrative 
measures like information points. 

The Wildlife Law Enforcement Program 
ensures control of predators and domestic 
animals on the installation. It ensures that 



the hunting and fishing seasons are 
monitored as determined by the installation 
commander and state and federal laws. The 
program also ensures the enforcement of 
environmental and safety regulations. It 
ensures that training on boating and 
hunting safety includes local, state, and 
federal laws pertinent to the local area. 
Coordination is effected between the DEH, 
the installation recreation activity, the 
safety office, and the game warden on 
camping, boating and hunting safety. The 
program ensures that help ana information 
are provided to persons using government 
recreation facilities. 



MP CUSTOMS INFORMATION SERVICES 



MP customs units furnish a wide variety of 
customs information to entire commands as 
well as units and individuals. MP customs 
personnel often present briefings on customs 
information to units and other groups. The 
units provide desk sergeants of MP stations 
basic customs information for answering 
routine questions from the military 
community. The MP customs units 
themselves can be contacted for detailed and 
technical information. General information, 
such as new or changed requirements, 
privileges, procedures, and so forth, are 
publicized through newspapers, command 
information publications, armed forces 



radio, and similar news media. General 
information may be prepared in the form of 
news releases. Radio and television talks 
and interviews may be presented. Brief and 
concise fact sheets can be developed, and 
display posters may be produced and 
distributed on items or current or continuing 
customs interest. 

Specific information will be sought, 
particularly by individuals, on such matters 
as sales or transfers of personal property, the 
import or export of certain items, weapons 
and vehicle registration requirements, 
border crossings, and others. Specific 



70 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



information may be furnished by 
maintaining and publicizing walk-in and 
telephonic services to which all members of 
US forces have ready access. An important 
part of the customs information service is 
the ready availability of all blank forms 
required for customs actions. Instructions 
for completion of the blank forms should 
also be made available. Display boards with 
completed samples may be maintained at 
walk-in service locations. 

The walk-in station may also display — 

• Customs travel information for the host 
and neighboring countries. 

• A list of restricted trademark items. 

• US rates of duty for various imports. 

• State laws pertaining to importation of 
alcoholic beverages. 

• The addresses and locations of host 
nation offices concerned with customs, 
tax, and registration matters. 

Personnel assigned to provide customs 
information must be experienced and, as a 
minimum, familiar with the contents of — 

• DOD Regulation 5030.49-R. 

• The Gun Control Act. 

• ARs 40-12, 55-71, 55-355, 215-1, 600-290, 
and 608-4. 

• Pertinent international agreements. 

• Command directives. 

In addition MP customs personnel must be 
familiar with applicable Army and 
command regulations that pertain to the 
operation of sales facilities. Weapons and 
other tax-free items are often sold at rod and 
gun clubs in host countries. MP must make 
every effort to monitor these operations 
frequently. And MP ensure that managers 
and sales personnel are thoroughly informed 
of host country and US customs 
requirements. Particular emphasis is given 
to transfer limitations, firearms registration, 
resale, importation requirements into 
CONUS, and provision of accurate 
information to customers. 



MP render customs assistance to sales 
facilities by— 

• Briefing managers and sales personnel. 

• Monitoring facilities frequently. 

• Providing managerial personnel with 
pertinent customs information and 
ensuring that each facility has 
regulations on file, to include weapons 
regulations when applicable. 

• Providing a customs briefing at the 
annual rod and gun club convention, if 
one is held, or at any other meeting of the 
membership. 

To ensure that sales personnel and members 
have a basic knowledge of pertinent customs 
regulations, detachment commanders, field 
officers, and NCOICs coordinate with each 
local sales store manager and arrange 
formal or informal customs classes. They 
also maintain good rapport with managerial 
personnel and assist them in developing a 
customs enforcement program. 

Public events conducted by US forces in 
overseas locations, such as open houses, 
Fourth of July celebrations, youth carnivals, 
and so forth, to which nonmembers of the 
forces may be invited or admitted, may 
involve the transfer or sale of US forces 
tax-free items, particularly food and bever- 
ages, to nonmembers. Such transfer or sale 
often requires prior approval of the host 
country customs and/or tax authorities. 
This approval will probably specify limits to 
the amounts which may be so transferred or 
sold, as well as require that they be 
consumed on the premises. Items such as 
tobacco products on which taxes are 
collected at the time of the sale are not 
normally included in such approval. MP 
customs personnel can furnish assistance in 
an advisory capacity to persons planning 
such events and can assist them in 
obtaining any required approval. 
Consultation with the local SJA office will 
normally be required since a legal 
interpretation of treaties and local statutes is 
often involved. 



FM 19-10 



71 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



DOD Regulation 5030.49-R provides for 
US military enforcement of US customs 
laws, postal regulations, and regulations of 
the US Department of Agriculture (AR 40-12) 



with respect to plant products, animals, and 
birds. The Department of the Army serves as 
the executive agent for the DOD Military 
Customs Inspection Program. 



DISASTER RELIEF AND AREA DAMAGE CONTROL 



MP may be called upon to assist in 
disaster relief operations. The preservation 
of law and order following the development 
of disaster conditions can be a major 
problem. MP should report any indications 
of civil disturbances so that measures can be 
taken to prevent major incidents. MP may 
assist in the prevention of looting; protection 



of property, especially critical facilities; 
prevention of panic; and enforcement of 
emergency restrictions. They may also assist 
in traffic and circulation control, and the 
evacuation, and detention of civilians. 
Additionally, MP teams may be used to 
provide guidance to other military units 
performing law and order functions. 



72 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 7 
Planning Enforcement Measures 



The PM bases his law enforcement 
measures on the premise of "selective 
enforcement/' Selective enforcement is the 
key to effective law enforcement. The PM 
focuses MP resources on the actions and 
areas where they are most needed. Police 
incidents are usually caused by conditions 
and acts that continue to cause trouble unless 
corrected. 

Basing law enforcement measures on 
selective enforcement fosters an efficient use 
of manpower. And it lends direction to crime 
prevention and law enforcement efforts. It 
allows MP actions to be based on logical, 
systematic information that makes the best 
use of resources. 

To employ selective enforcement the PM 
must have access to up-to-date information. A 
PM needs data that will provide pertinent 
facts for solving continuing enforcement 
problems. The PM must ensure he has the 
people and equipment he needs to do the job. 
And he must employ these resources where 
they are most needed. Effective law 
enforcement is proactive and minimizes 
unproductive time. Checking a building 
during hours when the facility is closed is not 
proactive. Being at the facility before it closes 
is proactive. It eliminates the need to check 
the facility immediately after it closes. And it 
places the MP at the facility for maximum 
visibility and deterrence at the most 
vulnerable time. 

PMs, like all modern police administrators, 
have learned through training and 
experience that MP assets must be dispersed 
when and where police problems are likely to 
occur. The amount or volume of crime that 
occurs is not evenly distributed over the 
course of a week or a day. In 100 offenses 
reported during a seven-day period, more 
crimes will have occurred on certain days of 
the week, at certain times of the day, and in 
certain places. Analysis of such information 




CONTENTS 



COLLECTING, COMPILING, AND USING 
SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT DATA ... 



ACQUIRING DATA FROM MP REPORTS 
AND FORMS [ 




77 



Recording Telephone Conversations! 77 

Maintaining Radio Log| 78 



PREPARING MP REPORTS! 78 

80 



Maintaining MP Desk Blotte 



Submitting Criminal Data 
Reference Cards 



.80 



keeps the PM alert to changing needs for 
police services. Then the services, matched to 
the number of MP available, can be provided 
in the areas in which they are most needed. 

Selective enforcement is founded on a 
continuous process of accumulating, 
analyzing, and interpreting data. 
Information in complaint reports, vehicle 
accident reports, and offense reports is 
tabulated, computerized, marked on spot 
maps, and filed in the proper files. Each 
complaint or offense for which a report has 
been made is studied. 

An analysis of data accumulated over a 
period of time can show the nature of a 
problem and how often it recurs. Analysis 
can also show the requirements for the most 
effective assignment of MP. This data allows 
the PM to plan enforcement activities 
without relying on intuition or arbitrary 
plans. 

The basis for selective enforcement is 
accurate, historical data on time, place, type, 
and frequency of incidents or violations. 
Careful interpretation of this data can help 
determine the cause of crime, project 
operating costs, forecast personnel and 
equipment requirements, and maintain 
accurate reports on the status of discipline 
within the command. 



FM 19-10 



73 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



COLLECTING, COMPILING, AND USING SELECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT DATA 



Selective enforcement requires the support 
of statistical data. Proper collection and 
interpretation of this data is essential if 
successful results are to be achieved. The best 
sources of information are the routine records 
and reports readily available to PMs. To be 
useful, the routine reports must be accurate 
and complete. If operating personnel like 
desk sergeants, patrols, and investigators 
fail to record incidents, accidents, or 
violations accurately, the resulting data will 
not be factual. 

Collecting and compiling enforcement data 
must be done systematically. Clear 
instructions must be available concerning 
the information that is needed and the format 
in which it is to be collected. Misunderstood 
instructions can result in lost time or 
erroneous decisions based on poor data. The 
responsibility for collecting and compiling 
data is assigned to a specific individual or 
section. If too many people work with the 
data, the likelihood or misunderstood 
instructions, errors, or inconsistent or 
inaccurate data increases. 

The method used to compile and organize 
the data depends on available data resources 
and the desired results. Computer technology 
helps. It can easily provide the statistical 
analysis needed to produce pertinent 
information. For instance, computers, 
sorting reports of crime by day of the week 
and hour of the day, can make comparisons 
readily available. Specific types of 
information may be requested. Reports can 
be obtained that reflect increasing and 
decreasing trends. 

Raw data must be organized and 
summarized before it will become meaningful 
for planning purposes. Data are usually 
obtained from various reports, records, or 
surveys and appear as unorganized numbers 
and facts. By systematic rearrangement or 
classification, meaning and significance 
may be given to data. This makes the 



information easier to compare with other 
groups of similar data. It also offers a chance 
for further analysis of the facts. 

An imaginative PM will find many ways to 
present selective enforcement data. A 
presentation should be tailored to fit the 
situation, the facts being presented, and the 
intended audience. 

One useful method of organizing and 
presenting data is by the construction of a 
frequency distribution table. The basic data 
are located by finding the largest and 
smallest numerical values. The difference 
between these two values (such as the range) 
is determined. The values are grouped in the 
order of their magnitude, in groups of twos, 
threes, fours, fives, and so forth. The size of 
this grouping factor, called the class 
interval, normally is such that not less than 
ten, nor more than twenty, of such groupings 
result. Consideration is given, however, to 
the total number of numerical values with 
which it is necessary to deal. The completed 
tabulation is described as a frequency 
distribution. 

Presenting data in a frequency 
distribution table places the data in logical 
order. It condenses and simplifies the data. 
But essential details are retained. A 
frequency distribution table groups items of 
the same class and specifies the number of 
items in each class. Data can be classed by 
type of offense, time of day of offense, and 
age of offenders. With some types of data it is 
useful to group classes together for easier 
interpretation. For example, if we are listing 
numbers of offenses by time of day, it would 
be helpful to combine two or more hours 
together to form an hour group or interval. A 
taole that lists offenses for three-hour 
periods (such as 2100 hours to 2400 hours 
equals 284 offenses for a six-month period) 
would be more meaningful for most 
enforcement problems than a listing of 24 
different one-hour periods. 



74 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Another statistical aid to the PM and his 
staff is the calculation of percentages. Data 
presented in percentage form give a clear 
picture of problem area locations. 



Percentages are also helpful in presenting 
briefings and reports. A percentage is the 
relationship of a part to a whole calculated on 
the basis of 100. 



CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE 



If 800 offenses occurred at Fort Zebra during a 
certain month, 40 AWOLs would constitute 5 
percent of the total number of offenses. To arrive at 
this result, the following computations are made: 



Base figure: 800 (Offenses) 

Figure compared to base: 40 (AWOLs) 





s 


800 OFFENSES \ 


40 
AWOL 


-—-"'■ 


^y 


40 

* 100 5% 

800 





Divide the base figure into the figure being compared to the base, and multiply the 
result by 100 for a percentage. 



This method may also be used to 
determine percentage of increase or decrease 
in troop strengths. The only difference is 



that an additional computation must be 
made to determine the actual increase or 
decrease involved. 



CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE OR DECREASE 



1st Brigade increased in strength from 4,852 
in July to 5,294 in August. The percentage 
of increase is 9.1 percent. 



5,294 
4,852 

442 



August strength 
July strength 



c 
c 
o 

to 

Q_ 

O 

O 

o 



a) 
0. 



03 

DC 















CD 
CM 

in 








CM 
iT> 
CO 

<* 


- 












July 



August 



The base figure is 4,852. The figure being compared to the base is 442 The formula 
for this example is— 



442 
4,852 



100 - 9.1% 



Percentage of decrease is calculated in the same manner 



FM 19-10 



75 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The rate of occurrence is generally 
expressed in terms of frequency per some 
standard unit such as 100, 1,000, 100,000, 
1,000,000. These figures (100, 1,000, and so 
forth) are arbitrary. They act as a common 
denominator to make evaluation and 
comparison easier. 

A graph or chart provides the PM with a 
medium for presenting facts in a clear, 
understandable, logical, and interesting 
manner. (See Appendix C for more 
information on presenting statistical data.) 
A graph can give meaning to a collection of 
facts when that meaning, if presented in 
another form, might not be clear. On a graph 



or chart data can be quickly compared. 
Graphs permit the condensation of facts and 
figures and can demonstrate deficiencies 
and trends. A graph can provide the same 
information as a table, but usually has the 
advantage of ereater simplicity and clarity. 
But care must oe taken in the preparation of 
graphs to avoid faulty presentation and 
interpretation. The following are features 
found in most graphs: 

• A distribution of a group of values or 
traits or characteristics. 

• A brief, simple, and direct title describing 
the topic the graph represents. 

• The unit or units of measure used. 



CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE RATE PER STANDARD UNIT 



600 — 






OFFENI 


3ES FOF 


\ FY 88 


FORTZE 


:BRA ,3 


3,000 T 


ROOPS) 








500 — 
a no — 


























300 — 


















v -■' ; ' 








100 — 


y 


^mc 


























c 

T 



N 
O 
V 



D J 

E A 

C N 



M 
A 
R 



A 
P 
R 



M 
A 
Y 



J 
U 
N 



J A 

U U 

L G 



If 600 offenses occurred at Fort Zebra during a certain period and 30,000 troops were 
stationed there during this period, the offense rate is 20 offenses per 1,000 troops. 
The formula used to achieve this result is— 



Number of offenses 



x standard unit = rate per standard unit 



Strength 

In applying this formula to our example, it would appear thus: 

600 



30,000 



1 ,000 = 20 {rate per 1 ,000 troops) 



76 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



ACQUIRING DATA FROM MP REPORTS AND FORMS 



Complete, accurate, and timely completion 
of forms is of prime importance to law 
enforcement. All the effort expended in 
enforcement and investigative activities is 
wasted unless data are properly recorded 
and reported. And based on accurate data 
compiled from MP forms, the MP can plan 
crime prevention, traffic control, and 
enforcement programs that are timely and 
effective rather than reactions to situations. 

MP records and forms are unclassified 
except when they contain defense 
information as defined in DOD 5200.1-R and 
AR 380-5. When privileged information is 
contained as defined in AR 340-17, records 
will be marked 'TOR OFFICIAL USE 
ONLY" and safeguarded accordingly. 
Records will be maintained and disposed of 
in accordance with Army regulations. 

MP desk sergeants and supervisors must 
ensure that subordinates do not release 
information without proper authority and 
clearance from the post information officer 
or SJA (see AR 340-17). 

Computer technology enhances the ability 
to obtain and process information not 
previously possible because of time and 
resource limitations. When used to their 
fullest extent, automated systems become 
useful managerial and investigative tools. 
Computers have the ability to retrieve in a 
very short time obscure bits of information 
not readily available through the most 
elaborate cross-indexing. Moreover, the 
ability of computers to arrange statistical 
information in a meaningfuFformat can 
automate crime analysis and assist MP in 
patrol distribution and crime prevention 
efforts. 

To obtain useful information, all data 
entered into the computer must be timely 
and accurate. The basis for building any law 
enforcement data base comes from the 
records and forms completed by the MP and 
supporting agencies. Attention must be 
given to the kind of information desired prior 



to implementing an automated system. 
Consideration must be given to the manner 
in which the computer stores and retrieves 
information. A systematic arrangement of 
files allows for specific query capability as 
well as meaningful report generation. 

RECORDING TELEPHONE 
CONVERSATIONS 

MP desk personnel are authorized by the 
Department of the Army to record telephone 
conversations for a clear and accurate record 
of emergency communications for command, 
operational, or record purposes. This 
authorization extends only to reports of 
emergencies, analysis of reported 
information, records of instruction or 
commands, warnings received, requests for 
assistance, and instructions on locations of 
serious incidents. 

There are restrictions when telephone and 
radio conversations are recorded: 

• All telephones connected to recording 
equipment will be la bled "FOK 
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-CONNECTED 
TO RECORDING DEVICE." Access will 
be restricted to desk personnel only. 

• Recording equipment connection must be 
coordinated with appropriate telecom- 
munications personnel. 

• Official telephone numbers for the MP 
desk will be listed in appropriate 
telephone directories with a statement 
that emergency conversations will be 
recorded for accuracy of records. 

• Installation commanders must issue 
letters of authorization for such activities. 
One copy will be forwarded to Department 
of the Army. 

• Conversation recordings in overseas 
areas must also conform to SOFAS and 
other international agreements. 

• Recording equipment at MP desks may 
not be used to conduct wiretapping, 
investigative monitoring, and eavesdrop- 
ping activities. 



FM 19-10 



77 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



MAINTAINING RADIO LOG 

DA Form 3945 (Military Police Radio Log) 
is used as an official record of all MP radio 
calls. The radio log is begun at 0001 hours 
and closed at 2400 hours each day and 
contains all radio traffic to and from the MP 
station and patrols during the period. The 
form is normally preparecfin one copy. It is 
filed sequentially in the desk sergeant s files 



and serves as a backup reference for the desk 
blotter and other reports. It is important that 
the source, time, and subject of routine calls 
be entered in the log. In the case of serious 
incidents, the radio log entry is more 
detailed. Electronic tape-recording 
equipment is routinely authorized for use on 
MP desks. Audiotapes may be used in place 
of DA Form 3945. 















UILITary Police radio log 

For use of this form, see AR 190-45: the proponent 
agency is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. 


DATE (From 0001 Houra to 
2400 Hourm) 

20 August 1987 


PAGE NO. 

1 


NO. OF 
PAGES 

1 




SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE. 


UNIT OR STATION DESIGNATION 


CALL WORO 






Provost Marshal Office, Ft Blank, Alabama 12345 


Sierra 








TIME 


UNI T 
TO 

b 


UNI T 
FROM 


MESSAGE 
d 




0001 


~ 


" 


Radio Log Opened 








0100 


10 


s 


Radio Check 










0105 


20 


s 


Radio Check 










0300 


S 


10 


Completed Security Checks 










0530 


20 


s 


Report for Flag Call 










0800 


20 


s 


Report for School Cross Walk Mission 










0830 


S 


20 


School Cross Walk Mission Completed 










1300 


10 


S 


Report for Post Exchange Money Escort 










1320 


S 


10 


Completed Post Exchange Money Escort 










2400 


r 


■ "H 


Radio Log Closed 










DA: ,-igw 


EM OflIC REPLACES DA FORM 19^3. 1 OCT 66. WHICH WILL BE USED. 





PREPARING MP REPORTS 



DA Form 3975 is prepared on all com- 
plaints received and incidents observed or 
reported to MP, except routine traffic 
violations and those minor violations noted 
by MP where corrective action consists of a 
verbal warning. DA Form 3975 is also 
prepared when an apprehension is made or a 
military person is returned to US Army 
control from another apprehending agency. 



The military police report is initiated 
immediately upon receipt of information. If 
time does not allow for the immediate 
initiation of the report, the report should be 
initiated as soon as practicable. This report 
assures complaints are recorded, system- 
atically assigned for follow-up, disposed of. 
or referred, and posted to the MP desk 
blotter. 



78 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



EXAMPLE OF MILITARY POLICE REPORT 



MILITARY POLICE REPORT 

Fof use ot (His lorm see AR 190-45 
the proponent agency is ODCSOPS 



MILITARY POLICt HE POUT NUMBER 

06281-87-MPC001 



THRU Conunander 

15th Engineer Bn 
Fort Blank, AL 12345 



DATE 

871223 



TO Commander 

HHC, 15th Engineer Bn 
Fort Blank, AL 12345 



USARC CONTROL NUMBER 



FROM CDR, USACML&MPCEN&FM 

ATTN: Provost Marshal 
Fort Blank, AL 12345 



REPORT TYPE/STATUS 



□ Intormaiion 



XjCCommander s Aclion IDA Form 4833i 



D Supplemental XH Complaint 



2 EVALUATION 



XH Criminal Oltense 



D Military Olleose 



D Trait* Ottense 



D Founded 



□ Unfounded 



O Information 



3 COMPLAINT/OFFENSE/INCIDENT (See Reverse/ Allached lor Summary) 

Disorderly Conduct (Art 134, UCMJ) 



7 OFFENSE COOes 



5Y2 



4 LOCATION' XX On posi Q Oft posl 

(address) 

In front of the Junior 
Enlisted Club, Bldg 223 
Ft Blank, AL 12345 



B COMPLAINT RECEIVED BY 

FRANKLIN, Joseph P., E-6, Desk Sgt 



11 MP ACTION REFERED TO 



b TIME OF OFFENSE 



2330 



9 TIME RECEIVED 

2330 



□ Civil Authorities 



D Other | Specify) 



\l UME Of SUIJECT 

ADAMS, Jeffrey David 



(HI 

282-55-7766 



I. CAT |l| 
A 



E-3 



I PLACE OF IIRTH 

Lubbock, TX 



Brown 



Light 



h COLQH ETES 

Blue 



• MCE (2 1 
C 



I OATE Of aiDTH 

600606 



< WEIGHT 
150 



D Alcohol 

N/A 



I HEIGHT 
5»7" 



14 ORE U 

Ql Uniform 
D Civilian 



b ORGANIZATION (Include address and telephone nurtiDeil 

HHC, 15th Engineer Bn 
Fort Blank, AL 12345 
(205) 831-2000 



6 DATE OF OFFENSE 



871220 



to DATE RECIEVED 
871220 



a DATEHEFEREO 



k AGE 

27 



I JUVENILE: 

D Yes XKNo 



15 COOPERATIVE 

H Yes a No 



ff Male D Female 



IB IDENTIFYING MARKS 

None 



17 PERSONS RELATED TO REPORT (Place Additional Entries on Reverse'Attachedt 



a Name 



cSSN 



d Organi/aiion/Address/Telephone No 



ANDERSON, Judy D. 



E-4 



662-12-2245 



HQ Co, HQ Cmd, Ft Blank, AL 



BROWN. Stanley P. 



E-4 



333-22-1111 



111th MP Co, Ft Blank, AL 



HENRY, Charles B. 



E-5 



222-11-3333 



111th MP Co, Ft Blank, AL 



18 PROPERTY DATA 



a Dale 



19 DISPOSITION OF: 



Released to Unit 1SG on 
DD Form 629 



N/A 



ENCLKURES 

1. DA Form 2823 (ANDERSOfl) 

2. DA Form 3881 (ADAMS) 

3. DA Form 4833 (ADAMS) 



FOR THE COMMANDER iStnke oul it not applicable) 



1 - Unit Cdr 
1 - PM File 



TTPEO NAME. RANK. AND TITLE OF REPORTING OFFICER 

JOHN T. LOGAN 

CPT, MP, Operations Officer 



IWMTURE 



inn 



A-A/my 

B-Other service 
C- Family Member 
D-DA Civilian 
E-&vitian 



F Contractor 
G-Other Govt Empl 
H-FGN Natl Empl 
l-Olfiet FGN Nail 
J -Other 



M Yellow 
N-Black 
C While 
H Hispanic 
X-Other 



A Not Used 
B- Witness 
C-Viclim 
D Complainant 



E Military Police 
f Civil Authorities 
G Sponsoi 



|4| PROPERTY TYPE 



A Govl Prop/Funds F Private Vehicle 

B-Govt Vehicle G Host Govt Prop/Funds 

C NAF Vehicle H Host Govt Vehicle 
£ Private Property 



A-Lost 
BSlolen 
C-Recoverad 
D Damaged 



DA 



3*75 



WTtON 01 I JAN M ft OTOOTl 



FM 19-10 



79 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



MAINTAINING MP DESK BLOTTER 

The MP desk blotter is a chronological 
record of police activity developed from 
reports, complaints, information, and 
incidents. The desk blotter is not a substitute 
for the MP report. Its entries, in narrative 
form, contain the essentials of the report. It 
states concisely the who, what, when, where, 
and how of an incident. It cites the identity 
of persons related to an incident. And it 
directs readers to the MP report for details. 
Entries do not list names of juvenile 
subjects. In certain types of incidents /offenses 
such as rape and child molestation, names of 
victims should also be protected. In these 
cases, entries reflect the term "protected 
identities" (PI) where the name of the 
subject /victim is normally listed. If 
approved by the installation/activity PM, 
tnis technique may be used whenever 
information on a particular entry should be 
controlled. In that case, the blotter will 
indicate that the entry is restricted. And it 
will show the number of the associated MP 
report. The action taken and the name of the 
person recording the entry will be indicated 
in the columns provided. 

The desk blotter covers the period from 
0001 to 2400 hours. Time recorded in the 
"time column" reflects the time the 
information is typed on the blotter. The first 
daily entry on each blotter is always "blotter 
opened" and the last entry on each blotter is 
always "blotter closed." The blotter is 
normally prepared in original and two 
copies. One copy is sent to the senior 
commander supported by the respective PM 
office (see AR 190-45). The original is 
maintained in the PM files. The other copy is 
maintained in the desk sergeant files. With 
approval of the senior commander, extracts 
may be prepared for subordinate 
commanders when the blotter contains 
entries that pertain to their respective 
commands. As determined by local policy, 
the form may be used to provide information 
to the supporting USACIDC element. 
Distributed copies of blotters or extracts will 
include the following statement (typed, 



printed, or stamped): "This blotter or extract 
is a daily chronological record of police 
activity developed from reports, complaints, 
incidents, or information received and 
actions resulting therefrom. Entries 
contained on the blotter may or may not be 
complete or accurate and are not 
adjudications attesting to the guilt or 
innocence of any person. ' The desk sergeant 
or duty officer verifies the entries. An 
authorized individual signs the blotter after 
it has been closed. 

Information concerning the administration 
of the MP station, such as personnel changes, 
inspections, visitors, and other administrative 
data, is recorded on DA Form 1594 and 
in the MP desk journal. 

SUBMITTING CRIMINAL DATA 
REFERENCE CARDS 

DA Form 2804 (Crime Records Data 
Reference) is used to forward to the Crime 
Records Center information on subjects of 
investigations for— 

• Violations of Article 111 through 133, 
UCMJ. 

• Violations of Articles 77 through 84, 87 
through 110, and 134, UCMJ, for which 
the maximum punishment prescribed in 
the MCM is confinement for six months or 
more. 

• Offenses which result in revocation or 
suspension of driving privileges or the 
assessment of six or more points as 
outlined in AR 190-5. 

• An offense under the Assimilative Crimes 
Act (18 USC 13) or other federal statute for 
which there is no corresponding offense in 
the MCM and for which a maximum 
punishment of six months or more 
confinement is prescribed. 

A separate DA Form 2804 is submitted for 
each identified subject (real name and aliases) 
of an investigation of a special category 
offense, regardless of DA Forms 2804 pre- 
viously forwarded as a result of separate 
investigations. Completed DA Form 2804 



80 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



EXAMPLE OF MILITARY POLICE DESK BLOTTER 



m MILITARY POLICE DESK BLOTTER 
For u»o of litis form, 10AR 190-45; thf proporv 
Qflwncy li Of Tip of »ho Provost Morshal Contra 



DATE (from OOOI hour* to 24<X> hours) 

20 August 1987 



UNIT OR STATION DESIGNATION 

Office of the Provost Marshal. Fort Blank. AL 12345 



ENTRY 
NO. 



0001 
0425 



SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT, INCIDENT, POLICE INFORMATION 



2400 



"This blotter /extract is a daily chronologi- 
cal report of police activity developed from 
reports, complaints, incidents or information 
received and the actions resulting therefrom. 
Entries contained on the blotter may or may 
not be complete or accurate and are not adju- 
dications attesting to the guilt or innocence 
of any person". 

BLOTTER OPENED: 



MURDER (ART // 118, UCMJ) 



DA/ D f c M «3997 



SUBJECT: 



VICTIM #1: 



VICTIM #2: 



TIME /DATE: 
LOCATION: 

MIL /POL: 



SIMONS, ROBERT A., E-5, 
M/C/29, 041-36-4289, 
Co A, 13th INF Bn, 
Ft Blank, AL 12345 
SIMONS, NANCY E. , D/W, 
F/C/25, 623-85-3321 
BLDG 3355A, 95th St., 
Ft Blank, AL 12345 

KING, WILLIAM D. , E-4, 
M/C/21, 459-21-9062, 
Co A, 13th INF Bn, 
Ft Blank, AL 12345 

0001 hrs, 20 Aug 87 

QTRS 3355A, 95th St., 

Ft Blank, AL 12345 

SGT SCHIFF / SP/4 ROBINSON 

1st MP Co, Ft Blank, AL 12345 



PAGE NO 

1 



NO. OF PAGES 

1 



SUMMARY OF ACTION 
TAKEN 



DETAILS : Preliminary investigation re- 
vealed that SIMONS, R became drunk at the NCO 
club during the evening of 19 Aug 87. SIMONS 
R left the NCO club at approx 2345 hrs in his 
P0V, and drove to his quarters where he found 
his wife, SIMONS, N, and his best friend, 
KING, undressed in the master bedroom. 
SIMONS, R immediately went to the living room 
and obtained from his gun cabinet a Savage, 
Model 99 shotgun, and then returned to the 
bedroom and with two shots killed SIMONS, N, 
and KING. At 0055 hrs, SIMONS, R notified the 
MP Desk SGT. SIMONS, N and KING were pro- 
nounced dead by Coroner, Dr. (MAJ) MAIR at th^ 
Hill Top Army Hospital at approx 0230 hrs. 
SIMONS, R was apprehended by MPs and trans- 
ported to the MP Station and administered a 
portable breath test with results being .23% 
Investigation continues by CID. 
PREVIOUS OFFENSES AT THIS STATION: None. 
BLOTTER CLOSED: _____ v 

" INALD R. V SAMPSON 

1LT, MP 
MPDO 



Information 

MPR // 03199-87 
DA Form 3975 
DA Form 2823(3) 
DA Form 4137 
DD Form 529 
initiated . 
Notified: CID 
(BUTLER) at 0105 
hrs, MPDO (SAPP) 
at 0115 hrs, UNIT 
CDR (BOCK) at 
0320 hrs. 

SIMONS, R rel'd to 
CID. 



Information 



PAVLOV 



REPLACES DA FORM 1 »- SO, 1 NOV ««, WHICH WILL ©E USED. 



FM 19-10 

161-0160 -94-6 



81 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



with completed DA Form 3975 is forwarded 
by the preparing office directly to Director, 
US Army Crime Records Center, 2301 
Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21222. 
The card is completed in accordance with 



AR 195-2, except for the report of in- 
vestigation (ROI) number block, which 
reflects the number shown in the USACRC 
control number block of the completed 
DA Form 3975. 



EXAMPLE OF CRIMINAL DATA REFERENCE CARD 






THOMAS, Phillip Derrell 

1. NAME <Latt, Firtt, Mtddltt 


2.SUBJ STATUS CODE 


E5 

3. GRADE 


4. MCAC 


723-85-9372 

5. SSN 




6. ALIASES/NICKNAMES 

None 


7. St- X 

M 


* CODES 


1 0. FORMER SVC NO. 

None 


11. DOB 'Yr, Mo, Doy) 

630718 


8. RACE 

c 


9, E THNIC 

z 


12. P06 (City, Stat*) 

Royal Oak, MI 


13. ROl/MPR (Inctudt Primary Offense Code 

87-MP0111-3984B 
7A1A 


14. SURVEY 
CODE 


15. OTHER OFFENSE CODES 

7J2 


16. ORGANIZATION AND STATION 

441st Infantry Company 
Fort Blank. AL 1234? 


17. STA- 
TION CODE 


DATE 


20. DRUGS INVOLVEMENT 


IB. OPENED 


19. CLOSED 


21. OTHER INVOLVEMENT 


22 FILE LOCATION 


23. (Check appropriate box) 

[" 1 SUSPECT JtX SUBJECT [JviTTim 


24. DISPOSITION 


25. DATE RF- PORTt H 

870729 


26. ACTION TAKEN 

3CH3 YES ~ NO 


REMARKS 

None 




UJ 

o 
o 
u 


RACE 9 CUBAN 5 FILIPINO 
R red S LATINAMER V VIETNAMESE 
M YELLOW 1 OTHHISPANIC 3 OTHASIAN 
N BLACK 8 ALEUT EMELANESlAN 
C WHITE 7 ESKIMO W MlCRONESIAN 
X OTHER 2 USCANINDIAN L POLYNESIAN 
Z UNKNOWN G CHINESE Q OTHPAClSLANO 

ETHNIC J JAPANESE X OTHER 
6 MEXICAN K KOREAN Y NONE 
4 PUERTO RICAN D INDIAN Z UNKNOWN 


!%#■;■ POBM ftfifVA EDITION OF 

M ■■■> mm «o ZflU4 


1APft :„ i«rt«soLefe CR|**r*f C#R0S DAT* RE* £KfNCf 

■ : - v ' : - ■ - ■ ' for. use or imi r orm* ; se e a r; tssw*. the >ROf*:6.NtN : t; 

AGENCY 15 USACIOC 





82 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 8 



Operating Patrols 



Military police practice preventive patrol- 
ling. Preventive patrolling places a 
uniformed patrol in the right place at the 
right time. It has as its major feature the 
protection of people, not property. The 
primary emphasis of preventive patrolling is 
laving uniformed patrols work areas where 
analysis shows many people gather at times 
when the likelihood of crime is greatest. 
Emphasis is placed on such establishments 
as the post exchange, commissary, package 
beverage store, hospital (during evening 
shift changes), banks, gas stations, and the 
numerous recreational facilities. 

The hours of operation of all estab- 
lishments are verified and plotted on a time 
chart to indicate opening and closing 
periods. These are the times of the highest 





CONTENTS 


Page 

83 

84 

86 

86 

86 

87 

87 

90 

92 

92 

92 






COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND 
ASSISTANCE 




PATROL METHODS AND MEANSl 










CONUS Off-Post Patrols! 


OCONUS Off-Post Patrolsl 


|PATROL DISTRIBUTION! 




Distribution Policy Decisions|. . . . 




Patrol Distribution Data| 




Computation of Patrol Hours[ . . 




PATROL SHIFT DESIGN| 






Shift Reference Planl 




Special Shif ts| 









susceptibility of most establishments to 
crime. Uniformed patrols are assigned to 
these areas at those times for maximum 
visibility and deterrence. 



COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE 



Whether providing soldiers a safe 
environment in which to train, providing 
commanders a means to promote order and 
discipline, or providing military suspects 
fair and impartial investigations, MP 
protect and assist the military community. 

The MP purview for implementing law 
and order in the military community affects 
more than just commanders and their 
troops. The military community includes 
family members or military personnel. It 
sometimes includes DA civilian employees. 
And it can sometimes include installation 
visitors and the surrounding civilian 
populace. 

MP on patrol work for positive community 
relations. Public cooperation and under- 
standing benefit both the community and 
the MP. The handling of incidents requires 
observation, approach, and tactful corrective 
action or assistance by MP. 



MP behavior is professional while on duty. 
MP follow proper procedures for handling 
incidents. Their behavior is impartial, not 
judgmental. Minor violations are usually 
interpreted as noncriminal and require only 
a warning or on-the-spot corrective action. 
Taking a subject into custody is only done as 
a last resort when compliance cannot be 
achieved by other means. 

MP often are called on to assist persons 
unable to help themselves. Military 
personnel may require assistance either for 
their own protection or because they are 
unable to care for themselves properly. They 
may be intoxicated, ill, confused, or in shock; 
they may be without funds or transportation 
for return to their units; or they may, if not 
properly assisted, become the victims of 
various offenses such as robbery, assault, or 
rape. Such persons are not apprehended or 
taken into custody, although it may be 



FM 19-10 



83 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



necessary to take them to the MP station for 
return to their units. 

MP also protect juveniles. Most MP 
contact with juveniles occurs when patrols 
investigate minor offenses like disturbing 
the peace. Sometimes contact is made when 
juveniles are seen committing acts that 
could be harmful to people or property. 
Usually, MP stop the misconduct and, when 
needed, refer the incident to the parents. Or, 
for those juveniles who have committed 
minor offenses, a verbal warning by the MP 
or making the child's parents aware of the 
situation may correct their actions. 
Investigation into the causes of the 
misconduct and the collection of background 
data are limited to essential information. 
But MP may extend their investigation to 
include the conduct of the child's military 
sponsors if that conduct is dangerous or 
harmful to the child. 

MP on patrol respond to reports of crime. 
The initial action by MP at a crime scene is to 
look for victims and, if there are signs of life, 
render first aid. Everything else is secondary 
to the welfare of the injured person. Only 
when death of the person is established, do 



MP next take action to protect the crime 
scene. MP patrols also protect the 
community by enabling military 
investigators to pursue their inquiries 

expeditiously. 

The first MP to arrive at a crime scene have 
the critical task of securing the scene. They 
preserve its physical aspects so that it can be 
examined in detail by crime scene 
investigators and /or lab examiners. 
(See FM 19-20.) The patrol prevents 
unauthorized intrusions and protects the 
scene from change until an investigator 
arrives. The Mr prevent unneeded 
movement of physical evidence, which can 
render the evidence useless. They rope off 
entrances and exits and routes possibly used 
by the suspect. They post guards to control 
spectators near zones likely to yield physical 
evidence. If needed, they reroute traffic. They 
cover fragile evidence and areas that could be 
affected by rain, snow, wind, smoke, or direct 
sun rays. And when investigators arrive, the 
MP make all of their information 
immediately available. Knowing that 
details are important, the MP who arrive 
and secure the scene provide their 
observations on any changes. 



PATROL METHODS AND MEANS 



MP patrol activities are coordinated by the 
MP officer or MPDO in charge of the MP 
station. Patrol personnel report for duty to a 
designated officer or noncommissioned 
officer. The relief is formed and is reported to 
the desk sergeant. The desk sergeant gives 
all personnel their specific duty 
assignments. Personnel and equipment are 
inspected. Personnel are briefed by the duty 
officer, the desk sergeant, or the patrol 
supervisor. MP assigned to traffic control 
posts, gate duties, and foot and motor patrols 
are briefed on the information they are 
authorized and expected to furnish. Maps 
and informational material to enable them 
to answer questions not covered in their 
briefing are nelpful. 

MP patrols are dispatched by the desk 
sergeant, desk clerk, or radio operator. The 



patrol supervisors then take charge of 
dispatched patrol personnel. When two or 
more patrol supervisors are directed to 
operate in unison, the desk sergeant 
designates a leader for the operation. The 
desk sergeant keeps patror supervisors 
advised of adjacent patrol operations and 
foot patrol areas. This permits reinforcement 
of any areas if it becomes necessary. 

There are many different ways to patrol. 
The method or combination or methods is 
based on statistical analysis conducted by 
the PM office. 

When setting patrol areas and routes, 
consideration must be given to- 

• Mission of the patrol and directives and 
policies to be enforced. 



84 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Billeting, transient, and resident 
population centers. 

Hours of operation of theaters, service 
clubs, and community clubs. 

General information on any recent 
criminal or mischievous activity. 

Traffic patterns and frequent accident 

sites. 

Post size and population density. 

Total mileage to be covered by the patrol. 

Location of adjacent military and civil 
police patrols. 

Location of nearest medical facility, police 
station, and fire station. 

Communications capabilities and limits. 

Personnel available for patrol. 

Including patrol orders in patrol note- 
books at the time of briefing: 

The means of patrolling usually depends 
on operational needs and environmental 
conditions. For example, MP can patrol 
using mopeds, snowmobiles, or boats. Foot 
patrols provide intensive law enforcement in 
potential or high crime areas such as- 

• Warehouses. 

• Family member quarters. 

• Commercial establishments. 

Foot patrols check doors and windows for 
security and signs of attempted or forced 
entry. "Foot patrols enhance community 
relations by providing assistance to people 
on a personalized basis. Use of foot patrols to 
enforce off-limits policies enables the MP to 
monitor trouble spots and prevent offenses 
from occurring. (See FM 19-4 for specific 
procedures for conducting combat foot 
patrols.) 

Motor patrols provide highly mobile MP 
who can respond to a wide variety of law 
enforcement and emergency situations. 
Motor patrols operating in defined areas 
provide planned continuity of operations 
and enhance the more intense coverage 
provided by foot patrols. Motor patrols are 
also used for traffic control and enforcement 



of traffic regulations. Motor patrols must 
maintain constant communication with the 
MP base station. (See FM 19-4 for specific 
procedures for conducting combat patrols.) 

The type of patrol visibility required is 
based on each activity's vulnerability to 
crime. Visibility objectives should, be 

established and "coded." 



EXAMPLE OF PATROL VISIBILITY 

CODES 
CODE A 

Slow roll-by to be seen. Checks are 
made of areas such as theaters and 
bowling centers, with the patrol 
moving toward these facilities at 
closing time. 

CODEB 

Park in a visible area; dismount and 
walk through the area. Checks are 
made of hospitals, parking lots, and 
like facilities during the /300-2330 
change of shift. 

CODEC 

Park in a visible area; meet the 
manager. Checks are made of 
facilities dealing with large amounts 
of cash receipts, or facilities located 
in more isolated areas. 



The kind of check each activity receives is 
based on its code patrol checks. A feedback 
form, completed by each activity manager 
and provided to MP operations, permits 
adjustment of patrols and patrol areas. 

Motor patrol personnel must know how to 
respond to emergencies that require 
immediate and knowledgeable action. 
Knowledge of how to request aeromedical 
assistance, emergency medical treatment 
assistance, backup assistance and 
procedures on proper defensive tactics until 
help arrives is important. 

Unmarked vehicles may be used if needed 
to provide limited warning of MP presence. 
The most effective use of unmarked vehicles 
is during surveillance operations. 



FM 19-10 



85 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Aircraft patrols can be used when MP are 
required to cover large, sparsely populated 
areas where motor patrols are inefficient or 
ineffective. Helicopters are normally used in 
performing aircraft patrols. 

MP patrols may be supplemented by 
courtesy or unit patrols provided by 
commanders of units other than MP. These 
courtesy/unit patrols consist of NCOs who 
may wear brassards for identification. 
Courtesy/unit patrols must rely on regular 
MP in securing crime scenes and 
questioning suspects. Courtesy/unit patrols 
must not interfere or attempt to prevent 
apprehension of personnel who have 
committed an offense. The MP duty officer 
will brief and debrief courtesy/unit patrols. 
Briefings will emphasize procedures for 
obtaining MP support, limits of authority, 
and any pertinent information concerning 
the town area. Emphasis must be placed on 
the procedure that courtesy/unit patrols deal 
only with personnel from their unit; 
however, information concerning personnel 
from other units may be providea to the MP. 

CONUS OFF-POST PATROLS 

In CONUS off-post patrols will normally 
not be employed. Where off-post patrols have 
been established, the desk sergeant will brief 
patrol personnel on— 



• Coordination of requirements with armed 
forces police detachments. 

• Limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act as 
it applies to local laws. 

• All policies governing off-post law 

enforcement. 

• Published off-limits areas and 
establishments as determined by the 
Armed Forces Disciplinary Control 
Board. (See AR 190-24.) 

• Apprehension of personnel not on official 
business who are present in off-limits 
establishments. 

• Enforcement of curfews when established. 

• Trouble spots based on post data. 

OCONUS OFF-POST PATROLS 

In overseas commands it is necessary that 
MP have a working knowledge of SOFAs 
and pertinent international laws as well as 
local laws, agreements, and customs. All 
working agreements with host nations must 
be reviewed by the SJA prior to 
implementation. Due to the language barrier 
it may be advisable to have an interpreter 
fluent in the host nation language to assist 
in interrogations, investigations, and other 
operations. Due to host nation restrictions 
the jurisdiction and authority change from 
locale to locale. 



PATROL DISTRIBUTION 



Efficient use of manpower and other 
resources is critical for effective patrol 
operations. Essential to the success or patrol 
operations is appropriate distribution of 
manpower. Supervisors must develop a 
distribution plan addressing both available 
manpower and the need for enforcement. 

Military working dogs can be an effective 
means of patrolling while reducing 
manpower requirements. (See Chapter 11 for 
more information on military working dogs.) 
One-man patrols conserve manpower. They 
are useful for emergency traffic control. And 
a one-man patrol can respond to complaints 
if chance of contact with a criminal is 



minimal. But careful consideration must be 
made based on the types of crime occurring 
on the installation. Consideration must also 
be given to backup requirements and the 
experience level or assigned MP. 

How many work hours of patrol time are 
available to the PM in a 24-hour period? How 
should these hours be distributed for the 
most effective patrol coverage? These are 
two of the questions that can be answered 
using compiled data. 

Patrol distribution equalizes the work load 
among patrol units. If the work load is 
unbalanced, one unit may spend its entire 



86 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



shift responding to calls and completing 
reports, while another is underemployed. 
Unequal work loads can also adversely 
affect MP morale. Equal patrol areas allow 
personnel to spend roughly equal 
percentages of their time between 
responding to service calls and preventive 
patrol. 

Standards for distribution will vary. On 
one installation it may be the number of 
crimes or accidents, while on another it may 
be the number of buildings to be checked. 
The geography of the installation will affect 
distribution plans. Railroads, bridges, and 
rivers must all be considered so that no area 
is denied protection. 

Response time is another factor to 
consider. Response time in most patrol areas 
should be minimal and about equal to other 
areas. The larger and more diverse the area, 
the more difficult it will be to equalize the 
patrol areas. 

Distribution plans consider the varying 
numbers of patrol units available for duty on 
any one shift, depending on the number of 
units on each shift, adjustments are made in 
patrol area responsibilities. 

DISTRIBUTION POLICY DECISIONS 

Policies must be developed to adequately 
distribute patrol force coverage. Which 
services will be handled by telephone and 



which will require a unit to be dispatched? 
Which calls will be referred to more 
appropriate agencies, such as Army 
Community Service or the unit commander? 
There must be a clear policy on the degree to 
which patrol personnel handle crime 
investigations. Do they gather witnesses as 
well as secure the crime scene? The extent 
that patrol vehicles will become involved in 
traffic control, investigation, and 
enforcement must be decided. The building 
security tasks that will be accomplished by 
patrol units must be set. The time period that 
patrol personnel can be separated from their 
vehicle to accomplish these tasks must be 
set. The reporting responsibilities of patrol 
personnel must be delegated. Personnel must 
know what information and details must 
appear in their reports. Even who will review 
ana type the reports and if the reports will be 
written in the station or at the scene must be 
decided. And certainly, the priorities for 
assigning service call precedence if 
insufficient patrol units are available must 
be known. 

PATROL DISTRIBUTION DATA 

The PM has most of the data he or she 
needs to make a careful analysis of the past 
events occurring within a jurisdictional 
area. Data that can be used to project future 
as well as current police needs are often a 
part of the normal receipt of complaints and 
the dispatching of patrols. 



KEY DATA FOR DEVELOPING PATROL DISTRIBUTION 



MEANS OF COMPLAINT 
OR REQUEST 


NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT OR SERVICE 


□ RADIO 

a TELEPHONE 
d TELETYPE 
a LETTER 

□ IN PERSON 


Location of occurrence 


Date and time complaint received 


Date and time complaint occurred 


Unit assigned 


Date and time unit dispatched 


Date and time assignment completed 



FM 19-10 



87 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The number of complaints received per 
month varies markedly during the course of a 
year. The complaints range from a high 
of 251 in August to a low of 124 in January. 
The monthly average of offenses is 167.17. 
For the following January, a conservative 
prediction would be that the number of 
offenses would fall in the 124-251 offense 
range, further defined by historical data for 
the month of January and the previous 
year's average. Caution must be exercised in 
such predictions to consider any changes 
that might affect the rate of offenses, such as 
unit transfers or increased troop strengths. 

A PM, knowing only dates and times that 
crimes or complaints have occurred, has 
limited information concerning the number 
of offenses or work load to be affected in 
upcoming months. More precise projections 



can be made if it is known how the offenses 
varied by day of the week and hour of the 
day over the past year. The PM may want to 
give additional "weight" to certain offenses, 
such as assaults and robberies, compared to 
lesser offenses, such as curfew violations. 
Any patrol distribution plan must reflect the 
logical requests for police service in the area. 

A 24-hour day, 7-day week is used to 
develop a frequency distribution table. The 
resulting data shows that a large percentage 
of crime /complaints occurs on Friday and 
Saturday. The pattern shows a low on 
Sunday of 10 percent and a high on 
Saturday of 18.2 percent of all reported 
crimes /offenses. Friday and Saturday 
accounted for 35.4 percent of all weekly 
offenses, Wednesday through Saturday for 
65.6 percent. 



COMPLAINT LEVELS COMPILED BY MONTH 



MONTH 


TOTAL 2,006 


PERCENTAGE 


RANK 


January 


124 Lowest 


6.2 


12 


February 


143 


7.1 


10 


March 


157 


7.8 


6 


April 


147 


7.3 


8 


May 


138 


6.9 


11 


June 


178 


8.9 


4 


July 


210 


10.5 


2 


August 


251 Highest 


12.5 


1 


September 


186 


9.3 


3 


October 


177 


8.8 


5 


November 


150 


7.5 


7 


December 


145 


7.2 


9 


AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS REPORTED PER MONTH 


167.17 


AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS RE 


PORTED PER DAY ... 


5.50 









88 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Once the high offense days of the week are 
known, the high offense hours of the day 
should be determined. The assumption is 
made that prior patterns of offenses should 
occur in the future, subject to any 



uncontrollable variations such as weather or 
troop strengths. With this basic data, the 
distribution of the patrol force by shifts and 
days of the week becomes meaningful. 





COMPLAINT LEVELS COMPILED BY DAY AND HOUR 








CRIME/COMPLAINT OCCURRED 


DAY OF THE WEEK WHEN OCCURRED 




Time 


Number 


Percent 


Sun 


Mon 


Tues 


Wed 


Thurs 


Fri 


Sat 


0001-0100 


61 


3.1 


10 


5 


4 


8 


10 


15 


9 




0100-0200 


94 


4.7 


7 


5 


7 


14 


18 


20 


23 






0200-0300 


43 


2.1 


6 


3 


4 


10 


8 


7 


5 






0300-0400 


31 


1.6 


3 


4 


4 


6 


2 


5 


7 






0400-0500 


37 


1.8 


1 


3 


5 


7 


6 


7 


8 






0500-0600 


35 


1.7 


3 


2 


4 


7 


6 


5 


8 






0600-0700 


45 


2.2 


9 


7 


5 


4 


8 


2 


10 






0700-0800 


64 


3.2 


7 


10 


10 


5 


8 


9 


15 






0800-0900 


86 


4.3 


4 


20 


10 


9 


15 


18 


10 






0900-1000 


105 


5.3 


9 


10 


15 


17 


18 


16 


20 






1000-1100 


56 


2.8 


10 


8 


9 


8 


10 


5 


6 






1100-1200 


68 


3.4 


10 


9 


7 


10 


15 


8 


9 






1200-1300 


70 


3.5 


15 


9 


8 


15 


10 


7 


6 






1300-1400 


97 


4.8 


18 


10 


15 


18 


17 


14 


5 






1400-1500 


92 


4.6 


10 


8 


12 


20 


10 


15 


17 






1500-1600 


102 


5.1 


5 


7 


18 


15 


16 


27 


14 






1600-1700 


113 


5.6 


7 


9 


15 


20 


18 


30 


14 






1700-1800 


125 


6.3 


10 


20 


17 


16 


19 


25 


18 






1800-1900 


103 


5.1 


7 


17 


14 


12 


15 


18 


20 






1900-2000 


108 


5.4 


5 


15 


20 


18 


13 


12 


25 






2000-2100 


132 


6.6 


9 


14 


18 


20 


22 


21 


28 






2100-2200 


113 


5.6 


12 


19 


14 


13 


10 


15 


30 






2200-2300 


125 


6.2 


15 


10 


15 


18 


16 


20 


31 






2300-2400 


101 


5.0 


8 


7 


9 


11 


15 


24 


27 






TOTAL 


2006 




200 


231 


259 


301 


305 


345 


365 




Percentage 




100.0 


10.0 


11.5 


12.9 


15.0 


15.2 


17.2 


18.2 


Of all complaints reported, 3.1 percent oc 


curred between 0001-0100 hours. Of tru 


3 total 




number of 61 complaints occurring during 


these hours, 9 occurred on Saturday. 

















FM 19-10 



89 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



COMPUTATION OF PATROL HOURS 

This section describes a simplified patrol 
distribution plan. For illustrative purposes it 
will be assumed that the PM has 35 person- 
nel available for patrol duty per 24-hour day, 
or 1,400 work hours of available patrol 
service per week. This figure is obtained by 
multiplying the number of personnel by the 
number of hours worked per week (35 times 
40 equals 1,400 work hours). 

In this sample plan, days off, holidays, 
and so forth are not considered. Each of the 
35 personnel work an eight-hour day and a 
five-day week. It may be desirable for the 
purposes of a particular PM office to project 
into work hours available the leave time or 
other factors that reduce manpower 
availability. 

The traditional 0001 to 0800, 0800 to 1600, 
and 1600 to 2400 hours shifts were selected 
for this distribution plan. Local 
considerations may dictate different shift 
hours. 

The following information describes the 
manner in which the patrol distribution plan 
should be developed: 

• Take the percentages of complaints by 
day from the table that was developed to 
show complaint levels by day and hour. 
Place these daily percentages at the 
bottom of columns for each day of the 
week, Sunday through Saturday, in a new 
table for showing projected patrol 
distribution. 



Construct columns showing the total 
number of military police available and 
the work hours available, and enter the 
appropriate figures. 

Determine the shift design to be used. 
Place the shift hours to be used in the far 
left column. Using the table showing 
complaint levels by day and hour, 
determine the percentage of complaints 
occurring during the different shirts, and 
place these complaint subtotals in a 
column immediately to the right of the 
shift column, matching the percentage 
subtotals to the corresponding shifts. For 
example, 20.4 percent of all complaints 
occurred from 0001 to 0800 hours. This 
percentage is obtained by dividing 410 
complaints by 2,006 total complaints. 

Disperse the total number of work hours 
of patrol service available by multiplying 
work hours available by the percentage of 
complaints received per shift. Enter the 
results in a column showing average work 
hours (1,400 multiplied by 20.4 percent of 
complaints equals 286 work hours). Work 
hours should oe rounded to whole work- 
hour weeks. In this example 286 work 
hours is rounded to 280 work hours. 
Divide this figure (280 work hours) by the 
40-hour work week of each MP. The result 
is the number of MP required for the 0001 
to 0800 shift per week (seven MP in this 
example). Repeat this procedure for the 
remaining two shifts. Enter this data in 
the columns titled average work hours 





EXAMPLE OF PROJECTED PATROL DISTRIBUTION (35 MP) 






Shift 


s&&&& 


,xj& y&s^ Distribution 
*j*$T^ b V Da VS o f w © ek b Y Work Hours 




^k* 0° 9j£^S* \ 


fr^o^ 


Mon 


Tues 


Wed 


Thurs 


Fri 


Sat 


0001-0800 


20.4 


7 


280 


28 


32 


36 


42 


43 


48 


51 


0800-1600 


33.8 


12 


480 


48 


55 


62 


72 


73 


83 


87 


1 600-2400 


45.8 


16 


640 


64 


74 


83 


96 


97 


110 


116 


Total 


100.0 


35 


1,400 


10.0 


11.5 


12.9 


15.0 


15.2 


17.2 


18.2 











90 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



and personnel available, opposite the 
corresponding shifts. 

The work hours are then distributed based 
on the percentage of complaints received 
per day of the week for each eight-hour 
shift. That is, the average work hours of 
patrol service available is multiplied by 
the percentage of complaints to obtain the 
work hours of patrol service required. 
These computations are also made for the 
other two shifts. Any numbers that must 
be rounded are rounded up when the 
decimal place is 0.5 or greater. 

280(WORK HRS) X .10 (SUN) = 28 HRS REQUIRED 
280(WORK HRS)X .115 (MON) = 32 HRS REQUIRED 

Having constructed a projected patrol 
distribution table, the data are now used 
to develop a table showing the actual 
patrol distribution based on eight-hour 
increments. The computed work nours of 
patrol service must be converted into 
working personnel. Increments of eight 
are used because each person works an 
eight-hour day. 



In the example for projected patrol 
distribution above, note that 28 work 
hours have been assigned to Sunday on 
the 0001-0800 shift. As this converts to 3.5 
personnel (28 work hours divided by 8- 
nour day), a decision will have to be made 
on whether three or four personnel will be 
assigned to the shift. In this instance, 
three persons were assigned duty (3 MP 
times 8 hours equals 24 hours). Four of the 
28 work hours must be transferred to 
another day on the 0001 to 0800 shift. 
Work hours are not moved from shift to 
shift, only from day to day on the same 
shift. 

This procedure is done for all remaining 
days and shifts. At this point, the number 
of patrol personnel per shift on each day 
of the seven-day workweek has been 
determined. Thirty-three personnel have 
been scheduled for duty. The remaining 
two personnel will be used to replace 
personnel who are on TDY or leave or in 
the hospital. Or they will be used in 
selective enforcement operations. 







EXAMPLE OF ACTUAL PATROL DISTRIBUTION (35 MP) 
IN 8-HOUR INCREMENTS 








Shift 


{&&&& 


^ft^b 


Distriution 
/ Days of Week by Work Hours 




ft^un 


Mon 


Tues 


Wed 


Thurs 


Fri 


Sat 


0001-0800 
Hours 

Personnel 


20.4 


7 


280 


24 
3 


32 
4 


40 
5 


40 

5 


40 
5 


48 
6 


56 

7 


0800-1600 

Hours 

Personnel 


33.8 


12 


480 


48 
6 


56 

7 


64 
8 


72 
9 


72 
9 


80 
10 


88 
11 


1 600-2400 

Hours 

Personnel 


45.8 


16 


640 


64 
8 


72 
9 


80 

10 


96 
12 


96 

12 


112 
14 


120 
15 


MP Per 
Day 








17 


20 


23 


26 


26 


30 


33 


Total 


100.0 


35 


1,400 


10.0% 


11.5% 


12.9% 


15.0% 


15.2% 


17.2% 


18.2% 













FM 19-10 



91 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



PATROL SHIFT DESIGN 



The shift arrangement worked by patrol 
personnel determines to a large measure the 
level of their morale, job satisfaction, and 
effectiveness. Poorly designed rotational 
shifts create confusion, fatigue, and turmoil. 
The number of shift patterns is infinite, so a 
satisfactory one can be designed for every 
installation. The shift pattern should be 
responsive to MP operations. MP assets 
must be available when needed. Squad and 
platoon integrity should be maintained, if 
possible, under the same supervisory 
personnel. Patrol personnel should be fully 
utilized. Nonoperational tasks such as 
painting, unit training, and maintenance 
are time-consuming, and, if not properly 
distributed, can overwork personnel. 

The methods used to design shifts are 
detailed. The shift design process must take 
into account- 

• Analysis of the existing work schedule to 
determine its effectiveness. 

• Determination of the MP and security 
force staffing requirements. 

• Allocation of personnel based on crime 
and/or other analysis. 

• Determination of the type of work 
schedule that would best suit the needs of 
the PM operation. 

Regardless of which shift schedule is 

designed, when possible, consideration must 
be given to shift preference of personnel. For 
further information on how to design a shift, 
see the US Department of Housing and 
Urban Development Work Schedule Design 
Handbook: Methods for Assigning 
Employees' Work Shifts and Days off 

SHIFT PREFERENCE PLAN 

Shift assignments can do much to 
motivate patrol personnel. Although some 
shift patterns are based on squad integrity, 
incoming and assigned personnel can be 
rotated between squads. Personnel who 
attend schools, who have family problems, 
or who prefer working odd-hour shifts can 
have their work preferences considered. 



However, such a plan can be implemented 
only in a stabilized patrol shift environment. 

In establishing a shift preference plan, all 
personnel should initially identify the shift 
they want. Based on rank, time-in-grade, 
and efficiency of operations, the shifts are 
established. Guidelines must then be set to 
consider future requests for transfer to other 
shifts. Merit, seniority, length of time on a, 
particular shift, and discipline are some 
standards that have been used to govern 
transfers in units using this plan. For the 
most desirable shifts, a standing transfer list 
may have to be established. 

SPECIAL SHIFTS 

Occasionally it is necessary to temporarily 
increase the number of MP patrols for 
special events, for special operations, or for 
selective enforcement. If the on-duty squad 
cannot meet the added commitments, it must 
be augmented. In doing so, one objective 
shoula always be to minimize the loss of off- 
duty time if possible. 

On-duty hours for regularly scheduled 
shifts can be increased so that they will 
overlap with the on-coming shifts for special 
situations. For example, on New Year s Eve 
if the midnight shift reports for duty at 2200 
hours and the evening shift is retained until 
0200 hours, the number of patrols can be 
approximately doubled during the most 
troublesome period. 

An extra fourth shift can be formed to 
overlap two regular shifts. This fourth shift 
does not have to be organized as a regular 
squad but can be of wnatever size the PM 
feels is necessary. It would be subordinate to 
regular shift supervisors. As an example, the 
PM desires to apply a selective enforcement 
campaign against drunk drivers. Most of 
these offenses occur from 1800-0200 hours. 
He could employ a fourth shift of six MP 
organized into three patrols, working under 
the regular shift supervisor. This extra shift 
would not have regular patrol areas but 
would concentrate on gates, roads, and other 
areas frequented by drunk drivers. 



92 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 9 
Conducting Searches And Seizures 



The Fourth Amendment to the Consti- 
tution provides that the right of the people to 
be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated. It also provides 
that no warrants shall be issued except upon 
"probable cause/' And without probable 
cause no search is admissible in a court of law 
unless it is incident to a lawful apprehension, 
conducted with the consent or the person 
searched, or is otherwise legal. 

There is probable cause to search when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
items connected with criminal activity are 
located in the place (room and barracks, pri- 
vately owned vehicle, or quarters) or on the 
person to be searched. MP must know and 
understand search and seizure procedures to 
function effectively within the law. 

During raids MP must adhere to laws 
governing jurisdiction and authority, search 
and seizure, apprehension, and use of force in 
order to ensure evidence obtained is ad- 
missible in court. MP must understand the 
procedures involved in obtaining a search 
warrant or authorization. Probable cause 
must be shown before getting a search 
authorization. The seizure of items for use as 
evidence is limited. The items must be 
specified in the search authorization, or they 
must be in plain view; any illegal articles that 
are found are confiscated. Seized property or 
evidence is receipted. Receipting for seized 
property establishes its accountability and 
chain of custody. 

DETERMINING SCOPE OF 

Once authorization to search has been 
obtained) the person conducting the search 
must carefully comply with the limitations 
imposed by the authorization. Only those 
locations described in the authorization may 
be searched and the search may be conducted 
only in areas where it is likely that the object 
of the search will be found. For example, it an 



CONTENTS 



DETERMINING SCOPE OF AUTHORIZED 
SEARCH 1 93 




Authorizing a Searchl 


94 


Determining Probable CJause| 


94 


I Reliability Test 


95 


'iPlainViewl 


96 



DETERMINING ARTICLES SUBJECT TO 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 



..96 



CONDUCTING ENTRY AND SEARCH TO 
PROTECT PERSONS OR PROPERTY . . . 



CONDUCTING AN IDENTIFICATION 
SEARCH 



.97 



...97 



CONDUCTING AN AUTOMOBILE SEARCHl .98 

CONDUCTING AN AREA SEARCH! 99 

CONDUCTING A CONSENT SEARCH] 100 



CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF ABANDONED 

L jVvJj Cilv 11 [IUU 



CONDUCTING A TRASH AND GARBAGE] 
CONTAINER SEARCH I. ...100 



CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF PREMISES 
WITHOUT RIGHT TO PRIVACY 



..100 



CONDUCTING A FIRE SEARCHl 101 



MAINTAINING STATUS QUO OR 

FREEZING THE SITUATION ... I 101 

CONDUCTING A BODY CAVITY SEARCH| .101 

SEIZING BODY FLUIDS! 101 



CONDUCTING A FRISKl 101 

CONDUCTING INVENTORIES! 102 

CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS! 102 

CONDUCTING RAIDS! 103 

Planning a Raidl . 103 



Determining Raiding Party Composition[ 105 



Determining Equipment Requirements! . ..106 

Performing Reconnaissance! . ...106 

Executing a Raid| 107 



AN AUTHORIZED SEARCH 

investigator has authority to search the 
quarters of a subject, the investigator may 
not search a car parked on the road outside. 
Likewise, if the authorization states that the 
MP is looking for a 25-inch television, that 
MP may not look into areas unlikely to 
contain a television, such as a medicine 
cabinet or file cabinet. 



FM 19-10 



93 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



An authorization to search for contraband 
implicitly carries the limited authority to 
detain occupants of a home, apartment, or 
barracks room while the search is conducted. 
Also, the MP may detain occupants leaving 
the premises at the time the MP arrive to 
execute the search authorization. 

AUTHORIZING A SEARCH 

The commander may authorize the search 
of a person or place under his command when 
there is probable cause to believe that items 
connected with criminal activities are located 
in the place or on the person to be searched. 
When time permits, the commander consults 
the office or the SJA. A commander may not 
delegate his or her authority to authorize a 
search to another individual in the unit. 
However, the power may devolve to the next 
senior person present when the commander is 
absent or when circumstances are such that 
the commander cannot be contacted. 

When there is a military magistrate or 
judge on an installation, law enforcement 
personnel may obtain the magistrate's or 
judge's authorization to search, following the 
procedures set forth in AR 27-10. Law en- 
forcement personnel can also seek the com- 
mander's authorization. Federal magistrates 
have powers similar to military judges but 
are limited in area and authority by their 
respective district court. 

AR 27-10 sets out the procedures for 
obtaining an authorization to search. 
Information in the form of statements, either 
written or oral (and which can be transmitted 
by telephone or radio), must be presented to a 
commander, magistrate, or military judge. It 
is not mandatory that these statements be 
sworn, but an oath may be required by the 
authorizing official and, in a close case, an 
oath may be the factor which determines 
admissibility. The authorizing official will 
then decide, based upon the statements, 
whether or not probable cause to search 
exists. Once the authorizing official deter- 
mines that probable cause exists, the official 
will issue either an oral or a written authori- 
zation to search. Even though there is no 



general requirement that probable cause 
statements or the authorization to search be 
in writing, various commands or units may 
impose additional requirements. Strict 
adherence to these requirements is man- 
datory. The authorizing official must specify 
the place to be searched and the things to be 
seized. 

DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE 

To determine if probable cause exists, the 
authorizing official will evaluate whether or 
not the information furnished to him is 
reliable and reasonably warrants his acting 
on the basis of that information. The overall 
issue of reasonableness is composed of two 
elements. The first is the source's basis of 
knowledge, which may be established by- 

• Personal observation. 

• Statement of the person or accomplice to be 
searched. 

• Self-verifying detail. 

• Corroboration. 

The basis of knowledge can be established 
by showing that the commander personally 
observed the criminal activities himself, or 
that he is basing his authorization on the fact 
that a third party personally observed the 
criminal activity, that this fact has been 
related to him, and that such information has 
been corroborated or substantiated. 

In the drug area, personal observation 
must also include facts indicating there is a 
basis for belief that what was seen were drugs 
(that is, the commander has had a class on 
drug identification, or the third party has had 
a class on drug identification or has fur- 
nished reliable information in the past as to 
the particular drug in question). 

The commander or the person seeking the 
authorization from the commander may have 
trustworthy information that items con- 
nected with criminal activities are located in 
the place to be searched based on information 
obtained from a statement of the individual 
to be searched or an accomplice of the 
individual to be searched. 



94 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



One way to pass the basis of knowledge test 
is by showing that the tip was so detailed that 
the information must have been obtained as a 
result of a personal observation by the infor- 
mant or from a statement of the defendant or 
an accomplice. The best example of when a 
tip is self-verifying is the one the Supreme 
Court used in Draper v. United States 
(Illinois v. Gates, 1983; Massachusetts v. 
Upton, 1984). 

In the above case, the arresting police 
officer had received a tip from an informant 
that the defendant had departed Denver, 
Colorado, to travel to Chicago. The informant 
(1) said the defendant would return by train 
on 8 or 9 September; (2) described the 
defendant's physical appearance; (3) 
indicated that the defendant would oe 
carrying a tan zipper bag; (4) said the 
defendant walks with a fast gait; and (5) said 
the defendant would be carrying heroin. 
Before making the arrest, the arresting police 
officer verified facts 1 through 4. 

The court indicated that the tip was so 
detailed that it could conclude that the 
informant obtained his information in a 
trustworthy manner, such as by personal 
observation or a statement of the defendant 
or a combination of the two. 

When the police officer can verify a number 
of the items listed in the informant's tip, the 
conclusion is that the other items in the tip 
must also be true. The best example of 
corroboration is, again, Draper v. united 
States. A number of courts have indicated 
that the Draper situation could apply to not 
only train stations but airports or 
rendezvous-type situations with automobiles. 
In the case of an anonymous tip, this 
corroboration is extremely important and 
may be essential to a finding of probable 
cause. 

Reliability Test 

The commander must also be satisfied as to 
the credibility of the person furnishing the 
information. This has been called the 
reliability test and may be established by one 
or more of the following: 



• Demeanor of the individual furnishing the 
information to the commander. 

• Statement of past reliability. 

• Corroboration. 

• Statement from victim or eyewitness of 
offense. 

• Declaration against interest. 

• Information from other law enforcement 
officials. 

• Information obtained from senior NCOs 
and above as a result of being passed 
through the chain of command. 

When the information is personally given 
to the commander— not by an MP, but by the 
third party who obtained the information— 
the commander can judge the individual 
source's reliability at that time. In many 
cases the individual may be a member of the 
commander's unit; thus, the commander is in 
the best situation to judge the credibility of 
the person. Even when the person is not a 
member of the authorizing commander's 
unit, it is an eyeball-to-eyeball situation in 
which the commander can question the 
individual and determine the consistency of 
statements made by the individual. The 
eyeball-to-eyeball situation may either lend 
to or detract from establishing, credibility. 
The same is true when the individual is a 
member of the commander's unit. Again, the 
commander's personal knowledge of the 
informant can lend to or detract from 
establishing credibility. Corroboration and 
demeanor of the person are particularly 
important when questioning first-time 
sources with no established record of past 
reliability. 

One of the easiest methods for determining 
reliability is to know that the informant has 
proven reliable in the past. There should be 
some indication as to the underlying 
circumstances of past reliability — such as 
this informant has furnished correct 
information three times in the past about 
wrongful possession of a particular type of 
drug, naming the drug. 



FM 19-10 



95 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The person furnishing the information to 
USACIDC and then to the commander may 
furnish information that is against the 
person's penal interest— such as he is aware 
he is admitting an offense, and he has not 
been promised any benefit. Thus, he may be 
prosecuted himself. This lends a great degree 
of reliability to the information furnished. 

Obtaining information from other law 
enforcement officials through normal 
channels gives a presumption of reliability 
concerning the information. This factor 
comes into play when the desk sergeant puts 
out an all-points bulletin. It is not necessary 
for the apprehending MP to personally 
obtain the information from the source. Of 
course, the original source of the 
information must satisfy the reliability test. 
But this determination can be made later 
and need not be made by the MP who 
received the all-points bulletin. In other 
words, reliance on another MP is considered 
to be reasonable. The same is true for 
reliance on the report of the victim of a 
crime. Remember if acting on the basis of an 
anonymous tip, corroboration of the 
information may be essential to a finding of 
probable cause. 

Plain View 

An MP who is lawfully in any place may, 
without obtaining a warrant or a com- 
mander's authorization, seize any item in 
plain view or smell which he has probable 
cause to believe is contraband or evidence of 
a crime. This is so even if the seizable item is 
not related in any way to the crime that the 
MP is investigating. Seeing an item in plain 
view in proximity to an individual may 
justify an apprehension or further search of 
the same area or another area. 

An MP may use binoculars, flashlight, or 
in some cases, a ladder or stool. The same 
rationale that applies for plain view also 
applies for plain smell. 



The commander or MP can lawfully 
apprehend or search during a lawful, hot 
pursuit. They also may lawfully apprehend 
or search while conducting an investigation 
at a unit or office premises. 

Listed are a few of the places where the 
commander or MP can lawfully apprehend 
or search. 

• Areas of public or private property 
normally accessible to the public or to the 
public view. 

• Any place with the consent of a person 
empowered to give such consent. 

• Any place pursuant to an authorization to 
search the particular place. 

• Any place where the circumstances 
dictate an immediate police response to 
protect life or prevent serious damage to 
property. 

• Any place to effect a lawful apprehension, 
such as business, home, on the street, or in 
a vehicle. (In the absence of exigent 
circumstances, a prior authorization is 
required to apprehend someone in a 
private residence.) 

While on patrol, an MP may observe an 
item in a parked car; or while making a 
routine spot check of a vehicle, the MP may 
notice something that will aid in a criminal 
prosecution. The MP may seize that item. 

When an MP is lawfully at a place to make 
an apprehension, he may not examine the 
entire premises solely to look for evidence. 
With an apprehension authorization, an MP 
may go to the on-post quarters to apprehend 
an individual for an offense. While standing 
in the foyer of the quarters, the MP may see 
some item that will aid in a criminal 
prosecution. He may seize the item that is 
visible from the foyer. He may not, without 
invitation, go to the other rooms of the 
house. 



DETERMINING ARTICLES SUBJECT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE 

Items can be subject to seizure when search conducted under a commander's 
specified in a legal search warrant, during a authorization, or during an otherwise lawful 



96 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



search. All seized items should be clearly 
marked with the initials of the person 
making the seizure and the military date and 
time. While it may be desirable to seize 
property in the presence of the accused, it is 
not mandatory; however, a DA Form 4137 
must be issued and the chain of custody 
maintained. 



During a lawful search, any evidence 
relating to crimes other than that specified 
by the search warrant or search 
authorization may be seized, provided it is in 
plain sight during the search or in a place 
where the specified evidence could 
reasonably be round. 



CONDUCTING ENTRY AND SEARCH TO PROTECT PERSONS OR 

PROPERTY 



A commanding officer or noncommis- 
sioned officer may search government 
property used in connection with assigned 
duties (such as desks and filing cabinets 
located in an individual's assigned office or 
building) to look for contraband or property 
held in a representative capacity. Any 
evidence found in the desk may be 
admissible at a trial. 

An MP may make a warrantless entry into 
any premises whenever he has reason to 
believe that it is necessary to prevent injury 
to persons, to prevent serious damage to 
property, or to render aid to someone in 
danger. 

While on patrol in the housing areas or 
barracks area, an MP may hear sounds of a 
fight or cries for help coming from a 
building. Upon hearing these sounds, he 
may enter the building to prevent injury or 
damage. Once the danger or emergency 
conditions have ceased, he may take only the 
necessary steps to carry out the purpose of 
the original entry. 

An MP, who is pursuing a person who he 
has probable cause to believe is armed and 
has just committed a serious crime, may 
enter a vehicle or building believed to have 
been entered by the suspect and may search 
the multiple dwelling unit or vehicle for the 
person or any weapons that might be used to 
rurther his escape. Once the individual 



pursued is apprehended, the search will be 
limited by the search incident to 
apprehension rules. 

When the person pursued is not found on 
the premises, the MP may search the 
premises for evidence of the suspect's 
identity or the location to which he is freeing 
if it is unknown. 

The hot pursuit rule will apply when the 
MP receives a report of an armed robbery or 
rape and shortly thereafter receives the 
description of the person who has committed 
the offense, and pursues the suspect, at 
which point the suspect enters a quarters on 
post. He and the other MP may enter the 
building (for example, quarters or house) 
and search wherever the suspect may be 
hiding. 

An MP may eo to the on post quarters of 
an individual wnen the MP has been notified 
of a domestic disturbance. At the particular 
house, the officer will try to quell the 
disturbance, and if the MP views any 
contraband or any other item which he 
reasonably believes to be evidence of 
criminal activity, these items may be seized. 
Additionally, the disturbance may be such 
as to give the MP a basis for apprehending 
one of the individuals at the home. 
Thereafter, a search incident to the 
apprehension may be conducted. 



CONDUCTING AN IDENTIFICATION SEARCH 



An identification search applies to an inca- 
pacitated person or to an unsecured or stolen 
vehicle. An MP may examine the personal 



effects of any person who appears to be 
incapacitated, to learn either the cause of the 
incapacitation or to identify the individual. 



FM 19-10 

161-016 0-94-7 



97 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



When MP are called to a barracks, they 
may find an individual unconscious because 
of an overdose of prescription drugs or a 
prohibited substance. The MP may gain 
entry to the room and call for medical help. 
After the call for medical help, the MP may 
search the immediate area and the personal 
effects of the individual to obtain evidence of 
identity. The MP may also search the 
immediate area to determine what 
substance was used to overdose, so medics 
can treat the illness properly. 

An MP on patrol at night may observe a 
car in a parking lot after the establishment 
has closed. If someone is observed in the 
vehicle apparently unconscious, it is proper 
for the MP to open the vehicle, learn if the 
individual is unconscious, notify a doctor, 
and then obtain evidence of the identi- 
fication either from the individual or from 
the car itself. 

An MP who finds a vehicle unsecured — 
one that is registered on post or has a 
visitor's pass and is capable of being 
secured — will secure the vehicle, leaving a 
note that the individual who owns the 
vehicle should secure it himself next time. If 
the vehicle registered on post cannot be 
secured, the MP will attempt to learn the 
identity of the owner by first calling the PM 
office if time permits and, if not, by 
searching the vehicle for identification. If 
the vehicle is not registered on post or does 



not have a visitor's pass, the MP may search 
the vehicle for identification. 

If while searching the unsecured car, the 
owner of the vehicle is identified, the person 
making the search for identification will 
attempt to contact the owner and ask him to 
secure his vehicle in the future. If while 
looking for identification evidence of a crime 
is found, the evidence may be seized and 
may lead to appropriate action against the 
individual for criminal conduct. 

If the owner of the vehicle cannot be 
determined by looking for identification, the 
vehicle should be secured temporarily by the 
MP, and an attempt should be made through 
all available means to determine the owner 
or if the vehicle was stolen. 

In some states license plate numbers may 
not be stored in a computer. It may be 
difficult to determine whether or not a 
vehicle is stolen unless the identity of the 
owner can be determined immediately. 

When the MP is permitted to make a 
search for identification, the scope of the 
search is limited to areas such as glove 
compartments and consoles where owner 
and vehicle identification are normally kept. 
The scope of the search may also include 
reading documents that are lying in 
open view inside the car. Once identification 
has been established, the search is ended. 



CONDUCTING AN AUTOMOBILE SEARCH 



An apprehending MP may make a 
warrantless search of the interior of a car at 
the time and place of apprehension if there is 
probable cause to apprehend one of the 
occupants. The scope of the search can be 
extended to the entire automobile if there is 
probable cause to believe there is evidence in 
the trunk or under the hood. The warrantless 
search need not take place where the 
apprehension of the occupant took place if 
there is a valid reason for conducting the 
search at another place such as at an MP 
station. 



Where there has been a stop of an 
automobile, the MP stopping the automobile 
may make a protective search of the 
passenger compartment of the automobile if 
the Mr possesses reasonable suspicion that 
the vehicle contains weapons potentially 
dangerous to the MP. Whether or not 
reasonable suspicion exists depends on the 
same factors discussed later for a frisk of an 
individual. The investigative search extends 
to those parts of the passenger compartment 
in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. 
Just because there is a stop of an automobile 



98 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



does not mean the MP may conduct an 
investigative search. 

When an individual is stopped for a 
robbery that has occurred on post and the 
driver is apprehended on post and taken to 
the MP station, the car may also be taken to 
the MP station. If the robbery has recently 
taken place, there may be probable cause to 
believe the car contains evidence of the 
robbery, and it may be searched at the MP 
station, even though there is no 
authorization from the commanding officer 
to search the vehicle. 



An individual may be stopped for a traffic 
offense, and the MP may see items in plain 
view such as drugs or drug paraphernalia or 
evidence of other crime. This would give the 
MP probable cause to believe that other 
evidence is located in the vehicle. Thus, the 
vehicle can be searched there or it can be 
taken to the MP station where a search of the 
entire vehicle may be made. If the car was 
not in motion prior to the owner being taken 
into custody, and there is no likelihood of the 
vehicle being removed by a third party, a 
search warrant should be obtained to search 
the vehicle.. 



CONDUCTING AN AREA SEARCH 



If an offender has left the scene, an 
adequate number of MP teams should be 
detailed to participate in an area search. An 
area search is conducted by using the 
quadrant method. The area to be searched is 
divided into four equal pie-shaped wedges 
radiating outward from the crime scene. One 
or more units are assigned to each quadrant. 
The search is begun at the outer perimeter of 
the quadrant. Units search inward toward 
the crime scene using a zigzag pattern. It is 
recommended that units overlap each other's 
patterns to ensure complete area coverage. 



QUADRANT METHOD 



PIE-SHAPED 
■ QUADRANT 




The search for the offender continues until 
an apprehension is made or the search is 
abandoned. 

In initiating a search, speed is important. 
Patrol personnel should not wait until a 
complete description of the offender and /or 
vehicle is obtained. They should 
immediately deploy with the information 
available and start the search. Further 



information can be forwarded to units in the 
field by radio or other means of 
communications as it is made available. 

An area search may be conducted by using 
a motor vehicle or setting up a fixed post. Or 
a foot search may be conducted. When 
conducting a motor vehicle search patrol 
personnel remain in their vehicles and 
conduct a rapid area search of fields, 
parking lots, sidewalks, laree throughway 
alleys, and roads. They are limited in their 
ability to search because they are 
conspicuous in a patrol vehicle and thus 
easily avoided. Also, they are unable to 
search in detail behind bushes, in doorways, 
and so forth. Fixed posts are useful at 
intersections or other vantage points on 

Eossible escape routes. These positions can 
e either single vehicles or formal 
roadblocks. When conducting a foot search 
the patrol vehicle is parked, and the search 
is carried out on foot. Personnel conducting 
such a search should stop frequently and 
listen for sounds of the offender. Trees, 
bushes, and other concealment should be 
used to protect approaching searchers from 
being seen by the suspect. Personnel in the 
area should be questioned. They may have 
seen the fleeing suspect or strange vehicles 
in the area. Foot searches can also be 
initiated to find witnesses and to look for 
evidence. 



FM 19-10 



99 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



CONDUCTING A CONSENT SEARCH 



An MP who wishes to make a search that 
is not otherwise authorized may do so if the 
person or persons in control of the immediate 
area or object to be searched voluntarily give 
their consent. To ensure that the consent is 
voluntary, the MP should warn the 
individual of his intent to search. Ideally the 
individual's consent would be in writing. 



"I have no authorization to search. I 
would like to search you or a particular 
place. " 



If the person consents to a search, it will be 
a voluntary waiver of his Fourth Amend- 
ment rights. It must be voluntary and not 



mere acquiescence to authority. A refusal to 
consent to search, like evasive answers to a 
question, may arouse suspicion, but this 
evasiveness is not enough to amount to 
probable cause to search. When you have the 
subject's consent, you may continue with the 
search without authorization. A pitfall of 
consensual search is that it may alert a 
suspect and permit him time to dispose of 
evidence or to escape from the installation. 

One question a subject may ask is, "What 
happens if I do not consent to search?" The 
answer should be that appropriate action 
will be taken. If the subject persists, tell him 
you will apply for a search authorization. Do 
not tell him you will get one. 



CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF ABANDONED PROPERTY 



MP lawfully in any place may, without 
an authorization to search, recover any 
abandoned property and examine its 
contents for seizable items. While on patrol 
MP may observe an abandoned vehicle on 
an isolated road. It is proper to search the 
vehicle for any items that may be seized. 



While on patrol an MP may apprehend an 
individual for a traffic offense. Prior to the 
vehicle coming to a complete halt, with the 
offender in it, he notices the offender 
throwing a small envelope from the vehicle. 
The MP may recover the envelope and seize 
any objects inside. 



CONDUCTING A TRASH AND GARBAGE 
CONTAINER SEARCH 



MP lawfully in any place may, without 
obtaining authorization to search, examine 
the contents of a trash or garbage container 
that is not located next to on-post quarters or 



not located in the driveway of the on-post 
quarters. Thus, the garbage cans located on 
any street near the curb may be searched 
without authorization to search. 



CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF PREMISES WITHOUT 

RIGHT TO PRIVACY 



MP may, without authorization, 
search any premises to which a suspect no 
longer has a right of possession or has 
demonstrated a lack of intention to return 

An individual who has been a resident of 
the guest house, but who has checked out 
earlier in the day, has given up the right to 



object to a search of his former room. 
Additionally, when an individual has left 
the guest house and has not returned for two 
or three days, and has not provided some 
intention of returning, that room may be 
searched. Any items found will be ad- 
missible in court. 



100 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



CONDUCTING A FIRE SEARCH 



After a fire in private quarters, the fire 
marshal and MPI may investigate the cause 
of the fire so long as the fire fighters are still 
present performing their duties. Once this 
investigation is discontinued and the MP 
and the fire fighters leave the scene, the MP 
may not return unless an authorization to 
search the premises without consent has 
been obtained or it is an emergency. An 



emergency is when there is an immediate 
threat that the fire might rekindle. 

When the premises are completely 
destroyed, investigators may return at any 
time to investigate the cause of the fire. 
Additionally, when fire officials leave 
because of darkness and smoke, they may 
return within a reasonable period to 
continue their investigation. 



MAINTAINING STATUS QUO OR FREEZING THE SITUATION 



In some instances, probable cause may not 
exist without further investigation, or the 
MP may want to seek advice rrom a SJA. In 
such situations, the MP may want to hold a 
house, room, or automobile in a status quo. 

Assume the husband has taken his spouse 
to the hospital because of a gunshot wound. 
He implies that he may have been involved 



with the crime or that he knows what 
weapon was used, but he will not tell the MP 
where it is located. If the husband has been 
legally apprehended or is consensually at 
the Mr station and there are no children in 
the family, the MP may want to place notices 
out on the premises that no one will be 
allowed to enter without MP permission. 



CONDUCTING A BODY CAVITY SEARCH 

Under certain situations, a search of body with the SJA is recommended before 
cavities may be permitted. Coordination conducting a body cavity search. 

SEIZING BODY FLUIDS 



An individual may consent to giving a 
blood or urine sample. Nonconsensual 
extraction of blood and urine may be made 
pursuant to a search authorization. 
Nonconsensual extraction of blood or urine 
may be made without such an authorization 
only when there is a probable cause that 
evidence of crime will be found and when the 
delay that would result if an authorization 
were sought could result in the destruction of 



the evidence. An order for the individual to 
give blood or to collect a urine specimen is 
permissible if done as part of a lawful 
inspection. 

The voluntary and involuntary extraction 
of blood or urine must be done by a medical 
specialist, physician's assistant, medical 
aoctor, or other person who is authorized to 
collect samples. 



CONDUCTING A FRISK 



An MP may frisk any person whom he has 
lawfully stopped when the MP reasonably 
suspects the person is carrying a concealed 
weapon or dangerous object, and the frisk is 
necessary to protect the MP or others. The 
frisk may be conducted immediately upon 
making the stop or at any time during the 



stop — whenever a reasonable suspicion to 
frisK arises. 

A number of factors may be examined in 
determining whether or not there is 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is 
armed and that the frisk is necessary for the 
protection of the MP or others. 



FM 19-10 



101 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Listed are a few factors that may give 
grounds for a frisk: 

• Appearance. 

• Actions. 

• Prior knowledge of the individual stopped. 

• Location of the stop and whether or not it 
is a high crime area. 



• Time of day. 

• Purpose behind the stop. 

• Companions of the person stopped. 

If, while conducting a frisk, an MP feels an 
object which he reasonably believes to be a 
weapon or dangerous item, he may seize this 
object. 



CONDUCTING INVENTORIES 



A commander may direct an inventory of 
an individual soldier's property when the 
soldier is absent from the unit on ordinary or 
emergency leave or when hospitalized. It the 
commander or his designated representative 
discovers items that would aid in a criminal 
prosecution, these may be seized and used as 
evidence. A commander or his designated 
representative also may conduct an 
inventory of the property of an individual 
who has been placed in military or civilian 
confinement. 

When an individual is apprehended for 
driving while intoxicated or is a subject 
under apprehension which involves 
transportation to the PM office, the vehicle 
of the individual will be secured. When there 



is space at the place of apprehension, the 
vehicle may be secured there; however, if 
there is no place to secure the vehicle, it will 
be impounded at the PM office and in- 
ventoried. 

When a person is apprehended for DWI as 
he pulls into his quarters parking lot, there is 
no reason to impound the vehicle. However, 
if a person is apprehended on one of the outer 
roads of the post and there is no place to 
secure the vehicle and there is a possibility 
that items may be stolen, the vehicle should 
be impounded at the PM office and in- 
ventoried. (AR 700-84 and DA Pam 600-8 
contain more information on conducting 
inventories of personal clothing and 
property.) 



CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS 



The commander has the inherent right to 
inspect the individual barracks in which 
individual soldiers are housed to ensure the 
command is properly equipped, functioning 
properly, and maintaining standards of 
readiness, sanitation, and cleanliness, and 
to ensure that personnel are present, fit, and 
ready for duty. 

Such an inspection may include an 
examination to locate and confiscate 
unlawful weapons and other contraband if 
the primary purpose is to determine if the 
unit is functioning properly, is maintaining 
standards of readiness, and is fit for duty. 
This inspection may also include an order 
for the individual to collect a urine specimen. 

A commander conducting an inspection 
for these reasons may find items he believes 



may aid in a criminal prosecution. These 
items may be seized. The inspector may only 
look in those areas that will enable him to 
achieve the purpose and scope of this 
inspection. When inspecting for food or 
flammable products, such as lighter fluid, he 
may look in cigar boxes or other suitable 
containers. 

Normally a commander will conduct 
periodic security checks to ensure that wall 
lockers and footlockers are locked. If the 
commander or his representative conducts a 
security inspection and notices a wall locker 
or footlocker unlocked, he may take the 
valuables from the locker secure them in the 
unit supply room until the individual returns 
to the unit. If, while removing the valuables, 
the person conducting the inspection sees 



102 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



items that would aid in a criminal 

prosecution, these may also be seized. 

The commander has the right to conduct a 
search for weapons after a unit has been 
firing on the range and has returned to the 
unit area and found a weapon missing. 
Under these circumstances the commander 
or his designated representative may 
conduct a search of all persons who were on 
the range and others who were in a position 
to stealthe weapon, to include their living 
area and private automobiles. 

Under no circumstances may an in- 
spection or inventory be used as a subterfuge 
for a search (United States v. Roberts, 



2 Military Justice Reporter 31 [Court of 
Military Appeals, 1976]). 

If the commander is looking for evidence 
of a specific crime, or suspects that an 
individual or group of individuals have 
drugs in their possession but does not have 
probable cause for such a belief, he may not 
use the inspection of the unit as a subterfuge 
for a search of the individual or group of 
individuals. Subterfuge normally taxes 
place when a commander or MP "feels" an 
individual has contraband in his possession' 
or living area but not enough information to 
amount to probable cause and uses an 
inspection of the type previously mentioned 
in this section to search for the contraband. 



CONDUCTING RAIDS 



A lawful raid is a surprise, legal invasion 
of a building or area. A raid may be made to 
apprehend offenders, to obtain evidence of 
illegal activity, or to recover personal or US 
government property. Occasionally this raid 
is made to prevent the commission of a crime 
or to confiscate contraband. 

A raid must be justified. It must have a 
clearly stated purpose. The authority to 
conduct a raid stems from and is justified by 
having probable cause. Probable cause for a 
lawfulraid comes from information obtained 
through surveillances, registered /confidential 
sources, criminal intelligence, or other 
sources. 

Raids are conducted by the agency that 
has jurisdiction of the case. This agency will 
have mission responsibility and may be 
augmented by other agencies based on the 
reputations or those being raided. 

Military authorities authorize and conduct 
raids in areas under military control. Civil 
police conduct all raids in areas not under 
military control. Military authorities can 
request that civil police conduct a raid if 
enough justification exists. And MP or 
USACIDC special agents may accompany 
civil police as observers. Although forbidden 



by the Posse Comitatus Act to participate in 
a raid, MP or USACIDC special agents may 
help identify persons or property seized. If 
military personnel are apprehended in a civil 
police raid, they may be released to 
observing MP or USACIDC special agents 
without formal receipt. 

A raid must be coordinated with units and 
agencies that will be affected by the raid or 
that can add to the raid s success. 
Coordination with the SJA helps ensure that 
the results of a raid can be used in court. In 
the interest of security, however, coordi- 
nation is limited to that which is essential. 
The time of the raid should be selected, if 
possible, to ensure minimum interference 
from heavy traffic and allow rapid 
movement to ensure the presence of subjects 
and illegal items. 

PLANNING A RAID 

To be successful raids must be planned. 
Plans must include not only team compo- 
sition, equipment, and operational concept, 
but also any special arrangements that must 
be made. And alternate plans should be 
developed. The raiding party can switch to 
the alternate plan on prearranged signals if 
the original plan goes awry. 



FM 19-10 



103 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



A raid plan should be concise, simple, 
flexible, and should generally follow the 
steps used for planning an operations order. 
It must be based on sound tactical concepts 
and should be adaptable to any contingency. 

A raid is planned in detail with each 
member of the raiding party briefed on the— 

• Objective of the action. 

• Number of offenders and their names, 
descriptions, injuries, and so forth. 

• Act the offender is suspected of 
committing. 

• Reputation, background, characteristics, 
and mental state of the offender. 

• Hostages or other bystanders involved 
and their descriptions. 

• Location of the offender (apartment, floor, 
room number, window, and so forth). 

• Offender and if he is armed, and, if so, the 
type of weapon and amount of 
ammunition if known. 

• Physical layout of the operation (sewers, 
skylights, adjacent buildings, type 
construction; for example, wood, brick, 
and so forth). 



• Support forces. 

The effectiveness of a raid depends largely 
upon specific planning and preparation 
including use of criminal intelligence. 
Essential to the effectiveness of any raid is 
the speed and surprise with which it is 
executed. Although some raids must be 
staged with a minimum of planning and 
preparation, the factors of proper coordi- 
nation, manpower, and equipment to include 
special weapons must not be overlooked. 
Essential factors in planning a raid are — 

• Mission. 

• Opposition expected. 

• Items to be searched for or seized. 

• Composition of raiding party. 

• Orientation of personnel. 

• Position and role of each member. 

Planning time can be reduced by following 
an SOP. The SOP contains checklists to help 
planners. And it gives guidelines for 
recurring raid factors common to all 
successful raids. These factors are surprise, 
speed, simplicity, superiority, and safety. 



FACTORS OF A SUCCESSFUL RAID 



SURPRISE 
of time and 
place 


SPEED 
of action 


SIMPLICITY 
of plan 


SUPERIORITY 
of numbers, 
weapons, and 

maneuverability 


SAFETY 
awareness 


Essential for 
success 


Essential for 
surprise 


Ensures plan 
can be under- 
stood by 
participants 


Reduces 
resistance 


Reduces 
danger to 
raiders 


Catches 
subjects 
unaware 


Ensures 
raiders can 
apprehend 
subjects 
before they 
can take 
counteraction 


Ensures 
instructions 
can be 
carried out 


Increases likeli- 
hood of raid's 
success 


Protects 
public 


Raiding party 
can move in 
when least 
expected 



104 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Surprise keeps subjects from organizing 
resistance to the raiding party and from 
destroying or concealing evidence. It keeps 
them from escaping or helping other subjects 
escape. And it lessens their chances for 
suicide attempts if they are so inclined. The 
subjects of the raid must not know they are 
targets until the operation begins. The fewer 
people who know a raid is planned, the 
greater the likelihood of surprise. Once the 
raid begins, it must be carried out with speed 
and precision. The time of the raid must be 
planned to fit the circumstances. The best 
time to carry out a raid is when few 
uninvolved people are about. Raids are often 
conducted at daybreak. The element of 
surprise is usually on the side of the raiding 
party at that time of day. 

Speed of execution is vital to the success of 
a raid. And speed can only be obtained if, 
from the planning stage onward, all 
participants have and know their specific 
assignments. Thus, simplicity of the plan is 
a key factor for a well-organized raid. 
Raiding party instructions must be clearly 
stated. And they must be easy to carry out. 

Superiority in manpower and equipment 
can make the difference between a raid's 
success or failure. Superiority comes from 
knowing and exceeding the subject's 
capabilities. The need for superior 
manpower or maneuverability dictates the 
number of members used in the raiding 
party. And superiority of firepower is 
desirable in any raid situation. If criminals 
know the raiding party is better armed than 
they are, they are less likely to resist. If 
criminals are armed as well or better than 
the raiding party, they may believe they 
have a chance for escape and thus offer 
greater resistance. 

Safety must have a high priority in any 
MP operation. Danger is inherent in any 
raid situation. The raiding party must be 
thorough, cautious, and safety conscious. 
Speed must not be gained at the expense of 
safety. Using trained and experienced 



personnel reduces the hazard of injury to or 
death of innocent persons. Every raid 
member must be able to recognize all mem- 
bers of the raid party. In multiorganizational 
raids, distinctive clothing, like raid jackets, 
can clearly identify raiding party members. 
Each member of the multioreanizational 
raiding party must be familiar with all 
aspects or the operation, as well as his or her 
own mission. 

DETERMINING RAIDING PARTY 
COMPOSITION 

The raiding party's composition is 
determined by the situation and the 
resources available. There is no set number 
of people or teams who should make up a 
party. A suggested organization, which can 
be modified as needed, is composed of a raid 
commander; entry, security, prisoner, 
reserve, and medical teams; and their 
respective commanders. Sometimes 
specially detailed persons or teams augment 
the raiding party. For example, a chemist or 
a special dog handler team may accompany 
the basic party. 

The raid commander has the overall 
responsibility for planning and conducting a 
raid. Raid commanders are selected for their 
experience and leadership ability and for 
their knowledge of the situation. Team 
commanders are responsible to the raid 
commander for the supervision of their 
respective teams. They, too, are selected for 
experience and leadership ability. A reserve 
team commander is usually named as the 
assistant raid commander. He assumes 
command of the raiding party if the 
commander is injured. A chain of command 
is established for the raiding party and 
within each team. 

The entry team is the maneuver element. It 
enters the target area to make apprehen- 
sions, as needed, and /or recover property. 
The entry team may have a recorder, a 
photographer, and an evidence custodian. 
The recorder makes notes of events, and 
property recovered during the raid. 



FM 19-10 



105 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The photographer complements the record- 
ers notes with photographs of items or 
events. The evidence custodian assembles, 
tags, and receipts for the evidence or prop- 
erties seized. 

The security team provides cover for the 
entry team. It also seals off possible avenues 
of approach and escape. 

The reserve team reinforces or assists 
wherever needed. Part of this team may stay 
mobile for use as a pursuit unit. If the reserve 
team is not needed for its basic purpose, it 
can augment processing and help control the 
raid site. 

The prisoner team enters the building or 
area after it is secured. It takes charge of 
prisoners apprehended by the entry team. 
The prisoner team must be aware that the 
entry team does not make a complete search 
of the prisoners at the time of apprehension. 

The medical team should include a doctor 
if possible. The medical team normally 
remains with the reserve team. The medical 
team treats injuries incurred by members of 
the raiding party or subjects of the raid. 



munitions must be obtained from the 
installation commander. The raiding party 
must have protective masks. Ana wind 
direction, traffic, and population density 
must be considered. Type of munitions must 
be considered. For example, using burning- 
type munitions in wood structures can cause 
fires. 

Effective communications are a must for a 
successful raid. Natural voice, visual, and 
radio communications give the raid com- 
mander control over his various elements. At 
a minimum, the raid commander and each 
team leader need a radio. Members of the 
security team occupying likely avenues of 
escape also need radios. (Radio equipment 
must be checked before use. Use of relays 
may be necessary.) 

Hand and arm or whistle signals are often 
used to direct movements, such as when to 
begin the raid. Visual and sound signals 
should be backed by radio communications. 
The reverse is also true. The local telephone 
system can be used as well. The important 
point is to have an alternate means of 
communication. One method is not enough. 



DETERMINING EQUIPMENT 
REQUIREMENTS 

Equipment is selected to suit the raid's 
purpose and the expected degree of oppo- 
sition. Special equipment like public address 
systems, night-vision devices, and drug 
detector dogs are carefully chosen. Too much 
equipment can slow the raiding party. Too 
little equipment can hamper the raid's 
effectiveness. 

The raid commander selects the weapons 
to be used. He considers the subject's arma- 
ment, the terrain of the neighborhood, and 
the degree of resistance expected. He ensures 
that MP armed with special weapons are 
proficient in their use. 

If riot control munitions are used, they 
must be planned for. (See FM 19-15 for 
specific procedures for use of riot control 
agents.) Clearance to use riot control 



PERFORMING RECONNAISSANCE 

If time permits, the raid commander 
performs a reconnaissance of the building or 
area to be raided. He may have photographs, 
maps, blueprints, or sketches collected to 
supplement visual observations. And he 
may consider covert operations to gain 
entrance to help develop his raid plan. 

When performing a recon, the MP look for 
the best route of entry to the target. They 
check for vantage points and patterns of 
occupants of the area. And they note points 
offering observation and fields of fire ror the 
raiding party and/or the occupants. 

When reconnoitering a specific building, 
MP may enter only if doing so will not 
compromise the raid. MP can obtain blue- 
prints from the facility engineer to gain a 
thorough knowledge of floor plans and 



106 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



interior arrangements of a building. MP can 
note the doors and windows, their 
construction, and the direction in which they 
open. They can note likely exits and 
entrances to include emergency doors and 
fire escapes. They seek interviews with 
reliable persons who are responsible for or 
who have previously entered the area. And 
they identify persons who may or will be in 
the building. They spot the location of 
activities in the area; for example, MP may 
note the placement of dice and card tables 
used for gambling. They also assess likely 
problem areas. 

EXECUTING A RAID 

No two raids are alike. But many raids are 
based on similar types of information and 
follow similar sequences of actions. 

Night raids are more hazardous than 
daylight raids. In many civil jurisdictions a 
night raid must be justified to a magistrate. 
The magistrate must be convinced that the 
purpose of the raid could not be achieved 
during the daytime, perhaps because the 
subject would not be at home. This legal 
restriction is not written into military law. 
But the principle applies. The law supports 
the point that a raid should be announced 
and the raiding party should clearly identify 
themselves as MP before the party enters. 



This identification is difficult at night 
because visibility is limited. Command and 
control are also harder at night. And the 
chance of injury to police personnel, 

subjects, and innocent bystanders is greater. 

Special situations result when females and 
juveniles are present or are the subjects of a 
raid. If it is believed females will be 
apprehended during a raid, arrangements 
must be made to have them searched and 
attended by a female MP who is assigned to 
the raiding party. When juveniles are the 
subjects of a raid, care must be taken to use 
minimum force. Plans must be made to 
process them separately from adult 
offenders. And they must be maintained 
separately until they are released to their 
parents or transferred to juvenile facilities. 

If a covert agent is operating within the 
subject group, he should be advised to be 
absent at the time the raid will take place. If 
he cannot be absent, he must be appre- 
hended during the raid or given a plausible 
means of escape. If apprehended, his later 
disposition will depend upon the situation, 
his mission, and his prior identification as a 
covert agent to the local police. The identity 
and description, if possible, of the covert 
agent should be given to all members of the 
raiding party to prevent any accidental 
shooting of the covert agent. 



FM 19-10 



107 



CHAPTER 10 
Conducting Apprehensions 



M ilitary police must be prepared to take 
immediate, coordinated action at the scene of 
a crime. This action sometimes involves 
apprehension. MP must be familiar with 
standing operating procedures, laws of 
apprehension, use or deadly force, handling 
and custody of evidence, and crime scene 
protection. In cases involving felony crimes, 
procedures are prearranged for notifying the 
JSACIDC office and other law enforcement 
agencies. Prompt investigation can often aid 
in the swift apprehension of offenders. 





CONTENTS 




Page 

108 

109 




AUTHORITY TO APPREHENDl 




APPREHENSION OF JUVENILES . . . 




MEANS OF APPREHENSIONl 




109 

110 






Cordon 






Pursuit 


110 






Contacts and Stops| 


110 

Ill 




EXECUTION OF AN AUTHORIZATION 
TO APPREHEND 


SEARCH IF 
APPREHE1S 


sf RELATION TO AN 
JSION 


112 













AUTHORITY TO APPREHEND 



MP and civilian guards or police employed 
by the Army have the same authority to 
apprehend. Their authority is derived from 
tne installation commander's inherent 
authority to maintain order on the 
installation. AR 600-40 affirms that— 

• All members of the military have the 
ordinary right of private citizens to assist 
in maintenance of the peace. This includes 
the right to apprehend offenders. Citizen's 
arrest power is defined by local law. In 
exercising this power, care should be taken 
not to exceed the right granted by law. 
Service members also must be familiar 
with the limits imposed upon military 
personnel by the Posse Comitatus Act. 

• The restraint of the person imposed under 
the provisions of AR 600-40 will not exceed 
that reasonably necessary, nor extend 
beyond the time required to dispose of the 
case by transfer of custody to civil 
authority or otherwise, under the law. 

The laws of most jurisdictions are 
relatively clear on the arrest authority of 
peace officers. They are also somewhat 
obscure on the authority of private 
individuals. The SJA should be asked to 
conduct a survey of local laws relating to 



citizen's arrest on and off the installation. As 
the authority for the citizen's arrest is the law 
of the local jurisdiction and not AR 600-40, 
any variance between it and AR 600-40 
should be made clear to all concerned. 

Limited authority exists to apprehend 
persons not subject to the UCMJ. This does 
not mean these offenders go unpunished. If 
administrative measures are not sufficient, 
action may be taken as provided in AR 27-40, 
which sets forth procedures for filing 
complaints with Ub magistrates. 

In applying the law authorizing appre- 
hensions in the capacity of a private person, 
the following terms must be understood: 

• A felony is any offense punishable by 
death or imprisonment for more than one 
year. 

• A misdemeanor is any offense not a felony. 

• A breach of the peace is a public offense 
where violence or the threat of violence is 
causing or likely to cause an immediate 
disturbance of public order. Any act which 
involves the use of force or the threat of 
immediate use of force towards the person 
or property of another is a breach of the 
peace. 



108 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



• A private person is any person other than a 
peace officer or police officer, whether he is 
or is not a citizen of a particular state or 
area or resident therein. The authority of a 
private person to make an apprehension 
may be broadened under local law. 



Generally, it is restricted to felonies and 
breaches of the peace. 

The phrase "in his presence" means that 
an act occurs within range of any of the 
person's five senses. 



APPREHENSION OF JUVENILES 



Juveniles may be apprehended under the 
conditions set forth in AR 600-40. Upon 
apprehension, MP will follow normal 
apprehension procedures and SOPs and will 
notify juveniles of their legal rights and the 
offense for which apprehended. 

The authority of MP on an installation, as 
far as juveniles not subject to military law are 
concerned, is derived from the installation 
commander's inherent authority to maintain 
order on the installation. 

The general authority placed upon the 
installation commander by Army 
regulations gives that commander broad 
powers to create policies and publish 
regulations governing the conduct on post of 
civilian and dependent juveniles. The 
installation commander may authorize the 
MP to make a citizen's arrest when more 
serious criminal offenses are committed 
on a military reservation by a juvenile. 
Since state laws may vary regarding 
citizen's arrest power, the SJA is 
consulted for guidance. 

Immediately upon arrival at the MP 
station, the offender's parents or guardians 
must be notified of the apprehension. Parents 
or guardians must also be told of the 
juvenile's rights and the offense for which 
apprehended. 



The initial interview of a juvenile is 
normally done by the MP immediately after 
apprehension. During the initial interview, 
the parents are read the youth's legal rights, 
acquainted with the facts of the suspected 
offense, and given an appointment to meet 
with the juvenile officer as soon as is 
practicable. After the MP duty officer or duty 
investigator has conducted the initial 
interview, the youth will be released to the 
parents. If a major offense such as rape or 
armed robbery is involved, the initial 
interview is deferred to the appropriate 
authorities who have jurisdiction. The 
juvenile will be released to civil authorities 
for detention upon completion of the initial 
interview. See TM 19-20 for more detailed 
discussion of interviewing juveniles. 

Juveniles may be referred to legal state 
juvenile courts. An MPI may refer a juvenile 
whom he apprehends in the course of 
unlawful activity, takes into custody via a 
complaint, or apprehends as a result of an 
ongoing investigation. 

DA Form 3997 will not list names of 
juvenile subjects, their parents or sponsors, 
or the juvenile victims of such offenses as 
rape or child molestation. Refer to AR 190-45 
for detailed procedures. The desk blotter must 
indicate that the person is a minor with 
protected identity. 



MEANS OF APPREHENSION 



The need to apprehend an offender can 
occur with little warning. It can happen at 
any time. Speed in erecting barricades, 
redeploying patrol units, ana performing 
similar actions are necessary for rapid 



apprehension. A plan of action for each type 
or apprehension is immediately available to 
the desk sergeant. The plan considers the 
placement of temporary roadblocks, 
checkpoints, and methods of alerting patrol 



FM 19-10 



109 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



units. It considers decisions on when to use 
lights and sirens. It considers traffic control 
in the operations area. It considers location 
and employment of specialized equipment 
and communications requirements. It 
considers evacuation of bystanders and the 
apprehension of offenders at the scene of the 
crime. It considers the pursuit of armed 
suspects and area searches for suspects and 
witnesses. It considers coordinating with 
other military, federal, and civil law 
enforcement agencies. And it considers 
securing crime scenes for investigators. 

CORDON 

Patrols converging on the scene of a crime 
may establish a hasty cordon. Reserve 
personnel, temporary barricades, and other 
devices are used by MP to complete the 
encirclement of the area. All personnel 
stationed along the cordon prevent entry of 
unauthorized persons. A separate force is 
normally used to accomplish the actual 
apprehension. All cordon MP are given a 
description of the person, vehicle, or property 
sought. Action is not delayed to await 
accurate, detailed descriptions. 

Checkpoints and barricades are used when 
fugitives are known to be proceeding along a 
definite route or in a definite direction. This 
helps to block their escape. 

PURSUIT 

Formal written arrangements between 
military and local civilian police are required 
for "hot pursuits." These agreements set 
forth procedures to be followed and 
limitations imposed on hot pursuits. These 
agreements provide for mutual assistance 
during pursuits. MP must not leave their 
jurisdiction without written arrangements. 
Hot pursuit is a direct, continuing pursuit 
with the immediate probability of 
apprehension. When apprehended, the same 
search may be made as is authorized for any 
lawful apprehension. 

Because of the danger involved in high-speed 
pursuits, specific guidance is proviaed. MP 
policy specifies types of offenses that justify 



a high-speed pursuit. Pursuit of an armed 
robbery suspect is normally warranted. The 
dangerous pursuit of traffic violators is 
much less justified. Lights and sirens are 
always used in pursuits. Normally only one 
vehicle will use a siren. When two 
emergency vehicles approach the same 
intersection from different directions, the 
sound of each siren tends to mask that of the 
other. This increases the chances of the 
vehicles colliding. 

Emergency and pursuit vehicles are 
exempt from most traffic regulations. A 
pursuit is never carried to the extent that the 
safety of bystanders or the MP is endangered. 
MP do not operate military vehicles in a 
reckless manner during pursuits or partici- 
pate in unlawful pursuits. If necessary, the 
pursuit is terminated. 

Pursuit cutoff speeds are set based on local 
policy. The same speed on a range road would 
be excessive in a housing area. Other vehicles 
are not passed on the right. If a driver does 
not see the MP vehicle approach until it is 
very close, he may instinctively pull to the 
right to allow it to pass. This could cause a 
serious accident. Intersections must be 
approached with caution as not everyone 
hears or heeds warning lights and sirens. 

MP never fire weapons from a moving 
vehicle. Bystanders could be hit with missed 
shots and ricochets. MP in pursuing vehicles 
keep the MP station constantly advised of 
their location and direction or travel. This 
will allow a multiunit pursuit to be initiated 
and coordinated. 

CONTACTS AND STOPS 

An MP or commander must conclude that 
an apprehension or stop is justified. If not, 
communication with a person begins with a 
contact. Contacts and stops are similar 
actions but have differences. (See Chapter 5.) 

MP must stop any person they reasonably 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime. This action must be 
in a place the MP has a right to be. Both 



110 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



pedestrians and occupants of vehicles can be 
stopped. If a soldier who is stopped is a 
suspect and is to be questioned, the MP must 
read him his Article 31 rights. 

The term "reasonable suspicion" cannot be 
precisely defined. The stop must be based on 
more than a hunch. The MP must be able to 
state specific facts for his decision to stop the 
individual. Factors to be used in determining 
reasonable suspicion are— 

• Personal appearance. Does the person 
generally fit the description of the person 
wanted for a known offense? Does he 
appear to have a recent injury? Does he 
appear to be under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs? 

• Actions. Is he running away from an 
actual or possible crime scene? Is he 
otherwise behaving in a manner to 

indicate possible criminal conduct? 

• Prior knowledge of the person. Does the 
person have an arrest or conviction 



record? What is the person's reputation on 
post or in the unit? 

Demeanor during contacts. Does the 
person act evasive or suspicious or 
knowingly give false information when 
questioned? This behavior may be a basis 
for a stop after the initial contact. 

Area of the stop. Is the person near an area 
known for the commission of certain 
crimes? Is it a high crime area? 

Time of day. Is it a very late hour? Is it 
usual for people to be in the area at this 
time of day? Is it the time of day when 
criminal activity of the kind suspected 
usually occurs? 

Police training and experience. Does the 
MP making the stop have the training to 
determine if the pattern of conduct sets a 
modus operandi for that type of crime? 

Source of the information. Can sources of 
information be used to establish probable 
cause? 



EXECUTION OF AN AUTHORIZATION TO APPREHEND 



MP must have a search warrant to enter a 
third party's residence to execute an 
apprehension. When MP are not authorized 
to apprehend there must be an emergency 
situation or consent must be given before Mr 
may enter private quarters, bachelor officers' 
quarters (BOQ), and bachelor enlisted 
quarters (BEQ), on or off post, to apprehend. 
Authorization is not needed to apprehend in 
barracks; however it is encouraged. 

A commander, military judge, or 
magistrate may authorize an apprehension 
at private quarters, BOQ, or BEQ. The 
authorizing official must have jurisdiction to 
order such apprehension. There is no 
requirement to have both an apprehension 
and a search warrant unless the authorizing 
official has found both probable cause to 
search and probable cause to apprehend. 
There is probable cause to apprehend when 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
an offense has been committed. There also is 
probable cause to apprehend when it is 



believed that the individual to be 
apprehended has committed the offense. All 
commissioned officers, warrant officers, 
petty officers, noncommissioned officers, 
and DOD police officers and guards may 
apprehend persons when there is probable 
cause for such apprehension. 

Timeliness of the information is a key 
factor in proving probable cause. For 
example, we may have reliable information 
from an informant who has proven reliable 
in the past. He obtained his information 30 
days ago by personal observation. The fact 
that the offense was committed 30 days ago 
and was based on personal observation from 
a reliable informant gives us probable cause 
to apprehend. It does not give probable 
cause to search an area under the exclusive 
control of the offender. If a small quantity of 
drugs was seen in the offender's possession 
30 days ago in the company billets, this 
would not giveprobable cause to search the 
billets today. There would be no basis to 



FM 19-10 



111 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



believe that the drugs are still present. 
However, a basis for apprehension and for a 
search incident to the apprehension still 
exists. Additionally, both the basis of 



knowledge test and reliability test must be 
satisfied in determining the existence of 
probable cause. 



SEARCH IN RELATION TO AN APPREHENSION 



During an apprehension the suspect is 
subject to a full search of his person. The 
search is lawful only if there is probable 
cause for making the apprehension. Any 
search has both time and geographical 
limits. During the apprehension, or 
immediately afterwards, the MP must tell 
the suspect he is being apprehended and 
state the specific offense. The apprehending 
MP may search not only the suspect but also 
the area immediately around the suspect. 
Searches are limited to the area in which a 
person can reach a weapon or destroy 
evidence. This includes any distance from 
which a weapon could be reached by a 
sudden lunge, leap, or dive from where the 
suspect is. 

If a driver or passenger in an automobile is 
placed under apprehension, a search of the 
closed and locked trunk is not justified as 
incident to that apprehension. But the MP 
may search the passenger compartment of 
the automobile. This includes all containers 
found in the passenger compartment. 
(''Containers 1 ' denotes any object capable of 
holding another object.) This search may 
also include closed or open glove 
compartments or consoles. Other receptacles 
located anywhere within the passenger 
compartment, such as luggage, boxes, bags, 
clothing, and so forth, are subject to search. 

Normally, MP do not make a full search of 
a traffic offender. However, if the offender 
leads MP to believe he may be armed or a 
threat to the MP's safety, the person may be 
frisked. If MP believe the offender is 
concealing evidence of a crime, then MP 
have probable cause to search the offender 
and the offender's car. 



If a person is stopped for speeding and MP 
see him make a motion to place something 
under the front seat or grab something from 
under the front seat, it is permissible to frisk 
the person and check the immediate area. If, 
when issuing a traffic citation or making an 
apprehension, MP view items in plain view 
that they believe are evidence of a crime, 
they may seize, these items even though they 
are not on the person or in the immediate 
area. 

Prior knowledge of past violent behavior 
may provide justification for searching an 
individual. Under unusual circumstances, 
search of the individual and the immediate 
area can be made at a different time or place. 
One reason for doing this is that a 
potentially unruly crowd may have gathered 
where the initial apprehension took: place. 
The search could not be conducted at the 
time and place of apprehension for security 
reasons or for crowd control reasons. 
Lighting conditions are another valid 
reason. 

Information gathered at the time of 
apprehension may indicate that seizable 
items are on the premises and in immediate 
danger of destruction, concealment, or 
removal. In this case the MP may 
immediately search for and seize these 
items. 

When an apprehension is made at a 

Person's on-post quarters, the apprehending 
IP makes a cursory view of the premises to 
see if other people are present who may 
impede the apprehension. If, while making 
the cursory view, other items come into plain 
view that would aid in a criminal 
prosecution, these items are also seized. 



112 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



A person who is apprehended at his 
quarters or place of business may have to 
obtain wearing apparel or a change of 
clothing for a stay at the detention cell. If 
the apprehended person requests permission 
to gather other things to bring with him, the 
MP may search the immediate area where 
the additional materials are located. This is 
done to protect the apprehending MP and to 
prevent the destruction of evidence. The MP 
may not, however, move the suspect 
throughout the home simply in order to 
search other rooms. 

When an apprehended person has no 
reasonable expectation or privacy, the 
apprehending MP may make an inspection 
of the entire area. For example, an MP is 
investigatine a break-in of the auto crafts 
shop. He finas the door jimmied and enters 
to find an individual in the garage. The MP 
can inspect the entire crafts shop, looking 
for other evidence of a crime. This is because 
the suspect cannot have an expectation of 
privacy in the crafts shop. 



When there has been a lawful appre- 
hension and the person has been taken 
to the MP station or the person consented to 
go to the MP station, the following actions 
may be compelled: 

• Fingernail scrapings if there is probable 
cause to believe that such scrapings will 
aid in a criminal prosecution. 

• Fingerprints. 

• Voice exemplars. 

• Handwriting exemplars. 

• Bite plates to identify teeth marks when 
there is probable cause to believe that 
such evidence will aid in a criminal 
prosecution. 

The rights warning is not required to take 
these actions as the individual is not being 
interrogated and is not being asked to make 
a statement. The Fifth Amendment only 
covers "testimonial communication ,, and 
not the physical display of the body or 
similar actions. 



FM 19-10 



113 



CHAPTER 11 
Employing Military Working Dog Teams 



Military working dog teams support a 
variety of MP operations. They are used in 
peacetime environments to extend MP 
resources. And on the battlefield MWD 
teams can support MP tactical units 
involved in all MP missions. The MWD 
teams can prove an additional asset for 
security measures. MWD teams can be used 
to help MP deter and detect the enemy. In 
peacetime MWD teams make a valuable 
contribution in the detection, investigation, 
or prevention of criminal activity. 



CONTENTS 


Page 

.114 
..115 
..116 

.116 
..117 


IPATROL DOG TEAMSl 




In Peacetime Environmentsl 


In Combat Areasj. 






Narcotics detector dog teamsi . 




IEXPLOSIVES DETECTOR DOG TEAMS|. 





Installation PMs can enhance the 
effectiveness of law enforcement operations 
by employing MWD teams. 



PATROL DOG TEAMS 



The functions of MWD teams focus on the 
skills of the dog. The patrol dog is the basic 
Army MWD. All of the MWD employment 
concepts that have been developed revolve 
around the basic skills of the Army patrol 
dog. Some patrol dogs may subsequently be 
trained in additional skills, such as tracking, 
narcotics detection, and explosives 
detection. 

The decision to employ patrol dogs must be 
weighed carefully by the responsible 
commander to be sure that if patrol dog 
teams are committed, all lesser means of 
force have been reasonably attempted and 
have failed. PMs, security officers, or MP 
commanders will establish procedures 
governing the release of patrol dogs 
consistent with Army use of force policy (see 
AR 190-12 and AR 190-28). 

Patrol dog teams are not generally used for 
traffic control or accident investigation 
duties. If exceptional circumstances require 
that they perform these duties, the dog is 
secured in the vehicle. The patrol dog is 
trained to perform the primary function of 
detecting the presence of unauthorized 
personnel and warning its handler. The 
secondary function of tne patrol dog is to 



pursue, attack, and hold any intruder who 
attempts to avoid apprehension or escape 
from custody. Releasing the dog constitutes 
the conscious application of physical force. 
Patrol dogs may be released to apprehend an 
intruder who is suspected of committing a 
serious offense and tries to escape or use 
deadly force. 

Patrol dogs must be used cautiously in 
confrontation situations, since their 
presence could aggravate a situation. Unlike 
people, a patrol dog does not fear an armed 
person and, if fired at, will pursue and 
attack. A patrol dog handler who is 
confronted (for example, in a club or housing 
area) avoids entering a building or a closea 
area alone with the patrol dog. The handler 
withdraws safely from a confrontational 
situation and then immediately reports the 
incident to his supervisor so that necessary 
actions can be taken. 

Patrol dogs are not to be used for crowd 
control or direct confrontation with 
demonstrators unless determined to be 
necessary by the responsible commander. 
Use of patrol dog teams for direct 
confrontation with demonstrators is not 
recommended. The duty of the MP is to 



114 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



prevent escape or effect a lawful apprehension 
of a person engaged in a criminal act. In a 
crowd situation, there is no certainty that a 

patrol dog will attack, pursue, and hold the 
person against whom the dog has been 
released. Therefore, under no circumstances 
will dogs be released in a crowd. 

Using patrol dogs in dependent housing or 
in the vicinity of troop billets helps deter 
criminal actions. The team has the ability to 
move quickly from one area to another, but 
actual patrolling of housing and billet areas 
is done mostly dismounted^ 

IN PEACETIME ENVIRONMENTS 

A patrol dog team may be used on gate 
duty or other entry control functions. The 
dog's primary function is deterrence and 
protection of the handler. Use of MWD teams 
for entry control, however, is not 
recommended because of the high volume of 
traffic, the large number of distractions, and 
the reduction of the handler's ability to 
maintain positive control over the dog. 

If circumstances necessitate using MWD 
teams at entry control points, the dog is not 
confined inside a gate house where it cannot 
respond to its handler if needed. Further, the 
MWD team will need to be frequently moved 
to other duties to keep the aog alert and 
proficient. 

The primary function of a patrol dog team 
on a fixed post is surveillance over an area or 
building. It used outside, the team is located 
downwind where the dog can detect an 
intruder by scent, sound, or sight. If this is 
not possible, the team is located so an 
intruder can be detected by sight and sound. 
When used inside, the dog depends mostly on 
his hearing. Other MP maybe used with dog 
teams on fixed posts. 

The patrol dog's contribution to the law 
enforcement effort is most effective when the 
team is used on foot patrol. Some of the law 
enforcement duties that a patrol dog team 
can do as a walking patrol include checking 
or clearing buildings and patrolling parking 
lots, family housing areas, and troop billet 



areas. Patrol dog teams used to escort and 
safeguard funds may deter some people from 
attempting to rob tne courier. 

Giving patrol dog teams a mobile 
capability significantly increases their 
potential area of coverage and allows the 
teams to perform a greater range of 
functions cfuring a duty shift. The team is 
normally unaccompanied, but other MP may 
go with the team when the need arises. 

Mobile patrols are most effective when the 
patrol dog team uses the ride-awhile, walk- 
awhile method. The team is able to help 
cover a laree patrol area, and the periodic 
exercise helps to keep the dog alert. 

The patrol dog team can check buildings 
visually while patrolling by vehicle. Tne 
patrol dog team can also stop and dismount 
so the handler can physically check doors 
and windows. To take maximum advantage 
of the dog's scenting ability, the handler 
approaches buildings from downwind. 

To check identification or to apprehend, 
the handler always warns the person that if 
he or she displays any hostility to the patrol 
or to the handler, the doe will attack without 
command. Once the nandler has been 
alerted by the dog, it becomes the 
responsibility of the handler to cope with the 
situation in the most appropriate manner. 
Frequently, the appropriate action is to keep 
the intruder or area under surveillance until 
other MP personnel can arrive. After an 
apprehension, a search is always done with 
tne patrol dog in the guard position. A 
backup MP patrol is used to transport 
apprehended personnel. 

Dog teams are useful to detect and 
apprehend thieves and vandals in vehicle 
parking lots. Also, the presence of the patrol 
dog team may deter potential acts or theft 
and vandalism. The team can be most 
effective by alternating between vehicle and 
foot patrol in a parking lot. During hours of 
darkness, when there is no activity in a 
parking lot, the team approaches the lot 
from the downwind side. 



FM 19-10 



115 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



If a building is open or forced entry is 
evident, patrol dog teams may be used to 
track hidden intruders from point of 
penetration to their location. In responding 
to an alarm at facilities such as clubs, 
finance offices, or banks, the patrol dog team 
should be among the first MP on the scene. 

When the need for tracking arises, 
personnel who are on the scene avoid the 
area and keep other personnel from entering 
the tracking area. This will reduce 
contamination of the area with extraneous 
or confusing scents. 

The dog begins tracking as soon as 
possible because success often depends on 
the strength of the available scent. The 
passage or time, wind strength, and other 
environmental conditions will affect the 
strength of the scent. Human scent adheres 
well to grass and brush which can improve 
the chances of success. Paved or gravel areas 
and strong scents such as fertilizer, burned 
grass, or spilled oil or gasoline impede the 
tracking ability. Human scent remains 
longer on cool, moist ground. Direct 
sunlight, extremely dry ground, or heavy 
rain dissolves scent rapidly, making 
tracking more difficult. 

The methods used to track lost personnel, 
especially children, are different from those 
used to track a fleeing suspect. Only does 
who have been trained to track successfully 
for lost personnel are used, to avoid any 
danger of harming innocent persons. 

Not all patrol dogs have been trained to 
track. Among the dogs trained to track, not 
all have the same tracking ability. The 
kennel master must know which of his 



assigned patrol dogs are good trackers and 
use the best patrol dogs for tracking 
missions. 

IN COMBAT AREAS 

MWD teams provide support for crime 
prevention and law enforcement activities. 
MWD teams may be employed in routine 
patrol duties in heavily populated areas with 
safety and efficiency. They can be used to 
support police operations in searching crime 
scenes. They can track fleeing saboteurs. 
They can clear buildings of sympathizers or 
stay-behind pilferers. They can also 
apprehend criminal offenders. MWD teams 
can perform perimeter security duties at 
isolated activities. Patrol dogs may be 
employed on fixed security posts or in 
conjunction with security patrols. MWD 
teams can protect ammunition supply points 
and critical resupply areas. They can protect 
bridges, railway marshaling areas, and 
airfields. They can work with MP security 
units at remote communications sites and at 
isolated MP circulation control points. They 
are also highly useful in cordon and searcn 
operations. In fact, on the battlefield just as 
in a peacetime environment, MWD teams are 
useful wherever the dogs' highly developed 
senses of smell and hearing can be used to 
detect the presence and location of otherwise 
invisible intruders or enemy. (The use of dogs 
in the vicinity of petroleum, oil, and lubricant 
points must be infrequent and of short 
duration because of damaging effects on 
paws and to sense of smell.) In addition 
explosives detector dogs have been trained to 
discriminate the scent of explosives. They 
may be used in detecting, tracking, and 
searching buildings, aircraft, and vehicles to 
protect government property and personnel. 



NARCOTICS DETECTOR DOG TEAMS 



The abuse of drugs by military personnel, 
their dependents, and civilians, who may 
enter military areas for work, business, or 
recreation, presents a continuing problem for 
the Army. Every effort must be made to 
reduce the potential danger to society and 



particularly to the military community from 
those who sell or abuse drugs. 

Narcotics detector dogs serve as effective 
investigative tools for trained personnel in 
detecting narcotics and other contraband 



116 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



and will be employed under the supervision 
of such personnel. The dog handler with his 
detector dog form a detector team. 

The use of well-trained narcotics detector 
dogs is one of the most efficient means of 
detecting the possession or transportation of 
dangerous drug contraband The narcotics 
detector doe is trained through a program of 
practice ana reward to recognize the scent of 
drugs such as marihuana, nashish, heroin, 
cocaine, and other related substances. When 
the narcotics detector dog locates any of 
these substances, the dog will alert its 
handler. 

The use of narcotics detector dogs durine a 
health and welfare inspection must be 
authorized by the installation commander or 
a commander having control over the 
personnel and property to be inspected. There 
are several legal considerations in using the 
narcotics detector dog since the 



apprehension and possible criminal 
prosecution of offenders may be involved. 

Commanders and supervisors should work 
closely with the command SJA to ensure that 
drug detection operations achieve objectives 
and comply with legal requirements. 
Whenever the operational situation may 
result in the apprehension and possible 
criminal prosecution of offenders, the 
procedural and record-keeping requirements 
defined in AR 190-12 apply to narcotics 
detector dog teams. 

Court decisions and changes to existing 
laws and policy frequently alter the methods 
and procedures that must be followed for 

B roper narcotics detection programs, 
'andlers must learn and apply the rules of 
evidence, search and seizure, and the 
procedures for collecting and preserving 
evidence. 



EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR DOG TEAMS 



Few other criminal acts create such 
concern and fear in the hearts of a nation's 
citizens as a series of bombings. It is no 
coincidence that organized crime and 
terrorist groups routinely use explosive 
materials as a means of achieving their 
violent goals. Whether the objective is 
murder, intimidation, extortion, or 
governmental disruption, the bomb is a 
favorite and effective weapon of the criminal 
element. One of the most effective 
countermeasures to the use of explosives is 
the deterrent value and the detection 
capabilities of the EDD team. EDD teams fill 
three distinct roles in MP operations in 
addition to their routine use as patrol dog 
teams. 

The type of threat received and local policy 
determine the initial actions to be taken in 
response to a bomb threat. The procedures 
used durine training rehearsals for bomb 
threats will be usee! during actual bomb 
threats. 



Evacuation of the area may or may not be 
ordered by the responsible commander or his 
designated bomb scene officer. But the area 
must be evacuated if the EDD team is being 
used to perform the initial search. The area 
must be evacuated to minimize the 
distractions to the EDD team and to reduce 
the risk to area occupants in the event of an 
explosives detonation. The advantage of 
using the EDD team to conduct the search is 
that the EDD handler has specialized 
knowledge of explosives and explosive 
devices and search techniques. 

Public knowledge that EDD teams are 
assigned to and are used at an installation 
acts as a deterrent to persons who may try to 
use explosives illegally on the installation. 
The knowledge that, explosives can be 
detected by EDDs at installation gates or in 
places where explosives have been hidden 
can prevent a person from attempting to 
bring explosives onto an installation. 



FM 19-10 



117 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



The most common use of EDD teams, and 
probably the most important, is to search 
areas or buildings against which a bomb 
threat has been made. A well-trained EDD 
team can conduct a significantly more 
effective search of any area or facility than 
almost any number of people. However, when 
persons who work in the specific, threatened 
area are available to identify unfamiliar 
objects, planners should consider their 
contribution to an EDD search. If the dog 
alerts during an actual search, explosives 
ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel are 
immediately notified of the location of the 
alert. EOD will dispose of any suspect devices 
or objects. Using EDD teams also helps to 
reduce the potential risk to persons who 
would otherwise have to oo the search 
without benefit of the dog's superior sense of 
smell. Neither the MP nor any other person 
attempts to move, open, or tamper with any 
object suspected of being an explosive device 
unless they have been specifically trained to 
do so. 

EDD teams can be useful in many 
investigations involving almost any type of 
weapon, ammunition, or explosive. They are 
particularly useful if there is a need to locate 



one or more items which may have been 
hidden in an area. 

The most frequent tasks performed by 
EDD teams are in response to bomb threats 
against military or civilian resources. The 
general requirements for providing EDD 
team support to civil authorities is stated in 
AR 190-12. However, many units are also 
using EDD teams in random searches at 
entry control points, for inspection of troop 
and family housing areas, and for checks of 
aircraft and aircraft areas; sensitive or high 
value equipment storage areas; and mail, 
baggage, freight shipments, and so forth. 
The expandea use or EDD teams for these 
functions presents many of the same legal 
problems for explosives searches that are 
characteristic of narcotics detector dog team 
searches for drugs. Whenever the operational 
situation may result in the apprehension and 
possible criminal prosecution of offenders, 
the procedural and record-keeping 
requirements defined in AR 190-12 apply to 
EDD teams. However, compliance with 
procedural requirements is not to be an 
obstacle to protecting life and property. The 
EDD handler is always prepared to establish 
the EDD team's credibility with training, 
utilization, and proficiency records. 



118 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 12 
Enforcing Customs Laws and Regulations 



In some locales MP may be called upon to 
enforce US customs laws and regulations. 
MP may be tasked to visually inspect both 
incoming and outgoing mail at local Army 

Eost offices for customs violations. MP may 
e aided by military narcotics or explosives 
detector dogs in performing these customs 
inspections. Mail containing narcotics, 
explosives, or other contrabands processed 
in accordance with directives issued by 
Department of the Army. 

MP may be required to operate control 
posts and border patrols and to supervise 
crossing points at international borders. 
Many countries control the movement of 
military personnel and civilians at their 
borders. Border control is maintained for 
reasons of security, customs and tariff 
enforcement, protection of the civilian 
economy, and apprehension of criminals, 
absentees, and persons of intelligence 
interest. Control is maintained through the 
establishment of authorized road or rail 
crossing points, border patrols, control posts, 
and, iffeasible, liaison with authorities of 
neighboring countries. Prohibited or 
restricted zones are often used to help control 
circulation at borders. 

In border control, MP normally coordinate 
with host country police, counterintelligence 
units, and civil affairs units. Border control 
posts and patrols are also furnished border 
alarms. They are to watch for individuals or 
items that may be involved in criminal and 
customs offenses. Normal procedures for 
checking personnel, luggage, vehicles, and 
documents at border crossing points include 
the following requirements for MP customs 
personnel: 

• Establish the identity and purpose of US 
forces members crossing borders and 
examine vehicles and travel documents. 

• Instruct US forces members to make oral 



CONTENTS 



Page 
IMILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTQRSJ 120 



CUSTOMS OPERATIONS PROCEDURES .121 



or written customs declarations as 

required. 

• Conduct searches of vehicles, luggage, 
and any other property being importeaor 
exported by US forces personnel. 

• Seize contraband items that are in 
violation of customs regulations. In all 
cases where property or contraband is 
seized, DA Form 413/ will be prepared in 
four copies. 

MP customs personnel concern themselves 
with individuals subject to military 
authority who enter or leave an 
international port or control point of a host 
country. Members of US forces may be 
referred to MP customs inspectors by host 
country authorities for partial or final border 
processing. 

MP in HNs may be tasked to enforce 
customs laws and regulations in support of 
local government officials. US military 
enforcement of customs laws of countries in 
which US forces are stationed is often part of 
agreements like the NATO SOFA between 
the United States and the host nation. Under 
agreements MP enforce customs laws of the 
host country with respect to US forces 
personnel and their dependents. MP help — 

• Prevent the illegal sale or transfer into the 
local economy of US forces' goods which 
enter the country free of customs duty and 
taxes. 

• Authenticate and issue customs import 
documents to members of the US forces 
for importation of personal property 
(except for hold baggage or household 
goods which enter as official consign- 
ments of the US forces). 



FM 19-10 



119 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



• Issue permits to transfer customs/duty-free 
personal property to nonmembers of US 
forces. 

• Verify the status of retired US forces 
personnel residing in the country so that 
these personnel, who are not members of 
the US forces as defined in the SOFA, 
may apply to the host country customs 
authority for customs certificates. These 
certificates entitle them to purchase items 
in commissaries and post exchanges 
without payment of import duties or taxes. 

• Work with host country border police and 
customs agents to prevent import/export 
violations oy members of the US forces. 

At overseas airports MP customs 
personnel may be tasked to provide customs 
control. They may make customs and 
antihijack inspections for all outbound 
military and civilian personnel and family 
members and accompanying baggage 
pending departure on Military Airlift 
Command (MAC) charter aircraft. They are 
also tasked to prevent contraband, 
unauthorized weapons, and illegal drugs 
and narcotics from being introduced into 
CONUS or the HN. 

The enforcement of administrative MAC 
regulations is beyond the scope and range of 
Mr customs inspector duties (for example, 
oversize baggage is rejected only by MAC 



counter personnel). Safety and security 
requirements, however, are enforced by the 
MP customs inspectors. 

US military customs personnel assigned to 
duty at ports and control points are granted 
authority to apprehend and detain any 
person subject to the UCMJ who — 

• Avoids, or attempts to avoid, a customs 
inspection. 

• Fails to make a declaration required by 
law, or who is suspected of making a false 
declaration. 

• Conceals, or attempts to conceal, any 
property" or goods from a customs 

inspection. 

• Illegally enters, leaves, or attempts 
illegally to enter or leave any area under 
US control or HN control. 

MP custom inspectors must be familiar 
with the various types of US passports and 
other identification documents that are 
shown to them at ports of entry and border 
crossing points. AR 600-290, AR 640-3, and 
AR 630-5 provide pertinent information. 
Command directives may also provide 
special requirements, such as the US Army, 
Europe (USAREUR) requirement, that a 
"Certificate of Status" be stamped in the 
passports of dependents of members of the 
US forces or civilian component. 



MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTORS 



DOD Regulation 5030.49-R provides for 
the selection and training of military 
customs inspectors. These inspectors check 
household goods and hold baggage and 
certify them as customs-processed. They 
function under the supervision of designated 
commanders and in close cooperation with 
Transportation Corps personnel. They are 
trained and certified by the MP customs 
units which also monitor and spot-check 
their operations. A friendly and courteous 
attitude by MP customs inspectors is 
required for all public contact. Such an 
attitude promotes the cooperation of 



passengers, enhances enforcement, and 
fosters a favorable image of the MP. Before 
assuming MP customs inspector duties, 
personnel are trained and oriented to 
recognize various types of narcotic drugs. 
(SeeTM 19-20 for a detailed discussion on 
drugs.) Customs inspectors also receive 
annual refresher training and daily 
briefings before assuming shift duty. 

As questions and special situations arise, 
all MP customs inspectors refer unresolved 
problems to their respective squad leader, 
the field office NCOIC, the detachment com- 
mander, or group headquarters, as required. 



120 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



Information is available so that on-duty 
customs personnel can contact supervisory 
personnel on a 24-hour basis. 

When personnel are apprehended, MAC 
counter personnel are notified immediately. 
Removal of Army personnel from a flight for 
a felonious act or for suspicion of a felonious 
act is coordinated through the MAC and the 
Army Aerial Port Liaison Office. Air Force 
personnel or other service personnel 
committing felonious acts or suspected of 
committing such acts are referred to the Air 
Force security police. Aggravated or 
uncorrectable offenses will be cause for the 
offender to be cited on DA Form 3975. 

Military personnel who refuse to submit 
themselves or their baegage for inspection 
will be ordered to comply. If they continue to 
refuse, MAC counter personnel will be 
notified, an offense report issued for 
violation of Article 92, LJCMJ, and the 
offender released to proper service police for 
return to unit or origin. Civilian personnel 
who refuse to have themselves or their 
baggage inspected will be advised that 
refusal can cause them to be deleted from the 
MAC aircraft passenger manifest. If they 
continue to refuse, MAC counter personnel 
will be notified, a written report issued 
concerning the incident, and the civilian 
concerned will not be allowed to pass the 
checkpoint. 

Detailed searches will be performed on all 
personnel detected to be in possession of 
prohibited drugs, prohibited items, 
contraband, unregistered weapons, and /or 
personnel attempting surreptitious entry or 



engaging in actions to circumvent controls 
of customs checkpoints. 

MP customs supervisory personnel will 
observe the influx and circulation of 
passengers to detect suspicious or evasive 
actions. 

The technique of spot-checking is 
employed when necessary at the baggage 
checkpoint and whenever appropriate at the 
personnel checkpoint. Calculated, rather 
than random, judgment must be applied. 
Many factors must be considered. For 
example, hijackers often display 
nervousness and may attempt evasion at 
checkpoints. The neat, orderly-looking 
soldier is less suspect of carrying 
contraband than the sullen or boisterous 
one. Talking to a passenger undergoing 
customs processing is essential to detect 
nervousness or evasion. Experience, 
alertness, and the application of good 
judgment are the keys to proper enforcement 
techniques. 

An amnesty box is made available to all 
passengers and crew members for deposit of 
prohibited or nonadmissible articles prior to 
inspection/examination. Transactions 
involving the amnesty box will not be 
challenged. In addition, personnel are made 
aware that the box can he used to discard 
explosives. In such an event, or if a 
suspicion exists, the area must be 
immediately cleared and Air Force and EOD 
representatives notified. The routine 
emptying of amnesty box contents will be 
accomplished in the presence of authorized 
personnel in strict accordance with command 
directives, maintaining detailed inventories. 



CUSTOMS OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 



Five MP customs inspectors are 
considered ideal coverage at an average size 
airport. One of the five MP inspectors should 
be a female to facilitate the search of female 
passengers and hand-carried baggage. 



A baggage checkpoint and a personnel 
checkpoint are established within the main 
airport building to process passengers and 
their accompanying baggage. The oaggage 
checkpoint is located near the entrance door. 



FM 19-10 



121 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



All personnel who enter the main processing 
area of the passenger terminal are required 
to pass this checkpoint. Emergency doors 
providing bypass capabilities will be kept 
closed and posted to preclude unauthorized 
passage. The purpose of the checkpoint is to 
detect and prevent baggaged contraband 
from being stowed in the cargo compartment 
of the aircraft. 

All passengers presenting themselves for 
baggage inspection are asked if they have 
any weapons, contraband, prohibited items, 
or prohibited drugs. Declared items are then 
examined for proper documentation. 
Firearms and ammunition must be listed on 
orders and have all required treasury and 
customs forms or a certificate of prior 
CONUS possession attached. They must 
then be repacked in baggage to be stowed in 
the cargo compartment of the aircraft. Small 
arms ammunition must be packed 
individually in complete lots and must not 
exceed 1,000 rounds. Drugs must be 
consistent with prescriptions and be in 
reasonable quantities for use only during 
pending trip and related leave. Any 
contraband, prohibited items, or prohibited 
drugs will be seized, a receipt given, and an 
offense report rendered. Personnel who 
surrender prohibited drugs or explosives will 
be apprehended. 

When possible all cargo compartment 
baggage is inspected. Under no 
circumstances will the customs checking 
procedure be the cause for delay in loading 
an aircraft. Spot checks may be performed 
when passenger volume exceeds the 
capability of Mr customs personnel. 

Before a customs inspection is done at 
baggage checkpoints and before passengers 
enter tne main processing area, MP customs 
inspectors brier all departing personnel on 
the location of the amnesty box and its 
purpose. Passengers are told that once a 
customs check is done the amnesty box can 
no longer be used to discard prohibited 
items. Passengers also are told that 
detection that discloses an offense will result 



in the issuance of an offense report and 
subsequent disciplinary or administrative 
action. 

The personnel checkpoint will be located 
at the entrance of a customs exclusion area. 
The checkpoint will be opened upon 
announcement by MAC personnel that 
processing for a specific flight is initiated. 
The purpose of the checkpoint is to detect 
contraband on the person or within items to 
be handcarried aboard the aircraft. The 
checkpoint provides a last, formal, 

Predeparture, antihijack security check, 
ersonnel will be required to enter the 
customs exclusion area through curtained 
booths. Their identification cards and 
passports will be checked. They will be given 
a body frisk or required to pass through a 
metal detection device as appropriate. 
Personnel in possession of prohibited drugs 
or weapons and explosives will be 
apprehended and MAC counter personnel 
notified. 

Baggage which is offered for customs 
inspection will be thoroughly examined for 
contraband, prohibited items, prohibited 
drugs, and weapons. Probes may be used to 
help detect prohibited drugs. Discovered 
contraband, prohibited items, prohibited 
drugs, concealed weapons, and US 
government property, including undeclared, 
unregistered firearms equipment, will be 
seized if no proof of ownership is produced 
during customs checks. A receipt will be 
issuea and disposition accomplished in 
compliance with command directives. 
Personnel who possess suspected prohibited 
drugs or explosives will be apprehended and 
MAC counter personnel notified. Personnel 
who possess other contraband and /or 
prohibited items will be permitted to proceed 
after being cited, unless a felonious act is 
involved. 

Personnel processed into the customs 
exclusion area remain within this area until 
their flight departs. Personnel who exit the 
customs exclusion area prior to their 
scheduled departure must be rechecked upon 
their reentry. 



122 



FM 19-10 



LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 



A complete body search will be directed 
whenever the MP customs inspector suspects 
that a passenger has weapons, contraband, 
prohibited items, or prohibited drugs on his 
person. If a complete body or strip search is 
deemed necessary, this will be accomplished 
in a private area with at least one witness 
present. 

Female passengers normally proceed into 
the customs exclusion area ahead of male 



passengers and are inspected by enlisted 
female customs inspectors. If valid suspicion 
exists, female MP customs inspectors will 
search female passengers. Male customs 
inspectors will not, under any circum- 
stances, allow themselves to be inside a 
curtained booth with a female passenger. 
The hand-carried items of all passengers are 
subject to inspection. 



FM 19-10 



123 



PART THREE 
INVESTIGATIONS 



Military police conduct official inquiries 
into incidents and crimes involving the 
military community. Such investigations are 
a primary means of protecting and 
enhancing the commander's order and 
discipline. 

All MP conduct preliminary investiga- 
tions. MP routinely make inquiries to learn 
the facts about incidents to which they have 
been called. Based on their inquiry, Mr help 
determine the outcome of an incident by 
resolving the problem, referring the problem 
to helping agencies, or determining the need 
for a full-scale investigation by a trained 
investigator. 

Military investigators conduct systematic 
and impartial investigations to uncover the 
truth. They seek to determine if a crime has 
been committed and to discover evidence of 
who has committed it. They administer 
oaths pursuant to Article 136(b)(4), UCMJ 
(see AR 600-40 and MCM). They find, 
protect, collect, and preserve evidence 
discovered at the crime scene or elsewhere. 
They document their findings and their 
actions with careful records. They ensure 
evidence is accounted for by a complete 
chain of custody to allow it to be admissible 
in court. They conduct interviews and 
interrogations in a manner that ensures 
depositions, statements, admissions, and 
confessions can be accepted in court. And as 
professional fact finders they maintain 
unquestionable integrity in the course of 
conducting their investigations. They treat 
victims of and witnesses to a crime with 
dignity, courtesy, and consideration, and 
assist them in obtaining medical or social 
services if needed or requested. Their charter 
is to impartially find, examine, and make 
available evidence that will clear the 
innocent and allow prosecution of the guilty. 

Full-scale investigations are conducted by 
MPIs and enlisted special agents (MOS 95D) 



or warrant officers assigned to USACIDC. 
Responsibility for the investigation depends 
on the nature of the incident and the 
elements of the crime. The MPIs work 
directly for the PM. Special agents support 
the local PM but are under the direct control 
of USACIDC. Close and positive liaison is 
maintained between the PM office and the 
USACIDC support element. 

With the approval of the commander 
concerned, Mrls may provide assistance to 
USACIDC whenever USACIDC assumes 
responsibility for an investigation from 
Mrls. Additionally, when requested by a 
USACIDC unit commander or special agent 
in charge, a supported commander may 
provide MPI assistance to USACIDC on a 
case-by-case basis for a limited time. 
Likewise, MPIs may request and obtain 
USACIDC assistance on a case-by-case 
basis. 

Joint MPI/USACIDC teams have been 
created at some installations for specialized 
investigative missions such as drug 
suppression, black market, and criminal 
information. Joint teams have increased the 
effectiveness of total community law 
enforcement efforts in areas that share 
overlapping investigative or enforcement 
responsibilities. Such joint teams are created 
by formal memorandums of understanding 
between the local PM and the responsible 
USACIDC supervisor. 

In a peacetime environment, criminal 
investigations conducted by military 
investigators receive intense effort and 
support. During combat such investigations 
may not receive the same effort and support. 
HN authorities, if available, will also 
provide investigative support to the 
battlefield. 

The PM directs when, what type, and 
under what circumstances to begin criminal 



124 



FM 19-10 



-INVESTIGATIONS 



investigations that fall within their purview. 
Although effort is made to adequately and 
thoroughly investigate such crimes, 
investigations are not allowed to interfere 
with accomplishment of a combat mission. 
USACIDC^ will maintain a dedicated 
investigative force on the battlefield to 
investigate serious crime affecting the 
battlefield capabilities of the supported 
commander. When combat operations take 
priority, MPIs and MP will only be able to 
gather the essential who, what, when, where, 
why, and how of the crime. The information 
will be passed to the PM operations section, 
where it will be reviewed and forwarded to 
the Gl and the appropriate unit commander. 
The operations section will also make 
appropriate referrals to USACIDC of 
reported crimes within their command. See 
FM 19-20 for more information on criminal 
investigations. 

Two types of criminal investigations are 
performed by MP on the battlefield. Minor 
crimes are investigated by personnel from 
MP company operations sections. In a 
combat environment, few MP investigations 
of minor incidents will be required. Major 
incidents involve death, serious bodily 



injury, war crimes, and major property loss 
or damage. MP may verify such major 
incidents if operational priorities permit. 
These incidents will be referred, whether 
verified or not, to criminal investigators 
assigned to USACIDC. 

The number of MP used for criminal 
investigation operations is directly related to 
the level and intensity of the battle. MPIs are 
assigned to MP companies in division and 
above to conduct criminal investigations. 
These MPIs are shown in their company's 
TOE by the skill identifier V5. Although 
each company has trained investigators, in 
combat these investigators may not be 
available at all times. They may be on 
missions having higher priority. Therefore, 
every MP team must be able to gather basic 
information about battlefield crimes. 

USACIDC investigators on the battlefield 
are usually collocated with MP unit HQ for 
ease of coordination and support. But 
command and control of these investigators 
usually stays within the USACIDC chain of 
command. Organization and employment of 
USACIDC investigators during combat 
operations is discussed in FM 19-1. 



MP INVESTIGATIVE PURVIEW 




FM 19-10 



125 



CHAPTER 13 
Law and Order Investigations 



The investigation of disruptive or 
dangerous behavior is a necessary part of 
any command's effort to maintain good 
order and discipline. 

INVESTIGATING DOMESTIC 

DISTURBANCES 

The role of MP in domestic disturbances is 
to restore order. MP are to stop the conflict 
and convince the individuals to regain 
control of their actions. The MP are to ensure 
that all family members are safe and have 
not been harmed. In incidents involving 
suspected spousal abuse see AR 608-1. 

Domestic disturbances are one of the most 
dangerous types of activities in which the 
MP can become involved. Every year, a great 
many law enforcement officers are killed or 
injured in responding to domestic 
disturbances. MP know that each 
disturbance is different and must be treated 
individually. 

MP are trained in methods of handling 
domestic disturbances. Their training gives 
them the specific skills and methoas they 
need to handle crisis situations. The support 
systems available to MP enable them to 
intervene in domestic disturbances. Because 
communication and transportation systems 
are constantly available to MP, MP can 
respond immediately to disturbances 24 
hours a day. MP also have the authority to 
physically intervene in domestic 
disturbances and to apprehend disputants if 
necessary. 

In answering domestic disturbance calls, 
MP must have all available information on 
the family and the situation. When receiving 
a domestic disturbance call, the MP desk 
sergeant must obtain as much information 
as possible from the individual making the 
complaint before dispatching patrol units. 



CONTENTS 



INVESTIGATING DOMESTIC 
DISTURBANCES 



Page 
. ...126 



INVESTIGATING DRUG AND CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 



129 



INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE RAPE] 
OFFENSES 



129 

MP Encounter and Aid Victims I. 130 

MP Turn Case Over to USACIDC 
Investigators 130 



INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 



,.131 



Reports of Child Abuse and 

Neglect 

Sifins of AbuseL 

Investigation or Suspected Abuse 



,131 
..132 
..133 



Home Visits! 135 



Initial Observations! 135 

Interviews with the Parents! 135 



Contact and Interviews with 



Prosecution! 



136 

. ...137 



INVESTIGATING SUICIDE THREATS 
AND ATTEMPTS 



,.137 



INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF ABNORMAL 
BEHAVIOR 



138 



INVESTIGATING CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS! .139 



The desk sergeant— 

• Obtains data from the complainant-who, 
what, when, where, and how, and if 
weapons are involved or available. 

• Asks the caller to describe the situation. 
Encourages caller to remain on the 
telephone to report changing events. 

• Checks weapons registration cards and 
advises responding MP as appropriate. 

• Relays all information to MP answering 
the call. If unable to obtain a clear 
description of the situation, the 

responding MP must be informed. 

• Assigns a backup vehicle when a one-MP 
vehicle is dispatched. MP will never enter 
a residence alone. 



126 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



MP avoid making noise that will 
announce their arrival at the scene. The 
approach of an MP vehicle is usually the 
first sign to one or more of the disputants 
that the MP have been called. If disputants 
are prone to violence, sieht of an 
approaching MP vehicle allows them time to 
obtain weapons or otherwise prepare for 
police arrival. Upon arriving at the scene of 
a disturbance, the MP vehicle is parked one 
house away from the address to which 
called. 

There is always a danger that MP may be 
assaulted between the time of arrival and the 
time they reach the door. MP visually check 
windows and doors for unusual movements 
or objects while approaching the residence. 
At night, flashlights will not be shined in 
windows to avoid warning of arriving MP. 
Only the MP in front will use a flashlight to 
avoid silhouetting the other MP to the 
occupants. 

MP will always stand to either side of the 
door, never in front of it. Before knocking, or 
using the doorbell if one is available, MP 
listen at the door for 15 to 30 seconds. They 
may be able to determine the nature of the 
disturbance and whether or not it is violent 
before announcing their presence. Before 
knocking, MP check screen doors to see if 
they are locked. Locked screen doors can 
create an unexpected barrier between the MP 
and the disputants if immediate action is 
required. When knocking on the door, MP do 
not sound aggressive. If there is no response 
at the door and the dwelling appears quiet, 
MP verify the address with the MP desk. If 
correct, tney check the sides and rear of the 
dwelling for indications of the presence of 
the occupants. Neighbors may also provide 
useful information. 

To ensure coordinated activity, patrol 
partners will decide before gaining entry 
what action each will take in separating the 
disputants and mediating the disturbance. 
When someone answers the knock, MP will 
identify themselves and state why they are 
there. It not invited into the dwelling, the MP 
request to move the interview inside and 



attempt to remove the dispute from view of 
the neighbors. 

To avoid walking into an unknown 
situation, MP do not enter a dwelling even 
after being told by the occupant, "Come in, 
the door's open/' MP allow the occupant to 
open the door for them. When entering a 
room or building, the senior partner 
positions himself on the side of the door that 
affords the greatest observation of the 
interior. The senior partner will direct who 
enters the dwelling first based on his 
observation of the situation. This provides 
for better command and control of the 
situation. 

If entry is initially denied and the 
situation is temporarily calmed, the MP 
remain on the scene and work through the 
disputant's chain of command to gain entry. 
If the situation appears violent, or if the MP 
have cause to believe a person is injured or in 
danger of being injured, they have a lawful 
right to force entry into the dwelling. 

Once inside, the MP separate the 
disputants if necessary. MP suggest that 
everyone sit down. Mr realize that people 
involved in domestic disputes may be 
hostile, abusive, and uncooperative. It is to 
be expected that some hostility may be 
directed toward the MP, who are viewed as 
intruders. Reactions of the disputants will 
often be directly related to attitudes of 
indifference, aggression, or concern as seen 
in the MP. 

The attitude of the MP is important. The 
initial impression will determine the degree 
of cooperation. MP realize that unintended 
meanings and attitudes will be read into 
their words, facial expressions, and body 
positions by the disputants. The MP must 
display a calm, positive, and helpful 
manner. A sensitive and tactful approach 
can do much to create a positive 
environment in which the dispute can be 
mediated. 

Observing conditions inside the dwelling 
while obtaining background information 
may give the MP ideas of contributing 



FM 19-10 



127 



INVESTIGATIONS 



causes to the dispute. MP must be alert for 
sudden movements. They watch to see if 
subjects continually glance at closets or 
bureaus. Such actions may be the first 
indication that a subject has a weapon 
available. The MP must also observe — 

• The disputants' living conditions, 
clothing, and personal cleanliness. 

• The location and number of disputants 
and any injuries requiring treatment. 

• Any visible weapons and threatening 

moves. 

• The emotional level of the dispute and the 
emotional condition of the disputants. 

Apparent lack of food, broken furniture, 
and excessive amounts of liquor on hand can 
indicate neglect and instability. The 
condition of clothing and personal 
cleanliness can reflect the pride the family 
has in itself and the level of support 
provided. Facial expressions, eye 
movements, and body positions can provide 
emotional signs of rear, hate, depression, 
and embarrassment. Physical deformities or 
other handicaps affecting the family 
relationship may be noticeable if the 
afflicted person is being criticized or belittled 
by other family members. 

After calming the disputants, the MP 
obtain information on the family structure 
and background before attempting 
mediation. MP will obtain — 

• Names and addresses of all present and 
their ranks, social security numbers, and 
units if military. 

• Relationship and legal status of the 
disputants: valid marriage, nephew-uncle, 
boyfriend-girlfriend. 

• Length of residence in quarters and period 
assigned to the installation. 

• Whether or not children are involved; if 
so, their ages and parental relationships. 

• Whether or not MP or civil police have 
intervened in a domestic dispute before 
and if the disputants are receiving 
professional counseling. 



If the parties can be separated, they are 
moved out of sight and hearing of each other. 
In separating the parties, the disputants are 
not allowed to come between the MP, are not 
left alone in another room, and are not moved 
to the kitchen because of potential weapons. 
The MP, if possible, are to remain within 
sight of one another at all times. 

Once the disputants have been separated, 
seated, and have furnished basic 
background information, MP then interview 
each disputant. During the interview, MP 
may remove their hats and sit to further 
relax the disputants. MP must not assume 
that everyone is okay based on the word of 
one of the disputants. Each disputant is 
asked to define or explain the problem that 
caused the argument. The MP must appear 
interested and be good listeners. MP must 
carefully avoid giving opinions and making 
value judgments, as this will give the 
impression they are taking sides in the 
argument. 

If a disputant refuses to discuss past 
events, his or her wishes are respected. 
Should a disputant be willing to discuss 
related facts or events, every effort is made 
to obtain as much information as possible. If 
the MP are being told obvious lies, it must be 
made clear that the lies are not believed. The 
interview must continue. Questioning, 
repeating the disputant's statement, and 
evaluating apparent facts are methods that 
will aid in gathering sufficient information 
for mediation. After the problem has been 
defined, MP question each disputant about 
related problems to see if a pattern occurs. 

Mediation, referral, temporary separation, 
and apprehension are four courses of action 
available to MP once order has been 
restored. As soon as the MP establish what 
has occurred, the MP must choose one of 
these courses of action. If the dispute is 
verbal only, the MP can mediate, make 
referrals, or suggest temporary separation. 
If a physical assault has occurred, they must 
effect an apprehension. In all cases, MP will 
inform unit commanders of domestic 
disturbances involving unit personnel. 



128 



FM 19-10 



-INVESTIGATIONS 



INVESTIGATING DRUG AND CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 



MP, in enforcing laws, orders, and 
regulations, may uncover information 
relating to sales, availability, and users of 
narcotics and dangerous drugs. 
Investigative operations for such cases are 
complex. Close coordination between 
USACIDC special agents and federal and 
nonfederal investigative agencies concerned 
with drug suppression is of the utmost 
importance in the enforcement and control 
of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs. 

The unauthorized use, possession, sale, 
purchase, and receipt of narcotics, mari- 
huana, and dangerous drugs is a violation of 
federal law and Article 112 A, UCMJ. 
"Dangerous drugs" is an administrative 
label applying to those nonnarcotic 
substances listea in Public Law 91-513 that 
have been found to have a potential for 
abuse because of their depressant, 
stimulant, or hallucinogenic qualities. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration 
has the primary responsibility for 
investigating drug violations in the US, 
including military installations. The Drug 
Enforcement Administration has, however, 
delegated much of their authority on Army 
installations to USACIDC. The PM may 
assume responsibility for investigation of 
certain types of drug violations as 
determined by USACIDC. On all major 
Army installations and on many smaller 
installations, USACIDC and the PM 
conduct combined drug suppression 
operations. The focus of these operations is 



to stop the possession, use, and sale of illicit 
drugs on military installations. 

PMs may request MP investigators or 
USACIDC special agents to develop 
information on the local drug situation. 
Within military installations, appropriate 
action will be taken to eliminate illegal 
sources of narcotics and dangerous drugs. 
When the source of supply originates in a 
civil law enforcement jurisdiction, 
coordinated operations will be required for 
detection and apprehension. 

MPIs conduct investigations of offenses 
involving possession ana /or use of nonnar- 
cotic controlled substances (see AR 190-30). 
Notification that an investigation has been 
initiated will be made to tne supporting 
USACIDC element without delay. They will 
be kept fully informed of the progress of the 
investigation. A copy of all initial, interim, 
and final DA Forms 3975 will be provided to 
USACIDC at the local level. 

Investigations of offenses involving 
possession and /or use of nonnarcotic 
controlled substances will be transferred to 
USACIDC on request. Once the transfer is 
made, the investigation must be carried 
through to conclusion by USACIDC. It 
cannot be transferred back to the MPI. 

Investigations involving possession 
and /or use of nonnarcotic controlled 

substances generated by another USACIDC 
investigation may be transferred to the MPI. 
This can be done with the concurrence of 
USACIDC and the unit commander involved. 



INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE RAPE OFFENSES 



The MP play an important role in 
handling rape cases. MP are often the first 
help available to a rape victim. 

The crime of rape, under appropriate 
federal laws, is a capital offense punishable 



by death. It is a complex offense. It is not 
often sexually motivated. It is most often a 
crime of hate, anger, and violence in which 
the rapist uses sex as a weapon to inflict 
harm and humiliation upon the victim. 



FM 19-10 

161-0160-94-9 



129 



INVESTIGATIONS 



Sometimes the victim is a substitute target 
for the rapist's anger against women as a 
group or even society itself. MP actions 
in rape investigations must accord with 
FM 19-20. 

MP know that rape is both an emotional 
and a physical assault. The emotional shock 
of rape often does greater harm to the victim 
than does the actual physical assault. Rape 
victims may show fear, anxiety, anger, and 
shock, both physically and verbally; victims 
may laugh, cry, or shake while discussing 
the offense. Or they may appear controlled 
and calm, hiding their inner feelings. 

Physical shock, exhaustion, or even strict 
self-discipline may cause a victim to seem 
calm and composed. But fear is present in all 
victims. Fear may last for hours or for 
months, depending on the victim and the 
ordeal she has experienced. The victim may 
have been threatened or come close to death. 
A victim may fear that the rapist knows her 
name and address and may harm her in the 
future. 

MP ENCOUNTER AND AID VICTIMS 

When MP encounter rape victims they 
react quickly to ensure the emotional and 
physical well-being of the victim. They check 
the physical condition of the victim. They 
must establish rapport with the victim. They 
are aware of the victim's fears and know 
how to lessen them. The MP's initial actions 
set the stage for the investigation and the 
subsequent recovery of the victim. MP know 
that victims treated in a callous, indifferent, 
disbelieving manner can undergo difficult 
and lengthy recovery periods. 

The victim is told what is being done and 
why. The MP informs the victim of the 
evidence procedures that must be followed 
until the investigator arrives. The MP makes 
sure the victim knows that taking a shower 
is not allowed until after the physical exam. 

The initial interview with the victim is 
brief. The role of the MP conducting the 
interview is to gather enough information 



for investigators to begin investigating the 
offense. Leading or sexually explicit 
questions are not asked. The MP at the crime 
scene learns from the victim exactly what 
took place and where. The victim is asked if 
she knows the offender, if she can describe 
the offender, and if she knows where the 
offender is or can be located. 

The rape victim will relate to the incident 
more freely if only one person is present 
during the initial interview. Tact, 
compassion, and patience is used or the 
interview will fail. And more importantly, 
the victim may suffer emotionally. If the 
victim is made to feel guilty of the crime, the 
psychological damage may be significant. 

Once enough information has been 
obtained to start processing the scene, MP 
escort the victim to the nearest facility for 
medical treatment and a thorough 
examination. Under no circumstances is tne 
victim left alone. The MP remains with the 
victim until he or she is released to the 
USACIDC investigator. 

Medical personnel are to preserve clothing 
and other items for evidence examination. 
The examining physician is advised of the 
areas of interest in the case and the evidence 
samples needed for the investigation. 

MP TURN CASE OVER TO USACIDC 
INVESTIGATORS 

When the victim is emotionally prepared, a 
follow-up interview is conducted by a 
USACIDC investigator. The USACIDC 
investigator will investigate all rape claims 
thoroughly and objectively. Rape claims are 
never assumed to be false. 

The USACIDC investigator is told of all 
MP who have had contact with the victim. 
The investigator will want to interview 
them. The MP observations of the victim's 
emotional state, the condition of her 
clothing, and the circumstances surrounding 
the crime can be important both to the 
investigation and to the future prosecution 
of the offender. 



130 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



INITIAL ACTIONS IN DEALING WITH RAPE VICTIMS 



D LEND AID AND COMFORT TO THE VICTIM 

D PROVIDE A PRIVATE PLACE TO TALK 

Q ESTABLISH A CARING RAPPORT 

a INFORM VICTIM OF EVIDENCE 
PROCEDURES 

a TAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF VICTIM'S 
ACCOUNT OF EVENTS 

a ESCORT VICTIM TO THE NEAREST 
MEDICAL FACILITY 

a REMAIN WITH THE VICTIM^UNTIL VICTIM 
IS RELEASED TO AN INVESTIGATOR 




INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 



The MP are one of the main military 
agencies responsible for identifying and 
protecting abused and neglected children. 
The MP are most often contacted first when 
child abuse or neglect is suspected. 

The PM office investigates suspected child 
abuse and neglect. The PM office par- 
ticipates in public awareness programs and 
activities. The PM office sets procedures for 
handling child abuse and neglect cases. The 
PM office sets up lines of communication 
with the Army Community Service, Family 
Advocacy Case Management Teams 
(FACMTs), and local civilian welfare and 
law enforcement agencies. The PM office, in 
accord with the installation FACMT, often 
publishes a local SOP setting out the role of 
each agency. 

On US Army installations, the Army 
Family Advocacy Program (AFAP) and its 
action arm, the FACMT, are the key 
agencies for handling child abuse and 
neglect. The FACMT is legally mandated to 
ensure preventive, investigative, evaluative, 
and treatment programs are responsive, 



first, to the needs of the abused or neglected 
children and, then, to the needs of their 
families (see AR 608-1). 

The FACMT is coordinated by a social 
services professional. The coordinator 
monitors the program and supervises the 
staff of the local AFAP. A team of medical 
and social work professionals, the AFAP 
officer, and the Army Community Service 
social worker are supported by other 
installation agencies and their personnel. 
Law enforcement personnel, civilian child 
protection workers, chaplains, and members 
of the SJA often serve on the FACMT. MP 
and USACIDC representatives on the 
FACMT work closely with team members to 
provide help and investigative support. 

REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 

Reports of child abuse and neglect may 
come from hospital staffs, teachers, police 
officers, or neighbors. In accordance with 
AR 608-1 installation physicians, nurses, 
law enforcement personnel, school officials, 



FM 19-10 



131 



INVESTIGATIONS 



and child care /development personnel will 
report all incidents of suspected child abuse 
to the installation FACMT or the MP. The 
report may be received over the phone or in 

Kerson. An MP may be sent to the child's 
ome after a report has been received by 
another agency. 

A report of suspected child abuse or 
neglect is not an accusation. The report itself 
does not prove the existence of child abuse 
and neglect. But neither are reports from 
questionable sources necessarily invalid. All 
reports of child abuse or neglect must be 
investigated. Sometimes false reports of 
suspected child abuse and neglect are made 
by angry parents with marital problems, by 
quarrelsome family members, by feuding 
neighbors, or even by an angry or distressed 
child. 

If the report is received by the MP desk 
sergeant, the MP will need to interview the 
source in the field. It is often difficult for the 
source to make the initial report. MP tell the 
source that, if requested, statements made in 
connection with a particular case of alleged 
child maltreatment will be kept confidential 
under the provisions of AR 340-21. 
Statements made by sources will be marked 
"confidential" in all case records. MP 
attempt to obtain information from the 
source: 

• The date and time the reported incident 
was received. 

• The source's name, telephone number, 
and address if he/she is present and 
willing to provide this information. 

• The type of source (for example, 
mandatory, permissive, anonymous). 

• The relationship of the source to the child 
and family. 

• The willingness of the source to share 
with the family his/her role in initiating 
the report, and his/her willingness to 
participate in the assessment process if 
appropriate. 

• The action taken by the source or others 
including whether or not the child has 
been placed in protective custody. 



• The motives of the source if possible to 

• evaluate. 

• The possible witnesses to the incident 
which caused the child's condition. 

Simple verbal reassurance, or a follow-up 
letter which expresses gratitude for the 
source having taken the initiative to call, 
can make the difference in the source's 
future willingness to cooperate. 

Witnesses to actual incidents of child 
abuse and neglect are rare. Most incidents 
occur within the confines of the home. 
Outside observers are few. However, there 
are usually persons who can furnish 
corroborative evidence of the child's 
condition, the home situation, or conditions 
of family life. Witnesses who are afraid of 
becoming involved are allowed to express 
any concerns they may have about their 
participation in the investigation. 

SIGNS OF ABUSE 

MP are trained to recognize the physical 
effects of child abuse and neglect. When MP 
encounter injured or disturbed children, MP 
note if the condition could be the result of 
parental behavior. MP are alert to physical 
injuries like disfigurement, burns, broken 
bones, bites, lacerations, or bruises that may 
indicate cases of child abuse. They know 
that unsanitary living conditions, 
inadequate food, untreated illnesses, and 
inadequate clothing and shelter often mean 
parents or guardians are not providing 
adequate care for a child. MP act 
immediately to protect children whose 
physical or mental health and welfare has 
been threatened or harmed by the persons 
responsible for the child's welfare. 

As protectors of the military community, 
MP are concerned with the physical and 
emotional well-being of dependent children. 
At all times MP patrols— 

• Respond immediately to a reported 
incident of child abuse and neglect. 

• Report cases of suspected child abuse or 
neglect to the PM or appropriate civilian 
authorities. 



132 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



INDICATORS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 

MP LOOK FOR PHYSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT 
THAT MAY EXIST INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATIONS. 



PHYSICAL ABUSE — Unexplained injuries; 
bruises, fractures, lacerations, and/or 
abrasions 

EMOTIONAL MALTREATMENT- Emotion- 
ally or intellectually immature, inadequate 
coping skills, low self-esteem, antisocial or 
destructive behavior 



NEGLECT^Poor hygiene, inappropriate 
clothing, hunger, fatigue, lack of supervision, 
unattended physical or medical need. 

SEXUAL ABUSE -Difficulty in walking or 
sitting, complains of pains in genital area, 
engages in fantasies, bizarre or sophisticated 
sexual knowledge 




• Take immediate action to protect a child 
in danger of further maltreatment. 

• Investigate allegations of child abuse or 
neglect and suspect conditions noted in 
the course of other investigations. 

INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED 
ABUSE 

The primary concern of the MP, when 
investigating cases of child abuse and 
neglect, is the protection of the child. To 
protect the child, MP must ensure the 
investigation determines— 

• Whether or not child abuse or neglect is 
occurring. 

• Whether or not the child is at risk in the 
home. 

• Whether or not immediate intervention is 
necessary to ensure the child's safety. 

Once this immediate concern has been 
addressed, the investigator must then 

determine— 



• Whether or not further police action is 
required by MPI or USACIDC. 

• Whether or not the case should be referred 
to FACMT in accordance with AR 608-1. 

• If the case is based on a false report and 
no further action is indicated. 

Deciding whether or not a child is safe in 
the home is the most crucial step in the 
investigation. This decision can be reached 
through a review of past parental behavior, 
statements, and behaviors during an 
investigative interview, or from reports by 
others who know the family. If the child is in 
imminent danger, the investigator must 
take whatever steps are necessary to ensure 
the child's safety before proceeding with the 
investigation. 

In determining if protective custody is 
necessary, the investigator considers 
whether or not— 

• Maltreatment in the home, present or 
potential, is such that a child could suffer 
Permanent damage to body or mind if left 
here. 



FM 19-10 



133 



INVESTIGATIONS 



• The child is in immediate need of medical 
or psychiatric care and the parents refuse 
to obtain it. 

• The child's sex, age, or physical or mental 
condition renders the child incapable of 
self-protection — or for some reason 
constitutes a characteristic the parents 
find completely intolerable. 

• Evidence suggests that parental anger 
and discomfort with the investigation will 
be directed toward the child in the form of 
severe retaliation against him or her. 

• Evidence suggests that the parent or 
parents are so out of touch with reality 
:hat they cannot provide for the child s 
3asic needs. 

• Evidence suggests that the parent or 
parents' physical condition poses a threat 
to the child. 

• The family has a history of hiding the 
child from outsiders. 

• The family has a history of prior incidents 
or allegations of abuse or neglect. 

• The parents are completely unwilling to 
cooperate in the investigation or to 
maintain contact with any social agency 
and may flee the jurisdiction. 

• The parent or parents may abandon the 
child. 

If the investigator decides to place a 
seriously abused child in protective custody, 
the FACMT will be notified immediately. 
The child is immediately taken to the instal- 
lation medical facility for examination. The 
child will remain in the medical facility for 
observation while the FACMT simultaneously 
acts on the case. If the child is not in 
imminent danger, then the decision to 
remove the child from the home should be 
made jointly by the investigating officer and 
the FACMT. 

If grounds exist for temporary removal of 
the child from the home, the SJA must be 
consulted while the MP or responding agent 
remains at the scene until further guidance 
is received. 



To conduct an effective investigation, MP 
or responding agents will need to visit the 
home, see the child, interview the parents, 
and collect evidence. Two types of 
information need to be gathered in order to 
corroborate or dismiss a report. Primary 
information includes records of the 
investigators' interviews and their 
observations, photographs, and physical 
evidence. Background information is that 
which has been gathered from collateral 
sources such as medical records, school 
records, and other agency records. 

A routine check of the family is the first 
step after receipt of the report. This check 
may include internal departmental records, 
court records, or FACMT records. In some 
areas central registers of reports of actual or 
suspected child abuse and neglect are 
maintained, often on a statewide basis. 
These central registers may be accessed 
directly by the law enforcement agency itself 
or, in some jurisdictions, indirectly through 
the local FACMT. 

Information which may be revealed 
through a records check includes— 

• Prior reports of suspected child abuse and 
neglect for this family and the outcome of 
those reports. 

• Services being provided to the family 
because of a previous report. 

• Information on the informant's reliability 
based on any prior reports. 

Evidence of child abuse and neglect may 
include the investigating officer s obser- 
vations, photographic evidence, and 
physical evidence. All evidence is important. 
Hearsay evidence can be of value to a social 
agency in its subsequent efforts to serve the 
family. Such evidence may even be 
admissible in later court actions. The MP or 
responding agent concentrates on 
obtaining— 

• The name, age, sex, ethnic background, 
and permanent address of the child. 

• Present location of the child and location 
where incidents occurred if different from 
permanent address. 



134 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



• Name of person or institution responsible 
for the child's welfare (and address if 
different from the permanent address of 
the child). 

• Name and address of the person alleged to 
be responsible for the abuse and /or 
neglect. 

• The names, sexes, and ages of siblings 
and other adults present. 

• The nature and extent of the suspected 
abuse or neglect, including any available 
information of prior injury to the child or 
other siblings. 

(See FM 19-20 for more information on 
physical evidence and photographing 

evidence.) 

Home Visits 

Investigators may not gain entry to the 
home on their initial approach to the family. 
Investigators must indicate concern and 
sympathy and explain their presence as 
ensuring the health and safety of the child to 
gain entry into the home. However, if 
investigators do not receive permission to 
enter, they have the right of forcible entry 
if— 

• There is probable cause to believe a child 
in the home is in imminent danger. 

• There is probable cause to believe that a 
crime is being committed in the home. 

If the investigator feels entry is necessary 
but the family will not allow it and it does 
not appear that an emergency exists, a court 
order or search warrant must be obtained. 
The local SJA is contacted to determine the 
proper course of action. 

Initial Observations 

Upon entering the home MP or responding 
agents must record their observations 
accurately and in detail so that they will be 
able to testify effectively if the case goes to 
trial later. MP or responding agents must 
note the— 

• Physical condition of all children, 
including any observable injuries or 



conditions such as disfigurement, burns, 
broken bones, bites, lacerations, bruises, 
or untreated illnesses. 

• General appearance of all children, 
including the condition of their clothing 
(for example, worn, tattered, filthy). 

• Safety of their surroundings. 

• General condition of the home, including 
degree of cleanliness; availability of food 
and water; adequacy of sleeping, eating, 
and washing facilities; adequacy of heat, 
light, and space; and evidence of human 
or animal waste. 

MP will also observe and record the 
behavior of parents and other children in the 
family, including their reaction to the MP's 
presence. These observations can be used to 
confirm or deny parents' statements. 
Nonverbal messages that can be observed 
are— 

• Eye contact between family members. 

• Facial expressions of love, support, anger, 
distrust, or rejection. 

• Tones of voice that communicate various 
emotions. 

• The presence or absence of communica- 
tion. 

• Willingness to listen. 

• Willingness to express feelings and 
emotions. 

• Physical closeness. 

Interviews with the Parents 

Interviewing the parents may be the most 
important step in the investigation. Due 
process rights granted by the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution as well as those covered by 
Article 31, UCMJ, must be observed in 
conducting these interviews. The Miranda 
rights, or Article 31 rights, must be made 
known to the parents. Article 31 rights must 
be voluntarily waived before questioning 
begins. Any person accused of child abuse or 
neglect must be informed of their rights 
pertaining to information in the report or 
records generated from the incident. 



FM 19-10 



135 



INVESTIGATIONS 



In conducting interviews with parents— 

• The interview is conducted in a 
comfortable setting free from distraction. 
Jargon is not used. 

• The investigator will, if possible, 
interview each parent privately and 
separately. 

• The investigator will tell the parents the 
reason for the interview, give the legal 
authority, and treat them with respect. 
Under no circumstances will the 
investigator display horror, anger, or 
repugnance. 

• The investigator must be alert to any 
apparent vagueness or inconsistencies in 
the explanations each gives for the 
allegations contained in the report. 

• The investigator will not respond to 
demands by the parents to be told who 
reported them. 

• The investigator will not reinforce 
questionable parental actions by such 
statements as, "If he were mine, I'd hit 
him too." This may give a disturbed 
parent license to increase assaults upon 
the child. 

• The investigator must not allow feelings 
of anger or revenge to impair his 
professional judgment. 

• The investigator will not attempt to coerce 
a confession from a parent. 

Contact and Interviews with the Child 

The first contact the investigator has with 
the child is of greatest importance. This 
initial contact may take place in the home, 
medical facility, school, or a child care 
facility. The investigator must not assume 
that the victim is old enough or mature 
enough to cope mentally with the offense. 
The purpose of the initial contact with the 
child is to determine the validity of the 
accusation and to determine if the child is in 
imminent danger. 

There are times when the child must be 
interviewed in order to learn what has 



happened. However, every attempt is made 
to minimize the need for interviews of child 
victims. Whether or not the child is 
interviewed depends upon factors such as— 

• The child's age. 

• The child's ability to understand and 
evaluate what has happened. 

• The possible impact of the interview upon 
the child . 

• The possibility of retaliation by a parent 
against a child who has "told.' 

The parents are informed of the need for 
the interview. But they are not present while 
the child is being questioned. Many children 
are afraid to speak in front of those who 
have hurt, abused, and neglected them. If the 
parents object strongly, it may be necessary 
to place the child in protective custody before 
proceeding with the interview to assure the 
parents will not retaliate against the child. If 
:he child must be in the sole care of the 
military even for a short time, two 
investigators will be responsible for the 
child. If the investigators are both male, a 
female member of the armed forces must be 
provided to be with the child also. 

Investigators must tell children that they 
are not in trouble and have done nothing 
wrong. Interviewing children in sexual 
abuse cases calls for particular sensitivity 
and skill. In addition to feeling confused and 
afraid, these children may also feel great 
guilt. The investigator /interviewer must 
convey to the child the understanding that he 
or she has done nothing wrong. 

When conducting the interview, the 
interviewer must keep in mind that the child 
may be hurt, inpain, fearful, confused, or 
apprehensive. The child must be made as 
comfortable as possible under the 
circumstances. It is advisable to have a 
trained interviewer who is of the same sex as 
the child or at least to have someone of the 
same sex present during the interview. 

When interviewing the child the 
interviewer must try to determine the 
emotional state of the child. Is fear, hatred, 



136 



FM 19-10 



-INVESTIGATIONS 



defiance, shock, confusion, love, jealousy, or 
anger apparent? Is the child ready to tell the 
truth, lie, or exaggerate? The interviewer 
must attempt to gam the child's confidence. 
The interviewer must act as a friend to the 
child rather than as a figure of authority. 
The interviewer must not take sides against 
the parents. The interviewer must conduct 
the interview in language the child clearly 
understands. The interviewer must permit 
the child to tell about incidents in his or her 
own way. The child must not be pressed for 
details that he or she may be unwilling or 
unable to give. Questions are limitea to 
necessary information. Open-ended 
questions are asked whenever possible. The 
interviewer will tell the child what will 
happen next and how the investigator will 
use the information the child has given. The 
interviewer will inform an adolescent when 
a "person in need of supervision" petition or 
a similar order is necessary. 

Prosecution 

Prosecution of persons who abuse or 
neglect children can be difficult in all but the 



most serious cases. The purpose of 
prosecution is to establish the guilt of and 
impose punishment upon the person 
responsible for an incident of child abuse or 
neglect. Unsuccessful prosecution may 
result in increased risk for the child. An 
angry or disturbed parent may view a 
verdict of "not guilty' as approval of his or 
her conduct or as a license to continue 
maltreatment. 

There are times when apprehension of the 
parent, guardian, or caretaker is necessary. 
An apprehension may be made immediately, 
particularly when the incident is severe. Or 
it may be delayed, pending consultation with 
FACMT and others. An apprehension may 
be made when injury to the child is severe or 
evidence exists that a serious crime has been 
committed. When there is reason to believe 
that the parent, guardian, or caretaker will 
flee the jurisdiction, he or she may be 
apprehended. An apprehension may be 
made when it is necessary to preserve the 
peace or when the person believed 
responsible presents an immediate danger to 
others. 



INVESTIGATING SUICIDE THREATS AND ATTEMPTS 



Suicide threats received at the MP station 
must be treated seriously. The desk sergeant, 
or any other MP answering the call, must 
show immediate concern and interest in the 
caller's problem. The interest, concern, and 
reassurance shown by the MP on the 
telephone is important in keeping the 
individual on the line. The first priority is to 
obtain basic information from the caller, 
such as the caller's name, address, and the 
telephone number of the phone from which 
the call is being made. Information obtained 
from the caller will also allow the MP to 
return the call if the connection is cut off. It 
is critical that the caller be kept on the 
telephone as long as possible while a patrol 
unit is being dispatched. Talking will 
distract the person, provide time for a 
change of mind, and allow for rescuers to 
arrive. Keeping the suicidal person on the 



telephone while a patrol unit is being sent 
will prevent many suicides. 

When MP arrive at the scene before the 
threatened suicide attempt is carried out, 
they may find the subject emotionally upset. 
MP must avoid sudden, aggressive moves to 
avoid frightening the subject into 
committing suicide. Upon arrival, MP 
should try to start a conversation with the 
subject to help talk him or her out of 
committing suicide. If the subject is in 
immediate danger of jumping, safety 
precautions sucn as nets are used. MP 
carefully position themselves to restrain the 
subject. MP must keep crowds and onlookers 
away from the area. They must be patient 
and understanding with the subject. And 
they must not use abusive or threatening 
language. 



FM 19-10 



137 



INVESTIGATIONS 



When MP arrive at the scene and the 
subject has already attempted suicide, they 
must immediately take action to stop the 
subject from further self-injury. First aid is 
administered, if necessary, and medical help 
requested. If the subject has taken poison or 
an overdose of pills, any remaining pills, 
bottles, and related material are taken to the 
hospital, along with the subject. The 
immediate family, unit commander, clergy, 
or other personnel who might help tne 
subject are notified. 

When MP arrive at the scene of a suicide, 
they carefully approach it, so as not to 
destroy evidence. They immediately 
examine the subject for signs of life. If there 
are signs of life, MP should immediately 
begin lifesaving techniques such as 



cardiovascular pulmonary resuscitation. MP 
then request immediate medical assistance 
for continued rescue efforts. 

If the victim is obviously deceased, 
medical assistance is still required to affirm 
the victim's death. MP will secure the scene 
until medical and investigative assistance 
arrives. Suicide notes, weapons, and other 
evidence must be secured at the scene and 
released only to assigned investigators. 

After securing the scene, MP identify 
witnesses, friends, and relatives in the area. 
They make notes of anything that might aid 
the investigators. Until proven otherwise, 
every suicide will be treated as a potential 
homicide. (See FM 19-20 for a detailed 
discussion of suicide investigations.) 



INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 



MP may be called upon to investigate 
reports of people exhibiting abnormal 
behavior. Each person encountered may 
require a different form of response from the 
MP. In all situations, the MP must not only 
preserve the peace and control disorderly 
incidents, but they must also protect 
individual rights and obtain help for those 
people who cannot adequately control their 
behavior. 

People with abnormal behavior may react 
violently to stresses and problems. They can 
be dangerous and must be handled with 
caution. They may be easily influenced by 
others. They may be easily threatened by 
unfamiliar people, places, and events. The 
MP approach must be friendly and 
understanding. MP seek to handle these 
people as humanely as possible without 
endangering themselves, the person 
involved, or others. MP must — 

• Not deceive. 

• Use the least amount of force necessary. 

• Allow the person time to calm down. 

• Avoid threats and abuse. 



• Ignore verbal abuse. 

• Remain calm. 

MP must be trained to identify abnormal 
behavior. Improper identification of 
behavior and subsequent treatment can 
result in serious illness or death. People with 
abnormal behavior might show changes in 
their behavior and personality that may 
help in identifying them. Characteristics of 
someone with abnormal behavior may be — 

• Change in personality, behavior, and 
attitudes. 

• Change in personal habits. 

• Sudden change in job performance. 

• Uncontrolled outbursts of temper. 

• Distrust and hypersensitivity. 

• A strong interest in weapons. 

• Disorganized thinking. 

• Hallucinations, delusions, and fears. 

MP must be familiar with local agencies 
best able to assist people in need. MPdo not 
take action unless the person poses a threat 
to himself or to the welfare and property of 
others. 



138 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



MP do not diagnose injuries and diseases. 
However, they must be alert for unusual 
symptoms and know that illness and other 
abnormalities may appear as intoxication. 
Local medical facilities can train MP in how 
to recognize and react to people with 
abnormal symptoms. 

When MP encounter a person who has had 
an accident where the possibility of a head 
injury exists, or if an individual carries a 
medical alert notice, or where doubt exists 
over the person's condition, examination by 
medical personnel must be immediately 
requested. Because it is often difficult to 
distinguish between the behavior and 
confusion caused by alcohol or drugs and 
that caused by injury or illness, all 
apparently intoxicated personnel are 
watched for other symptoms. 

If the person has to be apprehended there 
must be a sufficient number of MP to 
restrain the individual. The procedures for 
searching and restraining do not differ from 



those used for other offenders. MP must 
consider that the individuals may be less 
aware of their constitutional rights and may 
not fully understand when rights are read to 
them. The police role is to initially interview 
the subject, gather evidence, and complete 
an objective investigation of the incident. 
Legal and medical authorities must then 
determine the individual's level of 
responsibility and competence. 

MP immediately notify parents, 
guardians, or next of km of those people with 
abnormal behavior who must be removed 
from the scene of an incident or placed under 
apprehension. If the individual has 
committed a criminal offense, the parents, 
guardian, or next of kin are read the rights 
warning statement and notified of the 
charges. The parents, guardians, or next of 
kin must also be present during interviews 
and interrogations. They may be able to 
furnish important background information 
on the individual. 



INVESTIGATING CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS 



MP customs units conduct investigations 
of alleged or suspected violations of customs 
laws and regulations by members of the US 
forces. These investigations are conducted 
under the same rules and procedures, with 
appropriate reports, as are other MP 
investigations (see FM 19-20). Some of the 
investigations will be conducted jointly with 
host country customs and tax personnel or 
other official investigative agencies having 
an interest in the case. MP customs 
inspectors who possess MPI credentials may 
receive locally fabricated identification with 
data in the host language. All credentials are 
treated as accountable items. Since the 
investigator may be assigned to a 
surveillance operation, the commander can 
permit the wearing of civilian clothing while 
on duty. A duty roster of investigators is 
maintained to provide necessary 
investigation during nonduty hours. 



Customs authorities periodically find 
unauthorized material such as contraband, 
explosives, ammunition, weapons, and 
property, some of which may be property of 
the US government. In order to determine if 
theft or government loss is involved, the 
procedures of the Bureau of Customs call for 
the notification of DA when weapons or 
material believed to be military property 
have been seized or are in customs custody 
under questionable circumstances. All such 
offenses will be reported to MP and 
investigated by USACIDC or MPIs, as 
appropriate (see AR 195-2, AR 190-30). 
Recovery of weapons and significant 
amounts of ammunition will be reported by 
the Army element receipting for them from 
the Bureau of Customs in accordance with 
AR 190-11. 

MP will receipt, from US Customs person- 
nel, for all confiscated US government 



FM 19-10 



139 



INVESTIGATIONS 



property and contraband shipped by US 
Army personnel. The property will be 
returned to Army supply channels if there 
are no legal requirements to retain the 
property before releasing it into supply 
channels. Items of contraband will be dis- 
posed of in accordance with AR 190-22. Prop- 
erty receipted for by MP will be accounted 
for and disposed of in accordance with 
evidence procedures outlined in AR 195-5. 

All physical property seized by MP 
customs personnel will be processed, 
safeguarded, and disposed of in accordance 
with the guidance furnished in FM 19-20 and 
the provisions of AR 190-22 and AR 195-5. 



Evidence custodians and alternate 

custodians are appointed on unit orders and 
perform the responsibilities as outlined in 
the publications previously cited. Prescribed 
depositories must be provided at appropriate 
locations and inspections and inventories 
performed as required. 

When it is determined that the subject of 
one of these investigations is no longer a 
member of the US Army, the investigation 
will be terminated and a final report 
submitted indicating the subject has been 
released from the Army. An information 
copy of the report will be furnished to the 
appropriate civil investigative agency. 



140 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 14 
Criminal Investigations 



The investigation of crimes and offenses 
is a necessary part of any command's effort 
to protect its personnel, supplies, and 
facilities. It is also essential to the 

command's maintenance of good order and 
discipline. 

DETERMINING PURVIEW 

The purview for investigating crimes is 
divided among unit commanders, MPIs, and 
USACIDC special agents according to the 
type and seriousness of the incident under 
investigation. Procedures at the local level 
ensure mutual cooperation and support. 

This close working relationship achieves 
optimum results in investigations, 
apprehension of offenders, acquisition and 
transmittal of police information, and the 
prevention of crime. 

UNIT COMMANDERS 

Unit commanders have authority to take 
appropriate action on all barracks larcenies 
or property with a value less than $1,000 and 
simple assaults not requiring hospitaliza- 
tion. Unit commanders ensure that these 
types of offenses are reported to law 
enforcement activities for statistical and 
crime reporting purposes. A law enforcement 
investigation of such an offense is usually 
conducted only when considered necessary 
by the PM/security officer or the appropriate 
USACIDC commander. But it may be 
requested by a field grade officer in the chain 
of command of the unit concerned. 

Commanders report all criminal offenses 
to the PM office. The PM office will refer the 
case to MPI or USACIDC if appropriate. 
After the PM is notified, the commander 
secures the crime scene and separates and 
holds all witnesses and suspects until MP 
and MPIs arrive. Direct coordination 
between the commander and the MPI for 



CONTENTS 



Page 
[DETERMINING PURVIEWl 141 

I Unit Commanders! 141 

IMPTandUSACT5b 142 

pther Investigators| 142 



CONDUCTING CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 



142 

Testimonial Evidencel 143 

[Physical Evidence ! 143 



PRESERVING THE CUSTODY OF 
EVIDENCE 



..144 



IDISPOSING OF EVIDENCE] 145 



Disposition of Unneeded Evidence 
land Nonevidence 



I Disposition of Evidence Belonging 
Ito US Government 



..146 
Disposition of Personal Propertvl. 147 



.145 



I Disposition or Personal rropertvj. . . . 
[Disposition ot Contraband, Controlled 



and Illegal Items of Evidence 
Disposition Through Narcotics 

Field Testing . 

Final Disposition of 
DA Form 4137 . 



.147 



..147 



..148 



SUPERVISING MILITARY POLICE 
INVESTIGATORS 



..148 



investigation status and narcotics detector 
dog support is authorized. Direct contact 
with USACIDC concerning investigative 
status also is authorized. 

The PM office provides commanders with 
a DA Form 3975 on offenses involving their 
personnel (see AR 190-45). On cases referred 
to the USACIDC, the commander will be 
provided with an initial report and a final 
report. Significant developments will be 
provided to the commander if appropriate. 
The final report will provide guidance for 
submission of a report of commander's 
action taken. Commanders need not wait for 
a final report before taking action. 

Commanders are encouraged to assist the 
MPI and USACIDC in apprehending 
criminals. A commander can have an 
individual in his unit serve as a source. The 
source acquires and releases information 



FM 19-10 



141 



INVESTIGATIONS 



concerning criminal activity to the MPI or 
USACIDC. Additionally, individuals in the 
unit may be asked to make buys from a drug 
dealer. These controlled buys, when there is 
an indication the suspected individual has 
been involved in some type of criminal 
activity in the past, do not constitute 
entrapment. 

MPI AND USACIDC 

Investigations of violent crimes are an 
inherent responsibility of the MP and the 
USACIDC. Such offenses may fall within 
the investigative purview of MPIs or within 
the investigative jurisdiction of the 
USACIDC. 

MPIs normally investigate offenses as 
cited in AR 190-30. MPIs also coordinate and 
supervise the use of narcotics detector dogs 
in support of unit health and welfare 
inspections. USACIDC agents investigate 
criminal offenses that carry a maximum 
punishment of more than one year 
confinement. They investigate all narcotic 
offenses, sale /trafficking in marihuana and 
dangerous drugs, and larcenies of property 
valued at $1,000 or more. 



Investigations are conducted in accor- 
dance with the provisions and restrictions of 
the MCM and the UCMJ. When there is any 
question of jurisdiction, authority, or legality 
of action or evidence, investigators seeK the 
counsel of the SJA. The SJA is responsible 
also for the Army's Victim/ Witness 
Assistance Program. Investigators 
cooperate and coordinate their case 
activities with the Victim /Witness Liaison. 

OTHER INVESTIGATORS 

In CONUS incidents occurring off post 
normally are investigated by civil law 
enforcement agencies, including state, 
county, and municipal authorities, or by a 
federal investigative agency. When an 
incident involving military personnel occurs 
off a military installation, coordination will 
be made with the appropriate civil court or 
law enforcement agency and the result 
reported on DA Form 3975. A copy of the civil 
police report will be obtained and attached to 
the MP report whenever possible. In 
overseas areas off-post incidents are 
investigated in accordance with SOFAs 
and /or US-host country agreements. 



CONDUCTING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 



To effect the prosecution of criminals, 
military investigators must know the 
technical and legal requirements for a 
successful investigation. Generally, the art 
of an investigation lies in gathering and 
evaluating information and evidence, both 
testimonial and physical. (FM 19-20 
addresses investigative methods and 
techniques.) Testimonial evidence, like 
sworn statements of eyewitness accounts 
and admissions of guilt, is obtained through 
communication with people. Physical 
evidence, like identified weapons and 
fingerprints, is obtained by searching crime 
scenes, tracing leads, and developing 
technical data. 

Military investigators develop skills and 
techniques to recognize, collect, evaluate, 
process, preserve, and account for evidence. 



From this evidence a court-martial or jury 
forms its conclusions as to the guilt or 
innocence of an accused. Evidence is the 
means by which any alleged matter of fact is 
proved or disproved. It includes all matters, 
except comment or argument, legally 
submitted to a court to enable it to decide a 
question before it. Military investigators 
must understand the general rules of 
evidence. 

Investigative steps for gathering evidence 
in juvenile offenses are the same as those 
used in cases involving adult suspects. But 
MP must ensure that juveniles are processed 
in accordance with Public Law 93-415. And 
they ensure that children are protected from 
unwarranted treatment. 

If MP must detain juveniles, they ensure 
that juvenile suspects are not detained in 



142 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



confinement facilities, detention cells, or 
hospital prisoner wards. Juveniles may be 
temporarily detained in the offices or the 
post commander or PM, but a check is made 
with SJA to ensure the proper conditions 
exist. Unless a juvenile is taken into custody 
for serious offenses, MP do not take 
fingerprints or photographs of them without 
written consent of a judge. MP routinely 
contact SJA to ensure they have the proper 
judicial authority. MP do not release names 
or pictures of juvenile offenders to the public. 

Military investigators conduct their 
inquiries to find evidence and make it 
available for presentation in court. But 
something more than a mere collection of 
evidence is required of a successful 
investigation. The evidence must be 
admissible in court. Investigators must 
present to the court only admissible and 
reliable information upon which to base a 
proper decision. MP are always "evidence 
conscious." The scene of any crime is itself 
evidence. And so is the testimony of trained 
investigators about observations and 
findings at a crime scene. Both testimonial 
and pnysical evidence are vital to the 
successful prosecution of a case. 

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 

Obtaining testimonial evidence requires 
skillful interpersonal communication with 
human sources of information, particularly 
with the persons directly involved in a case. 
Questioning victims, witnesses, com- 
plainants, suspects, and sources is the 
investigative method most often used to 
obtain testimonial evidence. It is also the 
method used to obtain background 
information that gives meaning to the 
physical evidence tnat is collected. Many 
crimes have been solved as a direct result of 
leads and testimonial evidence developed 
through interviews and interrogations. 

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 

Collecting and evaluating physical 
evidence is an important technical part of 



any investigation. Physical evidence is one 
of the most valuable investigative assets. It 
produces leads to pursue to help bring the 
investigation to an end. And physical 
evidence can help establish the guilt or 
innocence of an accused person in a court of 
law. For example, as a general rule, a person 
cannot be convicted on the basis of an 
uncorroborated confession. There must be 
independent evidence, either direct or 
circumstantial, that raises an inference of 
the truth of the essential facts admitted in 
the accused's statements. Physical evidence 
can be that necessary independent evidence. 
And, while the rule requiring independent 
corroborating evidence does not apply to a 
confession made by an accused to the court 
during his trial, nor to statements made 
before or at the time the act was being 
committed, having physical evidence to 
substantiate such a confession or admission 
of guilt is desirable. 

One of the main duties of an investigator 
is to ensure that the evidence obtained is 
admissible in court. Investigators must be 
careful to seize, collect, and accept receipt of 
evidence in a legal manner. They know they 
must be able to identify each piece of 
evidence weeks, months, or even years after 
it was collected. They must be able to 
describe the crime scene and where each 
piece of evidence was located at the scene. 
They must be able to explain any change in 
the evidence that has occurred since it was 
collected. And they must be able to prove 
that the evidence remained in proper custody 
from the time it was collected until it is 
presented in court. 

The final result in bringing a successful 
investigation to a close is often the 
investigator's testimony in the courtroom. 
When preparing for trial, investigators 
coordinate with the trial counsel so there are 
no surprises in court. They develop a close 
working liaison with the trial counsel. They 
do not conceal information from the court. 
They know the accused has the right to a fair 
trial regardless of opinion. Investigators are 
professional in every way. 



FM 19-10 



143 



INVESTIGATIONS 



PRESERVING THE CUSTODY OF EVIDENCE 



Investigators follow specific requirements 
in receiving, processing, safeguarding, and 
disposing of evidence and in preparation 
and disposition of property (see FM 19-20, 
AR 195-5, and AR 190-22). 

To achieve the maximum benefit from 
physical evidence, investigators must be not 
only skilled in its collection, but careful in 
their handling of it to preserve it for 
laboratory examination ana /or presentation 
in court. They must retain the item's 
integrity by keeping the item as nearly as 
possible in its original condition. 
Consideration should be given to the ease of 
identifying the item and trie cost of the item 
when it is collected. Unnecessary marking of 
evidence may result in claims against the 
government for diminution of value of the 
item. All MP in contact with evidence must 
maintain a chain of custody — a 
chronological, written record of who has 
control of the item from the time it is 
acquired as evidence until it ceases to have 
value as evidence and is released or 
destroyed— to assure accountability. 

The investigator who first receives, 
recovers, or discovers physical evidence 
must be able to identify such evidence 
positively at a later date as being the specific 
article or item obtained in connection with a 
specific investigation. To be able to do this, 
investigators mark and tag evidence 
promptly at the time they obtain it. If they 
can, they place their initials, time, and date 
directly on the evidence. If the evidence 
cannot be marked, all identifying data are 
noted on the container in which the evidence 
is placed. A record of all details of the 
marking of evidence is made in the 
investigator's notes. Photographs, sketches, 
and notes of the crime scene must show the 
exact places from which evidence was 
removed. This care is imperative to ensure 
the chain of custody of evidence is kept 
unbroken. 

Evidence custodians control and account 
for all evidence received in an investigation. 



They are in charge of the evidence 

depository. When safeguarding, safekeeping, 
and transferring property, they ensure care 
is taken to guard property against loss, theft, 
pilferage, damage, alteration, or any change 
in its value or appearance other than by 
laboratory examination. They also maintain 
all evidence records. 

Primary and alternate custodians are 
appointed, in writing, by the appropriate 
commander or PM (see AR 195-5). A copy of 
the appointing document must be kept in the 
depository files. These records must show 
who is responsible for evidence at any given 
time. The requirements for determining 
primary and alternate evidence custodian, 
and for recording and accountability of 
evidence, inspections, and inventories and 
security standards for evidence storage, are 
specified in AR 195-5. For more information 
on preparation of required forms and 
maintenance of evidence see FM 19-20. 

Evidence custodians carefully maintain 
an evidence ledger. Corroborating entries in 
the ledger and on the custody document help 
assure accountability of evidence. The ledger 
is prepared with six columns spanning two 
facing pages showing— 

• The document number assigned and the 
date evidence was received. 

• The USACIDC or MPR sequence number. 

• A brief description of the evidence. 

• The date of final disposition. 

• The final disposition. 

• Remarks. 

If an improper entry is erroneously made, 
the entry is lined through and the person's 
initials written across the line. The ledger 
book is completely filled before starting a 
new one. In large offices it may be necessary 
to start a new ledger each year to 
accommodate anticipated evidence entries. 
The cover of the ledger book identifies the 
organization or activity responsible for the 
evidence depository and the dates spanned 
by entries in the ledger. If more than one 



144 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



calendar year is covered in the ledger, the 
front cover reflects this information. After 
the last entry in the ledger for a calendar 
year, a statement identifying all documents 
contained in it is entered. (For example, 
'This ledger pertains to custody documents 
001 through 432 for calendar year 1987.") 
The initial entry for the next year goes on the 
next page. 



When evidence is temporarily released or 
custody changed, it is accompanied by a 
carefully completed DA Form 4137 (for 
directions see FM 19-20 and AR 195-5). The 
original DA Form 4137 goes witn the 
eviaence. A copy of the form is placed in the 
suspense file when the item of evidence and 
the original DA Form 4137 are temporarily 
releasee!. 



DISPOSING OF EVIDENCE 



The evidence custodian is responsible for 
the disposition of evidence. He maintains 
continued and open communication with the 
supervisor and the SJA to ensure timely 
disposition of evidence. Consulting with the 
MP or special agent for pertinent 
information can assist in the timely 
disposition of evidence. If the SJA appoints 
his chief of military justice as the point of 
contact, plans are discussed with him. His 
assistance is requested in making timely 
disposition of all evidence. 

To ensure prompt disposition of evidence, 
a suspense system can oe established as an 
internal management tool. The US Army 
Criminal Investigation Laboratory 
(USACIL), adjudication, and pending 
disposition suspense files must be 
maintained. Other suspense files may be 
used, such as "Hold for Appellate Review/' 
when the SJA advises that this requirement 
exists. There can be many variations to suit 
the needs of your particular evidence 
depository operation. 

DA Form 4833 can be used to assist in 
timely disposition of evidence (AR 190-45 
contains additional information). If final 
action has not been accomplished, the form 
may be placed in suspense for 15 to 30 days. 
This simple method has proved an effective 
follow-up to ensure timely disposition of 
evidence. 

When it has been determined that final 
administrative or judicial action has been 
taken in a known subject case, the original 
custody document is handcarried or 



forwarded to the SJA of the commander 
exercising jurisdiction in the case. 

If the SJA says the evidence must be held 
for further adjudication, the final disposal 
authority portion of DA Form 4137 is not 
completed. A brief memorandum for record 
giving the reason for retaining the evidence 
is written and attached to DA Form 4137. 

If DA Form 4137 must be mailed to the 
SJA, a letter or DA Form 2496 (Disposition 
Form) is substituted containing sufficient 
information for the SJA to render a decision. 
The return correspondence indicating 
disposition approval is attached to the 
original DA Form 4137 for file at USACRC. 

If an item of evidence is made a permanent 
part of the record of trial, the trial counsel 
coordinates this action with the evidence 
custodian so that DA Form 4137 can be 
properly, annotated. 

DISPOSITION OF UNNEEDED 
EVIDENCE AND NONEVIDENCE 

Evidence connected with an investigation 
in which no subject has been identified may 
be disposed of three months after completion 
of the investigation without SJA approval. 
Consideration must be given to serious 
crimes when the probabnity exists that a 
subject may be identified. If a need to dispose 
of the evidence in less than three months is 
determined, the SJA must approve the 
action. In either case, the supervisor must 
approve the disposal and complete the final 
disposal authority section of DA Form 4137. 



FM 19-10 

161-016 O-94-10 



145 



INVESTIGATIONS 



Items of evidence found at a crime scene 
that have no owner or are of no obvious 
value, such as matchbooks, beer cans, 
bottles, glass fragments, and wooden sticks, 
will be destroyecfm the presence of a witness 
by crushing, burning, or any other method 
to render the items useless and harmless. 
The witness in such cases can be of any 
grade. If no trial results from the 
investigation, or if there is a trial and the 
SJA advises the evidence is no longer 
needed, then the appropriate return/release/ 
destruction can be made. Items in the 
evidence depository which are determined 
by laboratory analysis and the SJA to be 
nonevidentiary in nature may be disposed 
of. The witness may be anyone. 

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE 
BELONGING TO US GOVERNMENT 

When disposing of US government 
property, the items normally must be 

returned to the organization to which issued. 
Sometimes the unit cannot be identified or 
the item has been dropped from the property 
book. In such instances, the property must 
be released to the installation accountable 
officer. AR 710-2 is the authority for 
government property disposition. 

Recovered US government treasury checks 
and money orders stolen or obtained from an 
Army and Air Force Post Office (APO) 
facility must be returned to the responsible 
APO facility when no longer needed as 
evidence. Approval must be obtained from 
the SJA for this release or return. 

US postal money orders not identifiable as 
the property of a specific individual must be 
forwarded, to the Military Money Order 
Division, Postal Data Center, PO Box 14971, 
St Louis, Missouri 63182, with a letter of 
transmittal. (Include the case number, date 
of final report, offenses, identification of 
subjects and victims, and a remark that the 
final report is available and on file at the 
USACRC, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, 
Baltimore, Maryland 21222.) 

When it is not practical or desirable to 
retain items of evidence such as military 
vehicles, government food items, or other 



items determined mission essential, 
disposition may be immediately initiated. If 
it is not feasible to obtain written permission 
or approval before disposition of the 
evidence, verbal permission may be obtained 
from the SJA followed by written authority 
on DA Form 4137. 

Known document standards are normally 
returned to the office or individual from 
whom received. Exemplars and other 
documents that have no value or which the 
agency does not desire returned must be 
destroyed. When such items are destroyed, 
there is no requirement for a witness. 

US government firearms and ammunition 
retained as evidence must be returned to the 
appropriate military organizations. 
Normally DA Form 581 (Request for Issue 
and Turn-In of Ammunition) is used as an 
adjunct to DA Form 4137 for the turn-in of 
ammunition. Preparation of DA Form 581 is 
governed by AR 710-2. 

Final disposition of post exchange items, 
commissary items, and items illegally 
introduced into a host country, connected 
with black market, customs, and postal 
investigations, must be in accordance with 
local regulations, SOFAs, and laws or 
customs of the host country. When evidence 
is released to an external agency to be 
permanently retained and disposed of by 
that agency, the final disposal authority 
portion of DA Form 4137 must be completed. 

Limitation .0015 contingency funds held 
as evidence must be disposed of by 
depositing the funds with the local finance 
and accounting officer on DD Form 1131 
(Cash Collection Voucher). Before depositing 
funds with the finance and accounting 
officer, the accounting classification must be 
the same as on the voucher on which the 
funds were originally disbursed. A copy of 
DD Form 1131 showing the return of the 
money to the finance and accounting officer 
must go to the appropriate certifying 
and approving officer. Another copy of 
DD Form 1131 must be attached to the 
original evidence /property custody 
document. 



146 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 

Items of personal property that are legal to 
own and possess are normally returned to 
the rightful owner. Personal weapons that 
are lawful to own and possess but have been 
impounded for minor infractions (such as 
failure to register in accordance with local 
regulations) must be returned to the rightful 
owner when the requirements of local 
regulations have been met and the item is no 
longer needed as evidence. 

Money for which a rightful owner cannot 
be identified must be submitted to Army 
Finance with DD Form 1131. A copy of the 
completed form is attached to the original 
custody document and forwarded to the 
USACKC with the completed case. 

Items of personal property belonging to 
deceased or missing military personnel must 
be released to the summary court officer in 
accordance with AR 600-8-1. If the death of a 
civilian or military dependent occurs on the 
military reservation, normally the personal 
property is released to the agency assuming 
jurisdiction of the investigation, such as the 
FBI. Consult the SJA for specific guidance 
in such cases. 

Items that have obvious monetary value, 
and for which reasonable attempts to locate 
the owner have failed, must be released to 
the property reutilization and marketing 
officer. DD Form 1348-1 (DOD Single Line 
Item Release/Receipt Document] is prepared 
when these items are released. SJA approval 
must also be obtained. This authority is 
found in DOD Manual 4160.21-M. 

DISPOSITION OF CONTRABAND, 

CONTROLLED, AND ILLEGAL 

ITEMS OF EVIDENCE 

The disposition of contraband is governed 
by federal statutes. Therefore disposal of 
contraband must be in accord with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
Appropriate agencies should be contacted to 
determine if any other documentation is 
necessary for disposition of contraband. 



Contraband firearms and ammunition or 
firearms and ammunition used or intended 
to be used in commission of criminal acts 
and retained as evidence (not US 
government property) must be released to 
USACIL-CONUS. Ammunition is relin- 
quished to the nearest ammunition supply 
point, using DA Form 581. 

Counterfeit currency or coins and the 
equipment necessary to print or make them 
are normally released to the nearest office of 
the US Secret Service (USSS). However, if 
the incident occurs outside the jurisdiction of 
the US, the counterfeit items will be released to 
the appropriate USSS office exercising juris- 
diction over the host country. Coordination is 
effected with the USSS and SJA before 
making disposition of the items. 

Controlled substances that are not 
associated with any ongoing investigation 
but were discovered or found on post may be 
immediately disposed of after it is 
determined that the substance cannot be 
connected with any ongoing investigation or 
suspect. Controlled substances or narcotics 
must be destroyed in the presence of a 
witness in grade E6 or higher. The witness 
may be any USACIDC special agent. The 
witness will not have been involved in the 
chain of custody. Destruction must be by 
burning or by methods that will permanently 
destroy the substance. Flushing the 
substance down a commode is not considered 
an appropriate means of destruction. 
Definitive guidance is found in AR 195-5. 

DISPOSITION THROUGH 
NARCOTICS FIELD TESTING 

Nonnarcotic controlled substances may be 
field tested when the commander exercising 
court-martial jurisdiction of a subject ad- 
vises the PM or USACIDC supervisor that 
court-martial action will not be taken 
against the offender. Close coordination 
with the commander concerned is essential 
to determine the appropriate course of 
action. If the commander contemplates 
court-martial action, the evidence is 
forwarded to the supporting USACIL for 



FM 19-10 



147 



INVESTIGATIONS 



forensic analysis. Evidence consumed 
through field testing must be appropriately 
deducted from DA Form 4137 by annotating 
the chain of custody section to reflect 
disposition of the quantity consumed. In 
most instances the quantity consumed is 
estimated, or stated as "a few particles" if 
that is the case. 

USACIDC Form 36 (Field Test Results) 
provides a record for field test results of 
nonnarcotic controlled substances. This 
form is prepared and signed by the person 
conducting the field test. The test results are 
provided orally to the action commander as 
soon as possible in addition to a copy of 
USACIDt Form 36. Copies are attached as 
an exhibit and the original is retained and 
ultimately forwarded to USACRC. 

When definitive guidance cannot be found 
in AR 195-5 or AR 190-22, the SJA is con- 
sulted for guidance. It is the responsibility of 
the SJA to complete the final disposal action 
section of DA Form 4137. 

FINAL DISPOSITION OF 
DA FORM 4137 

After all items of evidence listed on a 
particular DA Form 4137 have been properly 
disposed of, the original and first copy of the 
form are placed in the case file to which they 
pertain. The original DA Form 4137 will be 



treated as any other original exhibit. It will 
be submitted to the USACRC alone with the 
final ROI/MPR or other supplemental 
information. When the final report and all 
other supplemental information has been 
forwarded to the USACRC before closingthe 
DA Form 4137, the DA Form 4137 is 
forwarded to USACRC as a single exhibit 
without a letter of transmittal. The 
USACIDC ROI number or USACRC report 
number, as applicable, must be reflected on 
the form when forwarded as a separate 
exhibit. The first copy of the form will be 
retained with the local file copy of the 
pertinent ROI or MPR and destroyed with 
the report. If the original DA Form 4137 is 
entered in the record of trial as a permanent 
part thereof, accompanies evidence released 
to an external agency, or is not available for 
any other reason, a copy from the suspense 
copy is made and substituted as the 
USACRC copy. A notation reflecting the 
disposition or the original will be maae on 
the reproduced copy forwarded to USACRC. 
When DA Form 4137 pertains to items not 
connected with incidents or when a report is 
not forwarded to the USACRC, DA Form 
4137 will be maintained in the local 
investigative case file to which it pertains 
until the file is disposed of in accordance 
with AR 25-400-2. 



SUPERVISING MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATORS 



The military, police investigation super- 
visor (MPIS) is directly responsible for the 
supervision and control of all investigators 
assigned to the MP investigation section. To 
successfully supervise an organized, 
efficient operation, the MPIS must ensure 
that the regulations, policies, and procedures 
are complied with. 

When an investigation is initiated and the 
case has been opened, the MPIS assigns 
the case a number and records the case on 
DA Form 3975. The MPIS assigns an 
investigator to the case and ensures a case 
file is opened and a progress report is 



initiated. The MPIS also ensures that an MP 
report number has been assigned and 

recorded. 

The MPIS guides the investigation, 
checking case progress periodically. The 
MPIS ensures that each investigation is 
performed in a timely manner witn entries 
recorded in the reading file in accordance 
with regulatory requirements and local 
policy. (See ARs 190-30, 190-40, and 190-45.) 
Each entry will reflect case progress, and if 
no investigation has been conducted, an 
entry win be reflected with a brief 
explanation. The MPIS ensures a first 



148 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



progress report is initiated and dispatched to 
the commander of the suspect/ subject on the 
day the investigation becomes three days old 
(counted from the date it was reported in the 
MP blotter and the MP report number was 
assigned). The MPIS ensures that additional 
progress reports are completed and initiated 
every 45 days thereafter until the case is 
finalized. The MPIS ensures that all MP 
reporting files /investigations are safe- 

fuarded against illegal disclosures. The 
1PIS also updates suspect's commander 
and supervisor as necessary during the 
investigation. The MPIS supervises the 
investigators and provides technical and 
administrative guidance as needed 
throughout the investigation. The MPIS 
makes all proper notification and assists the 
investigators in preparing for judicial 
proceedings. 

Once a subject has been identified, all 
leads have been exhausted, and SJA 



coordination has been accomplished, the 
MPIS ensures the final report is prepared. 
The MPIS checks the final report for content 
and errors. When all investigative leads 
have been exhausted and no subject has 
been identified, an administrative closing is 
appropriate until further leads are 
developed. All MPISs review the case and 
note their approval on the case log and the 
police report. 

Supervisors of MP investigation sections 
should continually check on the quality of 
the performance of their investigators to 
ensure that the MPI mission is being 
effectively accomplished. An excellent 
example of a quality control method is 
outlined in FM 19-20. Other methods that 
could be employed are observations of 
interview situations through two-way 
mirrors, critiques of statements as they are 
obtained, and examination of statements 
during the final case review stage. 



KEY MPI PERSONNEL ACTIONS FOR MPI SUPERVISORS 



Screens applicants for the MP investigation 
section and ensures that they meet the 
requirements as shown in AR 190-30. 
o Performs records review of the 
applicant's personnel training records. 

E Interviews the applicant. 

E Performs a security clearance check. 

n Generates a name check (per message 
format described in AR 190-30). 

D Performs a local investigation of the 
applicant which consists of interviewing 
members of the applicant's unit. 

O Prepares a personnel file if the applicant is 
accepted. 

a Ensures that the credential control officer 
issues credentials to the applicant upon 
receiving a favorable national agency 
check (NAC). 

a Assigns the new investigator to an 
experienced investigator to be trained. 
(Exceptions will be determined by the 
MPIS.) 



a Ensures outprocessing investigators turn 
in their credentials to the credential 
control officer for final disposition. All 
other investigative material assigned will 
be turned in to the MPIS. 

D Reports by message the issuance of MPI 
credentials within five days of issue 
(AR 190-30). 

D Reviews open MP reporting files of 
outprocessing investigators normally two 
weeks before the outgoing investigator 
clears. Once this has been accomplished, 
conducts a debrief. 

□ Deletes outprocessing investigators from 
the duty roster the day their credentials 
are turned in for disposition. 

□ Requests by message the withdrawal of 
the credentials within five days from the 
date of withdrawal (AR 190-30). 

□ Ensures the completion of an enlisted 
evaluation report on all noncommissioned 
officers. 



FM 19-10 



149 



INVESTIGATIONS . 



GENERAL MPI SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES 



D Maintains a case load and status board of 
current MPI investigations, as well as a 
case log book. 

□ Briefs the PM or his/her designated 
representative concerning all ongoing 
investigations and all aspects of MPI 
operations. 

O Periodically reviews open cases, 
providing guidance concerning the 
investigations. Makes sure to record the 
results of the review in the case progress 
report. 

a Reviews DA Forms 3975 to ensure that 
they are technically and administratively 
correct before forwarding to MP 
operations for signatures. 

O Prepares monthly work load reports and 
forwards them to MP operations. 

D Ensures incidents or complaints involving 
MPI personnel are brought to the 
attention of the PM. 

o Ensures all very important person (VIP) 
security missions are carried out as 
directed by the operations section. 

□ Ensures all evidence is handled and 
maintained in accordance with the 
procedures outlined in AR 195-5. 

□ Assigns cases to the investigators, 
making sure that they are evenly 
distributed. 

O Performs duties as a working investigator 
only when absolutely needed to do so. 

O Maintains liaison with SJA for guidance. 

Q Maintains liaison with civilian authorities 
as necessary. 

□ Maintains an MPI duty roster and ensures 
proper notification of those scheduled. 

□ Ensures that the investigators receive 
professional training to enhance their 
knowledge of the many aspects of 
investigations. 



NOTE: It is important that the MPIS ensures 
that the investigator is proficient in his/her 
soldier skills. There should not be any 
excuse for missing mandatory unit training 
in preparation for the annual skill 
qualification test. 

D Ensures proper maintenance of 
offices/ office equipment, vehicles, 
weapons, and other equipment under 
his/her immediate control. 

Cl Ensures juveniles are properly processed. 
(See Chapters 6 and 10.) 

□ Ensures all assigned investigators are 
physically fit and meet the standards 
prescribed in AR 600-9. 

□ Submits civilian clothing allowance, 
when appropriate, as prescribed in 
AR 700-84 and AR 190-30. 

a Ensures proper investigation of offenses 
involving use and possession of 
nonnarcotic controlled substances in 
accordance with AR 190-30. 

NOTE: US AC I DC is responsible for 
investigating the use, possession, sale, and 
trafficking of narcotic controlled substances 
and the sale or trafficking of nonnarcotic 
controlled substances, thereby making it 
essential that the MPIS ensures notification 
is made without delay to the supporting 
USACIDC element. Anytime a case is 
initiated on a controlled substance, 
notification of USACIDC is necessary in 
accordance with AR 190-30. 

D Supervises the physical security of the 
MP investigation section. 

O Supervises the overall safeguard of all 
records and files maintained in the 
section. 

□ Serves as the forms management officer. 

D Performs other duties as directed by the 
PM. 



150 



FM 19-10 



CHAPTER 15 
Investigative Means and Measures 



T he success of an investigation can 
depend on the local application of criminal 
intelligence that investigators, worldwide, 

father and process about crimes committed 
y individuals or organized crime groups. 
This criminal intelligence nelps 
investigators identify criminals and makes 
them aware of criminal activity and 
violations of criminal law. It also helps them 
prevent crime by allowing them to assess 
crime problems and trends. 

The US Army uses criminal intelligence to 
reveal criminal activities affecting the US 
Army. Only data that are needed are 
collected. Data solely about political 
activities are not collected. DA policy, stated 
in AR 380-13, forbids collection and retention 
of data on non-DOD personnel except for 
data about crimes where DOD has 
responsibility to investigate or prosecute. 

Criminal intelligence is more than just 
data documented in ongoing investigations. 
It is any information observed or obtained 
by investigators that may be of value when 
added to the criminal intelligence already 



CONTENTS 



Page 

GATHERING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE! ... 151 



USING AND PROVIDING CRIMINAL 
INTELLIGENCE 



CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS AND| 
INTERROGATIONS 



PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE AND 
COVERT OPERATIONS 



.153 



.154 



.156 



Surveillancesl 156 

Covert Operations! 157 



possessed. The process by which investi- 
gators change the raw data from untried, 
undeveloped information into a useful form 
for investigative needs is called the criminal 
intelligence process. It is an ongoing cycle of 
planning, collecting, evaluating, collating, 
analyzing, reporting, disseminating, and 
reevaluating. The process, undertaken 
continuously both at local levels and at 
higher HQ, ensures that a broad spectrum of 
criminal intelligence is available to aid the 
investigator. The intelligence that is 
gatherea is processed and disseminated to 
all levels. 



GATHERING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 



At command level, the Investigative 
Operations Directorate, USACIDC, super- 
vises the US Army's criminal intelligence 
effort. It sets information priorities for 
worldwide collection. And it disseminates 
processed criminal intelligence to local 
levels. USACIDC sets guides for two types of 
criminal intelligence: essential elements of 
criminal intelligence (EECI) and other 
criminal intelligence requirements (OCIRs). 
OCIRs are data that may be useful, but often 
are not needed right away. EECI, on the 
other hand, are critical items of data on 
criminal activities and crime areas to be 
collected at all levels. When EECI data are 



correlated and disseminated to local units, 
this information can be used to reach 
conclusions and make decisions. 

At installation level, USACIDC offices 
and certain MP elements supervise the 
planning and collection of criminal 
intelligence. The criminal intelligence 
coordinators in local units plan and collect 
information of criminal functions within 
command boundaries. They then forward it 
on request or on their own initiative. They 
also set local priorities within the overall 
program. They keep in touch with criminal 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 



FM 19-10 



151 



INVESTIGATIONS 



At investigator level, data are planned and 
collected for input to the criminal intelli- 
gence system. Collecting criminal 
intelligence is a continual duty of all 
investigators, not just those assigned 
directly to a criminal intelligence section. 
The investigator is the key to a successful 
collection effort. The investigator is usually 
the person in direct contact with local 
human sources of criminal intelligence. 
During daily activities the investigator looks 
for EECI and OCIRs. He does this 
continuously and aggressively. Although 
priority is placed on EECI needs, he must 
not overtook other useful criminal 
intelligence. 

The local criminal intelligence coordinator 
helps the investigator sift, sort, review, and 
analyze data. Sources of criminal intelli- 
gence are developed. Criminal intelligence is 
gathered from both overt and covert sources. 
Overt sources may be citizens, workers in 
private and government agencies, members 
of police agencies, and unit commanders. 
Postal workers, news media, phone books, 
and public records are also good, overt 
sources of criminal intelligence. Covert 
sources include criminal elements willing to 
be sources and surveillant and undercover 
investigators. Development of sources of 
criminal intelligence is limited only by the 
imagination of the investigator. 

After data have been collected, collated, 
and analyzed, they must be reported. 
Because some data being reported are 
sensitive, criminal intelligence is usually 
reported on USACIDC Form 97 (Criminal 
Intelligence Report). Reports are tailored to 
the needs or the main user. Positive 
information is given. Reports are prepared 
objectively. Conclusions drawn from the 
data are included in the report. After the 
reported information is further analyzed at 
higher levels, criminal intelligence is 
disseminated back to local levels. The 
criminal intelligence is disseminated to 
reach the principal user — the local 
investigator. 



Criminal intelligence must be accurate 
and relevant. Usually the investigator who 
collects the details is most able to assess the 
reliability of his or her source. That 
investigator can determine reliability by 
recalling past experience with that source, as 
well as comparing the data with that 
gathered from other overt or covert sources. 
But even when the reliability of a source or 
accuracy of the criminal intelligence 
collected is questioned, it is not considered 
useless. It is reported. The immediate need 
for an item of criminal intelligence may not 
be seen. But this does not mean that item is 
not of value. 

Higher USACIDC levels, having wider 
sources of criminal intelligence than lower 
levels, may assess the accuracy and 
usefulness or an item of data by comparing it 
with a variety of other known data and 
circumstances. When seemingly useless bits 
of criminal intelligence are fitted together, 
the many separate bits may, like jigsaw 
puzzle pieces, form a recognizable picture. 
The criminal intelligence collected on every 
new case must be coordinated with the 
criminal intelligence center. 

To bring together collected data to decide 
their importance and relation to other 
criminal intelligence, data must be collated 
and analyzed. The data must be combined 
with other related data and then analyzed to 
allow sound theories and judgments to be 
derived. The analysis of criminal 
intelligence can be done at the same time as 
collation. The same data may be analyzed 
many times and by a variety of methods. 
The methods of statistical, system, 
computer, or operational research analysis 
may be used. However, when an analysis is 
done at any level of command, it is done to 
see if a pattern can be shown and to see if 
more data are needed. An analysis also 
serves as a tool to reevaluate collection 
plans. 

Reevaluation is the final stage of the 
criminal intelligence process. It is a review 
at all levels of the potential use and benefit 



152 



FM 19-10 



-INVESTIGATIONS 



of the collected criminal intelligence. 
Reevaluation serves to show where changes 
need to be made. It ensures that the 

information to be gathered reflects the needs 
and goals of local investigative units and of 
such units in general. It ensures the criminal 



intelligence reflects current targets of 
interest, as areas of concern vary over time. 
And it ensures the information is obtainable 
from the contacts and sources of criminal 
intelligence that are available. 



USING AND PROVIDING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 



To be useful, criminal intelligence must be 
available and easily retrievable. Only if the 
investigator can get to the criminal 
intelligence can he see if any exists that will 
aid him in an ongoing investigation. 

Three files are required by regulation to be 
maintained at each local USACIDC office. 
These are the name index card file, the 
modus operandi file, and the offense file. The 
name index card file contains criminal 
intelligence cross-indexed by subjects, 
victims, witnesses, and organizations. The 
modus operandi file contains criminal 
intelligence on distinct manners of operation 
cross-indexed by subjects and cases. And the 
offense file contains criminal intelligence 
indexed by the type of crime committed. 

But a unit's investigative file system is not 
limited to these. Other useful files may 
include criminal intelligence indexed by 
unit, location, nicknames, stolen property, or 
type of vehicles. Criminal intelligence may 
be indexed by any topic which would benefit 
the investigative needs of a given office. 

When an investigation is initiated, the 
criminal intelligence files are checked for 
information regarding offenders, victims, 
witnesses, modus operandi, similar offenses, 
and, perhaps, even locale. And while 
working on the case, the investigator must 



remain aware of the value of continuing to 
cross-check leads or other aspects of the case 
against the available criminal intelligence. 
When an investigation is complete, and the 
investigator drafts his report of 
investigation, he makes a last review of the 
criminal intelligence. This action will ensure 
the thoroughness of the report. And it will 
allow criminal intelligence gained in the 
investigation to be checked against any 
unsolved cases and, perhaps, aid in solving 
them. 

When acting on a request for criminal 
intelligence the investigator coordinates 
with the local Freedom of Information Act 
officer. The right to obtain information and 
the right to refuse to release information are 
limited by regulation and by the Privacy Act 
and the Freedom of Information Act. 
AR 340-17 gives guidance on USACIDC and 
MP law enforcement criminal intelligence 
systems. It exempts some law enforcement 
investigative files from disclosure. These 
files include source files and investigative 
working files. 

As a participant in the criminal 
intelligence process, the investigator must 
understand and comply with legal and 
regulatory restrictions on collecting, 
maintaining, and releasing information. 



CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS 



Most investigations depend heavily upon 
the ability of the investigator to obtain 
criminal intelligence. The solution to many 
crimes has been the direct result of leads and 
evidence developed through interviews and 
interrogations. 



Before MPIs can hope to develop 
interviewing and interrogating skills, and 
before supervisors can guide their 
subordinates, they must know the 
fundamental techniques of interviews and 
interrogations. Basic understanding and 



FM 19-10 



153 



INVESTIGATIONS 



attitudes must precede the development of 
communications skills. 

Interviews and interrogations are an 
investigator's means of obtaining criminal 
intelligence from or about persons connected 
with an incident. Investigators interview 
persons who they believe are willing to give 
information about a case. In an interview 
they help people give, in their own manner 
and words, their account of the matter. After 
they give their account, the investigator 
reviews it with them to be clear on key 
points. Or the investigator asks questions 
to have them clearly explain matters not 
covered before, depending on the elements 
of the offense under investigation. 
Investigators may have to question a 
number of people to eet the criminal 
intelligence needed. Tney may need to 
question people who know a victim, a 
suspect, or a witness. These people can help 
investigators understand the reasons and 
actions of those involved in an incident they 
are investigating. These interviews, often 
conducted in the office, home, or place of 
business of the person being interviewed, 
rarely result in an interrogation. 
Investigators interrogate only persons 
suspected of having committed or helped 
commit an offense, or persons believed to be 
withholding criminal intelligence about an 
offense. In an interrogation investigators 
rigorously question persons unwilling to 
give the criminal intelligence they are 
seeking. They avoid interrogating anyone 
who can be successfully interviewed. 

Investigators may find that some persons 
questioned are only "distracters." They have 
no real connection with the crime, but they 
seek to present criminal intelligence. They 
may be publicity seekers who say they 
witnessed the crime. Or they may be 
emotionally disturbed persons claiming 
involvement in the crime. Despite the 
distraction these people create, investigators 
should not ignore them. Investigators must 
make every effort to handle these persons so 
that neither the investigation nor the 
reputation of the armed forces suffers. 



Investigators listen to their stories. They 
check wnat the people say in relation to the 
known facts. Then they take the necessary 
action. 

Procedures for preparing, planning, and 
conducting interviews and interrogations 
are found in FM 19-20. 

Every investigation involves the 
gathering of evidence, both physical and 
testimonial. The collection and evaluation of 
physical evidence is an important part of the 
MPI's job. However, without interpersonal 
communication, the items of physical 
evidence have little or no practical value. It 
is through communication with other 
individuals that background data, giving 
evidence meaning, are obtained. Therefore, 
it is important that MPIs become effective 
communicators. The military investigators 
will find that a heavy percentage of the work 
load will be directly related to the gathering, 
evaluating, and recording of criminal 
intelligence resulting from interviews and 
interrogations. The questioning of suspects, 
witnesses, complainants, victims, and 
informants is the investigative procedure 
most frequently used by police officers. As a 
result or these activities, the investigative 
supervisor will find that the majority of the 
work load will consist of evaluating 
interview and interrogation results. 

It is essential to the investigative process 
that the MPI supervisor ensures that during 
and immediately following an interview, 
MPI personnel strive to evaluate the 
individual interviewed, any criminal 
intelligence obtained, and the investigator's 
performance. These evaluation steps must be 
accomplished to ensure that complete and 
accurate reports are subsequently written. 
For example, the number of false com- 
plaints, especially in cases of sex crimes, is 
very high; victims of thefts often exaggerate; 
homosexuals will, at times, name other 
homosexuals with whom they have had 
contact or nonhomosexuals whom they 
dislike for another reason. Eyewitness 
accounts are frequently not reliable, and no 



154 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



two witnesses are likely to give the same 
account of an incident. If they do, the 
investigator should scrutinize the 
information carefully and make certain that 
deception has not occurred. The investigator 
who is conscientious about improving his or 
her ability to interview persons successfully 
evaluates performance during and after each 
interview or interrogation. An evaluation 
should include approach, manner, and 
success of the interview. This procedure is 
particularly necessary when the investigator 
has been successful in obtaining from the 
individual all the criminal intelligence that 
was believed to be available. When a suspect 
confesses and a written statement has been 
completed, it can be of great assistance in 
engaging the suspect in casual conversation 
and asking him what was said or done that 
caused him to confess. Through use of such 
means, the investigator can improve 
knowledge and techniques each time an 
interview is conducted. 

Not only does the investigator have an 
enormous responsibility, but the investi- 
gative supervisor must assure that the 
procedures are being effectively applied by 



their investigators and that all necessary 
criminal intelligence relating to the 
investigation is being obtained. Therefore, it 
is important that Mrls and their supervisors 
know how to effectively conduct themselves 
in interview and interrogation situations 
and how to evaluate the criminal 
intelligence obtained. 

A criminal surprised and apprehended in 
the act of committing a crime is sometimes 
interviewed at the scene while still under 
considerable emotional strain. Properly 
handled, this interview may often produce 
an admission or confession that will help to 
establish the guilt of the criminal and other 
accomplices. These instances, however, are 
rare. Normally the interview is conducted at 
the MP investigation section, either in an 
interrogation room or in individual 
investigative offices, where the emotional 
feelings of guilt have to be cultivated by the 
investigator using established techniques. 
The proper environment for this type of 
interview is just as essential as the skills of 
the investigator. (Refer to FM 19-20 for 
complete discussion of interviews and 
interrogations.) 



OBJECTIVES OF INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS 



INTERVIEWS 

Investigators interview persons who are 
willing to give information. The aims or 
goals include— 

D GATHERING INFORMATION 

DEVELOPING LEADS 

AIDING IN LOCATING PROPERTY 

ASSISTING IN CLEARING SUSPECTS 

VERIFYING SUSPICIONS 

CONDUCTING INTERROGATIONS 

o GATHERING CRIMINAL INTELLI- 
GENCE NEEDS 



INTERROGATIONS 

Investigators interrogate only persons 
suspected of having committed or helped 
commit an offense. The aims or goals 
include— 

a LEARNING THE TRUTH 

D OBTAINING AN ADMISSION OF GUILT 

D RECOVERING EVIDENCE /PROPERTY 

D DISCOVERING CRIMES 

D OBTAINING ALL THE FACTS 

□ ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION 

a DEVELOPING CRIMINAL INTELLI- 
GENCE INFORMATION 



FM 19-10 



155 



INVESTIGATIONS 



Depending on the situation at the time, 
many locations are used as appropriate 
facilities for interviewing individuals 
having knowledge of an incident being 
investigated. However, when interrogating, 
the best facility to use is an interrogation 
room to ensure that the proper psychological 
atmosphere exists. The following guidance 
should be followed: 

• If any type of recording equipment is 
employed, the interviewer must follow the 
procedures in FM 19-20. 

• Desks, tables, and other furniture should 
be located neither where they will impair 
the interviewer's observation of the 
subject, nor where they will constitute a 
psychological or physical barrier to the 
communication between the interviewer 
and subject. 



• If a telephone must be installed in the 
office being used as an interrogation 
room, the interviewer should arrange for 
incoming calls to be transferred to 
another telephone. 

Every MP investigation section should 
possess at least one interrogation room of 
the type just described. If the section does 
not possess such an interrogation room, 
individual offices will have to be used until a 
facility is constructed. The individual 
investigator's offices should conform to the 
guidance just discussed if possible. The most 
important factor for the office interrogation 
room or individual investigator's office is the 
uninterrupted privacy of the facility to 
ensure that the individual being interviewed 
will not be distracted and will be able to 
concentrate on the conversation. 



PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE AND COVERT OPERATIONS 



As investigators develop their special 
skills they may be called on to work on a 
surveillance or covert operation. 
Surveillances and covert operations are 
undertaken to learn about a suspect's 
activities and relationships. In these 
operations investigators attempt to watch 
suspects or associate with them without 
their becoming aware of police interest. But 
for the operations to be successful, the 
investigators conducting them must be 
trained and experienced. And sometimes 
they must have special skills. They may 
even take on entirely different identities. 
There may be total, and in some cases 
dangerous, involvement of the investigators. 
Because of this, surveillances and covert 
operations are used only if there is no other 
way that will work as well to get needed 
criminal intelligence. 

SURVEILLANCES 

Police surveillance is the systematic 
observation of persons, places, or things to 
get criminal intelligence. Surveillant make 
notes of actions they see performed by 
subjects under surveillance. If there is more 



than one surveillant, the notes can be 
compared for accuracy. Normally, 
surveillance deals with persons. Places and 
things are watched if they relate to people or 
missions. Surveillance can provide 
information about a person's activities. It 
can show where persons under surveillance 
go. Or it can show where criminal activity 
takes place. It can verify the reliability of a 
source's information. (FM 19-20 discusses 
surveillance operations in detail.) 

COVERT OPERATIONS 

A covert operation is an investigative 
process where the investigators use pretexts 
and disguises in order to get as close as 
possible to suspects, their associates, and 
criminal activity. An important purpose of a 
covert operation is to obtain circumstantial 
evidence. 

While all investigations do not require a 
covert operation, a number of investigations 
depend primarily on investigators operating 
in a covert status to some degree. An 
investigator may be put in a covert status to 
determine if a crime is being planned or has 
been committed, to determine the location of 



156 



FM 19-10 



INVESTIGATIONS 



the crime, and to identify persons involved 
in the crime. Probable cause can be 
developed by the investigator so that 
apprehension warrants and search warrants 
can be obtained when necessary. 

The first step in the planning process for a 
covert operation is to determine if a covert 
operation is needed. The needs may be 
identified through a number of actions such 
as— 

• Criminal intelligence. 

• Liaison with other agencies. 

• Observations. 

• Crime prevention. 

• Statistics. 

Liaison is a must when coordinating a 
covert operation. If relationships are baa, it 
will be difficult to obtain good results from 
the operation. A covert operation, in most 
cases, requires coordination with the SJA, 
federal investigative agencies, and civil 
authorities. 

The number of investigators required for a 
covert operation must be determined. A 
covert operation may last for a long period of 
time. Therefore, investigators selected must 
not be scheduled for PCS, TDY, or to go on 
leave. 



On occasion, it may be advantageous for 
the covert investigator to use public 
transportation such as buses, trains, taxis, 
or subways. However, during most covert 
investigations, the investigator is provided a 
vehicle of some type. The means of 
transportation chosen is tailored to the 
selected cover identity of the investigator as 
well as the nature of the operation. The type 
vehicle chosen will vary according to tne 
operation. 

Weapons are carried by a covert 

investigator when there is imminent danger 
or if an apprehension might be necessary. If 
an investigator is to carry a weapon, it is a 
nonstandard issue-type weapon. 

The carrying of any type of illegal weapon, 
such as a switchblade knife, by a covert 
investigator is not authorized without prior 
approval. Prior approval must be obtained in 
writing from appropriate military or civil 
authorities or both. 

An investigator must be provided 
communication equipment and a point of 
contact. At a minimum, the investigator 
must be provided a telephone and a 24-hour 
contact point, preferably another 
investigator or supervisor. The investigator 
does not go through official channels such as 



INVESTIGATOR CHARACTERISTICS FOR PERFORMING 
COVERT OPERATIONS 



□ Be experienced. 

□ Have the ability to work with others. 
O Be able to handle fear. 

O Dress as the mission requires. 

D Know what personal possessions he has and 
be aware that certain possessions might 
identify him as a covert investigator. 

a Be able to speak the language of the area. 

D Know that his morals and integrity will 
constantly be tested. 



D Have common sense. 

O Use good judgment. 

D Have self-confidence. 

D Be intelligent. 

D If necessary, know street terminology. 

D Have pride in his work. 

D Have the ability to listen. 

□ Be physically fit. 

□ Be able to control his emotions. 



FM 19-10 



157 



INVESTIGATIONS 



the MP desk sergeant unless it is an 

emergency. 

An investigator must keep his background 
story as close as possible to his actual 
history. This makes it easier for the 
investigator to remember the background 
story, and it also prevents mistakes that 
might occur. 

The investigator must memorize his 
background story to prevent the story from 
changing if questioned by different members 
of the criminal element. An investigator 
must assume that criminals will try to trick 
him to find out if he is the person he claims 
to be. An investigator must always 
anticipate questions that the criminal 
element might ask. The criminal element 
will ask questions, knowing the correct 
answers, to see if the investigator is telling 



the truth. The investigator must never admit 
to the criminal element to being an MP. 

Once a background story is presented to 
the criminal element, it is not unusual for the 
criminal element to check out the story. The 
investigator must ensure that data are 
maintained in offices where the background 
story might be checked. 

If apprehended, the investigator must 
have specific instructions on what to do. The 
investigator never identifies himself as an 
MP in the apprehension unless there is 
reason to believe that he will be hurt by the 
authorities. Once at the jail, the investigator 
must tell the jailer that he is a covert 
investigator. The investigator must know of 
a name of a police official, other than the 
police chief, whom the jailer might 
recognize. 



158 



FM 19-10 



PART FOUR 
CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



The Military Police Corps' role in the 
confinement of US military prisoners is an 
integral part of the MP law and order 
mission. MP confinement operations assist 
in maintaining discipline and unit strength. 
The confinement of soldiers who transgress 
the laws and regulations of the military helps 
commanders ensure that discipline is upheld. 

MP are responsible for the confinement of 
US military prisoners in both wartime and 
peacetime environments. 

Military police detain, confine, protect, and 
sustain US military prisoners. MP evacuate 
prisoners when it is necessary. MP play a 
major role in the Army's correctional system 
for US military prisoners. From detention to 
confinement and correctional treatment, MP 



carry out Army policy by ensuring that 
persons held in Army custody are accorded 
humane care and treatment. The means, 
methods, and facilities used to carry out this 
operation differ with the environment. But 
the MP's just exercise of custody and control 
and their humane treatment of prisoners 
remains a constant. 

Military police participation in the Army's 
confinement and correctional system — 

• Assists the commander in maintaining 
good order and discipline in the armed 
forces. 

• Promotes efficiency and effectiveness in 
the military criminal justice establishment. 

• Strengthens the national security of the US. 




FM 19-10 



159 



CHAPTER 16 
Field Confinement of US Military Prisoners 



On the battlefield MP provide for the 
temporary confinement and swift 
evacuation of US military prisoners. MP 
confinement operations parallel, but are 
separate from, the MP EPw internment and 
evacuation system. Members of the US 
armed forces cannot be confined in 
immediate association with enemy prisoners 
of war, civilian internees, detainees, or other 
foreign nationals who are not members of 
the US armed forces. 

On the battlefield MP operate field 
detention facilities (FDFs) and field con- 





CONTENTS 




Page 
160 




OPERATING FIELD DETENTION 
FACILITIES 








161 


OPERATING FIELD CONFINEMENT 
FACILITIES 


EXPEDITING DISPOSITION! 


162 



finement facilities (FCFs). When the 
decision is made by the theater army 

commander that prisoners are to be retained 
in theater, FDFs may be set up in the combat 
zone and an FCF may be set up in the 
communications zone (COMMZ) . 



OPERATING FIELD DETENTION FACILITIES 



Military police use FDFs in the combat 
zone. FDFs are temporary facilities set up to 
detain soldiers placed in custody. FDFs are 
used to hold soldiers in custody only until 
they can be tried and sentenced to 
confinement and evacuated from the area. 

Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial 
remain in their units. Only when they 
present a hazard to the mission, themselves, 
or others are they placed in pretrial 
confinement and detained by MP. MP 
companies assigned to corps and 
TAACOMS are responsible for the detention 
of US military prisoners in their areas of 
operation. Convicted military prisoners are 
moved when possible to confinement 
facilities outside the area of operations. 

In the combat zone, US military prisoners 
are detained in two ways. They may be 
placed under the control or a squad or a team 
already performing another operation, such 
as an EPW collecting point or a TCP. Or they 
may be placed in a separate, temporary FDF. 
When small numbers of US prisoners are on 
hand, the squad operating the EPW 



collecting point can best take on 
responsibility for US prisoners. But military 
prisoners must be physically separated from 
EPWs. When large numbers exist, an MP 
team or squad may be given the mission to 
set up a detention facility. The PM decides 
when a detention facility is needed. The PM 
plans the detention or US prisoners and 
assigns the mission to the company 
commander. The company commander tasks 
an MP element to perform this operation, or 
he coordinates the removal of the prisoners 
to a corps detention facility. If there are 
many prisoners in the company's area of 
operations, a confinement team may be 
required to set up a temporary detention 
facility in the division area. 

Unit commanders are encouraged to use 
unit assets to detain soldiers accused of 
crimes as long as feasible. But they may 
take them to an FDF if this is necessary. 
Procedures are provided in commanders' 
policies for detaining and confining soldiers. 
If it is not feasible for the unit commander to 
retain control, MP will temporarily detain 
the prisoners. 



160 



FM 19-10 



CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



Either a team or a squad can operate an 
FDF, A team operating a detention facility 
may organize so that the team leader 
controls me operation and spells the guards, 
and the other team members perform guard 
duty in alternating 12-hour shifts. When 
operating an FDF, MP sign a receipt for each 
prisoner on DD Form 629 and for the 
prisoner's property on DA Form 4137. 
Policies and procedures on the care and 
treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding 
of the prisoners' personal effects apply to 
FDFs to the same extent that they apply to 
other Army confinement facilities. The 
physical criteria for housing the facility in 
permanent and temporary structures are 
basically similar. Maximum use should be 
made of existing structures to house 
confinement facilities. If a tent is used, it 
should not be smaller than the general 
purpose medium tent. Field expedient 
facilities must be approved by the Medical 



Corps Officer, who also conducts periodic 
inspections. 

Plans for establishing an FDF should 
include the following list of equipment and 
supplies which represents minimum 

requirements: 

• Barbed wire— roll. 

• Barbed wire— concertina. 

• Fence posts. 

• Gates and doors. 

• Floodlights and spotlights, complete with 
wiring. 

• Emergency generator. 

• Mess equipment and equipment for 
cleaning mess gear. 

• Water cans and /or lister bag. 

• Typewriters. 

• First aid equipment and supplies. 

• Spare clothing and bedding. 



OPERATING FIELD CONFINEMENT FACILITIES 



Convicted US military prisoners are 
usually only held for a short time in a theater 
of operations. Then they are evacuated for 
correctional treatment out of theater. 
However, they can be confined in theater if 
circumstances warrant. 

An FCF is maintained within the theater 
of operations when the prisoner population 
requires it, the distance to CONUS is too 
great, or the lack of transportation to 
evacuate prisoners to CONUS demands it. A 
separate MP confinement battalion is 
assigned to the Personnel Command 
(PERSCOM) to support the theater of 
operation's confinement of US military 
prisoners. It provides the theater with 
trained confinement personnel. And it 

Brovides a place capable of handling 1,500 
TS military prisoners. 

Military police temporarily confine 
soldiers in custody in tactical situations in 



an FCF. FCFs are used to hold soldiers in 
custody only until they can be evacuated to a 
correctional facility. An FCF can be a 
temporary, semipermanent, or permanent 
structure located in the COMMZ. Policies 
and procedures on the care and treatment of 
prisoners and the safeguarding of prisoners' 
personal effects apply to FCFs to the same 
extent that they apply to Army confinement 
facilities in peacetime environments. 

Although conditions within an FCF may 
be austere, military prisoners of the US 
forces are given the benefit of shelter and 
sustenance like that provided duty soldiers 
in the area of operations. The MP 
confinement battalion commander selects 
the general location of the confinement 
facility. The battalion commander must 
ensure the location of an FCF is not adjacent 
to the base perimeter, ammunition supply 
point, or any other area where the safety of 
the prisoners is imperiled. 



FM 19-10 

161-016 O-94-ll 



161 



CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



The MP confinement battalion com- 
mander is the FCF commander and 
maintains command and control of the 
facility. Battalion HQ is assigned a number 
of MP guard companies to confine, protect, 
sustain, and evacuate US military prisoners. 
Confinement teams are deployed within the 
combat zone for pretrial detention purposes 
only as needed. 



EXPEDITING DISPOSITION 

The command PM seeks to expedite 
actions involving military prisoners in 
pretrial confinement as well as those who 
'iave been sentenced. Coordination with the 
JSACIDC field element is undertaken to 
prioritize and expedite investigations on 
those persons held in pretrial confinement. 
And continuing coordination with Corps 
Support Command administrative services 
elements and transportation elements is 
necessary. When possible, prompt action is 
taken to ensure sentenced prisoners are 
expeditiously evacuated to the rear. Military 
prisoners are moved from corps detention 
facilities through the COMMZ confinement 
facility to confinement and correctional 
facilities in CONUS with a minimum of 
delay. The confinement facility commander, 
if one is required in a COMM^, coordinates 
with the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
PERSCOM, to ensure prompt administra- 
tive action. Assets of the Transportation 
Command must be requested to support 
movement of military prisoners from corps 
to COMMZ and from COMMZ to CONUS. 
Coordination is made with TAACOM 
elements to provide subsistence for those 
military prisoners kept within a COMMZ for 
brief periods. Close and continuous 
coordination is maintained between the PM 
and the Commander, Medical Command. 
This facilitates the security and segregation 
of military prisoners undergoing medical 
treatment or being evacuated through 
medical channels. 



PROVIDES 

TEMPORARY 

DETENTION OF 

SOLDIERS TURNED 

OVER TO MP FROM 

UNITS IN THE 

COMBAT ZONE 



•XX* 



PROVIDES 

DETENTION OF 

SOLDIERS AWAITING 

COURTMARTIALAND 

POSTTRIAL PRISONERS 

AWAITING EVACUATION 

FROM THE COMBAT ZONE 

TO THE FIELD CONFINEMENT 

FACILITY IN THE COMMZ 



'XXX- 



PROVIDES CONFINEMENT 

OF RESTORABLE 

PRISONERS IN THEATER TO 

BE RETURNED TO DUTY AND 

NONRESTORABLE PRISONERS 

AWAITING EVACUATION 



f fEVACUATION OF NONRESTORABLE 
5 / PRISONERS FROM THEATER TO 
O f CONUS FACILITY FOR 

CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 



162 



FM 19-10 



CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



US MILITARY PRISONER DETENTION, CONFINEMENT, AND EVACUATION 

ill llllllllllllll 

A $ X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X X X 

-LxXxlxlx- -xXxXx^xi-xlxi x i-xix4xix 

-1 ^PRISONERS I V \ \ 



DIVISION FORWARD 




CONF 
TEAM 



CONF 
TEAM 



►XX 



>xxx 




XX- 



CONF 
TEAM 



CONF 
TEAM 



•XX 




DIVISION CENTRAL 

FIELD DETENTION 

FACILITY 



XX« 



CONF 
TEAM 



CORPS 

FIELD 

DETENTION 

FACILITY 



—XXX 



Ai. 



PERSCOM 



MP 
CONF BN 





MP GUARD 
CO 



THEATER OF OPERATIONS 

FIELD CONFINEMENT 

FACILITY 

1,500 CAPACITY 

EACH BN 

3 GUARD CO ASSIGNED 



OOOO' 




FM 19-10 



163 



CHAPTER 17 
Installation Confinement and US Army Correctional Facilities 



O utside a theater of operations the MP 
accomplish the confinement of US military 
prisoners through their operation of the 
Army's correctional system. The long-range 
goal of the Army correctional system is to 
help as many prisoners as possible become 
responsible, productive citizens when 
released to civilian life or returned to 
military duty. The philosophy of the Army 
correctional system is to administer 
discipline on a corrective rather than a 
punitive basis. The services and programs 
employed by the Army correctional system 
are designed to prepare prisoners for return 
to civilian life or to military duty, whichever 
is prescribed by the needs of the Army. This 
philosophy governs all phases of 
confinement ana correctional treatment. The 
Army correctional system provides for the 
differing confinement needs of persons held 
for short, medium, and long periods. It does 
this by maintaining a three-tiered 
correctional system. 

At the local level are the installation 
confinement facilities (ICFs), which hold 
pretrial detainees and short-term posttrial 
prisoners. Army ICFs provide limited 
services and custodial supervision. On the 
second and third levels are the US Army 
Correctional Activity (USACA) and the US 
Disciplinary Barracks (USDd). Both the 
USACA and the USDB are full-scale 
correctional facilities. Although the mission 
at all levels of the Army correctional system 
is to confine US prisoners and to provide 





CONTENTS 


Page 




INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT 
FACILITIES 


164 


US ARMY CONFINEMENT AND 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES . . 


166 









correctional treatment, the mission 
emphasis differs at each level. The 
differences in mission emphasis are based 
on the length of time prisoners are to be 
confined and the facilities and services such 
confinement requires. 

The MP mission of confining US military 
prisoners is accomplished by maintaining 
prisoners in custody and under control. MP 
maintain custody of US military prisoners 
from the moment of custody to final release. 
The maintenance of custody and control is 
the basic purpose for which MP operate the 
Army's confinement and correctional 
facilities. Facility personnel achieve and 
maintain custody and control of prisoners by 
employing a number of custody and control 
measures. Prisoners are subject to custody 
and control measures 24 hours a day in all 
aspects of their lives in confinement both 
inside and outside the facility. 

To maintain custody, limits are placed on 
prisoners' freedom of movement. Custody is 
maintained within a facility by the presence 
of guards, walls, fences, protective lighting, 
alarms, and locking devices. Custody is 
maintained outside a facility by the presence 
of guards or supervisors. 



INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT FACILITIES 



MP operate ICFs to confine pretrial 
detainees, posttrial prisoners awaiting 
transfer to another facility, and prisoners 
serving short-term, sentences. Accused 
prisoners in pretrial confinement are 



informed of the nature of the offenses for 
which they are being confined. This is done 
at the time the prisoner is confined. 
Individuals are accepted for confinement 
only on receipt of a court-martial order, a 



164 



FM 19-10 



CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



ORGANIZATION OF INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT FACILITIES 



COMMANDER 



SENIOR 
CORRECTIONS NCO 



PRISONER 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SERVICES BRANCH 



RECORDS 
ADMINISTRATION 
PROCESSING AND 
POSTAL SECTION 



PROPERTY 

AND FUNDS 

SECTION 



SUPPLY 
SECTION 



FOOD SERVICE 
SECTION 



COUNSELING 

AND 

EVALUATION 

SECTION 



CORRECTIONAL 

SUPERVISION 

BRANCH 



CORRECTIONAL 

SUPERVISOR 

SECTION 



PRISONER 
GUARD 
SECTION 



valid DD Form 497 (Confinement Order) or a 
report of the result of a trial. Specific 
procedures for pretrial restraint and pretrial 
confinement can be found in the MCM Rules 
for Courts-Martial 304 and 305 and local 
supplements to AR 27-10. 

The staffs at ICFS provide administrative 
services, custodial supervision, and limited 
counseling. Other important ICF functions 
include screening prisoners for transfer to 
another facility, processing prisoners whose 
adjudged punitive discharge is ordered, and 
coordinating with the installation Adjutant 
General (AG) for the reassignment of 



prisoners when they are released from 

confinement. 

Installation PMs are responsible for staff 
supervision of the operation and 
administration of ICFS. They also are 
responsible for the custody and control of 
prisoners confined in hospitalized-prisoner 
wards. The installation PM guides and 
assists the facility commander and his staff 
in training the prisoners and the staff, 
implementing emergency plans, and 
obtaining people, equipment, and supplies to 
operate the facility. The installation rM also 
is responsible for ensuring that prisoners 
receive proper medical care. 



FM 19-10 



165 



CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS 



ICFs are arranged with the primary goal 
of safely controlling detainees and prisoners. 
Special consideration is given to cells and 
living quarters, fire protection devices, and 
locking devices. ICFs must meet specific 
requirements for location, site, and the 
amount of space allotted for confinement 
areas in which prisoners are quartered. The 
inmate population is segregated into 
detainees, enlisted prisoners, and officer 
prisoners. Each group is further segregated 
by sex. Workshops and recreation areas are 
constructed in facilities large enough to 
accommodate them. All ICFs must meet the 
physical requirements for the confinement of 
both sexes (see AR 190-47 for details). 

Usually the prisoner capacity of a facility 
is based on 1 percent of the troop strength of 
the area being served. In some cases, the 
prisoner population of a facility may be very 
small, or the size, location, or troop strength 
of an installation may not warrant a facility. 
Under such circumstances and when the 
installation commander so decides, 
prisoners of one service may be confined in 
confinement facilities operated by another 
service. The services coordinate a local 
written agreement. The agreement is called 



an interservice support agreement (ISA). It 
is based on the particular needs of the 
services in the area the facility serves. The 
rules, regulations, laws, and procedures that 
apply to the confinement of Army prisoners 
also apply to the confinement of members of 
the other services. (See FM 19-60 for a 
complete discussion of ICFs.) 

When access to an ICF is not available, 
military prisoners may be temporarily 
confined in federally approved local, county 
or city jails or in MP detention cells. For a 
detailed discussion of temporary confine- 
ment of military prisoners, see AR 190-47. 

In a peacetime environment PMs of 
tactical units tenanted on an installation 
(refer to FM 19-60 for configuration 
information/requirements) exercise staff 
supervision over confinement facilities that 
are set up by the units in the field. When in 
garrison and when facilities are provided by 
the installation on which the tactical unit is 
stationed, tactical unit PMs advise their 
commanders and staffs on current policies 
and procedures pertaining to prisoners. 
Tactical unit PMs also maintain liaison with 
the installation PM. 



US ARMY CONFINEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 



The US Army operates two "permanent'' 
full-scale correctional facilities. The 
missions and functions of the USACA and 
the USDB are similar. Both facilities provide 
a safe, secure environment in which to 
confine prisoners. At both facilities the 
mission emphasis is on correctional 
treatment and educational and vocational 
training. And both facilities are staffed with 
carefully selected, well-qualified 
correctional, supervisory, and professional 
personnel. The USDB and USACA provide 
the professional evaluation, counseling, 
training, custody, and personnel 
administration needed to prepare inmates 
for return to civilian life or military duty. 
The USDB, however, because it confines 
long-term prisoners, can and does provide 



specialized correctional programs. For more 
information on USDB and USACA, see FM 
19-60. 

Although federal civilian penal institu- 
tions are not a part of the Army correctional 
system they are sometimes used by the 
military to confine prisoners. Military 
prisoners whose disciplinary and 
adjustment records indicate a need for the 
treatment available in a federal penal 
institution may be so confined. Military 
prisoners who are to be confined in a federal 
institution are first confined at the USDB. 
From there they are transferred to the 
federal institution. For further guidance on 
procedures involving federal penal 
institutions, see AR 190-47. 



166 



FM 19-10 



PART FIVE 
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



Terrorists employ the calculated use of 
violence or threat of violence to attain 

Eolitical, religious, or ideological goals, 
ecause military personnel and military 
police serve as protectors of society, terrorists 
consider them to be their adversaries. 
Terrorists believe successful attacks against 
military targets show the vulnerability of the 
established society. They also believe 
successful attacks help show terrorism to be a 
means of effective change. Throughout the 
world the MP endeavor to ensure that US 
Army personnel and facilities are perceived 
as undesirable targets. 

Terrorists are extremely dedicated and 
must not be underrated. They are formidable 
adversaries. The use of terrorist tactics 
worldwide has increased over the years, and 
this upward trend is not expected to abate in 
the near future. Terrorists are becoming more 
daring, ruthless, and willing to eo to violent 
extremes to accomplish tneir goals. 
Terrorists prefer operations that have a high 
probability of success and escape. But terrorists 
may choose a hardened, well-defended target, 
especially if success is likely and if they 
can justify the end result as worth the risk. 

Terrorist groups have active cadres who 
train other terrorists. These trainers 
emphasize tactics that have been proven 
successful. Terrorists reconnoiter and 
maintain extensive surveillance to gather 
detailed intelligence. They plan and renearse 
their attacks. The trainers teach measures to 
counter response actions and innovations. 
And as governments take action to counter 
terrorism, terrorist organizations often alter 
their tactics. 

The many existing terrorist organizations 
constitute a threat for both peacetime and 
wartime. The probability of terrorism and 
other acts of sabotage and subversion is 
heightened during periods of hostilities. 



Terrorism can be a means for a nation to 
project power. Terrorism may be used to 
exhaust or deplete another nation's will or the 
resources or its armed forces. Terrorism, 
when used to cause governments to react 
repressively, can foment feelings of hatred 
toward government leaders and institutions. 

The structure of most terrorist groups 
prevents intelligence sources from 
infiltrating. But it is known that terrorist 
cadres often carry out orders from higher 
level leaders. And the groups are often 
maintained by strong political support. 
Terrorist groups are capable of diverting 
resources and disrupting the operations of 
government agencies using only a few 
persons and small amounts of equipment. In 
time of war, it is expected that these groups 
will use their skills, resources, and terror 
tactics to further their objectives. 

The MP role in terrorism counteraction is 
clear: prevent when possible, respond and 
resolve when required. In both peace and war 
MP deter, deny, detect, delay, and respond to 
terrorist attacks. On the battlefield MP help 
protect units and facilities against the Level I 
threat of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and 
enemy forces as part of their area security 
mission. (See FM 19-4 for details on MP 
terrorism counteraction on the battlefield.) 

In peacetime MP help protect personnel, 
equipment, and facilities against spies, 
saboteurs, and terrorists as part of their law 
and order mission. Terrorism always entails 
criminal activity. Terrorist goals are 
achieved through intimidation, coercion, and 
instilling fear. Terrorist groups often hold 
hostages or undertake kidnappings to obtain 
material or political demands. Common 
terrorist tactics include bombings, hijack- 
ings, arson, and ambush. MP undertake 
peacetime terrorism counteraction to help 
suppress crime and maintain order. 



FM 19-10 



167 



CHAPTER 18 
Planning Terrorism Counteraction 



At Army installations worldwide, 
terrorism counteraction is being planned, 
practiced, assessed, updated, and carried out. 
Ideally, the total Army community helps 
develop and implement installation plans for 
terrorism counteraction. And MP are 
involved extensively. MP help develop and 
they can help implement both the 
antiterrorism and the counterterrorism 
components of terrorism counteraction. 



CONTENTS 


Page 


|ANTITERRORISM| 


168 




Collecting Intelligence and 
Analvzine Vulnerabilities . . 


168 


Taking Preventive Measures 


169 


ICOUNTERTERRORISMl 


171 




Lead- Agency Concept 


172 


Response Operations 




172 


Response Operations Within 
Host Nations 


173 







ANTITERRORISM 



Antiterrorism measures are developed to 
reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. They 
are used to prevent or to defend against 
terrorist acts. Antiterrorism measures are 
used to defend US personnel, equipment, and 
facilities. They may be used to defend allied 
personnel and facilities, but such use must be 
specifically requested and approved. MP 
antiterrorism measures include collecting 
intelligence, analyzing vulnerabilities, and 
taking preventive measures. And MP are 
active in installation antiterrorism planning. 
The PM, his representative, or his staff- 

• Participates in the development and 

periodic update of the installation's Threat 
Assessment. 

• Develops the installation's physical 
security plan and crime prevention plan. 

• Conducts appropriate inspections, 

surveys, and vulnerability assessments. 

• Participates in the overall assessment of 
installation vulnerabilities. 

• Coordinates with USACIDC for personal 
security vulnerability analysis of nigh-risk 
personnel. 

• Participates in designating mission 
essential vulnerable areas (MEVA) and 
the orientation of planned protection for 
these areas. 



• Reviews antiterrorism programs to ensure 
OPSEC programs and the like developed 
by other agencies on the installation 
complement those developed by the PM 
office. 

• Participates in developing memorandums 
of understanding with federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies. 

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE AND 
ANALYZING VULNERABILITIES 

Obtaining intelligence and analyzing 
vulnerabilities are prerequisites to planning 
preventive measures. A well-planned, 
systematic, all-source intelligence program is 
essential to knowing the threat. The role of 
intelligence is to identify and quantify the 
threat. It also provides a timely evaluation of 
terrorist capabilities, tactics, and targets. As 
knowledge is gained, a threat assessment can 
begin. All available information is examined 
to develop intelligence indicators of future 
terrorist activities. Analyzing the threat is an 
essential step in preventing or reducing 
vulnerability to terrorist acts. 

Intelligence activities in terrorism 

counteraction are a team effort. Many federal 
agencies are actively involved in countering 
terrorism. These agencies provide technical 



168 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



support and evaluation. And they share 
information. And controlled liaison with 
civilian and HN police and intelligence 
agencies is essential. Exchanging 
information prevents duplication of effort 
and reduces the likelihood of compromising 
ongoing intelligence collection efforts. 

US Army Intelligence and Security 
Command (INSCOM) is the lead Army 
agency for Army, foreign, and counter- 
intelligence activities against terrorism. 
INSCOM coordinates with appropriate US 
and HN agencies when initiating any 
intelligence activity. It also provides overall 
direction and coordination for the Army 
counterintelligence effort. Local INSCOM 
offices provide area coverage at all levels of 
command. The Intelligence and Threat 
Analysis Center (IT AC) is an agency of 
INSCOM. It disseminates specific threat 
warnings to applicable commands and 
activities. Periodic regional threat packets 
are provided to supported commands and 
activities. On request, ITAC provides current 
intelligence data on terrorist groups and 
individuals. 

The MP serve as a major source of 
information in support of terrorism 
counteraction. Terrorists violate the law 
when they commit terrorist acts. MP agencies 
maintain information on known criminal 
incidents within their jurisdiction. (See 
section on criminal intelligence earlier in 
text.) This information is of vital interest to 
intelligence efforts. MP activities and 
USACIDC units collect and evaluate 
criminal intelligence. Local units and higher 
headquarters coordinate the development 
and dissemination of information. 
USACIDC disseminates terrorist-related 
information to installation and activity 
commanders within the affected area and to 
INSCOM. 

Successful efforts to counter terrorism 
depend on successfully providing com- 
manders timely, user-specific information of 
the terrorist threat. Integrating information 
provided by civilian, military, and 
governmental agencies produces a 



composite. This permits a commander to see 
what is happening or is about to happen and 
to plan accordingly. 

Coordination of information among MP 
units, USACIDC area offices, military 
intelligence units, and civilian police 
agencies is active. In the US, Mr and 
USACIDC field offices exchange infor- 
mation and intelligence with installation 
security and INSCOM elements. Outside the 
US, liaison is conducted by MP, USACIDC, 
and INSCOM elements with HN and allied 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
Liaison is conducted in accordance with 
SOFAs. Regardless of locale, any 
information and intelligence exchange 
includes briefing the local commander. And 
wherever located, MP elements, in 
coordination with military intelligence 
elements, investigate and report illegal 
terrorist acts against the US Army. They also 
conduct liaison with civilian police agencies 
as required. 

TAKING PREVENTIVE MEASURES 

Properly planned preventive measures, 
when resourced and employed, reduce 
vulnerability to terrorist attack. Vul- 
nerability assessments identify existing or 
potential conditions conducive to terrorist or 
criminal activity. Physical security surveys 
and inspections, crime prevention surveys, 
personal security surveys for high-risk 
personnel, the installation vulnerability 
determination system, and OPSEC surveys 
are among the tools available to installation 
commanders /staff personnel. They are used 
to determine the vulnerability of installation 
personnel, equipment, and facilities to 
terrorist attack or criminal activity. 

The Army's programs for OPSEC, 
personnel protection, and physical security 
are all excellent means for reducing 
vulnerability. Each helps to protect 
operations, activities, installations, and 
resources from hostile exploitation. But 
maximum benefit from these measures is 
gained when all of these programs are 



FM 19-10 



169 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



implemented in concert. Each of the 
programs seeks to reduce installation 
vulnerability to criminal or hostile acts. Each 
of the programs focuses on a different level of 
vulnerability or type of risk. Thus the 
programs can complement each other. When 
all of the programs, goals, objectives, and 
requirements are integrated, a synergistic 
prevention effect is realized. This is the key to 
a strong prevention program. The effect of 
the total interaction is far greater than would 
be expected of the sum or the parts. 

OPSEC denies adversaries information 
about friendly military operations. This 
denies terrorists information about potential 
targets. Terrorists select targets that offer the 
most opportunity for success. Information 
passed unknowingly by military personnel 
and family members is used by terrorists in 
their planning efforts. OPSEC. reduces the 
availability of this information. OPSEC 
procedures— 

• Protect itineraries, travel plans, and 
personnel rosters. 

• Eliminate established patterns. 

• Protect building and facility plans, 
billeting assignments, and VIP guest lists. 

• Ensure discussion of classified or sensitive 
information only on National Security 
Agency approved, cryptographically 
secured telephone or radio circuits; for 
example, automatic secure voice 
communications system. 

• Protect personal or family information 
from nonacquaintances. 

• Coordinate physical security measures to 
protect personnel and prevent 
unauthorized access to equipment, 
facilities, materiel, and documents. 

Personnel protection measures help to 
protect personnel from criminal and terrorist 
acts. Personnel protection programs provide 
protective measures. They also create a 
threat awareness in people, especially those 
considered high-risk potential targets. 
Personnel protection includes protective 
services provided to high-risk persons by 



specially trained personnel. (See the chapter 
on protective services.) And it includes 
protective measures to be taken by the high- 
risk persons themselves. These latter 
measures help persons decrease their 
vulnerability to terrorist attack. Such 
measures reduce the likelihood of terrorist 
success. And they act as deterrents to 
terrorist activity. 

Physical security measures also protect 
and safeguard personnel from terrorist acts. 
Physical security programs mesh human 
resources and mechanical systems to 
prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
facilities, materiel, and documents. Program 
managers plan and evaluate courses of 
action that improve physical security of 
quarters, offices, and installation facilities. 
Physical security programs help deter or 
reduce the chances for successful terrorist 
attacks. They complement other installation 
programs like crime prevention and OPSEC. 
(See FM 19-30 for specific measures. See 
AR 500-50 and FM 19-15 for policy and 
guidance for the control of terrorist acts in 
civil disturbances.) 

Some antiterrorist measures are active 
defense measures. Aggressive counter- 
surveillance is fundamental to countering 
terrorism. Persons, and certainly high-risk 
persons, and installation security forces 
must be trained to be aware that 
surveillance is possible. They must 
understand the need to counter it. Tney must 
become able to detect and report it. And 
countersurveillance measures and 
equipment must be available to them. When 
gate personnel are equipped with cameras 
tney become a more effective counter- 
measure. They can photograph persons or 
vehicles suspected of surveilling an 
installation. 

High-visibility deterrent measures can 
convince terrorists they will be unable to 
accomplish their "attack sequence" of 
surveil, plan, execute, escape. Highly visible 
security forces and aggressive measures can 
convince terrorists that the security of an 



170 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



installation is too effective for them to 
succeed. If terrorists believe they cannot 
succeed, they are not as likely to attack. But 
sometimes a deterrent does not reduce the 
likelihood of attack. Instead, it may only 
cause the terrorists to change their methods 
or their target. And terrorists deterred from 
their well-defended primary target may 
decide to attack a more lightly defended 
target. Use of high-visibility measures 
requires a frequent reassessment of total 
target vulnerability. 



Providing a high level of security at all 
times is costly. Using a random application 
of measures and procedures reduces costs. 
At the same time, it reduces the 
attractiveness of the target. Terrorists 
generally want to avoid the unexpected. 
Unpredictable coverage patterns can be 
used for guard and security patrols. On a 
larger scale, varying an installation's 
operating schedule may be useful. Even just 
varying the time, day, and locale of staff 
meetings can be useful. 





TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 




ANTITERRORISM 




COUNTERTERRORISM 






PLANNING 


COLLECTING 




FOR CRISIS 


INTELLIGENCE ^^ 


^N^^ / TERRORISM IS \^ 
j^C the calculated use ~\ 
/ of violence or the \ 


^^^^ MANAGEMENT 


ANALYZING 
VULNERABILITIES 


/ threat of violence to \ 

^^^J attain political, religious, -4l 

*"1 or ideological goals. 1 

\ This is done through / 

\ intimidation, coercion, / 

\^ or instilling -^^ 


RESPONDING 
A TO TERRORIST 
INCIDENT 


TAKING ^^ 
PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES 


^^^^FV fear / ^^ 


^**w^ PERFORMING 
CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 



COUNTERTERRORISM 



Counterterrorism measures are under- 
taken to resolve terrorist incidents. Army 
policy stresses deterrence of terrorist 
incidents through preventive measures. 
However, when a terrorist incident occurs, 
military resources respond to gain control of 
the incident quickly. MP or security patrols 
on duty at the time of a terrorist incident are 
the initial response force. And the PM, his 
designated representative, or his staff 
should, as a minimum— 
• Provide input to the development of the 

installation's crisis management plan. 



Develop the special threat plan. The plan 
should include contingency plans to 
control installation access, response to 
hostage barricade situations, response to 
bombings, response to arson, and the like. 
Establish and train an SRT. 

Train selected personnel in protective 
services operations as required. 

Serve as a member of the installation's 
crisis management team (CMT). 

Serve as commander of the installation's 
threat management force (TMF). 



FM 19-10 



171 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



LEAD-AGENCY CONCEPT 

The US government terrorism 
counteraction policies are characterized by 
the lead-agency concept. Terrorist acts that 
occur within the US are managed by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ). So are acts 
within the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and US 
possessions and territories. The lead agency 
lor the operational response to a domestic 
terrorist incident is the FBI. The Federal 
Aviation Administration is the lead agency 
for actions affecting the safety of persons 
aboard aircraft in flight. ("In flight" is 
defined as that period or time beginning the 
moment all outside aircraft doors are closed 
after embarkation. It lasts until the moment 
when one such door is opened for 
disembarkation.) 

The lead agency for terrorism against US 
personnel and facilities not within the US or 
its possessions and territories and for the 
foreign relations aspects of domestic 
terrorism is the Department of State. HNs 
have responsibilities in accordance with 
international law and applicable SOFAs. 
Coordination between the US and HN 

governments is accomplished by the 
tepartment of State. 

Military personnel support the lead 
agencies in accord with federal laws or 
memorandums of agreement. Command and 
control of military forces for counterterrorist 
operations resides with the DOD. Army 
regulations require that procedures, 
guidance, and policies for the protection of 
US resources be established for all Army 
installations or activities. Such contingency 
plans must contain specifics for terrorism 
counteraction. 

The installation commander is responsible 
for command and control of installation 
resources during a terrorist incident. 
Command and control actions, however, are 
typically planned, coordinated, and directed 
by the emergency operations center (EOC). 
This center is activated immediately when 
terrorist/ special threat incidents occur. The 



EOC controls or assists in directing the 
military response and coordinates with 
higher, lower, and adjacent military 
headquarters and organizations. The CMT 
is composed of selected representatives from 
the installation staff. It is formed to assist 
the commander in controlling the incident. 
The CMT provides advice to the commander 
and the TMF through the EOC. The TMF is 
the tactical element of the EOC. The TMF 
commander has operational control of all 
installation military forces at the incident 
site. (See the chapter on special reaction 
teams for further discussion.) 

RESPONSE OPERATIONS 

Counterterrorist response operations on 
military installations within the US and its 
territories and possessions are characterized 
by three phases. The occurrence itself 
institutes the first phase. 

MP respond to isolate, contain, and 
evaluate the incident. MP — 

• Provide the initial patrol response. 

• Determine the scope of the incident. 

• Determine the motives of perpetrators. 

MP provide the initial report to the PM. If 
the incident requires it, MP direct 
inner /outer perimeter forces and implement 
the special threat plan. If the incident is 
declared to be a possible terrorist act, the 
installation terrorist threat response 
contingency plan is implemented. In such a 
case the FBI, the Army Operations Center, 
and higher headquarters are notified 
immediately. 

Phase II begins with the commitment of 
FBI or military forces from outside the 
installation. (Requests by an installation 
commander for additional military forces 
are coordinated through DA channels if the 
FBI has not assumed jurisdiction.) The FBI 
has primary jurisdiction for domestic 
terrorism. It assumes jurisdiction if the 
incident is of significant federal interest. 



172 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



Installation personnel continue under the 
direct control of the military even when the 
FBI assumes jurisdiction. The military 
provides support to the FBI based on 
provisions of the DOD and DOJ 
Memorandum of Understanding. When the 
FBI assumes jurisdiction of the incident, 
military personnel continue to support the 
FBI as needed. Command and control of 
military personnel remains with the 
military. 

The commitment of additional military 
forces by the National Command Authority 
to resolve the terrorist incident initiates 
phase III. If the FBI has jurisdiction of the 
incident, requests for these additional 
resources are accomplished through DOJ 
channels in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding between 
the DOD and DOJ. If military forces are 
committed, the secretary of defense directs 
military operations according to law 
enforcement policies determined by the 
attorney general. If the installation 
commander retains jurisdiction (no FBI 
involvement), requests for additional 
military forces are accomplished through 
DA channels. 

Upon termination of the incident, certain 
key military personnel, if requested by the 
FdI, remain at the site to protect the 
integrity of the investigative process. 
USACIDC special agents, in conjunction 
with the FBI, collect and process evidence 
for possible criminal prosecution. 
Investigation results are coordinated with 



local military intelligence elements who, in 
turn, forward them to IT AC. 

RESPONSE OPERATIONS WITHIN 
HOST NATIONS 

In response operations outside the US and 
its territories and possessions the basic 
responsibility lies with the HN. SOFAs, 
however, may grant the right (not the 
responsibility) to US forces to do whatever is 
necessary to maintain order and security on 
the installation. US procedures for 
responding to terrorist incidents on the 
installation are established according to US 
and HN law and SOFAs and in coordination 
with HN governmental agencies. 

The military response on installations 
outside the US might consist of an initial 
response by installation law enforcement, 
other military resources, and HN law 
enforcement agencies. The installation 
commander is responsible for the initial 
response to a terrorist incident. Notification 
of the incident is made in accordance with 
applicable SOFAs and Army regulations. As 
a minimum, higher headquarters, the HN, 
and the Department of State (country team} 
are notified. Phase II starts when US 
military forces from elsewhere in the country 
are brought in or HN forces are committed. 
Phase ifi starts when the HN commits 
specially trained counterterrorist forces. 
Augmentation by US forces from outside the 
country requires HN consent. Coordination 
between the US and HN governments is 
provided by the Department of State. 



FM 19-10 



173 



CHAPTER 19 
Protective Services 



The structure of the American democratic 
society depends on the intimate association 
of the people with their chosen leaders. But 
the dissidents and the disaffected of either 
extreme, left or right, attempt to isolate public 
figures from the people. In the face of impeded 
movement or attempts to embarrass, kidnap, 
or even assassinate them, many leaders have 
courageously continued to meet and 
communicate with the public. They do this 
despite demonstrations, threats of violence, 
and assaults. Such violent incidents generate 
widespread fear. They endanger life. And 
they interfere with the conduct of business 
and diplomatic relations. The rights of public 
and private officials must not be violated: 
Leaders must be able to communicate with 
the people. Leaders must be able to function 
freely and safely. One means of preventing or 
reducing exposure to violence and of 
increasing personal safety is through the 
provision or "protective services/' 

US ARMY 

PROTECTIVE SERVICES 

US Army commanders are responsible for 
protecting dignitaries and other high-risk 
individuals in the commanders' areas of 
responsibility. Commanders must be able to 
provide professional, personal protection 
commensurate with the threat. The 
vulnerability of visiting dignitaries, 
designated nigh-risk persons or their 
families, and other persons needing personal 
protection must be offset. When threat 
condition; grade, position, or location of a 
person; or special conditions presenting a 
danger to an individual create a need for 
protective services, resources must be 
available. And they must be committed in a 
graduated response to provide sufficient 
personal protection to counter potential 
adverse action. 




CONTENTS 

Page 

| US ARMY PROTECTIVE SERVICES | 174 

I PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAILSl 175 

Employment of Weapons| 176 

Carry and Use of Firearms | 176 

PROTECTIVE SERVICES PRINCIPLES! . . . 178 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES DEFENSE 
FUNDAMENTALS 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS 



.179 
180 



Low-Profile Operations! 180 

Low-intensity Conflict Operations! 180 

Preparation and Planning! 181 

Execution! 182 

Reviewl 182 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAlU 
RESPONSIBILITIES 



,184 



Principal! 184 



Detail Leader! 184 



Personal Security Officer! 185 

Shift Leader! 186 



Advance Team 



,186 



.187 



Residence Watch and Baggage 

Team 1 . 

Protective Teaml 187 

Other Support] 188 



[PROTECTION ON FOOT| 188 

[PROTECTION ON-SITEl 189 

[PROTECTION DURING TRAVEIJ 189 

One of a commander's principal resources 
to counter the possible danger to an 
individual is the presence of a protective 
services (PS) detail. A PS detail may be 
composed of USACIDC, MP, or other law 
enforcement personnel. The detail provides 
an "enhanced response" to developed threats 
against persons within the commander's 
area of responsibility. Usually, the PM is 
responsible for organizing, training, 
equipping, and maintaining the PS detail. 

Some installations may require a PS detail 
on a full-time basis. But a permanent detail is 



174 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



likely to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Most installations only require protective 
services on a part-time basis. And in some 
instances, such as when the secretary of 
defense visits an area of military 
responsibility, a local commander may only 
be requested to support the PS detail that 
accompanies the visiting dignitary. But all 
US Army installations should have 
identified and trained personnel available for 
protective services when they are needed. 

Specific missions and responsibilities are 
set oy the nature of the circumstances. US 
Army conduct of a PS mission is limited, in 
part, by HN responsibilities, Department of 
the Treasury and Department of State 
authority, legal and political restrictions, and 
appropriate regulations. Specific response 
capabilities are limited by the threat, by 
availability of resources such as personnel 
and equipment, and by training time. 
Sometimes protective services are limited by 
the personal desires of commanders and 
protectees. 

PS operations in the Army are divided into 
two categories: those conducted by 
USACIDC and those conducted by MP 
assigned to a local PM office. 

Headquarters, USACIDC (in accord with 
AR 1-4, AR 10-23, and AR 190-10) provides 
security for particular persons designated by 
higher authority. The chain of command for 
most USACIDC agents conducting PS 
remains within USACIDC. USACIDC field 
elements conduct PS operations only with 

Eermission of the Commanding General, 
SACIDC, or the Chief, Protective Services 



Activity, USACIDC. But if commitments and 
availability of resources permit, field 
elements may be called upon for advice or 
planning assistance. 

Protective services other than those 
required of USACIDC remain the 
responsibility of the installation or area 
commander in whose area a dignitary resides 
or is visiting. The commander of a 
geographical area is responsible for the 
safety and security of all dignitaries and 
high-risk personnel traveling through his 
area. (See AR 190-10.) Traditionally, the 
installation PM is tasked by the commander 
to provide security for the dignitary. The PM 
tasks his MP investigators to provide 
personal security for the designated persons. 
The MPIs, in turn, are usually augmented by 
other MP. MP conducting protective services 
normally report to the PM who, in turn, 
reports to the installation commander. 

The commander controls the resources 
used for protective services within areas of 
his military jurisdiction. Funding for 
protective services is the responsibility of the 
commander who directs his personnel and 
commits his assets to such a mission. The 
Joint Travel Regulation provides funds for 
persons engaged in protective services in a 
temporary duty status. For expenses incurred 
by rM personnel or USACIDC special agents 
providing protective services, AR 195-4 
permits advance funds to cover anticipated 
expenses or allows recovery of personal funds 
expended during the mission. Coordination 
with the local USACIDC element is required 
of the PM prior to the obligation or 
expenditure or .0015 funds by PM personnel. 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAILS 



In a PS operation the main participants are 
the person being protected, known as the 
principal, and the PS detail. The PS detail 
has a detail leader (DL), a personal security 
officer (PSO), an advance team, a protective 
team, a residence watch, a baggage team, and 
such other security teams as may oe required. 



Individual members of a PS detail may be 
involved in more than one element during a 
particular operation. 

Personnel being considered for PS 
assignments should be in excellent mental 
and physical condition. They should conform 
to established Army height and weight 



FM 19-10 



175 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



standards as prescribed in AR 600-9. They 
must be reliable, presentable in appearance, 
intelligent, and articulate. They must qualify 
as expert on assigned weapons. A knowledge 
of police unarmed self-defense tactics is 
desirable. Knowledge of the principal's 
language, if foreign, is desirable but not 
essential; interpreters or translators are 
usually provided by the host. The candidate 
must be aware of the inherent dangers and 
adversities of the assignment. He or she must 
be willing to sacrifice personal safety to 
protect a principal at the risk of serious 
personal injury or even death. 

Members of details must be thoroughly 
familiar with protocol requirements, 

personality information, and itineraries. And 
they must be fully briefed on all aspects of the 
mission. They must be able to act quickly and 
appropriately in an emergency situation. 
And they must be completely experienced in 
all aspects of PS operations. 

When adverse action is directed against a 
principal, it is the smooth, professional, and 
organized actions of the PS detail that will 
most effectively counter the threat. Security 
personnel must be trained so well that in an 
emergency, despite the excitement and 
emotion involved, they will instinctively act 
correctly. Security personnel must be 
proficient in special techniques. They must be 
able to protect the principal when he is 
walking or traveling by motor vehicle, train, 
aircraft, or boat. They must be able to protect 
the principal when participating at public 
assemblies. 

Although difficult, and in some cases 
impossible, PS details should ideally train 
together, much as special reaction teams and 
other small Army units do. Protection 
demands teamwork. A PS detail functions as 
a unit. Each person on the detail must be fully 
aware of his responsibilities and reactions as 
well as what he can expect from his detail 
members. Currently, most PS training is not 
geared to team training. It is difficult tor each 
Army agency to release five to seven people at 
a time, because there are many other 
commitments that are also being met by 



these individuals. But once personnel are 
identified as part-time or full-time PS 
personnel, it is recommended that they train 
as a team to refine their individual skills and 
coordinate teamwork. 

EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS 

Of primary importance for a PS detail is the 
anticipated use of weapons. The employment 
of weapons is made with the following 
considerations in mind: 

• Availability of weapons. 

• Threat analysis. 

• Location of the mission. 

• Desires of the chain of command. 

The employment of weapons must be 
consistent with established Army policy and 
with local and foreign laws. PS personnel 
armed with automatic weapons must have 
successfully qualified with these weapons. 
Supervisors must ensure that firearms 
training is well documented and made a 
matter of permanent record. 

CARRY AND USE OF FIREARMS 

PS personnel are armed with a US Army 
sidearm. When required by the mission, they 
have access to riot shotguns, rifles, or 
automatic weapons. Riot agent grenades or 
dispensers are carried and protective masks 
are available for members of the official 
party and security personnel when threat 
conditions warrant. 

USACIDC agents are authorized to carry 
concealed weapons in the performance of 
their official PS and investigative duties in 
accordance with AR 190-14. MP assigned to 
PS details carry their assigned firearm 
during the performance of their official 
duties by authorization under AR 190-14. 
They must have a DA Form 2818 (Firearms 
Authorization) in their possession. MP who 
are authorized to carry concealed firearms in 
the performance of official duties have a 
great moral responsibility to themselves, the 
principal, and the US Army. 

PS personnel may be authorized to carry 
concealed firearms outside the US. But they 



176 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



must have prior approval from the country 
to be visited. Approval may be obtained 
through the US embassy or through official 
agencies of the host country. But the 
approval may be revoked at any time by the 
host country. 

After permission has been obtained from 
local authorities, PS members may have to 
arrange to obtain their weapons from local 
US agencies in the host country. Or they 
may have to have the weapons delivered to 
them aboard the principal s official aircraft. 
If permission to carry weapons is not 
granted, guidance must be obtained from the 
local commander. 

Aboard aircraft the weapon must be 
carried concealed or locked in a briefcase 
retained by the individual. Personnel 
carrying a concealed weapon aboard an 
aircraft must notify appropriate airline 
officials of the presence of the weapon before 
boarding. Federal law enforcement officers 
are exempt under 49 USC 1472(1) from 
surrendering the weapon to the airline 
representative. However, final authority 
rests with the commander of the aircraft. 
Upon request, personnel must give up 
control of the weapon to the aircraft 
commander. Usually when escorting a 
principal aboard an aircraft, the weapon is 
not surrendered; however, exceptions to such 
policies are governed by the circumstances 
of the mission. The weapon may be 
transported in locked luggage stowed in the 
baggage compartment of the aircraft in 
accordance with AR 190-14. The weapon 
must be unloaded. 

When it is necessary to carry firearms 
aboard a military aircraft, prior coordi- 
nation must be made with the appropriate 
flight commander, the operations officer, or 
the pilot in command of the aircraft. 

PS detail members must be familiar with 
AR 190-28, which governs their use of 
firearms. All weapons must be used in 
accordance with this regulation and its 
supplements; local, federal, and foreign 
laws; and the mature judgment of rS 
personnel. 



The response to firearms presented 
against a principal does not include 
members or the protective team returning 
fire. The return fire may cause death or 
grievous injury to innocent bystanders. PS 
personnel maintain a defensive posture and 
evacuate the principal from the "kill zone/' 

There are situations when the immediate 
use of firearms is the proper response. This 
would occur in extreme circumstances. If the 
principal's vehicle is disabled in a kill zone 
of an ambush, return fire is appropriate. If 
organized attack occurs by multiple 
assailants, return fire is appropriate. 

Supervisors coordinate weapons employ- 
ment with participating law enforcement 
agencies when PS missions involve 
interoperability with other agencies. They 
ensure full understanding of the guidelines 
for weapons deployment and use. 

Although no definitive rules of engage- 
ment exist, it is generally agreed that any 
defensive actions taken by members of the 
protective team are undertaken for 
protective reasons or in self-defense rather 
than for law enforcement. In making this 
determination, one should consider if the 
subject constitutes a present or a continuing 
threat to the principal. Or circumstances 
may indicate that the subject might repeat 
the unlawful act that is considered to be a 
threat to the principal. When restraining the 
subject, only that force necessary to 
accomplish restraint is used. The incident is 
then immediately reported to the appropriate 
federal, state, or local police or foreign 
authorities. And the subject is remanded to 
their custody. The action taken by the 
protective team must be shown to have been 
necessary under an emergency situation. 
The restraint used must have been minimal. 
And the restraint must have been only to the 
extent needed to deliver the subject to the 
custody of civil authorities. The action taken 
must have been in self-defense or to protect 
the principal. And the protective team must 
have acted properly in fulfilling their official 
responsibilities and statutory duties as 
officers of the federal government. 



FM 19-10 

161-0160-94-12 



177 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES PRINCIPLES 



The goal of a PS mission is to protect the 
principal from all hazards. This includes 
hazards caused by personal design, accident, 
or negligence. But absolute protection is 
never possible. Thus the objective of a PS 
detail must be to operate in a manner that 
minimizes the likelihood of an attack and its 
chances of success. 

The "deterrence factor" offered by the 
presence of a PS team is invaluable. If the 
protective force is alert and firm in 
dispatching its responsibilities, the apparent 
control will be evident. Voluntary 
cooperation on the part of the public usually 
follows. The acquired atmosphere of 
command frequently prevents the need for 
further action. Sometimes ostentatious 
display of protective equipment and 
personnel is needed under some 
circumstances, such as in a combat zone or a 
hostile fire zone, to bolster the deterrent 
factor. 

Every element of protection must be 
thoroughly planned in advance. Every actor 
movement of the principal and the protective 
detail must be scrutinized to ensure 
maximum security. All personnel must be 
well briefed on emergency procedures. They 
must be able to react instantly and correctly. 
Good preventive measures may save the life 
of the protector as well as the person 
protected. 

Planning is critical to success. Every 
phase of a protective mission must be 
carefully planned. The possibility of 
unexpected changes requires flexibility in 
planning such missions. Alternate and 
contingency plans should be prepared. They 
should cover such circumstances as 
inclement weather, possible threats, or any 
other actions that may affect the security of 
the principal. Coordination with the host 
agency as well as other persons involved in 
the visit is essential. 

In all cases, advance work is the key to 
success. Advance work is the coordination of 



all security arrangements before the arrival 
of the principal at each location being 
visited. For some missions, advance work is 
extensive and complex, while other missions 
may require less. The extent of the work 
depends on the threat, the availability of 
resources and manpower, and the personal 
desires of the principal or the local 
commander. 

As far as possible, protective personnel 
should adapt themselves to the convenience 
of the principal. They should avoid 
interfering with the principal's official or 
private functions. The protection must not 
unnecessarily interfere with the principal's 
freedom of action. His privacy must always 
be respected. And every effort must be made 
not to embarrass him or interfere with his 
activities. Protective measures and 
personnel should always be as unobtrusive 
as circumstances permit. 

The resources used to protect the principal 
depend on the duration of the principal's 
travels. They also depend on the kind of 
public exposure desired by the principal or 
required oy circumstances. The modes of 
transportation used, the locations visited, 
and the ideologies of the population with 
which the principal will have contact also 
influence resource use. So too does the 
analysis of inherent threats obtained during 
advance threat information collection. 
Support of local police is important. They 
may be integrated into the security in depth, 
and they can provide valuable threat 
information. 

Release of personal information about the 
principal and other members of his party is 
closely controlled. Certain details of the 
itinerary and the security procedures to be 
employed are also closely controlled. 
Security personnel do not discuss or release 
this information to other than authorized 
persons. Particular care is taken with regard 
to representatives of the press. Release of 
information can adversely affect the 
integrity of the mission. Current guidelines 



178 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



stress that the itinerary of a general officer is 
at least marked 'TOR OFFICIAL USE 
ONLY/' It may be upgraded when needed. 

Generally, PS personnel wear clothing like 
that worn by the principal. Conservative 
business suits are appropriate when 
escorting a principal wearing a class A 
uniform. Unconventional styles or colors 
should not be worn during PS missions. 



Sports jackets and slacks of conservative cut 
and color may be appropriate for informal 
occasions. Formal wear, such as a tuxedo, 
may be required for the PSO and some 
members of the team. Sometimes specialized 
clothing like swimsuits or ski clothing is 
needed. If not available, these items may be 
rented or purchased, when specifically 
authorized. Standard equipment for a PS 
mission is listed in Appendix D. 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES DEFENSE FUNDAMENTALS 



The Army concept of personal security is 
based on the principle of "defense in depth." 
Coordination and flexibility are the 
watchwords to organizing a defense in 
depth. A series of protective cordons is 
established around the principal. The 
cordons are designed to prevent an attack or 
absorb its shock to such an extent that the 
results will not be tragic. They control the 



space above, below, and on all sides of the 
principal. Movement control within these 
cordons is normally established by an 
identification system. The system may use 
personal recognition, passes, badges, or even 
unobtrusive lapel pins. 

The inner cordon should be manned by the 
PSO and protective team members. This 
includes the shift leader on larger PS details. 



DEFENSE IN DEPTH 




PRINCIPAL 
INNER CORDON 

MIDDLE CORDON 
OUTER CORDON 



FM 19-10 



179 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



These people are those who have been 
school-trained and are experienced enough 
to occupy the positions of PSO and shift 

leader. 

The middle cordon should be manned by 
USACIDC or MP personnel who have PS 
training offered in basic USACIDC and MPI 
courses and by local law enforcement 

personnel. 

The outer cordon should be manned by MP 
and local law enforcement personnel. This 
cordon comprises surveillance posts, such as 
observation posts, listening posts, sniper 
positions, static posts, and response teams. 



These cordons are fluid in nature and must 
be flexible to adjust to the situation at hand. 
There are no derined areas for these cordons 
with regard to distance from one to the other. 
The distance between cordons is established 
on a case-by-case basis. It is based on the 
threat, location, crowd, personality of the 
principal, and desires of the chain of 
command. The PSO or the DL will adjust the 
cordons to fit the situation. 

Sometimes, particularly overseas where 
there is shared responsibility between the 
US and the host nation governments, 
changes to the positions in these cordons are 
made. 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS 



The axiom "know the enemy" is basic to 
successful PS operations. PS details must 
vary the kind and degree of protection 
accorded the principal to suit the kind and 
degree of danger presented by the threat. 

LOW-PROFILE OPERATIONS 

Sometimes it may be advantageous to 
modify classic PS procedures to reduce the 
notice paid to the principal and his need for 
protection. At these times a detail under- 
takes a "low-profile" operation. A low-profile 
operation employs only the protective 
measures that do not draw unnecessary 
attention to the principal. Such operations 
do not necessarily lessen manpower 
commitments, nor are they less costly. The 
protective coverage becomes more discreet, 
involves considerable planning and 
ingenuity, and generally is more difficult to 
conduct than a nigh-profile operation. Often 
the middle and outer cordons of protection 
are strengthened, allowing the inner cordon 
to be less obtrusive. 

Low-profile operations do not provide 
much visible protection close to the 
principal. This differs from a high-profile 
operation. Keeping a low profile may be, 
however, the best course of action. 
Sometimes the political situation requires it. 



Sometimes a principal desires a low-key 
security operation. 

LOW-INTENSITY 
CONFLICT OPERATIONS 

More and more US military personnel are 
being called upon to provide protective ser- 
vices in areas in wnich circumstances 
approach combat conditions. Such low- 
intensity conflict (LIC) situations require 
changes in the appearance of PS operations. 
A change may be only the implementing of a 
dress code. Or it may mean an upgrading of 
weapon systems and the understanding of 
rules of engagement with ostensibly hostile 
personnel. 

In areas outside the US, it is imperative 
that coordination be made with the US 
Embassy as well as the major military 
command responsible for the area. 
Diplomatic as well as military rules and 
guidelines differ with the locale. PS 
personnel planning to travel to an LIC area 
must know the ground rules before entering 
the area. 

The overriding concern in an LIC area is 
the need to conform to the tactical rules 
governing travel into the area. The "how to" 
perform protective services does not change. 



180 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



Advance work is still required. Threat 
analysis is done and updated. Itineraries 
must be prepared and safeguarded. Routes 
must be examined ana safe havens 
identified. Plans for evacuation must be 
considered. And special attention must be 
given to the potential for injuries and the 
ever-present possibility of capture. 

The major concern of PS personnel in an LIC 
area is to carry out the mission in accord with 
established policies of the US government. 

PREPARATION AND PLANNING 

When notified of an impending mission, a 
chronological events journal is started. It is 
used to record all information about the 
mission. And it is used to retain all 
information produced as a result of the 
mission. The journal is considered to be an 
official document. It serves to record actions 
by the PS detail. It helps in preparing the 
after-action report. And it may be acceptable 
for presentation to a board of inquiry if an 
incident occurs adversely affecting the 
security of the principal. 

The planning of the mission is done in two 
stages. The results of preliminary 
information received with the notice of the 
mission become the basis for a written 
personal security plan. This plan is the 
documentation that gives authority for the 
mission. It serves as a basis to fix 
responsibilities. It allows the measuring of 
resources against tasks to be performed. And 
it provides a standardized format for 
conveying information and instructions. 
The mission DL is responsible for preparing 
the security plan. The plan is given to afl 
members of the security detail. The original 
is retained on file. The plan is for official use 
only. It is controlled in the same manner as 
the principal's itinerary. 

Coordination between the protective 
services chain of command and a member of 
the visiting dignitary's staff is tantamount 
to a successful PS operation. A visiting 
dignitary must be informed that a PS detail 



will be assigned to him upon his arrival at 
the receiving commander's area of 
responsibility. This information can be 
transmitted from PM to PM, or from PM to 
aide-de-camp or executive officer by 
telephone or by message. 

The second stage of planning requires an 
on-site survey by the advance security team 
of all areas to be visited by the principal. The 
itinerary for the proposed visit should be 
obtained from the principal's office or the 
host agency as soon as it is prepared. It 
should he reviewed to determine if sufficient 
information has been furnished to permit 
advance security arrangements to be made. 

A threat collection effort should begin as soon 
as practical after receipt of the itinerary. This is 
normally accomplished by coordinating with 
the US Secret Service, FBI, State Department, 
USACIDC, military intelligence, and other 
local, federal and foreign law enforcement or 
intelligence-gathering agencies. Efforts to 
identify possible threats to the principal at all 
locations to be visited will be undertaken by 
these agencies. Should information considered 
prejudicial to the safety of the principal be 
developed, the developing agency will notify the 
mission DL of the PS detail. Frequent contact 
with intelligence-gathering agencies should be 
maintained throughout the mission to ensure a 
current threat analysis. 

EXECUTION 

This portion of the mission commences 
with the implementation of all prior 

Elanning. Often the information developed 
y the advance team is used in preparing the 
operations annex to the security plan. 
Execution is effected using the proper 
methods and techniques suited to the 
mission at hand. The execution phase ends 
with the completion of the visit or event, or 
upon order or competent authority. 

REVIEW 

A critique is held in the final stage of a PS 
operation. The purpose of the critique is to 
discuss the success or failure of the mission. 



FM 19-10 



181 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION- 



It is conducted so that all participants will 
have a clear, orderly idea of what was done 
correctly and incorrectly. To improve PS 
operations, intelligent, tactful, and 
constructive criticism is necessary. A 
critique is most effective if it is held as soon 
as possible after the mission is completed. 
The critique is so important that it must be 
considered a phase of the PS operation itself. 
The effectiveness of a critique depends on 
the flexibility with which the reviewer 
employs it. In conducting the critique, the 
reviewer presents criticisms. He comments 
in a straightforward, impersonal manner. 
Participants should leave the critique with a 
favorable attitude toward the PS operation 
and a desire to improve the next one. 
Examples of personal initiative and 
ingenuity and types of errors and ways to 
correct the errors should be covered. PS 



personnel should be encouraged to 
participate in the discussion to ensure the 
critique is a learning experience and not an 
"admonishment." 

Supervisory personnel can take notes to 
guide the critique, but detailed planning is 
not practical. However, coverage of essential 
elements includes — 

• Restating objectives of the mission. This 
enables the participants to start on a 
common ground. Participants who were 
concernea with a particular aspect of the 
subject may have forgotten the overall 
objectives. 

• Reviewing procedures and techniques 
employed, briefly summarizing the 
methods used to attain the objectives. 

• Evaluating PS detail performance. This is 
the most important part of the critique. 



KINDS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS 

THREE KINDS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY ARMY PERSONNEL: 



D Those conducted for senior 


n Those conducted by PS 


n Those conducted for 


military officials at their 


details traveling with their 


officials visiting the PS detail's 


permanent duty locations by 


principals away from their 


duty station. 


PS personnel assigned to that 


home stations. 




home station. 







ALL PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS FOLLOW A STANDARD SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
FROM NOTIFICATION TO TERMINATION OF THE OPERATION: 



a 



NOTIFICATION OF MISSION. 



PLANNING AND PREPARATION. 



D Assignment of responsibilities. 

D Receipt of itinerary and biography of the 
principal and control of the information 
contained therein. 

□ Initiation of a threat collection effort. 

G Identification of logistical needs. 

E Identification of travel requirements. 

D Preparation of the operations order. 



EXECUTION. 



D Deployment of advance team. 

□ Implementation of advance work. 

□ Accomplishment of the mission. 



REVIEW. 



E Critique. 

□ Preparation of the after-action report. 



182 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



• Using notes taken during the mission, the 
DL points out and discusses the strong 
points, then the weaker points, and makes 
suggestions for improvement. All remarks 
must be specific and impersonal. Detail 
members cannot profit from generalities. 

• Controlling the discussion to keep the 
critique to issues at hand and yet ensure 
thorough review. 

• Summarizing. The critique is concluded 
with a brief but comprehensive 
summation of the points brought out. 

The critique culminates in an after-action 
report. Written in narrative form, this report 
relates the highlights of the PS mission. It is 



written by the mission DL as soon as 
possible after the mission. He uses his notes 
and those of security team members and the 
journals and comments of the principal, his 
staff, the personal security officer, and the 
residence watch. Personnel other than the 
protective force who were instrumental in 
the execution of the mission should be fully 
identified. A file with this information is 
maintained for future reference. Emphasis is 
placed on problem areas encountered and on 
the procedures necessary to eliminate them. 
Recommendations are written in detail for 
improving, planning, coordination, per- 
sonnel, andequipment. A file copy is kept for 
use in improving future operations. 



EXAMPLE OF AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT 



MEMORANDUM FOR: CG, FT MASON, MT 
SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Visit of 



1. MG John A. Smith, Deputy CG, Ft Mason, Montana, traveled to Ft McClellan 3-5 Mar 87. 
A copy of his itinerary is attached as Enclosure 1.* 

2. Based upon a request for security from the CG, Ft Mason, the Provost Marshal 
directed that the MPI Section provide for the personal security of MG Smith on the 
occasion of his official visit to Ft McClellan. 

3. An intelligence collection effort was established with appropriate law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies and was maintained throughout the duration of the mission. 
No adverse information was received. 

4. All advance security arrangements were completed at each location of the visit 
prior to the arrival of MG Smith. An operations order outlining specific mission 
requirements and instructions was prepared together with the advance security work 
sheet . 

5. Identified problem areas and recommendations for future resolution were identified 
and discussed. 

6. Provost Marshal responsibility for the security of MG Smith terminated without 
incident 5 Mar 87 upon his return to Ft Mason, Montana. 



* Not shown. 



FRANK L. TAYLOR 

SFC 

Detail Leader 



FM 19-10 



183 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAIL RESPONSIBILITIES 



Individuals assigned to PS details must be 
constantly aware of the proper techniques 
they must employ to successfully accomplish 
their mission. Fulfillment of a mission 
requires close teamwork on behalf of the 
detail. This requires a thorough under- 
standing of the individual and collective 
responsibilities of the members of the detail. 
The safety of a principal in a threat situation 
can only be guaranteed by team members 
who are physically fit and mentally alert 
and who possess sufficient expertise to 
perform their duty in an overall planned 
response to an emergency situation. 

Responsibilities must be clearly defined 
and individuals should be assigned a 
specific responsibility for each phase of the 
mission. Project officers, protocol officers, 
and hosts of the activity that the principal 
will visit should be identified and their 
responsibility established in conjunction 
with the PS mission requirements. 
Coordination between all these persons must 
be established to ensure complete protection 
of the principal. When two or more agencies 
are protecting distinguished persons, the 
agency protecting the senior official has 
overall responsibility for security measures. 

PRINCIPAL 

Principals have a responsibility to 
contribute to the success of the mission by 
respecting the purpose of the mission and 
the responsibility of the detail assigned to 
carry it out. The education of the principals 
to this responsibility is critical to the overall 
success or PS missions. Many designated 
principals inherently feel that being combat 
leaders serving in command positions 
exempts them from a real need for a PS 
detan. Persons in the chain of command 
responsible for establishing the PS detail 
must ensure that the principal, his staff, and 
his family are fully briefed. The briefing 
includes tne responsibilities of the detail and 
how the close working relationship between 
all persons contributes to the smooth 
execution of the PS mission. 



The relationship between the principal 
and the PS detail has a professional and 
definitive basis. Principals should be 
encouraged to recognize and respect the 
professional distance kept by the detail. 
Members of PS details — 

• Keep all contacts with the official party 
formal. Detail members do not attempt to 
develop close relationships with the 
official party, nor do they accept favors 
from the official party. 

• Except in emergencies, make all contacts 
with the official party through the PSO. 

• Avoid presuming on protocol or escort 
prerogatives. 

• Avoid attracting notice, calling attention 
to themselves, or trying to impress people. 

• Respect the principal's privacy. Whenever 
possible, detail members adapt 
themselves and the protection they 
provide to the convenience of the 

principal. They make every effort to avoid 
interference with the principal's personal 
freedom. 

• Abstain from any activity which could 
reduce their mental or physical 
capabilities. Alcoholic beverages are not 
consumed during nor for a minimum of 
eight hours prior to the execution phase of 
the mission. 

DETAIL LEADER 

The DL establishes a close working 
relationship with the principal's staff and 
the project and protocol officer of the host 
agency. He obtains detailed itineraries, 
biographical sketches, protocol information, 
and any other protective type information. 
The mission DL discusses with host agency 
officials such matters as press policies and 
the amount of public exposure desired by the 
principal, funding considerations, and any 
other matters of mutual concern. He 
establishes liaison with the staff of the 
officials involved, transportation agencies, 



184 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



and civil and military police. He collects, 
evaluates, and disseminates threat 
information. He coordinates the utilization 
of available manpower and equipment 
resources. He reviews the security plan 
formulated by the advance team. He 
disseminates copies of the plan to appro- 
priate agencies. During the execution phase 
of the mission, he supervises and provides 
guidance and leadership to participating 
subordinates. In the final review, he 
conducts a post-mission critique. And he 
supervises the preparation of the after-action 
report. 

DLs have a responsibility to help detail 
members maintain peak performance. The 
long hours, day after day, of a PS operation, 
the requirement for prolonged absences from 
home, and the ever-present need to be 
constantly mentally ana physically fit place 
tremendous stress on rS personnel. PS 
operations are jeopardized if a detail member 
suffers "burnout ' from being overstressed. 
Supervisors must understand and help 
control the stress in which detail members 
operate. Time off can be critical in 
controlling stress. 

Supervisors must make themselves 
available for guidance on matters of tact and 
good judgment. Normally, security 
personnel should not accept gifts even 
though they are presented in gratitude by 
the principal. If gifts cannot oe refused 
without offending theprincipal, they should 
be accepted and the DL notified. Under no 
circumstances should the feelings of the 
dignitary be offended. Supervisors must 
ensure that a brief written statement is 
prepared that gives the circumstances of 
acceptance, a description of the gift, and an 
estimate of its value. Many times the 
principal or a member of his official party 
will give each member of the protective force 
a souvenir or memento of his visit. Caution 
must be exercised to ensure that these items 
do not have high intrinsic value nor place a 
financial burden on the giver. 



The nature of PS inherently lends itself to 
close interpersonal relationships. Often a PS 
member endears himself to his principal 
through mutual respect and admiration and 
a meshing of personalities. Such a 
relationship can tremendously enhance the 
relationship between the principal and the 
entire PS detail. As long as this relationship 
remains within professional parameters, the 
overall success of the PS mission is virtually 
assured. 

PERSONAL SECURITY OFFICER 

The PSO is responsible for the close-in 
security of the principal and normally 
accompanies him whenever he is away from 
his residence. To ensure continuity, unity of 
effort, and control, the PSO is usually the 
only point of contact between the members 
of the PS detail and the principal and his 
staff. The PSO and the DL may be the same 
person. 

Upon initial contact with the principal, the 
PSO briefs him and his staff concerning the 
security arrangements. The PSO is prepared 
to discuss any areas of particular concern to 
the principal. It is essential that the PSO 
obtain the confidence, respect, and 
cooperation of the principal as rapidly as 
possible. 

A close working relationship must be 
maintained between the PSO and the 
mission DL. This can be accomplished by 
communicating on a daily basis whenever 
necessary. While overall control of the 
mission remains the responsibility of the 
mission DL, it is imperative that the PSO be 
afforded adequate authority and sufficient 
freedom of action to accomplish his 
assignment. 

Effective communications are vital to an 
efficient PS detail. The PSO must be in 
constant communication with other 
members of the security force and the 
security control room or command post. (In 
many cases the security control room and 
the command post are one and the same.) 



FM 19-10 



185 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



Two-way radio equipment should be 
available. This can be accomplished with 
hand portable radios. However, these radios 
should be equipped with surveillance kits to 
enable security personnel to use the radios 
quietly when near the principal. Radio noise 
should not be heard by or allowed to disrupt 
the activities of the principal and party. 

Hand-held and portable base station 
frequency modulation radios provide 
appropriate communications within the PS 
detail. Communications between vehicles is 
maintained by vehicular-mounted radios 
supplemented by portable radios. When air 
cover is provided, special provisions to 
ensure effective communications between air 
and ground units must be made. 

SHIFT LEADER 

On larger PS details, a shift leader is 
designated for a given protective team. He 
works for the PSO and is responsible for his 
shift of personnel. The shift leader position 
is useful where there are sufficient PS 
personnel assigned to a mission to warrant 
three eight-hour shifts. A shift leader is 
actually another management position to 
maintain maximum command and control. 
He is analogous to the squad leader in a 
typical Army platoon. 

ADVANCE TEAM 

The mission of the advance team is to 
precede the principal and conduct on-site 
security surveys. The team effects necessary 
security coordination, making all security 
arrangements. When the PSO arrives at 
each location to be visited a member of the 
advance team meets him and provides 
information concerning local security 
arrangements. When appropriate, the 
advance team provides the rSO with details 
of the visit, including maps, sketches, names 
of people involved, telephone numbers, and 
so forth. 

After receiving an assignment for a PS 
mission, the DL designates a member to be 
in charge of the advance work. In most 
cases, more than one person is assigned to 
the advance team. But in all cases there 



must be one person designated as the 
controlling advance man at each location to 
be visited. 

Advance work begins as soon as the 
mission is assigned and the DL receives the 
basic information. The advance team starts 
a workbook for recording all advance team 
activities. The workbook also contains 
checklists to be used. 

In addition to the standard requirements 
that must be accomplished by the advance 
team, there are other intangible con- 
siderations that must be evaluated and 
discussed before and during an advance. 
These include the personality of the 
principal and consideration for his family 
members. They also include personal 
information (sometimes more than is 
available in a biographical sketch), that is, 
physical fitness training programs, religious 
^references, medical problems, hobbies, 
anguage capabilities or lack of them, 
physical impairments that may affect travel 
or lodging, and any other unusual traits that 
could affect the mission. Much of this 
information can be obtained from the 
principal, his aide-de-camp, or his staff. 

Once the advance team has gathered all 
available information, they go to the places 
to be visited by the principal well ahead of 
his scheduled arrival. Sometimes they go as 
much as weeks in advance depending on the 
duration of travel by the principal. Upon 
arrival at these locations, the advance team 
contacts identified points of contact, 
commanders, protocol officers, and other 
people designated to assist with the advance 
work. 

Duties of the advance team at each 
locality include, but are not limited to, 
establishing effective working relations 
with the host agency and conducting 
security checks of places and equipment 
with which the principal will be involved. 

At military reservations and facilities the 
advance team coordinates with the 
commanding officer, the PM, the public 



186 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



affairs officer, the intelligence officer, the 
engineer, the transportation officer, and the 
communications officer to— 

• Obtain a map or plan of the reservation or 
base showing the entrances, exits, or 
docking area to be used by the official 
party. 

• Select quarters for party (if applicable). 

• Review jointly the security aspects of the 
activities that the principal will view or in 
which he will participate, such as 
reviewing troops, witnessing demonstra- 
tions, and inspecting or examining 
devices and equipment. 

• Ascertain the availability of communica- 
tions, such as radios, telephones, 
telegraph, and so forth, including secure 
voice capability. 

• Review the accommodations, that is, food, 
refreshments, recreation facilities, and 
the like. 

RESIDENCE WATCH AND 
BAGGAGE TEAM 

When traveling with a principal, the 
residence watch and baggage team are 
normally part of the advance team. 
However, a residence watch functions at all 
times for a permanently located detail. 



One of the most sensitive areas is the 
principal's residence. The residence watch is 
normally responsible for the security of the 
residence. It also establishes the command 
post. It is responsible for organizing and 
coordinating security arrangements with 
the responsible individual from each facility 
under its charge. The residence watch also 
performs advance actions at hotels, motels, 
and military reservations and facilities. 

The primary purpose of the baggage team 
is to maintain accountability of all items of 
personal and official property belonging to 
the principal and to members of the official 
party who are traveling with or closely 
associating with the principal. The primary 
function is to protect all items from loss or 
theft and to prevent the introduction of 
foreign objects or explosives into the 
principal's aircraft, vehicle, or residence. 

PROTECTIVE TEAM 

The protective team is normally composed 
of the PSO and the other members of the PS 
detail in the closest proximity to the 
principal. On larger details the protective 
team would normally form a protective 
formation for routine walking movements 
around a principal. 



PROTECTIVE FORMATION 



Gun Man 
(not found on 
all teams) 



Direction of 
Movement 




FM 19-10 



187 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



The protective team should remain close to 
the principal at all times, changing their 
relative position frequently. Security 
personnel must ensure that an assailant is 
unable to get between the principal and the 
protective detail. 

Before any person is allowed to approach 
the principal or his personal property, he 
should be checked to establish his identity 
and the authority for his presence. This is 
especially true at the principal's residence, at 
public and sporting events, and near the 
principal's means of transportation. 
Whenever possible, the protective team 
should obtain advance lists of expected 
guests, visitors, press representatives, and 
people performing services for the principal. 

The protective team and residence watch 
should quickly learn to recognize all 
employees, regular visitors, members of the 
official party, and any public figures who are 
expected to call. No stranger should be 
admitted without the permission of the 
principal or a member of his staff. 

Although the security of other members of 
the official party is secondary to that of the 
principal, some degree of safety should be 
provided these persons. If a member of the 
official party is injured, the entire mission 
could be adversely affected. In some 
situations, it is an additional responsibility 
of the protective detail to provide limited 
protection for other members of the official 
party when traveling with the principal. 
When members of the principals family 
accompany him on trips, it is not uncommon 
for members of the protective team to 
provide security and escort for female 



members and minor children. Proper 
planning for manpower and vehicular 
support is necessary to accomplish this 
phase of a mission. 

Because a protective team is usually small, 
effective security often depends on the 
voluntary cooperation of the public. Friendly 
consideration for the public, especially the 
press, and a clear portrayal of the need for 
security stimulates the cooperation of the 
public and the press. Inquiries or requests 
not related to security matters should be 
referred to the appropriate member of the 
official party. Security personnel should 
refrain from unnecessary conversation with 
the public and, most or all, with the press. 

OTHER SUPPORT 

There are many other individuals and 
agencies who may be called upon to support 
a PS operation. A typical rS operation 
includes support from local civilian law 
enforcement personnel, law enforcement 
personnel from other branches of the armed 
services, EOD units, military intelligence 
offices, civilian intelligence-gathering 
agencies, fire department personnel, medical 
personnel, pilots, aircraft crews, ground 
support personnel, translators and 
interpreters, and drivers. This support is 
routinely requested by the organization 
responsible for the PS operation. Most 
military and civilian law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies have supported PS 
operations in some capacity and are very 
responsive to requested support. The best 
way to assure acquiring this support is 
through good continuing liaison with all 
agencies concerned. 



PROTECTION ON FOOT 



In a majority of instances, the safety of a 
principal is most critical when he is among 
the public and walking through crowds, into 
buildings, and to public events in which he 
will participate. 

If possible, the selection of walking time 
and routes should be varied. Accompanying 



PS detail members should be dispersed so 
they can cover all avenues of access to the 
principal. They should continually adjust 
their relative positions to ensure that no 
attacker is able to get between the protectors 
and the principal. During outdoor walks, the 
principal's motorcade should cruise in the 
immediate vicinity. The automobile can 



188 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



block any vehicle that may threaten the 
principal's safety. It can also be used to 
transport the principal in case an emergency 
develops, or it appears necessary to seek a 
safer location. 

Escorting a principal requires being 
highly alert to surrounding areas. Particular 
emphasis is placed on people in crowds who 
are either participating in the event or are 
drawn to the area out of curiosity. Close-in 
security should be established immediately 
around the principal. Additional concentric 
cordons of defense are added to the greatest 
possible extent. 



At indoor assemblies, typical defense 
cordons should be formed immediately 
around the principal. They are also formed 
around the confines of the room occupied by 
the principal and around the grounds where 
the building is located. The personnel 
manning the defensive cordons sTiould take 
control of the area before the arrival of 
guests or the general public. A careful search 

and an inspection of the area should be made 
at the time protection is established. The 
area is then secured until opened to the 

public. 



PROTECTION ON-SITE 



No two sites are exactly alike. Therefore, it 
is virtually impossible to establish a set of 
rules that will be completely applicable to all 
sites. There are, however, specific guidelines 
that must be applied to ensure that 
minimum acceptabfe standards are applied 
in each situation. PS personnel should refer 
to FM 19-30 when formulating a security 
plan. The intricacy of the plan depends on 
site configuration and the mission. 

Security plans must prescribe specific 
responsibilities for all actions required to 
protect the principal and the site. They must 



consider the need for personnel, materiel, 
and vehicle control. They must also consider 
the use of protective alarms and devices. The 
plans must designate priorities of protection 
based on analysis of criticality and 
vulnerability after considering available 
threat information. Plans must include 
consideration of assistance available from 
military units in the area, as well as civilian 
sources. All plans must be coordinated with 
civil authorities because civil authorities 
have primary responsibility for the 
protection of all private, public, and federal 
property. 



PROTECTION DURING TRAVEL 



Protective services during travel are 
designed for the method of transportation 
usea. The DL or his designee contacts the 
appropriate transportation authority to 
obtain pertinent information needed for 
planning. 

Maximum personal protection during 
travel is the product or a comprehensive 
program. That program integrates the mode 



of transportation with security measures, 
such as— 

• Varying daily routes. 

• Being alert to any changes in the locality. 

• Developing defensive driving skills. 

• Being constantly vigilant. 

• Employing other measures, weapons, and 
equipment. 



FM 19-10 



189 



CHAPTER 20 
Bomb Threats 



The MP response to a bomb threat is to 
minimize injuries, damage to property, and 
disruption of operations. MP respond to a 
bomb threat by securing the building, 
controlling traffic and pedestrian movement, 
and obtaining initial information. 

Each unit or activity on an installation will 
have a bomb threat search and evacuation 
plan. The plan describes the actions to take 
when a bomb threat is received. When 
explosives detector doe teams are available, 
they will be includea in these plans (see 
Chapter 11). 

The initial moments of a bomb threat are 
crucial to the evaluation of an incident. To 
assure the successful resolution of a threat, 
bomb threat contingency plans provide prior 
planning and training in procedures to take 
on receipt of a bomb threat. 



CONTENTS 



Page 
TELEPHONE BOMB THREATS| 190 



MAIL BOMBSJ 192 



SUSPICIOUS ITEMSI 193 



PERSONNEL TO NOTIFYl 193 



EMERGENCY OPERATIONSl 
CENTER 



193 

Communication! 194 

Evacuationl 194 

Searches! 7. 195 



Supervisor's Search! 195 

Search Team Search] 195 



lAFTER-ACTION PROCEDURES! 197 

Bomb threats are usually received by 
telephone or mail. Or they may be discovered 
by noticing a suspicious item. Each method 
requires special procedures to effectively 
obtain the maximum amount of information 
from the threat source. 



TELEPHONE BOMB THREATS 



When a telephone bomb threat is received, 
someone has actual knowledge that a device 
has been planted or a prankster wishes to 
disrupt an operation. Noting what is said and 
how it is said during a bomb threat call can 
help determine which of these reasons is true. 
The person receiving the call may be the only 
person to ever have contact with the potential 
bomber. This is why bomb threat con- 
tingency plans must address the need for 
training persons most likely to receive a 
bomb threat call. When a bomb threat is 
received, the receiver must know what to do 
and how to do it, or valuable information will 
be lost. Proper training provides the person 
with the skills to pick out important facts. 

Signaling another employee to listen in on 
the call is worked out in advance where 
working arrangements allow observation. 
The second person concentrates on the 
characteristics of the caller and any 



background noises. The receiver of the call 
concentrates on the exact words of the caller. 
The receiver must try to keep the caller on the 
phone as long as possible to allow time to 
recognize background noises and gain 
additional information. 

The receiver asks the caller for specific 
information as shown on FBI Form 6-136 
(Bomb Threat Checklist). See DA Pam 190-52. 
If the caller describes wnat it looks like, how it 
operates, and its general characteristics, this 
is known as a descriptive bomb threat. A 
descriptive bomb threat is probably real. The 
receiver documents the exact wording of the 
threat. For example, if the caller says, 
"Specialist Jones, there is a bomb planted on 
your floor. You and your six coworkers have 
20 minutes to clear out," the receiver must 
note all of that information. If the person 
receiving the call only indicates that a bomb 
threat was received, an important investi- 
gative tool and important information is lost. 



190 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 





EXAMPLE OF A BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST 






6-136 (Rev. 8-27 77) 














CALLER'S VOICE: 








Cairn Nasal 








Angry Stutter 








Excited Lisp 






^m£#^ 




Slow Raspy 






^^^ 




Rapid ... Depp 






FBI BOMB DATA CENTER 




Soft Ragged 

Loud Clearing throat 

Laughter Deep breathing 

Crying Cracking voice 




PLACE THIS CARD UNDER VGUn TELEPHONE 






QUESTIONS TO ASK: 




Normal Disguised 

Distinct Accent 






1. When is bomb going to explode? 




Slurred Familiar 

Whispprpr! 






2. Where is it right now? 




If voice is familiar, who did it sound like? 






3. What does it look like? 

4. What kind of bomb is it? 


















BACKGROUND SOUNDS: 






5. What will cause it to explode? 




Street Factory 






6. Did you place the bomb? 




noises machinery 
Crockery Animal noises 






7. Why? 




Voices Clear 

PA System Static 






8. What is your address? 




Music Local 

House Long distance 






9. What is your name? 




noises Booth 

Motor Other 






EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT: 




Office. 




machinery 


THREAT LANGUAGE: 

, Well -spoken Incoherent 












(educated) Taped 

Foul Message read by 












Irrational threat maker 

RFMARKS 








Report call immediately to: 




Phone nnmher 


Se* nf caller: Hupp * 




Aire- Leneth of rail • 
Number at which call is received: 












Date _/ /_ . 










Name 






Tim*' Date: /__ / 




Position 
Phone nnmher 




RflMR THRFAT 


dUIYId IrmLHI 













FM 19-10 



191 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



Recording the exact date and time of the 
phone call is important. By determining the 
time of the bomb threat, identification of the 
bomb site by background sounds may be 
possible. 

As part of the bomb threat plan, a bomb 
threat checklist is developed to be placed near 
telephones. FBI Form 6-136 is a good example 
and can be placed beneath a telephone for 
easy access. If this form is not available, then 
a copy of the form should be used to develop a 
locally produced form. A bomb threat report 



form is in most local installation telephone 
directories. 

The person receiving the bomb threat call 
immediately reports to the designated 
supervisor or security person with the 
completed bomb threat checklist. This action 
will facilitate proper emergency notifications 
and help lessen the possibility of panic. The 
receiver does NOT spread the word about the 
bomb threat before notifying the supervisor 
who then notifies the MP. 



MAIL BOMBS 



A small number of explosive devices have 
been mailed over the years resulting in death, 
injury, and destruction of property. 
Contingency planning is required to help 
prevent mail bomb disasters. Contingency 
planners first consider which organizations 
are possible targets. A bomb can be enclosed 
in either a parcel or an envelope, its outward 
appearance limited only by the imagination 
or the sender. However, past mail bombs have 
exhibited some unique characteristics which 
can assist in identifying a suspect mailing. 
To apply these factors, it is important for 
planners to know the type of mail normally 
received by an organization. Motives for mail 
bombs often are revenge, extortion, 
terrorism, or business disputes. 

The information contained in the postal 
pamphlet Bombs By Mail should be 
available to all mail handlers. A copy of this 
pamphlet should be in each unit mail room. 

A mail handler or recipient of mail who is 
suspicious of a letter or parcel and cannot 
verify the contents with the addressee or 
sender, must not open the article or put it in 
water or a confined space like a desk drawer 
or a filing cabinet. Mail handlers and 
recipients must isolate the suspected mail 
and evacuate the immediate area. If possible, 
windows are opened in the immediate area to 
help vent potential explosive gases. The MP 
or postal inspector is immediately contacted 
to report the suspected mail bomb. 



CHARACTERISTICS OF 
MAIL BOMBS 

D Mail bombs may bear restricted 
endorsements such as "personal" or 
"private" when the addressee does not 
normally receive personal mail at the 
office. 

D Addressee's name and/or title may be 
inaccurate. 

D Mail may reflect distorted handwriting. 

D The name and address may be prepared 
with homemade labels or cut-and-paste 
lettering. 

a Mail may have protruding wires, 
aluminum foil, visible oil stains, and/or 
they may emit a peculiar odor. 

a Mail may have an excessive amount of 
postage stamps affixed. 

□ Mail may feel rigid or appear uneven or 
lopsided. 

n Parcel bombs may be unprofessionally 
wrapped with several combinations of 
tape used to secure the package and may 
be marked "Fragile— Handle With Care" 
or "Rush— Do Not Delay." 

a Parcel bombs may be an irregular shape or 
have soft spots or bulges. 

D Parcel bombs may make a buzzing or 
ticking noise or a sloshing sound. 

a Pressure or resistance may be noted when 
removing contents from an envelope or 
parcel. 



192 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



SUSPICIOUS ITEMS 



Employees must be alert to determine if a 
suspicious item belongs in the area. An 
employee should know it a certain briefcase 
belongs, if a flower arrangement is new, if a 
recently delivered package is expected, or if a 

gackage in the corner is someone's lunch. 
>ne way to do this is to keep clutter to a 
minimum. 

When a bomb threat occurs, all personnel 
must quickly scan their immediate areas and 
identify anything out of the ordinary. This 
may be the only way to discover a bomb 



device. Personnel know that if a suspected 
bomb device is discovered they DO NOT 
touch the device. Instead, they make sure that 
the device does not belong. They ensure that 
no one touches it. Ana they report the 
discovery to a supervisor, security officer, or 
MP. Supervisors know that if a suspected 
bomb device is found, they consider 
immediate, total evacuation of the building, 
and they await arrival of MP and explosive 
ordnance disposal personnel before 
attempting to reenter the building. 



PERSONNEL TO NOTIFY 



The MP desk sergeant is the first person to 
notify when a bomb threat has been received. 
The desk sergeant then notifies personnel as 
shown in the local station SOP. In some 
locations it might be the responsibility of the 
personnel in the building receiving the bomb 
threat to make the notifications. Prior 
planning must be done to determine who is 
responsible for notification. 

As a rule, the MP are notified first. MP will 
respond as the initial investigating agency 
for a bomb threat. MP will cordon off the 
target area, provide traffic control, and 
obtain facts for the initial investigation. MP 
do not conduct a bomb search, because they 
are not familiar with the search area. Then 
other personnel are notified as dictated by 
local SOP like higher commanders, public 
affairs personnel or staff duty personnel. 
Then fire department personnel are notified. 



Fire department personnel normally respond 
to the scene and stand by. Fire is a common 
occurrence in connection with an explosive 
detonation. Early notification of the fire 
department personnel can assist in 
minimizing property damage and irijury 
should a device detonate. Then EOD 
personnel are notified. Under normal 
situations, EOD personnel do not respond to 
a bomb threat unless a suspicious item is 
located. But they may be able to tell if other 
threats of a similiar type have been received 
and if a bomb was subsequently discovered. 
They may also give guidance if a device is 
located. (AR 75-15 identifies EOD 
responsibilities.) Then medical personnel are 
notified. The potential for injury with any 
bomb threat is high. Time can be saved by 
having trained medical personnel stand by 
with an ambulance in case of injuries. 



EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 



It is necessary during any bomb situation 
to have a bomb threat EOC located at the 
bomb site. Having an EOC as a control point 
for search teams, communications, access 
lists, and release of information will prevent 
confusion as to who is in charge. 

The post commander may designate a 
bomb scene officer and an alternate to be in 



charge of the bomb site operation. Both the 
bomb scene officer and the alternate must 
have special training in bomb threats and 
emergency situations. The bomb scene officer 
or the alternate represent the commander 
and will respond to all bomb threats. 

The only person who may authorize 
release of information from the scene is the 



FM 19-10 

161-016 0-94-13 



193 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



bomb scene officer. And the only person who 
can release the information to the public is 
the public affairs officer. Keeping tight 
control on information can prevent a wave 
of bomb threats. For example, in a recent 
bombing incident in a major US city, after 
the initial release of the information, 400 
bomb threats occurred in a one-hour time 
period. 

During a bomb threat, the commander or 
his designated bomb scene officer — 

• Decides if the facility will react to the 
threat or conduct business as usual. 

• Determines if a supervisor's search will be 
conducted without evacuation. 

• Decides if the building will be evacuated 
and searched. 

• Serves as the primary person responsible 
for the search team. 

• Executes control of operations within the 
EOC. 

• After the search, if no bomb is discovered, 
determines if and when normal opera- 
tions will resume. 

• If a bomb is discovered, immediately 
clears the area and notifies EOD. 

COMMUNICATION 

Reliable communication from the bomb 
scene is essential. The bomb scene officer 
will continually keep the command post up- 
dated and informed of ongoing actions. 
However, radio transmissions, except for 
those of extremely low power, should not be 
used within 100 meters of the affected area. 
If possible, all elements of the bomb scene 
operation should use the telephone to 
maintain contact with the EOC. 

Types of communications which may be 
used to maintain contact with the teams 
within a building or facility are — 

• Runners. 

• Whistles. 

• Field phones, TA 312. 

• Hand signals (if one point is visible by all). 



EVACUATION 

Evacuation is not necessary for all bomb 
threats. Evacuation is determined by the 
bomb scene officer only after a thorough 
evaluation of all available information. Tne 
results of the bomb threat checklist, 
information from support agencies, and the 
criticality of the mission of the targeted 
facility are considered. The bomb scene 
officer also considers that just disrupting 
operations serves the purpose of the bomber. 
If the bomber describes in detail the type of 
device, its location, and /or the placing of the 
device, then the bomb scene officer may have 
more reason to believe that the device has, 
indeed, been planted. 



BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES 

D All persons will make a preliminary search 
around their immediate areas for 
suspicious items. 

O All persons, as they leave, will remove 
those items that they brought in 
(briefcases, thermos bottles, lunch bags), 
turn off radios, and unplug office 
machines. 

a Windows and doors will be left open to 
help dissipate any explosive force. 

D All cabinets and drawers will be left 
unlocked (classified cabinets may be an 
exception) to make it easier for the 
searchers. 

D When evacuation of a building is 
accomplished, only authorized personnel 
are permitted entry until the threat 
is resolved. 



If a device is actually discovered, either as 
a result of a bomb threat or during routine 
operations, evacuation procedures should be 
carried out expeditiously. All persons will 
evacuate to a predetermined assembly area. 
But this area must be at least 100 meters 
from the structure. This distance takes into 
account items like propane bottles, natural 
gas lines, or welding equipment that could 
contribute to the explosive force of a bomb 
within a facility. All personnel at the 



194 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



assembly area must be accounted for to 
determine if anyone is still in the building. 
And a contact point can be determined in 
case an item cannot be verified as belonging 
in that area. 

Depending upon the mission of the 
facility, it may be necessary to evacuate a 
building in sections. Some areas where 
partial evacuation may be necessary are — 

• Hospitals. 

• Special weapons areas. 

• Classified storage areas. 

Partial evacuation involves risks. There 
are no guarantees as to what damage will 
occur if a device should detonate. Therefore, 
total evacuation is desirable when possible. 

SEARCHES 

There are two types of search: a super- 
visor's search and a search team search. 
Both types of search move from the outside 
in, from the lowest level to the highest, and 
from public access areas to more restricted 
access areas. 

Supervisor's Search 

A supervisor's search can be conducted by 
a few of the activity's personnel using a 
cjuick-paced method to look for suspicious 
items. It can be useful only if all areas are 
orderly. If the area to be searched is 
cluttered, then a supervisor's search will not 
be effective. 

In determining if a supervisor's search will 
be used, it should be remembered that 
supervisory searches can be up to 60 percent 
effective. They also have the advantage of 
limiting the disruptions of the operation, 
because the search can be done without 
evacuation of personnel. 

Search Team Search 

A search team search requires that the 
building be evacuated until after the search 
has been accomplished. The search for an 
explosive device is one of the most important 
actions involved in the bomb threat 
procedures. Two-man teams composed of 
persons assigned to and familiar with the 



activity should search the building where a 
bomb threat has been received. Preferably, 
these persons should be volunteers. It must 
be stressed that the searchers must know or 
be able to determine if an item actually 
belongs in the area; thus they should be 
persons assigned to that activity. For this 
reason MP and EOD personnel should not 
search the area. 

It is imperative that persons forming 
search teams be well trained. Training 
accomplishes more than just preparing the 
members of a search team; it increases their 
confidence and morale. MP must make every 
effort to help provide local training. And 
search team members must be willing to 
practice periodically to maintain 
proficiency. 



DAMAGE CONTROL MEASURES 

Search teams must know the actions to 
take on discovery of a device and measures 
to reduce damage. They must learn that if a 
suspicious item is actually located, it 
requires concise and immediate action. They 
must learn— 

D NOT TO TOUCH THE DEVICE UNDER 

ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. 
D If evacuation is not already accomplished, 

to immediately evacuate all nonessential 

personnel. 

O Even if there may be more than one 
device, to discontinue the search until 
EOD personnel arrive to supervise. 

They must also know the measures to take 
to reduce damage if EOD determines that 
time allows. They must know to— 

□ Disconnect or shut off any gas lines 
leading to the facility. 

a Open windows and doors. 

d Remove items which may add to the 
explosive force (gasoline, lubricants, 
paint). 

D Sandbag the area around the device but 
never place any item on the device itself. 

D Evacuate personnel further than the 300 
meter range, preferably behind a 
windowless structure. 



FM 19-10 



195 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR SEARCH PROCEDURES 




The search team looks everywhere and at 
everything. Unless a specific area is 
indicated in the threat, the search team 
begins with the exterior and moves to the 
interior. Then they move into public access 
areas like lobbies, restrooms, waiting areas, 
and snack machine areas. And finally, they 
check limited public access areas, like 
basements, roofs, and storage rooms. 

The external area must be searched first. 
The search must cover all feasible areas 
where a device may be planted. It must be 
done systematically. Special consideration 
must be given to — 

• Window ledges. 

• Bushes. 

• Garbage cans. 

• Flower arrangements. 

• Air conditioner units. 

• Automobiles. (Extreme caution must be 
used when search involves automobiles.) 

Any item usually not found in the area or 
any item noted as being out of place should 
be viewed with suspicion. 

Most often a bomb device is thought to be 
hidden somewhere inside a facility. But a 



device may be planted against a facility. 
Depending upon the nature of the device, an 
enormous amount of damage can be caused 
by a device planted outside a facility. Both 
the exterior and interior of the bomb site 
area must be searched. 

After the exterior search is completed, the 
search inside the facility is begun. Interior 
searches are conducted horn the lowest level 
of the facility to the highest and from 
common access areas to more restricted 
access areas. 

First, all public access areas are searched. 
Then offices with public access are searched. 
And finally, offices, storage areas, and areas 
with restricted public access are searched. 
Rooms that have been searched should be 
marked with crepe paper or colored tape to 
ensure efficiency and to speed up the process. 

The searchers enter a room, stop, remain 
still, and listen for any unusual sounds. (In 
the evacuation phase, all machines are to be 
unplugged.) Searchers will make a quick 
visual scan of the room for obvious, unusual 
items. They divide the room in half and then 
into four levels. Their first search includes 



196 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



items such as desks, chairs, and garbage 
cans that lie within the area from the waist 
to the floor. Their second search includes 
items such as filing cabinets, table tops, and 
lower shelves that lie within the area from 
the waist to the top of the head. Their third 



search includes items such as picture 
frames, shelves, cupboards, windows, and 
vents that lie within the area from the top of 
the head to the ceiling. Their fourth search 
includes checking all vents, pipes, and 
ceiling supports beyond the ceiling. 



AFTER-ACTION PROCEDURES 



After a device has been rendered safe or it 
has detonated, the area is sealed off by the 
MP until criminal investigator and EOD 
personnel thoroughly investigate the area. If 
a device detonates, the most minute frag- 
ments are retrieved in order to determine the 
composition of the device. All persons not 
directly involved with the investigation are 
restricted from the scene. 



After-action reports are completed and 
must contain specific information such as — 

• Nature of incident. 

• Action taken. 

• Outcome. 

• Additional information. 



INFORMATION IN AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT 



BOMB THREAT 



NATURE OF INCIDENT 

D Who received call? 

a Where was call received? 

□ What was the telephone number 
of line to which call was made? 

□ What was date and time of call? 

□ What did caller say, and what 
was the response of the receiver, 
if any? 

D Was caller male or female? 

□ What was approximate age of 
caller? 

□ Were there any unusual speech 
characteristics of the caller 
such as lisp, accent, dialect? 



ACTION TAKEN 

Who was notified immediately 

after call was received? 

What was time of evacuation, i 

applicable? 

What search techniques were 

employed? 

What was discovered, if 

anything? 

What time did personnel 

reenter the building, if there 

was an evacuation? 



BOMB DISCOVERY 



NATURE OF INCIDENT 

a How was bomb discovered? 

□ Where was bomb discovered? 

□ Who discovered bomb? 

D What was date and time of 

discovery? 
D Was it established that 

only one bomb existed? 

□ What is the description 
of the device? 



ACTION TAKEN 

D What members of the search and 
EOD team arrived on the scene? 

D What time did they arrive? 

O What was the disposition of 
the device? 



BOMB DETONATION 



NATURE OF INCIDENT 

a Where did bomb explode? 
□ What was the date and 

approximate time of 

explosion? 
o Who reported incident? 



ACTION TAKEN 

□ What members of the search and 
EOD teams arrived on the scene? 

□ What time did they arrive? 

□ How were the injured, if any, 
treated /evacuated? 



OUTCOME 



O What was the extent of property 

damage, if known? 
o Was building secured for further 

investigation? 
D How many persons were killed or 

injured? 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

D What was the color, description, 
and the sound of explosion, if 
observed? 



FM 19-10 



197 



CHAPTER 21 
Special Reaction Team 



Commanders must provide an 
installation SRT capable of providing an 
enhanced response to developed threats in 
their area of responsibility within two hours 
of initial notification (see AR 190-52). The 
PM normally is responsible for organizing, 
training, equipping, and maintaining the 
SRT. The SkT is a specially trained team of 
military or security personnel armed and 
equipped to isolate, contain, gather 
information for, and, if necessary, neutralize 
a special threat. Specific missions and 
response capabilities are determined by the 
threat and availability of equipment and 
training time. 

When major disruptions or special threats 
occur (to include acts of terrorism), resources 
must be committed in a graduated response 
to resolve the situation and restore law and 
order. SRTs are one of the commander's 
principal response forces in the event of a 
major disruption or special threat, and as 
such, are an integral part of an installation's 
security. 

Some situations requiring SRT employ- 
ment may include, but are not limited to — 

• Barricaded criminals. 

• Barricaded criminals with hostages. 

• Sniper incidents. 

• Counterterrorist operations. 

• VIP protection (as a response force). 

• Threatened suicide incidents. 

• Barricaded, mentally disturbed persons. 

During hostilities, SRTs may be required 
to perform similar missions in a combat 
environment. 

SRT priorities during an incident are — 

• Protecting lives, to include hostages, law 
enforcement personnel, bystanders, and 
suspects. 



CONTENTS 


Page 
..199 
. . . 2M 


| EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER |. 


|EQUIPMENT| 





• Securing the safe release of hostages. 

• Isolating /containing the incident. 

• Gathering information/intelligence. This 
is an ongoing responsibility from the 
beginning of an incident until its 

resolution. 

• Protecting property/equipment. 

• Preventing escape. 

• Apprehending offenders. 

• Conducting an assault (only if all other 
alternatives have been exhausted, no 
other assistance is expected, and a threat 
to human life exists). 

These mission priorities apply in all 
special threat situations. They must be 
stressed, planned for, and given the 
necessary command emphasis to ensure 
success. However, during a special threat 
situation involving a nuclear weapon, 
recovery of the weapon is the overriding 
consideration (AR 50-5). 

To successfully meet mission require- 
ments, it may be necessary for the SKT or 
SRT member to replace or augment the 
initial responding MP on the inner perimeter 
around the affected site. 

PMs must ensure commanders understand 
the limitations of SRTs. Training scenarios 
used to test and evaluate SRTs must be 
consistent with team purpose and missions. 
Post crisis management teams, controllers, 
evaluators, and observers must be aware of 
team limitations and those circumstances 
under which more qualified forces will 
assume responsibility for an incident. 



198 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



US Army involvement in terrorism 
counteraction is limited by HN responsi- 
bilities, Department of Justice and Depart- 
ment of State authority, legal and political 
restrictions, and appropriate regulations. US 
Army support to civilian law enforcement 
agencies during civil disturbance operations 
is limited by DOD Civil Disturbance Plan 
(Garden Plot), 18 USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus 
Act), and applicable laws and regulations. 

Each installation has unique needs as 
determined by a current threat analysis and 
the installation's vulnerabilities. A detailed 
threat analysis is essential to support the 
process of identifying the desired level of 
SRT response capability. On one end of the 
spectrum the threat analysis may reveal the 
existence of only a low-level external threat 
requiring a general SRT manpower/ equipment 
response capability. At the upper end of the 
spectrum the threat analysis could indicate a 
sophisticated threat posed by groups having 
unique abilities and seeking specifically 
identified targets. This would require an 
SRT of highly trained personnel possessing 
specialized training and equipment. 
However, the need for SRT response 
capabilities cannot be based entirely on the 
external threat, but must be approached 
within the framework of the cferinition of 
special threats found in AR 190-52. Action is 



taken to ensure that the installation and its 
personnel are prepared to meet any potential 
threat. 

The knowledge and understanding of the 
existing threat is a viable tool essential to 
evaluating the installation's vulnerability. A 
survey outlining both the strong and weak 
points in an installation's ability to defend 
against a threat will assist commanders in 
training, equipping, and planning for the 
desired response levels for their SRTs. 
Available resources, materials, and 
personnel are factors that influence 
planning and establishing a workable SRT 
and initial response team. Resource 
availability will impact on the immediate 
SRT response capabilities. The long-range 
action is to plan for the unexpected, counter 
the threat, harden the installation's possible 
targets, and deal with special threats. 

While the SRT will usually be the 
installation's response to special threats, 
consideration must be given to the 
requirement for an expanded response. Since 
it is impossible to predict the magnitude and 
peculiarities of incidents, installations 
identify, train, and equip personnel from 
outside existing MP assets to augment the 
initial response force. SRT actions in 
response to threats are determined by the 
EOC. 



EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 



Command and control actions pertaining 
to SRTs are planned, coordinated, ana 
directed by the EOC which is activated 
immediately when a special threat occurs. 
The TMF, the tactical element of the EOC, is 
drawn from installation resources that 
respond to major disruptions on the 
installation. The TMF commander, 
normally the installation PM or his 
representative, is the on-site commander and 
has operational control for all response 
forces. The TMF commander gathers and 
disseminates information/intelligence about 



the incident and provides it to the EOC. 
Strategic planning decisions are developed 
at thekfc. 

The TMF includes the initial response 
force, inner and outer perimeter security 
elements, SRT, negotiation team, and 
investigative team: 

• The initial response force, normally 
on-duty law enforcement personnel, 
isolates, contains, and evaluates the 
incident, and provides the initial report to 
the PM. 



FM 19-10 



199 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



• Inner and outer perimeter security 
elements secure the incident site, control 
access to the area, and provide security to 
the remainder of the installation. 

• The SRT provides an enhanced response 
capable of controlling the situation. 
During initial employment, the SRT 
begins preliminary tactical planning to 
resolve the situation. (Rescue and assault 
missions are performed only under special 
circumstances.) 

• The hostage negotiation team sets up 
direct communication with the 
perpetrators. Negotiations are conducted 
to further develop the situation for key 
decision makers. 

• The investigative team investigates the 
incident while it is ongoing and concludes 
the investigation alter the incident is 

resolved. 

When selecting SRT personnel, the most 
qualified volunteers are those persons who— 

• Have at least one year of military service 
as MP. 

• Are in the pay grade of E4 or above. 

• Are highly disciplined and morally sound. 

• Are mature and able to handle pressure. 

• Have passed the Army Physical Fitness 
Test. 

• Have a minimum qualification of 

sharpshooter with assigned weapon. 

• Possess individual special skills (that is, 
demolitions, emergency medical 
treatment, and the like). 

• Have prior combat and /or small unit 
operations experience. 

Have prior law enforcement experience. 

Exhibit an ability to work with others. 

Possess good eyesight. 

Can be retained (one year recommended). 

Have had no derogatory data revealed 
during the background investigation. 

Additionally, all volunteers considered for 
selection to SRTs are psychologically 



screened before assuming their duties. This 
screening can be done through command 
channels without any adverse effects to 
individuals or their military careers. 

A suggested SRT consists of not less than 
nine people. This team composition best 
conforms to and allows for the suggested 
rank requirements contained in most MP 
unit TOEs and TDAs. 

Ideally, consideration is given to training 
one or two nine-man teams per installation. 
The goal is to have one SRT available at all 
times. Additionally, as situations dictate, it 
may become necessary to alert or employ 
more than one team and combine or 
augment teams to meet threats beyond the 
capabilities of one nine-man team. 



SPECIAL REACTION TEAM 

The suggested nine-man SRT composition is 
as follows: 

ENTRY ELEMENT 

a ONE TEAM LEADER 

E6 or Above (Civilian Equivalent) 

D ONE POINTMAN 
E4 or Above 

D TWO DEFENSEMEN 
E4 or Above 

D ONE REAR SECURITY 
E4 or Above 

COVER ELEMENT/SECOND ENTRY 
ELEMENT (If Needed) 

a TWO MARKSMEN 
E4 or Above 

a TWO OBSERVERS OR RECORDERS 
E4 or Above 



It is critical to SRT functions that all team 
members be cross-trained in at least one 
alternative position within the team. The 
team leader must be familiar with all 
aspects of each member's duties. 



200 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



SPECIAL REACTION TEAM DUTIES 



TEAM LEADER 

D Organizes and super- 
vises an SRT. 
D Coordinates planning, 

implementation, and 

training, 
a Establishes SRT SOP. 

Records and logs all 

training that team 

receives. 
D Acquires SRT equipment. 

Plans and executes 

assaults. 
D Controls cover and 

entry elements. 
D Determines special 

needs. 
G Ensures team weapons 

and equipment are 

accounted for. 



REAR SECURITY 

□ Provides rear security 
for the entry element 
during movement. 

a Covers the entry 
element during with- 
drawal. 

D Serves as second in 
command to team 
leader. 

D Carries additional 

equipment as necessary. 



POINTMAN 



D Conducts reconnais- 
sance. 

D Recommends primary and 
alternate routes of 
approach. 

D Leads entry element 
during approach. 

O Assists defenseman in 
security role. 

D Carries any special 
equipment and employs 
pyrotechnics at the 
command of the team 
leader. 



MARKSMAN 



O Maintains surveillance 
on the subject area 
from a fixed position. 

D Provides intelligence 
and information to 
team leader while in 
the surveillance role. 

D Neutralizes hostile 
fire with well-planned 
shots at command of 
team leader. 

O Provides cover for the 
entry element during 
initial entry. 



DEFENSEMAN 

□ Provides security for 
the pointman during 
movement. 

D Acts as pointman when 
necessary and protects 
the entry element from 
ambush during approach 
and entry into the 
objective. 

□ Covers the entry 
element during with- 
drawal. 

n Employs pyrotechnics 
at the command of 
team leader. 



OBSERVER OR RECORDER 

□ Records all events 
prior to, during, and 
after the incident for 
use as evidence and 
information in the 
after-action report. 

D Provtdes security for 
the marksman. 

a Assists marksman in 
locating hostile 
personnel. 

n Relieves marksman as 
necessary. 

n Employs CS at the 
command of team 
leader. 



EQUIPMENT 

Selection of equipment used by SRTs is Specific missions and response capabilities 
important to the total effectiveness of the are partially determined by selection, 
team in accomplishing assigned missions. availability, and assignment or equipment. 



FM 19-10 



207 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



It is suggested that an SRT SOP, including 
an equipment list, be included as an annex to 
installation security plans. This action will 
assist inprocuring and programming funds 
for SRT equipment not organic to the 
installation. 

Equipment authorized by CTAs, TOEs, 
and TDAs is used to the maximum extent to 
equip SRTs. Additional government supply 
sources include Self-Service Supply Center, 
Training and Audiovisual Support Center 
(TASCj, US General Services Admini- 
stration (GSA) Supply Catalog, GSA 
Federal Supply Schedule, The Army 
Authorization Documents System (TAADSj, 
and source selection advisory council 
(SSAC). 

Local procurement or one-time purchases 
may initially be necessary to obtain some 
specialized equipment until appropriate 
authorization documents are revised. 
Equipment not listed in an authorization 
document at present, but required, is 



identified and submitted for evaluation and 
approval to the US Army Military Police 
School, Directorate of Combat Develop- 
ments, ATTN: ATZN-MP-CM, Fort 
McClellan, AL 36205-5030, using DA Form 
2028 in accordance with AR 310-34. 

Individual equipment such as load bearing 
equipment, heavy body armor, survival 
vests, and the like, is determined by the 
commander using common sense, careful 
analysis of the opposing threat, and specific 
mission assignment. The basic suggested 
SRT uniform is composed of — 

• Work gloves with liners. 

• Battledress uniform (BDU). 

• Cap, woodland pattern (BDU). 

• Brown T-shirt. 

• Black combat boots. 

• Lightweight body armor. 

• Eye protection. 

• Hearing protection. 





SRT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 






ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Telephone set TA 312 

Disposable cable 
MX-6895/TT (specify 
number of feet) 

Commercial hand-held 

radios 

with secure/securable 

capability surveillance 

package 


V31211 

3895-00089- 7279 
G18575 

NA 


MTOE/TDA 
MTOE/TDA 

MTOE/TDA 


Ti 
ta 

Cl 

m 
M 

N 
©i 


lie equipment listed is intend 
ilored for the installation SRT 
irrent analysis information. C< 
aximum extent. AH commercu 
ost tactical radio systems ha 
ational Security Agency as me 
aerating frequency. 


ed 

. C 
am 
air 
ve 
eti 


to assist comrnanders in ide 
Communications equipment m 
munications equipment organ 
adio equipment is required by j 

this capability. The commerc 
ng regulatory requirements. SI 


nti 
ay 

ic 

&r 

:ial 
RTs 


fytng and procuring equipmer 
be added or deleted based upc 
to the installation is used to tf 
530-2 to be secure or securabl 
radio listed is endorsed by tr 
s should be assigned a dedicate 


t. 
in 
te 
e. 
le 
»d 



202 



FM 19-10 





1 EIYIYWIYIOIVI \^UU1^ 1 ElV/A.^ 


i ±wi> 








SRTEQUfPMENt 










ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Light, safety 


6260-00-1 06-7478 


CTA 50-970 




Luminous tape, 
reflective barricade 




NA 




Federal Supply 
Schedule 93-11 






Camera set SP KS-99C, 
35-mm 




6720-00-602-5099 
C85494 




TASC 






Gloves, leather 




8415-00-268-7870 
J68064 




CTA 50-900 






Portable PA system 




NA 




TASC 






Goggles, protective 




4240-00-816-3819 




GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 






Hearing protection 




NA 




Commercial purchase 






Tape recorder 




NA 




TASC 






manhole hook 




NA 




Commercial purchase 
Unit made/TASC 






BDU 




Basic issue 




CTA 50-900 






BDU cap 




Basic issue 




CTA 50-900 






Boots, black combat 




Basic issue 




CTA 50-900 






Lightweight body 
armor 




80592N 
80593N 




CTA 50-900 






Mask chemical-biological 
without hood 




4240-01-143-2017 
M11895 




TAADS/MTOE 






Disposable handcuffs 




NA 




Commercial purchase 






Work gloves with 
liners 




8415-00-268-7859 
J67379 




CTA 50-900 






Watch, wrist 




6645-00-066-4279 
Y34027 




TAADS 






Knife, pocket 




5110-00-526-8740 




GSA Supply Catalog 
SSAC, CTA 50-970 






Flashlight, with 
red lens 




6230-00-161-6422 




GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 






Tape, pressure sensitive 




7510-00-266-6710 




GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 






Mirror, inspection 




5120-00-618-6901 




GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 






Wedge, door 




5340-00-907-8277 




GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 














CONTINUED NEXT PA&E 





FM 19-10 



203 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 





SRT EQUIPMENT-CONTINUED 






ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Case, first-aid 

White chalk 

3-inch by 5-inch 
index cards 

Load bearing vest 

(pilots) 


8465-00-935-6814 
D64043 

7510-00-223-6706 

NA 

88853N 


CTA 50-900 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

CTA 50-900 


The equipment listed is intended to assist commanders in identifying and procuring equipment 
tailored for the installation SRT, Team equipment may be added or deleted based upon current 
analysis information. Selection of items should be the responsibility of the SRT leader. 







SRT ENTRY iQUlPMENT 








ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Ladder, straight (8 feet) 
Hammer, sledge 
(10 pounds) 
Hammer, hand 

Cutter, bolt, rigid, 
heavy duty 

Bar, wrecking 
Axe, single bit 
Cutter, glass 

Grapple hook 

Rope, fibrous nylon 
600 feet, 1 /2 inch 

Snaplinks (locking) 

Rappelling harness 


5440-00-242-7151 
5120-00-243-2957 

5120-00-892-5485 

5110-00-596-9156 

5120-00-242-0762 

5110-00-293-2336 

5110-00-222-4400 

NA 
4020-00-968-1357 

NA 
83421 N 


CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

Commercial purchase 

GSA Supply Catalog 
CTA 50-970 

Commercial purchase 

CTA 50-900 


T 
ta 
C 
id 


he equipment listed is intend 
ilored for the installation SRI 
enter, Entry equipment may b« 
entified is primarily for rappe 


ed 

r. f 

;ac 
llin 


to assist commanders in ide 
Most of this equipment can b 
Ided or deleted based upon cur 
g and fabrication of rappellin 


ntrl 

rer 
9 s 


fying and procuring equipmen 
purchased through GSA Suppl 
it analysis information. The rop 
eats. 


t 

y 

e 



204 



FM 19-10 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 









SRT WEAPONS 










ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Pistol, 45-caliber 


1005-00-726-5655 


AR 310-34 




automatic (M1911 A1) 




N96741 










Revolver, 38-caliber 




1005-00-214-0934 




AR 310-34 






special, 4-inch 




R91244 










Pistol. .9-mm 




1005-01-118-2640 




AR 310-34 






semiautomatic (M9) 




P98152 










Rifle, 5.56-mm 




1005-00-073-9421 




AR 310-34 






(M16A2) 




R94977 










Rifle, 7.62-mm 




1005-00-179-0300 




AR 310-34 






sniper (M21 ) 




R95422 










Launcher, grenade, 40-mm 




1010-00-179-6447 




AR 310-34 






(M203) 




L44595 










Shotgun, 12-gage 




1005-00-921-5483 




MTOE/TDA 






riot, 20-inch barrel 




T39223 










Shotgun (M520-30) 




1005-00-677-9130 
T39223 




MTOE/TDA 






Shotgun (M620A) 




1005-00-677-9140 
T39223 




MTOE/TDA 






Shotgun, pump 




1005-00-921-5483 




MTOE/TDA 






(MOD 1200) 




T39223 








T 


he weapons listed are available 


3f< 


k use by SRTs and are organic 


c to most TOE units. Weapons and 


weapons systems organic to the organization responsible for SRT are used to the maximum extent 


possible. When the 9-mm pistol is fielded it will replace both the ,45-caliber pistol and the .38-caliber 


revolver. 







SRT WEAPON ACCESSORIES 








ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTH DOCUMENT/REF 
SOURCE 




Telescope (M49) with 


6650-00-530-0960 


MTOE/TDA 




equipment 




V35477 










Binoculars (M17A1) 




6650-00-530-0974 
B67218 




MTOE/TDA 






Night vision 




5855-00-760-3869 




MTOE/TDA 






(AN/PVS-2B) 




N04730 










Night vision goggles 




5855-00-150-1820 




MTOE/TDA 






(AN/PVS-5) 




N04456 










Infrared aiming light 




5855-01-107-5925 




MTOE/TDA 






(AN/PAG-4) (must be 




A34938 










used with AN/PVS-5) 














Pouch, ammunition. 




Weapon dependent 




MTOE/TDA 






with speed loader 



























FM 19-10 



205 



TERRORISM COUNTERACTION 



SRT CONFIGURATION AND SUGGESTED WEAPON ASSIGNMENTS 

ENTRY TEAM 



TEAM LEADER 



45-caliber (M1911 A1) or 
.38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun 



POINTMAN 



45-caliber (M1911 A1) or 
.38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun 



DEFENSEMAN 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun 



DEFENSEMAN 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
.38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun 



REAR SECURITY 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
.38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
1 2-gage shotgun 



COVER TEAM 



MARKSMAN 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
7.62-mm sniper rifle (M21) 



OBSERVER 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
40mm grenade launcher (M203) 



MARKSMAN 



.45-caliber (M1911A1) or 
.38-caliber revolver 
(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 
7.62-mm sniper rifle (M21) 



OBSERVER 



.45 caliber (M1911A1) or 

.38 caliber revolver 

(9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded) 

40 mm grenade launcher (M203) 



206 



FM 19-10 



APPENDIX A 
MP STATION DESIGN 



The public must have access to MP 
station activities to conduct legitimate 
business. These areas must be easily 
accessible and clearly marked. However, 
controls must be established to prevent 
visitors and unauthorized personnel from 
wandering through the station. Such controls 
must not interfere with personnel conducting 
business with the various PM sections. 
Visitors can be controlled by electronically 
operated doors to gain access to the 
information desk. 

The desk must be located so desk personnel 
have an unobstructed view of the station 
entrance and the area around the desk. The 
area directly behind the MP desk is closed to 
the general public. 

The desk is constructed so that desk 
personnel, when seated, are on eye level with 
a person standing in front of the desk, The 
height of the desk may vary, but it must be 
high enough to prevent anyone from 
reaching desk personnel with the intent of 
harming them. If a restraining bar is not used 



in front of the desk, the desk must be sharply 
inclined outward from floor level to the desk 
top to make it more difficult for anyone to 
climb over the desk. The front of the desk is 
reinforced to provide protection from small 
arms fire and shrapnel. 

Proper location of the MP station desk can 
afford desk personnel a clear and 
unobstructed view of the detention cell area, 
eliminating the need for a guard to prevent 
persons in detention from self-inflicting 
wounds or injuries. Space for detention cells 
must be in accordance with AR 190-38 
structure criteria. Waivers of design 
requirements require complete justification. 
Job order requests for structure upgrade of 
existing detention cells must be approved by 
local engineers and submitted as an 
enclosure to the waiver request. 

The back side of the desk can be designed as 
a storage area for forms and desk supplies. 
The work area behind the desk must be large 
enough to permit use of a typewriter and 
telephones. 



MP STATION REQUIREMENTS 



Mission requirements determine the need 
for specific station features. To support the 
basic MP mission, space is required ror— 

• The PM or officer in charge and the duty 
officer. 

• Station desk. 

• Processing offenders. 

• Radio communications. 

• Office space. 

• Conference and interrogation/interview 
rooms. 

• Storage of arms, evidence, and property. 



Briefing/ debriefing patrols and reserves. 
Detention facilities. 
Public waiting room. 
Latrine facilities. 

Parking for employees, visitors, MP 

vehicles. 

Impounded vehicles. 

NCIC terminal room/infrared discrimina- 
tion systems monitor. 

Storage area for riot control and other 

equipment. 

Shower facilities. 



FM 19-10 



207 



Specific station features should include— 

• Outside lighting 360 degrees around the 
station ana a 50-foot "stand off" area free 
of private vehicle parking. 

• Controlled or monitored access to the 
station on all doors. Special entrances 
provided for MP. 

• Interior and exterior doors with plexiglass 
windows for maximum observation, with 
the exception of the door leading from the 
public waiting area to the detention area 
which must not permit observation. This 
door is electrically operated. 

• Maintenance, free internal surfaces. 

• A minimum of exterior windows. Where 
required, either plexiglass or triple glass 
substituted for plate glass. 

• Emergency lighting and power. 

• Separate latrine facilities provided for 
public and station personnel. 

• A field safe for storing property and 
evidence during nonduty hours when a 
custodian is not readily available. 

• Interview rooms with one-way mirrors 
where possible for identification purposes. 

• Private work area for duty officer. This 
area can also serve as an interview room. 

• A break area, out of public sight, for MP. 



Break areas may contain vending 

machines. 

• A communications room with intrusion 
detection alarms for the post exchange, 
finance office, bank, and so forth for rapid 
response. 

• Furniture (in public areas) inconspicu- 
ously secured to the floor to prevent its use 
in a scuffle. 

• Access to detention facilities free of items 
that can cause prisoner injury. 

• Offices that require frequent coordination, 
such as operations and administration, 
located close to one another. 

Efficient design can enhance the security 
of the station, reduce personnel requirements, 
and ensure effective use of station facilities. 
The general planning guidance in each 
example design is based on programming 
factors such as staff composition, 
organizational structure, and physical 
development requirements consistent with a 
hypothetical set of functional and 
operational objectives. Space organization 
principles are based on established 
organizational and functional needs and on 
requirements for the design and construction 
of MP facilities. For more information on 
designingMP facilities, see the Design Guide: 
Military rolice Facilities. 



PLANNING DIAGRAM FOR A LARGE 
MP OPERATIONS FACILITY 



KEY: 

A— ZONE 3— REGISTRATION 
B— ZONE 4— TRAFFIC 
C— ZONE 2— PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
D— ZONE t—PM ADMIN 
E— ZONE 4— OPERATIONS OFFICE 
F— ZONE 5— OPERATIONS SUPPORT 
G— ZONE 5— DETENTION/AWOL 
H— ZONE 5— MP DESK 
I— ZONE 5— PHYSICAL SECURITY AND 
INVESTIGATIONS 



; X- — Staff Entrance to 
*-\^POV Parking 

tJ> Circulation Line to 
<^" p Adjacent Building 




Screening 



208 



FM 19-10 



EXAMPLE OF A LARGE MP OPERATIONS FACILITY 




REGISTRATION SERVICES/ 
VISITOR PARKING 



VISITOR 
ENTRANCE 



§ 



4 ->n ^ i \ 




21 


?1 


9 


?4 



STAFF POV 
PARKING 



KEY: 

PRIMARY FACILITY 

1 PM OFFICE 

2 COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

3 PM ADMIN SUPPORT 

4 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 

5 COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES 

6 REGISTRATION 

7 TRAFFIC 

8 OPERATIONS OFFICE 

9 ADMINISTRATION 
10 LIAISON 



PATROL/POV PARKING 

1 1 COMMUNITY SERVICES 

12 DETENTION/AWOL 

13 INVESTIGATIONS 

14 PHYSICAL SECURITY 

15 MP DESK AREA 

16 BRIEFING/TRAFFIC 



GUARDMOUNT/SECURE 
PARKING/IMPOUND LOT 



17 LOCKERS/SHOWERS 
FOR MALE AND FEMALE 

1 8 OPERATIONS STORAGE 

19 PUBLIC ENTRANCE/ 
LOBBY 

20 PUBLIC RESTROOMS 

21 STAFF TOILETS 

22 STAFF LOUNGE 

23 STAFF ENTRANCES 

24 MAINTENANCE AND 
OPERATIONS SUPPLY 
AREA 

25 MECHANICAL 
EQUIPMENT 



FM 19-10 

161-0160-94-14 



209 



EXAMPLE OF A SMALL MP OPERATIONS FACILITY 



KEY: 

A—ZONE 3- 
8— ZONE 4» 
C— ZONE 2- 
D— ZONE 1- 
E— ZONE 4- 
F—ZONE 5- 
G—ZONE 5- 
H—ZONE 5» 
l—ZONE 5- 



REGISTRATION 
TRAFFIC 

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
PM ADMIN 
OPERATIONS OFFICE 
OPERATIONS SUPPORT 
DETENTION/AWOL 
MP DESK 

PHYSICAL SECURITY 
INVESTIGATIONS 



< * 



F'HIVAU 



To POV , 
J Parking 



>h]ff [. ntrance 





GUARDMOUNT/SECURE 
PARKING/IMPOUND LOT 

PATROL/POV 
PARKING 



KEY: 

PRIMARY FACILITY 

1 PM OFFICE 

2 COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

3 PM ADMIN SUPPORT 

4 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 

5 COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES 

6 REGISTRATION 

7 TRAFFIC 

8 OPERATIONS OFFICE 

9 ADMINISTRATION 

10 LIAISON 

11 COMMUNITY SERVICES 

12 DETENTION/AWOL 

13 INVESTIGATIONS 

14 PHYSICAL SECURITY 




STAFF POV 
PARKING 



OPERATIONS 
f EQUIPMENT 
STORAGE 



15 
16 
17 

18 

19 



MP DESK AREA 
BRIEFING/TRAFFIC 

LOCKERS/SHOWERS 
FOR MALE AND FEMALE 

OPERATIONS STORAGE 

PUBLIC ENTRANCE/ 
LOBBY 



25 



PUBLIC RESTROOMS 

STAFF TOILETS 

STAFF LOUNGE 

STAFF ENTRANCES 

MAINTENANCE AND 
OPERATIONS SUPPLY 

AREA 

MECHANICAL 
EQUIPMENT 



210 



FM 19-10 



APPENDIX B 
Military Police Firearms Qualification 



Military police personnel must be trained 
in the use or the weapon that they carry in the 
performance of their duties. The weapon may 
be the M16, the M1911A1 (.45-caliber pistol), 
the .38-caliber revolver with 4-inch or a 2-inch 
barrel, or the M9 9-mm parabellum 
semiautomatic pistol. FM 23-9 provides 
marksmanship instruction on the M16. 
USACIDC Regulation 195-19 provides 
instruction on the .38-caliber 2-inch barrel 
weapon. The Military Police Firearms 
Qualification Course (MPFQC) described in 
this appendix provides marksmanship 
instruction for the .45-caliber pistol, the .38- 
caliber revolver with 4-inch barrel, and the 9- 
mm parabellum semiautomatic pistol. 

Commanders at all levels are responsible 
for ensuring that personnel entrusted with 
weapons are trained to use the weapons as 
intended and in a safe manner. AR 190-14 
and AR 190-28 establish the requirements for 
granting authorization to carry firearms and 



to conduct training. DA Pamphlet 350-38 
authorizes ammunition for MP personnel to 
qualify yearly with their assigned weapon. 
Yearly qualification includes protective 
mask firing. (See DA Pamphlet 350-38 for the 
protective mask firing requirements.) 

The MPFQC is designed to provide realistic 
and effective police marksmanship training. 
The MP engages single targets at various 
ranges using the standard service weapon. 
The six tables of the MPFQC require the firer 
to fire from 7, 15, 25, and 35 meters. The firer 
uses both the strong, and weak hands in the 
standing and kneeling positions, and the 
strong nand in the prone and crouch 
positions. The MPFQC standards are— 

• Expert, 48 to 50 hits. 

• Sharpshooter, 45 to 47 hits. 

• Marksman, 35 to 44 hits. 

• Unqualified, 34 or fewer hits. 




FM 19-10 



211 



A locally reproduced record of qualification 
should be used and must be forwarded with 
departing personnel as proof of weapons 
qualification at the gaining unit. DA Form 88 



(Combat Pistol Qualification Course 

Scorecard) should not be used for the MPFQC 
because this course does not provide combat 
pistol qualification. 



MPFQC REQUIREMENTS 











/ Co / TIME / 


/ / / * / 4? / & / / 

/£/ g / i / * /i $/■$/ 

/'?/<? / <P /<?/<* <?/'?<?/ INSTRUCTIONS 
















1 


35 m 


Prone 


10 


1 min, 
45 sec 


2 

min 


9- mm/.45-ca liber— Holster weapon. Draw 
weapon, pull slide to the rear, chamber a 
round, and fire five rounds. Change 
magazines at own speed , and fire five 
additional rounds. 


.38-caliber— Fire revolver single- action, 
and reload at own speed. 


II 


25 m 


Standing 

without 

support 

(strong 

hand) 


10 


1 min, 
45 sec 


2 

min 


9-mmA45-caliber— Load one 5 round-maga- 
zine into the weapon initially. On 
command draw the weapon, chamber a round, 
and fire 5 rounds. Change magazines at 
own speed, and fire five additional 
rounds. Use the two-handed position. 
Use the weak hand for support. As an alterna- 
tive use the weak hand to support the strong 
hand by grasping the weapon's grip over 
the strong hand. 


,38-caliber — Fire revolver single- action, 
and reload at own speed. 


III 


25 m 


Standing 

with 

support 

(left 

hand) 

Standing 

with 

support 

(right 

hand) 


5 
5 


45 sec 
45 sec 


45 
sec 

45 
sec 


9-mm/.45-caliber— Load one magazine into 
the weapon initially. On command draw 
the weapon, chamber a round, and fire 
five rounds from the support position 
behind the left side of the barricade, 
using the left hand. Then, from behind 
the barricade, reload the weapon, move to 
the right side of the barricade, and 
fire five rounds with the right hand 
from a supported position. 


.38- caliber — Fire revolver single- action 
and reload behind the barricade at own 
speed. 



CONTINUED NEXT PAGE 



212 



FM 19-10 



MPFQC REQUIREMENTS-CONTINUED 











/ co / TIME / 




/*/$ / i /i//i/.i/ 

/£ / g / g / g /of <? /%3/ INSTRUCTIONS 




1 










- r ..,...,. . 


IV 


15 m 


Standing 

without 

support 

(strong 

hand) 


5 


40 sec 


40 
sec 


9-mm/.45-caliber— On command draw the 
loaded weapon, chamber a round, and fire 
from the standing position without 
support. Use only the strong hand and do 
not support it with the nonshooting hand. 


.38-caliber— Fire revolver double-action. 


V 


15 m 


Kneeling 
with 
support 
(left hand) 
Kneeling 
with 
support 
(right 
hand) 


5 
5 


40 sec 
40 sec 


40 

sec 

40 
sec 


9-mm/.45-caliber— On command draw the 
loaded weapon, chamber a round while 
assuming kneeling position, and fire five 
rounds with the support left hand over 
the top of the barricade. R eload at own 
speed before firing five more rounds. 
Use the right hand and again fire over 
the top of the barricade. 


.38-caliber— Fire the revolver double-action, 
and reload at own speed. 


VI 


7 m 


Crouch 


5 


12 sec 


12 
sec 


9-mm/.45-caliber— On command move forward 
from the 15-meter line with a locked and 
loaded weapon. On command obtain the 
crouch position and engage the target 
with five rounds, using two hands. 


.38-caliber— Fire revolver double-action. 


:.- 












,^ , ••'.'■•:• 










TOTAL 


50 


7 min, 
12 sec 


7 min, 
42 sec 


A summary of the MPFQC. 










NOTE: When the revolver is fired, the firer is issued the number of rounds required to 
fire a specific table. Reloading is done atthefirer'sown speed during the table. 

Loading done prior to the beginning of each table is controlled by the range 
officer or range NCO. 



FM 19-10 



213 



EXAMPLE OF RECORD MPFQC RESULTS 



DISPOSITION FORM 

For use of this form, tee AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGO. 



REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL 

xxxx-xx-x 



SUBJECT 

Record of Military Police Firearms Qualification Course Results 



T0 XXXXXX 



FR0M XXXXXX 



DATE XX XXX XX CMT 1 

XXXXXX/ XX /xxxx 



1 . Reference : 

a. DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training. 

b. FM 19-10, Military Police Law and Order Operations. 

2. The individual listed below completed the Military Police Firearms Qualification Course 
on 14 Dec 87 at Fort Blank, AL and qualified (££$&tt/ sharpshooter /Mt£6Mti) with 47 
hits out of 50 possible hits. 



Name Kenneth B. Lewis 



Rank Staff Sergeant 



SSN 257-52-0014 



Unit B Company, 952d Military Police Battalion, Fort Blank, AL 



3. The individual {drdfiiilUt) 
accordance with reference la. 



complete a protective mask fire for record course in 



^JOHN (jONES 



CPT, MP 

Company Commander/Range Officer 



DA 8St> 2496 



f>ft£VtQ&3"EXttTlOftl& WILL BE USED 



GPO : .1987 O - 172-428 



214 



FM 19-10 



APPENDIX C 
Presenting Statistical Data 



Statistical data can be depicted in a 
frequency distribution table. This data can 
be prepared in a logical order, condensed and 
simplified, and essential details can be 
retained. 

Three steps are required in construction of 
a frequency distribution table. 

• Step 1. The collection of raw data. The 
graphic illustrates raw data on the 
number of offenses per month for different 
age classes from 1/ to 38. Data arranged 
in this manner make it difficult to 
determine which age class has the highest 
total number of offenses for the year. 

• Step 2. This step involves totaling the 
items in each class and arranging them in 
order of magnitude. Such an arrangement 
(whether ascending or descending) is 
called an array. This graphic shows an 
array with yearly total offenses for each 
age listed in descending order. The range 
or total offenses is from 220 to 10 with a 
concentration of offenses in the younger 
age classes and comparatively few 
offenses in the older age classes. 

• Step 3. Finally, in preparing a frequency 
distribution table, classes are combined 
into class intervals or groups. In this 

graphic two-year class intervals have 
een used making it easier to see a large 
concentration. (The largest concentration 
is 423 or the 19-20 age interval.) Other 
data suitable for frequency distribution 
tables include— 

• Accident frequencies. 

• Accident fatalities or injuries. 

• Offenses by categories; that is, assaults, 
robberies, and so forth. 

Data taken from a frequency distribution 
table can then be depicted in a chart or 
graph. A vertical or horizontal bar chart 



may be used to depict the information. Or a 
circle graph or pie chart may be used. A pin 
map chart is another way to graphically 
present the data. 



in 




EBB 






AGE OFFENSES 




AGE OFFENSES 




19 


220 




17 


69 




20 


203 




18 


76 




21 


158 




19 


220 




22 


141 




20 


203 




18 


76 




21 


158 




24 


74 




22 


141 




23 


71 




23 


71 




17 


69 




24 


74 




26 


57 




25 


54 




25 


54 




26 


57 




27 


43 




27 


43 




29 


37 




28 


29 




30 


32 




29 


37 




31 


30 




30 


32 




28 


29 




31 


30 




33 


23 




32 


22 




32 


22 




33 


23 




34 


19 




34 


19 




36 


18 




35 


17 




35 


17 




36 


18 




37 


15 




37 


15 




38 


10 




38 


10 



EB3EI 


NUMBER OF 




AGE 


OFFENSES 




17-18 


145 




19 20 


423 




21 22 


299 




23 24 


145 




25-26 


111 




27 28 


72 




29-30 


69 




31-32 


52 




33-34 


42 




35-36 


35 




37-38 


25 




TOTAL 


1,418 



FM 19-10 



215 



CURVE 

The curve or line chart is probably the 
most widely used form of graphic 
presentation. It is very simple to construct 
and is most effective when the emphasis is 
on movement, rather than amount. The 
curve chart is normally used for data 
covering a long period of time. It is also 



CHART 

possible to compare two or more series on the 
same chart. The curve or line chart may be 
used to show trends in various enforcement 
activities, such as total AWOLs, vehicle 
registrations, offenses, apprehensions, and 
so forth. 




VERTICAL BAR CHART 



Another chart frequently used to depict 
enforcement data is the vertical bar or 
column chart. This chart is also used to 
depict numerical values of a given item over 
a period of time. It may be used for months of 
the year, as shown, for days of the week, for 



hours of the day, or for all three. The chart is 
simple to construct and readily understood. 
The vertical bar chart is preferable to the 
curve chart when a sharper delineation of 
trend is to be shown. 



VERTICAL BAR CHART: AWOL RATES (JAN-JUN 1986) 



FIRST 
HALF 
CALENDAR 
YEAR 
1986 




wmm 



6OT 



4 O 



<° 



JAN 



FEB 



MAR 



APR 



MAY JUN 



216 



FM 19-10 



HORIZONTAL BAR CHART 



The horizontal bar chart is the simplest 
form of graph. Its primary use is to compare 
different items as of a specified date. In MP 
work, the horizontal bar chart is used to 



break down offenses by units, traffic 
violations by specific violation over a given 
period and for a specified date, and similar 
categories. 



HORIZONTAL BAR CHART: SELECTED MILITARY OFFENSES (JUL 1 986) 



AWOL 

ASSAULT (MINOR) 

PASS VIOLATIONS 



UNIFORM VIOLATIONS 
DRUNK OR DISORDERLY 
CURFEW VIOLATIONS 




CIRCLE GRAPH OR PIE (SECTOR) CHART 



The circle graph or pie (sector) chart 
compares various components with each 
other and with the whole. This chart serves 
to direct attention to extreme areas. The 
primary disadvantage of the pie chart is that 



where many segments are involved the chart 
will appear confusing. The small sections of 
the chart will be difficult to label in such a 
case. A bar chart is recommended when 
dealing with numerous components. 



PIE CHART: INSTRUCTIONAL CYCLE BUDGET (1986) 



CALENDAR 
YEAR 1986 



84.4% 

EDUCATION 

AND 

TRAINING 




5.1% 
MISCELLANEOUS 

5.3% 

INSTRUCTIONAL 

MATERIALS 

5.2% 

NEW 

EQUIPMENT 



FM 19-10 



217 



PIN MAP 



The pin map is another way of graphically 
presenting data pertaining to frequency, 
type, and location of accidents or incidents. 
This chart is also considered to be an 
essential element of selective enforcement 
planning, A map of an area is mounted on a 
board capable of holding pins. Locations of 
accidents or incidents are indicated by pins 



stuck into the map at the location where the 
incidents or accidents occurred. Different 
types of accidents or incidents (that is, 
injury, fatality) may be depicted by different 
colored or marked pins. The pin map may be 
used as a yearly record and, if photographed, 
may be compared with succeeding years. 



PIN MAP: TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTS (1986) 



US HH3HW»Y SOI 



FORT TRAFFIC-BOG- 




LEGEMO - 

V riELO SIGN -**» BARRIER 

X TRAFFIC LIGHT --- BOUNDARY 

STOP »!9N 



O TNEEi 



hot wmm to ac*it 



\ \is njzj □ □ ra'izzi'tri f'_j [zITld "r:.J"! 



t 

N 



\ 



i?, 



DEPENDENT MOUSING AREA 



n n r n n □ u dd □ n<? n dj^^ 



_ Vh»\«*J e _ *_ 



j 



218 



FM 19-10 



APPENDIX D 

EXTRACT OF A LOCAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
DETAIL EQUIPMENT LIST 







STANDARD EQUIPMENT 


Ki^^^^^Hi^^H^s 






ITEM 




NSN/LIN 




AUTHORIZED DOCUMENT 
SOURCE 




*Revolver, 2-inch 


1005-00-937-5840 


MTOE/TDA 




.38 caliber 




R91107 










Holster, pancake 




1095-01-070-9454 




CTA 50-900 






with thumb break 














Radio, hand-held 




NA 




GSA contract, 
MTOE/TDA 






First aid kit 




6545-00-922-1200 




CTA 8-100 






Binoculars, M17A1 




6650-00-530-0974 




MTOE/TDA 






(7x50) 




B67218 










Pouch, ammunition. 








CTA 50-900 






.38-caliber/speedloader 




86301 N 










Handcuffs with case 




8465-00-242-7860 




CTA 50-900 






and keys 




KO8204 










Shotgun, 12-gage 




1005-00-921-5483 




MTOE/TDA 






20-inch barrel, riot 




T39223 










Credentials holder 




NA 




CTA 50-900 






Auto, sedan. 




2310-01-090-7738 




MTOE/TDA 






subcompact 




B04725 










Flashlight, 5-cell 




6230-01-169-1611 




CTA 50-900 






Spare batteries. 




6135-00-930-0030 




Self-service 






D-cell 








supply center, 
Commercial 






Vehicle radio 




IMA 




GSA contract 






Surveillance kits 




NA 




GSA contract 




♦Pending change to 9-mm pistol 



FM 19-10 



219 



ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 

This equipment may not be available to a!! details. Many PS missions, based on the threat, 
location, rank, and position of the principal will not require such sophisticated equipment. 



ITEM 



Frequency modulation 
radio system, voice 
secure with base and 
repeater-portable system 

Protective vest, 
MP-1, level II 

Oxygen tube with 
mask, 24-gallon 

ID lapel system 

Hardened vehicle for 
principal, 7.62 
protection 

Partially hardened 

follow vehicle kit 

form to upgrade vehicle 

Mask chemical-biological 



Body alarm system 
transmitter 

Flouroscope, portable 

Metal detector, 
hand-held 

Mobile telephone 



Submachine gun, 9-mm 

Submachine gun, closed 
bolt mini 9-mm 

Shotgun, 12-gage, 
pump with folding stock, 
pistol grip 

Shoulder holster, 
9-mm submachine gun 

Shoulder holster, 
closed bolt mini 9-mm 
submachine gun 

Briefcase, 9-mm, for 
9-mm submachine gun 



NSN/LIN 



NA 

80593N 
6505-00-965-2439 

IMA 
IMA 

NA 



4240-01-143-2017 
M11895 



36890D 

NA 
NA 

35500D 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 
NA 

NA 



AUTHORIZED DOCUMENT 
SOURCE 

GSA contract 



CTA 50-900 



CTA 8-100 



Section 3 to TDA 

Commercial 
lease only 



Commercial 

TAADS/MTOE 

Section 3 to TDA 

Commercial 
AF TA 

Section 3 to TDA 
or augmented TDA 

Commercial 

Commercial 

AF TA 538 

Commercial 
Commercial 

Commercial 



220 



GLOSSARY 




ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 


admin 


administration 


DL 


detail leader 


ADP 


automatic data processing 


DOC 


Directorate of Contracting 


AF 


Air Force 


DOD 


Department of Defense 


AFAP 


Army Family Advocacy Program 


DOJ 


Department of Justice 


AG 


Adjutant General 


DPM 


deputy provost marshal 


APO 


Army and Air Force Post 


DRM 


Directorate of Resource 




Office 




Management 


AR 


Army regulation 


DWI 


driving while intoxicated 


ASAP 


alcohol safety action program 


EDD 


explosives detector dog 


auth 


authorization 


EECI 


1 o 

essential elements of 


AWOL 


absent without leave 




criminal intelligence 


BCC 


battlefield circulation 


EOC 


emergency operations center 




control 


EOD 


explosives ordnance disposal 


BDU 


battledress uniform 


EPW 


enemy prisoner of war 


BEQ 
BER 


bachelor enlisted quarters 
budget execution review 


FACMT 


Family Advocacy Case Manage- 
ment Team 


BIP 


budget increment package 

-1-1,1 . -i 


FAR 


Federal Acquisition Regulation 


BMG 


budget and manpower guidance 


FBI 


1 o 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 
field confinement facility 


BOQ 


bachelor officers' quarters 


FCF 


CA 


commercial activities 


FDF 


field detention facility 


cal 


caliber 


FM 


field manual 


CDR 


commander 


FY 


fiscal year 


cm 


centimeter 


gal 

govt 

GSA 


gallon 

government 

General Services Administration 


CMT 
COB 


crisis management team 
command operating budget 


COMMZ 


communications zone 






CONUS 


continental United States 


HGNT 


horizontal gaze nystagmus 


COR 


contract officer's representa- 




test 




tive 


HN 


host nation 


CRS 


Correctional Reporting System 
chlorobenzalmalononitrile 


HQ 


headquarters 


CS 


hr 


hour 


CTA 


common table of allowances 


IAW 


in accordance with 


DA 


Department of the Army 


ID 


identification 


DCSPER 


Deputy Chief of Staff for 


ICF 


installation confinement facility 




Personnel 


IDS 


infrared discrimination system 


DD 


Department of Defense (forms) 


intel 


intelligence 


DEH 


Directorate of Engineering and 


INSCOM 


United States Army Intelligence 




Housing 




and Security Command 



221 



ISA interservice support agreement 

ITAC Intelligence and Threat Analysis 
Center 

km kilometer 

KO contracting officer 

LIC low-intensity conflict 

LIN line item number 

m meter 

MAC Military Airlift Command 

MACOM major Army command 

MAD major activity director 

MCA Major Construction, Army 

MCM Manual for Courts-Martial 

MDEP management decision package 

MEVA mission essential vulnerable 
areas 

MFR memorandum for record 

MI military intelligence 

min minute 

mm millimeter 

MOS military occupational specialty 

MP military police 

MPDO military police duty officer 

MPFQC Military Police Firearms 
Qualification Course 

MPI military police investigator 

MPIS military police investigative 
supervisor 

MPMIS Military Police Management 
Information Systems 

MPR military police report 

MSR main supply route 

MTOE modification table of organiza- 
tion and equipment 

MWD military working dog 

NA not applicable 

NAC National Agency Check 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NCO noncommissioned officer 

NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge 

no number 

NSN national stock number 

OALE Office of Army Law Enforcement 



OCIR 

OCONUS 

OIC 
OMA 

OPA 

OPSEC 

ORS 

PA 
PAO 
PCS 
PDIP 

PERSCOM 

PI 

PM 

POC 

POM 
POV 
PPBES 

PR&C 
PRAC 

PS 
PSO 

QSTAG 

ref 

rept 

RMO 

ROI 

ROTC 

sec 

SGT 

SIR 

SJA 

SOFA 

SOP 

SOW 

SRT 

SSAC 



other criminal intelligence 

requirement 

outside continental United 

States 

officer in charge 

Operations and Maintenance, 

Army 

Other Procurement, Army 

operations security 

Offense Reporting System 

public address 

Public Affairs Officer 

permanent change of station 

program development increment 

package 

Personnel Command 

protected identities 

provost marshal 

point of contact 

program objective memorandum 

privately owned vehicle 

planning, programming, budgeting, 

and execution system 

purchase request and commitment 

program resource advisory 

committee 

protective services 

personal security officer 

Quadripartite Standardization 
Agreement 

reference 

report 

Resource Management Office 

report of investigation 

Reserve Officers' Training Corps 

second 

sergeant 

serious incident report 

Staff Judge Advocate 

status of forces agreement 

standing operating procedure 

statement of work 

special reaction team 

source selection advisory 

council 



222 



FM 19-10 



SSN 
STANAG 

TA 

TAACOM 

TAADS 

TASC 

TC 

TCP 

TDA 

TDY 

TM 

TMF 

TOA 

TOE 

TRADOC 



social security number 
Standardization Agreement 

table of allowance 
theater army area command 
The Army Authorization Docu- 
ments System 
training and audiovisual 
support center 
training circular 
traffic control post 
table of distribution and 
allowances 
temporary duty 
technical manual 
threat management force 
total obligational authority 
table of organization and equipment 
United States Army Training 
and Doctrine Command 



UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

UFR unfinanced requirement 

USACA United States Army Correctional 

Activity 
USACIDC United States Army Criminal 

Investigation Command 
USACIL United States Army Criminal 

Investigation Laboratory 
USACRC United States Army Crime 

Records Center 
USADIP United States Army Deserter 

Information Point 
USAREUR United States Army, Europe 
USC United States Code 

USDB United States Disciplinary 

Barracks 
USSS United States Secret Service 

VIP very important person 

VRS Vehicle Registration System 



DEFINITIONS 

Amnesty box. A container into which personnel may place any item, without penalty, before customs 
processing. 

Antihijack security. All measures taken to reduce the risk of hijacking aircraft, with particular attention 
to the exclusion of weapons from the passenger compartment of an aircraft. (See Air Force Regulation 60-14.) 

Closed evidence voucher. An evidence voucher concerning evidence from which final disposition has 
been made by the custodian. 

Controlled substance. A drue or other substance, or immediate precursor thereof, listed in 21 USC 812. 
General categories included in this section are narcotics, derivatives of the cannabis sativa plant, 
amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens. 

Crime control. The detection and investigation of crimes and offenses and the apprehension and 
protection of offenders. 

Crime repression. The reduction of crimes and offenses through such measures as patrolling, physical 
security and crime prevention surveys and inspections, observation of persons and places considered 
crime-producing, and employment of off-limits procedures to preclude military personnel from 
participating in activities conducive to crime. 

Criminal complaint. An alleged criminal offense reported to or observed by military or civilian police 
personnel or USACIDC personnel, whether subsequently determined to be founded or unfounded. 

Crisis management team (CMT). A team found at a major command or installation level concerned 
with plans, procedures, techniques, policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism, special threats, or 
other major disruptions occurring on government installations or facilities. The team considers the local, 
national, and international implications of major disruptions and establishes contact with the Army 
Operations Center as the situation escalates, requiring higher level involvement and guidance. Normally 



FM 19-10 



223 



at installation level, the CMT is established at or in proximity to the designated emergency operations 
center. 

Customs exclusion area. Clearly defined area into which cleared customs personnel enter before they 
depart. 

Evidence ledger. The bound ledger or record book kept by the evidence custodian to provide double 
accountability control through cross-reference with the evidence vouchers. 

Evidence voucher. The original DA Form 4137 which, upon presentation to the evidence custodian, 
becomes an evidence voucher. 

Evidence subvoucher. A carbon or reproduced copy of the original evidence voucher used to effect the 
temporary release of evidence for any reason. 

Founded offense. A criminal offense that has been proven to have been committed. The determination 
that a founded offense exists is made by the appropriate police agency and is not dependent upon judicial 
process. 

High-risk personnel. US personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative 
isolation, are more likely to oe attractive or accessible terrorist targets. 

Identified offender. An individual identified by police action as the subject or perpetrator of a criminal 
offense. 

Nonintoxicating malt beverage. Any alcoholic malt beverage having an alcholic content of less than 
3.2 percent by weight. 

Open evidence voucher. An evidence voucher concerning evidence for which the evidence custodian has 
accountability. 

Referral. A process in which the parties in conflict are led to consider some specific form of professional 
counseling service. 

Strategic information. Information that has no immediate applicability but may be used in some future 
investigation or program. Strategic information gathering is a long-range continuous process. 

Tactical information. Information that has immediate applicability to the employment of units in 
combat. 

Total obligational authority (TOA). The total financial requirements of the five-year defense program 
or any component thereof required to support the approved program of a given fiscal year. 

Unfounded offense. A criminal complaint in which a determination is made that a criminal offense was 
not committed or did not occur. The determination is based on police action, not on court-martial or civilian 
court verdict. 



224 FM 19-10 



REFERENCES 



Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to under- 
stand this publication. 

ARMY REGULATIONS 

1-1 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Within the Department 

of the Army 

1-4 Employment of Department of the Army Resources in Support of 

the United States Secret Service 

5-3 Installation Management and Organization 

5-9 Intraservice Support Installation Area Coordination 

5-20 Commercial Activities Program 

10-23 US Army Criminal Investigation Command 

25-400-2 The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS) 

27-10 Military Justice 

27-40 Litigation 

27-50 Status of Forces Policies, Procedures, and Information 

37-103 Finance and Accounting for Installations: Disbursing Operations 

40-12 Medical and Agricultural Foreign and Domestic Quarantine Regulations for 

Vessels, Aircraft, and Other Transports of the Armed Forces 

50-5 Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel— Nuclear Surety 

55-71 Transportation of Personal Property and Related Services 

55-355 Defense Traffic Management Regulation 

75-15 Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

190-5 Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision 

190-9 Military Absentee and Deserter Apprehension Program 

190-10 Security of Government Officials 

190-11 Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives 

190-12 Military Police Working Dogs 

190-13 The Army Physical Security Program 

190-14 Carrying of Firearms 

190-22 Searches, Seizures and Disposition of Property 

190-24 Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards and Off-Installation 

Military Enforcement 

190-27 Army Participation in National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 

190-28 Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties 

190-30 Military Police Investigations 

190-31 Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program 

190-38 Detention Cell Standards 

190-40 Serious Incident Report 

190-45 Law Enforcement Reporting 

190-47 The US Army Correctional System 

190-51 Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level 

190-52 Countering Terrorism and Other Major Disruptions on Military Installations 

FM 19-10 225 

161-016 0-94-15 



310-31 



190-56 The Army Civilian Police and Security Guard Program 

195-2 Criminal Investigation Activities 

195-4 Use of Contingency Limitation .0015 Funds for Criminal Investigative 

Activities 

195-5 Evidence Procedures 

195-6 Department of the Army Polygraph Activities 

210-10 Administration 

215-1 Administration of Army Morale, Welfare^ and Recreation Activities 

and Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities 
215-2 The Management and Operation of Army Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 

Activities and Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities 

Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment 
(The TOE System) b H F 

310-34 The Department of the Army Equipment Authorization and Usage Program 

340-17 Release of Information and Records from Army Files 

340-21 The Army Privacy Program 

360-5 Army Public Affairs, Public Information 

360-61 Community Relations 

380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program 

380-13 Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated 

Persons and Organizations 

380-380 Automation Security 

420-74 Natural Resources: Land, Forest, and Wildlife Management 

500-50 Civil Disturbances 

530-2 Communications Security 

600-3 The Army Specialty Proponent System 

600-8-1 Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs and Line of Duty Investigations 

600-9 The Army Weight Control Program 

600-40 Apprehension, Restraint, and Release to Civil Authorities 

600-290 Passports and Visas 

608-1 Army Community Service Program 

608-4 Control and Registration of War Trophies and War Trophy Firearms 

630-5 Leaves and Passes 

630-10 Absence Without Leave and Desertion 

640-3 Identification Cards, Tags and Badges 

700-84 Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing 

710-2 Supply Policy Below the Wholesale Level 



COMMON TABLES OF ALLOWANCES 

8-100 Army Medical Department Expendable/Durable Items 

50-900 Clothing and Individual Equipment 

50-909 Field and Garrison Furnishings and Equipment 

50-970 Expendable/Durable Items (Except: Medical, Class V, Repair Parts 

ana Heraldic Items) 

226 FM 19-10 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORMS 

88 Combat Pistol Qualification Course Scorecard 

581 Request for Issue and Turn-In of Ammunition 

1594 Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log 

2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms 

2496 Disposition Form 

2804 Crime Records Data Reference 

2806-1-R Physical Security Inspection Report 

2806-R Physical Security Survey Report 

2818 Firearms Authorization 

2823 Sworn Statement 

3626 Vehicle Registration/Driver Record 

3837 and Military Police Investigator Credentials 

3837-1 

3881 Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate 

3945 Military Police Radio Log 

3953 Purchase Request and Commitment 

3975 Military Police Report 

3997 Military Police Desk Blotter 

3998 Military Police Desk Reference 

4137 Evidence/Property Custody Document 

4261 and Physical Security Inspector Identification Card 

4261-1 

4712-R Volunteer Agreement 

4833 Commander's Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action 

5070-R Justification Statement for .0015 Contingency Funds 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLETS 

5-3 Management Improvement Techniques for First Line Supervisors 

5-9 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution System 

190-31 Crime Prevention Handbook 

190-52 Personnel Security Precautions Against Acts of Terrorism 

350-38 Standards in Weapons Training 

420-7 Natural Resources — Land, Forest and Wildlife Management 

600-8 Management and Administrative Procedures 

608-28 Handbook on Volunteers in Army Community Service 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORMS 

460 Provisional Pass 

497 Confinement Order 

553(Test) Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces 

629 Receipt of Prisoner or Detained Person 

1131 Cash Collection Voucher 

1348-1 DOD Single Line Item Release/Receipt Document 

1408 Armed Forces Traffic Ticket 

FM 19-10 227 



1805 United States District Court Violation Notice 

1920 Alcoholic Influence Report 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANUAL 

4160.21-M Defense Utilization and Disposal Manual 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS 

5030.49-R Customs Inspection 

5200.1-R DOD Information Security Program 

FIELD MANUALS 

19-1 Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle 

19-4 Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon Combat Operations 

19-15 Civil Disturbances 

19-20 Law Enforcement Investigations 

19-25 Military Police Traffic Operations 

19-30 Physical Security 

19-35 Military Police Working Dogs 

19-60 Confinement and Correctional Treatment of US Military Prisoners 

21-20 Physical Fitness Training 

21-75 Combat Skills of the Soldier 

23-9 M16A1 Rifle and Rifle Marksmanship 

23-35 Pistols and Revolvers 

90-14 Rear Battle 

100-20 Low Intensity Conflict 

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS/QUADRIPARTITE 
STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS* 

1001 Standardized System of Designating Days and Hours in Relation 

to an Operation or Exercise 

2025/591 Basic Military Road Traffic Regulations 

2085 NATO Combined Military Police 

2154/539 Regulations for Military Motor Vehicle Movement by Road 

2155/561 Road Movement Bid and Credit 

2159/540 Identification of Movement Control and Traffic Control 
Personnel and Agencies 

2253/174 Roads and Road Structures 

TRAINING CIRCULARS 

19-16 Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations 

23-14 Sniper Training and Employment 

90-6-1 Military Mountaineering 

* NATO ST AN AGs /QST AGs are available, upon request, from Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 
Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19210. 



228 



FM 19-10 



TECHNICAL MANUAL 

55-1680-348-10 Survival Kit, Cold Climate, Individual 

USACIDC (CID) PUBLICATIONS** 

Form 36 Field Test Results 

Form 97 Criminal Intelligence Report 

Pamphlet 195-7 Personal Security Assessment Briefings: Action Officers Guide 

Regulation 195-19 Carrying, Using, Safeguarding, and Qualifying with Weapons 

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS 

Air Force Regulation 60-14, Preventing and Resisting Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) 

Bombs By Mail, Document Control Division, Room 2810, US Postal Service Headquarters, Washington, 
DC 20260^1561 4 5 

Commerce Business Daily, Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC 20402-9373 y r b 

Correctional Reporting System Users Manual Commander, US Army Military Police Operations 
Agency, ATTN: PEMP-A, 5611 Columbia Pike, tails Church, VA 220413014 y v 

Design Guide: Militarv Police Facilities, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Military Programs 
Directorate, Engineering Division, Washington, DC 20314 

FBI Form 6-136, Bomb Threat Checklist 

Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements of WorkAssociate 

Administrator, Major Systems Acquisition anarrocurement Strategies, Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy, 726 Jackson Place, NW, Washington, DC 20503 b 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1984 (Revised Edition) 

Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices,Superintendent of Documents, US Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9373 r 

Miscellaneous Publication 8-1, Joint Travel Regulations: Volume 1: Members of the Uniformed 
Services 

Offense Reporting System Functional Users Manual, Commander, US Army Military Police 

Operations Agency, & ATTN: PEMP-A, 5611 Columbia Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041-5014 3 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

United States Code 

Vehicle Registration System Functional Users Manual, Commander, US Army Military Police 
Operations Agency, ATTN: PEMP-A, 5611 Columbia Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041-5014 y 

Work Schedule Design Handbook: Methods for Assigning Employees' Work Shifts and Days 

Oft US Department omousing and Urban Development,TTUD User, P.O. Box 280, Germantown, MD 



** Determine availability of USACIDC publications by contacting Headquarters, US Army Criminal 
Investigation Command, ATTN: CIPP-PD, 5611 Columbia Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041. 

FM 19-10 229 



INDEX 



Absentee program, 70 

Adjutant general, 165 

After-action report, 183, 197 

Alcohol abuse. See Substance abuse 

Alcohol influence report, 68 

Alcohol safety action program, 60 

Amnesty box, 121 122 

Antiterrorism, 168 

Apprehension, 99, 102, 108-115, 121-122, 137 

absentee, 9, 12-14 

authorization, 108 

AWOL, 13-14 

dependent juvenile, 109 

deserter, 12-14 

felony, 108 

juvenile, 109 

law of, 108 

military, 108 

misdemeanor, 108 

search, 112-113 
Area security, 5-6, 44 

Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, 
36, 59, 86 

Army community service, 24 
Article 31, 51, 111, 135. See also Rights warning 
Assimilative crimes act, 48, 80 
Authority 

military, 45 

to apprehend, 108 

to apprehend juveniles, 109 

Barricades, 110 

Basis of knowledge, 94 

test, 95, 112 
Battlefield augmentation, 17 
Battlefield circulation control, 5-6, 44, 64 
Battlefield operations, 17-18 
Blood alcohol content, 69 
Bomb scene officer, 117 
Bomb threats, 117, 190-192, 194-195 
Border control. See Customs control posts 
Border patrol, 119 
Budget 

biennial program, 34 

budget year, 29, 32 

command operating, 32, 34 

elements of resource, 30 

execution review, 32 

execution year, 34 

increment packages, 29 



management decision packages, 28 

planning, programming, budgeting, and 

execution system, 28-29 

program analysis and resource review, 28 

program development increment packages, 29 

program objective memorandum, 28 

program resource advisory committee, 31, 34 

T account, 29-30 

total obligational authority, 28 

Checkpoints, 110 
Chemical breath testing, 69 
Citizen's arrest, 108 
Civil disturbance, 40 
Civilian guards, 108 
Civilian liaison, 11 
Civilian police, 8, 108, 110 

radio, 8 

station, 8 
Civilian personnel, 9, 41, 46 
Civilian personnel office, 8 
Commercial activities, 9, 19. See also Contract 

review, 19 
Communications, 10-11, 12, 194 

zone, 160, 162 
Community 

civilian, 14 

military, 45 
Community relations, 8 

program, 13 
Comptroller, 34 
Confinement. See Prisoner 
Contingency funds .0015, 30, 146, 175 
Contraband, 103, 119, 122 

confiscation of, 103 

disposition of, 147 
Contract 

officer, 20-22 

officer representative, 20-22 

quality assurance plan, 20 

services, 19-20 

statement of work, 20-21 
Cordon, 110 
Corps commander, 18 
Correctional reporting system, 39-40 
Covert 

investigator, 156 

operations, 156-158 
Crime 

analysis, 77 



230 



FM 19-10 



Crime prevention, 12-13, 55 

education, 55 

information, 55 

inspections, 56 

officer, 56 

plan, 56 

program, 12-13, 55 

section, 56 

survey, 55-56 
Crime records data reference, 80 
Criminal intelligence, 35 37, 103, 151 153 

analysis, 169 

coordinator, 152 

gathering, 151, 168 

system, 151 
Criminal investigations 

command authority, 141-142 

command responsibilities, 141-142 

conduct, 142 

purview, 141 

supervision, 148-150 
Customs, 70, 119-123 

control point, 119 

control posts, 119 

exclusion area, 122 

inspections, 120, 122 

laws, 119 

personnel, 119-121 

procedures, 121-123 

violations, 120-121 

Daily staff journal. See DA Form 1594 

Declared items, 122 

Defiles, 64 

Department of Defense, 41 

guard, 17, 22-23, 111 

police, 22-23, 111 
Department of Justice, 43, 172 173, 199 
Department of State, 199 
Deserter 

apprehension, 12-14 

program, 70 
Desk 

blotter, 10, 40, 53-54, 80-81, 109. See also DA 

Form 3997 

operations, 10-11 

reference, 52 

sergeant, 10-11, 74, 77, 80, 84, 109, 126, 193 
Detention. See Juvenile 
Division commander, 18 
Division PM, 17 
Driver 

licensing, 67 

records, 67 

safety, 68 



Driving 

privileges, 39, 61, 67 

while intoxicated, 60, 102 

while under the influence, 49, 68 
Drug abuse. See Substance abuse 
Drug enforcement administration (DEA), 43, 
129 

Drugs, 54, 94-95, 112 
Duty officer, 12, 84 
Duty officer's log. See DA Form 1594 

Echelon commander, 17 

Emergency operations center (EOC), 193-194, 

199 

Enemy prisoner of war, 5, 160 

Evacuation, 194 

Evidence, 93, 134 

custodian, 144-145 

custody document, 54, 144 

disposition, 145-148 

marking, 144 

physical, 143 

preservation, 144 

receipt, 93 

records, 144 

testimonial, 142-143 
Explosives detector dog. See Military working 
dogs 

Family advocacy 

case management team, 131-132, 134, 137 

program, 131 

program coordinator, 131 
Family members, 132 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 42-43, 
147, 172-173 

Federal district court, 47 
Field confinement facilities, 160-161 
Field detention facilities, 160 

equipment, 161 
Field sobriety test, 69 

horizontal gaze nystagmus, 69 

one legged stand, 69 

walk and turn, 69 
Files 

activity, 40-41 

area, 40 

criminal intelligence, 151 

depository, 145-146 

individual, 41 

investigatory, 41 
Fingerprints, 113 

juvenile, 53, 143 
Firearms, 176 

qualification, 211-214 



FM 19-10 



231 



Foreign national police. See Host nation 

police 

Forms 

DA Form 88 (p. 212) 

DA Form 581 (pp. 146-147) 

DA Form 1594 (pp. 10, 54, 80) 

DA Form 2028 (p. 202) 

DA Form 2496 (pp. 145, 214) 

DA Form 2804 (pp. 80, 82) 

DA Form 2806-i-R (p. 57) 

DA Form 2806-R (p. 57) 

DA Form 2818 (P. 176) 

DA Form 2823 (p. 52) 

DA Form 3626 (pp. 66-67) 

DA Form 3837 (p. 15) 

DA Form 3837-1 (p. 15) 

DA Form 3881 (pp. 51-52) 

DA Form 3945 (p. 78) 

DA Form 3953 (p. 20) 

DA Form 3975 (pp. 39, 40, 52, 54, 66, 68, 78, 82, 

121, 129, 142, 148) 

DA Form 3997 (pp. 10, 52, 81, 109) 

DA Form 3998 (pp. 52, 54) 

DA Form 4137 (pp. 54, 119, 145-146, 148, 161) 

DA Form 4261 (p. 58) 

DA Form 4261-1 (p. 58) 

DA Form 4712-R (p. 24) 

DA Form 4833 (pp. 39, 145) 

DA Form 5070-R (p. 30) 

DD Form 460 (pp. 10, 14) 

DD Form 497 (p. 165) 

DD Form 553 (Test) (p. 42) 

DD Form 629 (pp. 161, 629) 

DD Form 1131 (pp. 146-147) 

DD Form 1348-1 (p. 147) 

DD Form 1408 (pp. 66-68) 

DD Form 1805 (pp. 47, 66-67) 

DD Form 1920 (p. 68) 

FBI Form 6-136 (pp. 190-192) 

USACIDC Form 36 (p. 146) 

USACIDC Form 97 (p. 152) 
Freedom of information act, 37, 41, 153 

officer, 153 
Frisk, ,101, 112 

Gambling, 59 
Game warden, 16 
Garden plot, 199 
Gate inspections, 68 
Guard services, 46 
Gun control act, 71 

Heavy division combat support MP 
company, 17 

Host nation, 7-8, 62, 119, 124, 172-173 
police, 119-120, 169 



Informant, 95 
Information 

collecting, 37 

police, 35 

releasing, 37 

sources of, 40 
Inspections, 102 103 

automobile, 9 

gate, 68 
Installation commander, 24 
Installation confinement facility, 11, 15, 164- 
166 

organization, 165 
Installation planning board, 31 
Interrogations, 153-156 
Interviews, 135-137, 153-156 
Inventories, 102-103 

vehicle, 102 
Investigations, 11-12, 124-158 

child abuse, 131-134 

child neglect, 131-134 

combat criminal, 124-125 

customs violations, 139-140 

domestic disturbances, 126-129 

joint, 129 

law and order, 126 

rape, 130-131 

reports of abnormal behavior, 138-139 

spouse abuse, 126 

substance abuse, 129 

suicide, 137 
attempts, 137 
threats, 137 
Juvenile, 14-15, 39, 107 

apprehension, 109 

behavior, 14, 63 

blotter entry, 109 

council, 64 

court, 62 

crime, 14 

delinquency, 14, 62-63 

detention, 53-54, 142-143 

diagnostic interview, 62-63 

interview, 109 

jurisdiction, 62, 109 

offense, 62, 142 

officer, 62-63, 109 

overseas, 62-63 

photographs, 53 

protection of, 84 

records, 37-38 

rights, 109 

victims, 109 
Jurisdiction, 47, 48 



232 



FM 19-10 



civil, 49 
concurrent, 48 

criminal investigations, 141-142 
exclusive, 47 
federal, 23, 48 
legislative, 48 
military, 45, 48-49 
proprietorial, 48 
state, 48 
Law and order, 5-6, 9, 35, 44, 55, 72, 83 
battlefield, 5, 44, 159, 167 
peacetime, 5-6, 44, 159, 167 
Law enforcement, 8-9, 45 
measures, 73 
operations, 44-45 
planning, 77 
programs, 55 
volunteers, 23 

coordinator, 25 

job descriptions, 24 

orientation, 25-26 

removals, 27 

training, 26 
Light division combat support MP company, 
17 
Low intensity conflict, 6, 180-181 

Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), 23, 44, 46, 

80, 124, 165 

Memorandum of understanding, 43 

Military 

judge, 94, 111 

law, 48 

law of evidence. See Uniform Code of Military 

Justice 

magistrate, 94, 111 
Military police 

combat, 5-7 

combat service support, 6-7 

combat support, 5-7 

company, 9 

information cards, 40 

information file, 41 

management information system, 39 

operations, 8 

patrols, 13, 16-17 

radio log, 78 

report, 12, 35, 77-79, 132, 149. See also 

DA Form 3975 

station, 9, 109, 207 
design, 207 

team, 17-19 

uniform, 15 

victim aid, 130-131 
Military police investigators, 1445, 56, 109, 



124-125, 141-142, 154-155, 175 
clothing, 15 

credential control log, 16 
credentials, 15 
equipment, 15 
section, 15-16 
supervision, 15, 148-150 
Military working dogs, 12, 18, 86 y 114-118 
battlefield employment of, 114, 116 
capability of, 114, 116 
certification of, 19 
employment of, 114 
explosives detector, 19, 114, 117-119 
handler, 18, 114-115, 118 

qualifications, 18 

training, 18 
narcotics detector, 18-19, 114, 116-117, 119 
patrolling, 115 

foot patrol, 115 

mobile patrol, 115 
recertification of, 19 
teams, 17-19, 114-118 
tracking, 114, 116 
training, 19 
Miranda rights. See Article 31 
Modus operandi, 153 

Narcotics detector dog. See Military working 

dogs 

National crime information center (NCIC), 

12, 25, 42 

computer, 77 
Neighborhood crime watch, 13 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), 45, 119 

Offense analysis, 74 

Offense reporting system, 12, 39 

Office of Army Law Enforcement, 32-33, 42 

Off-limits. See Armed Forces Disciplinary 

Control Board 

Operations security (OPSEC), 13, 168470 

Outside continental US (OCONUS), 9, 62, 86, 

142 

Patrol 

areas, 12 

dogs. See Military working dogs 
operations, 9 
Patrols, 13, 16 
courtesy, 17 

Photographs, 51, 134, 144 

juvenile, 53, 143 
Physical injuries, 54 
Physical security, 12-13, 57-58, 170 

inspection, 13, 57 



FM 19-10 



233 



inspector identification card, 58 

operations, 11 

plan (and program), 12-13 

programs, 57 

survey, 13 
Plain view, 93, 96, 99 
Police and school liaison, 63 
Posse comitatus act, 47, 103, 108, 199 
Pretrial lineup, 51 
Prisoner, 159, 160-166 

confinement, 159-160 
philosophy, 164 
posttrial, 15, 164 
pretrial, 15, 160, 164 

custody, 164 

detention, 160 

evacuation, 162 

on battlefield, 160 

transfer, 15 
Privacy act, 37, 153 

Probable cause, 93-94, 103, 111, 113, 135 
Property custody document, 54 
Prostitution, 59 
Protected identities, 80, 109 
Protective services, 12, 174-189 

equipment, 219 

operations, 180-183 

principles, 178-179 

responsibilities, 184, 188 
Provisional pass. See DD Form 460 
Provost marshal, 7, 17, 53, 56, 58-59, 65, 74-75, 
131, 147, 160, 165-166, 168, 175, 182, 198-199 

command, 7 

corps, 17 

deputy, 8 

installation, 7-8 
organization, 9 

office, 9-14 

resource plan, 28 

Public affairs officer, 38 
Public relations, 11 
Pursuit, 110 
Pursuit rule, 97 

Radio operator, 11 
Raid, 103-107 

authorization, 93-94, 103 

composition, 105-106 

conduct, 93 

equipment, 106 

execution, 107 

factors, 104 

government property, 103 

jurisdiction, 93 

party, 105-106 



planning, 103-105 

probable cause, 103 

reconnaissance, 106-107 

subjects of, 107 

teams, 105-106 
Rate per standard unit, 76 
Records and forms, 77 
Reliability test, 95, 112 
Reporting 

child abuse, 132 

child neglect, 132 

domestic violence, 126 
Reserve component, 9, 45 
Reserve forces, 17-18 
Right to privacy, 100 
Rights warning, 49-51, 113. See also Article 31 

waiver, 51 

Safety office, 16 
Search 

abandoned property, 100 

area, 99 

automobile, 98-99, 112 

body cavity, 101 

consent, 100 

fire, 101 

garbage, 100 

government property, 97 

identification, 97-98 

nonconsensual, 101 

trash, 100 

warrant, 111 
Search and seizure, 96-97 

authorization, 97 
Searches, 93-94, 96-101, 119, 121, 195 
Seizing body fluids, 101 
Seizures, 96-97, 119 

receipts, 119 
Selective enforcement, 35, 73-76 

analysis, 73 

data, 74 
Serious incident report, 12 
Sources, 152 

covert, 152 

overt, 152 
Special reaction team, 11, 16, 171, 198-206 

composition, 200 

duties, 201 

employment, 198 

equipment, 201-206 

priorities, 198 
Speed detection, 66 
Speed measuring devices, 66 
Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), 12 14, 37, 41, 46- 
47, 49, 59, 61-62, 68, 71, 77, 86, 94, 101, 103, 108-109, 



234 



FM 19-10 



117, 134-135, 143, 145-150 

Standing operating procedure (SOP), 104, 

109, 131, 193 

Statistical data, 74 76, 215-218 

Status of forces agreement (SOFA), 37, 45, 59, 

77, 119-120, 142, 146, 172-173 

Substance abuse, 129 

alcohol, 60-61, 65 

drugs, 60-61, 65, 116, 129 
Surveillance, 103, 156-157 
Sworn statement, 52 

Tactical MP units, 7, 17, 114 

Terrorist counteraction, 6, 36, 171 

Theater army area command (TAACOM), 7, 

160, 162 

Theater of operations, 7, 35-36, 44 

Threat analysis, 199 

Threat management force (TMF), 171, 199 

Traffic 

accident, 10, 64 

investigation, 64 
citations, 67 
control, 11, 64-65 
plan, 65 
points, 9, 160 
posts, 6, 65 
studies, 64 
devices, 65, 66 
laws, 64-65 
measures, 64 
offenses, 66 
orders, 65 
patrols, 65 
aircraft, 86 
foot, 85 
motor, 85 
one-man, 86 



points, 65 
regulations, 65 

Undercover operations. See Covert operations. 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 

23, 45-46, 49, 51, 53, 59, 80, 108, 121, 124, 129, 135, 

211 

US Army Correctional Activity (USACA), 

164, 166 

US Army Crime Records Center (USACRC), 

15, 25, 42-43, 82, 145, 147-148 

US Army Criminal Investigation Command 

(USACIDC), 7, 13-14, 30, 37, 39, 42-43, 80, 95, 103, 

108, 124-125, 129-131, 133, 141-142, 144, 147-148, 

150-153, 162, 168-169, 173, 175, 180, 182 

US Army Criminal Investigation 

Laboratory (USACIL), 145, 147 

US Army Deserter Information Point 

(USADIP), 13, 42 

US Code, 24, 50, 80, 111, 199 

Title 10 (pp. 37, 47, 62) 

Title 18 (pp. 46-48, 59, 62, 80) 
US district court, 67 
US magistrate, 108 

court, 47, 67 

system, 46 
Use of force, 108 

deadly, 108 

Vehicle 

check 13 

registration, 39, 64, 66 
system, 12, 39 

Vice control programs, 58 

War crime, 125 

Wildlife law enforcement, 12, 16, 70 



FM 19-10 



235 



FM 19-10 

30 SEPTEMBER 1987 



By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 



CARL E. VUONO 

General, United States Army 
Chief of Staff 



Official: 



R. L. DILWORTH 

Brigadier General, United States Army 
The Adjutant General 



DISTRIBUTION: 

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A, Require- 
ments for Military Police Operations (qty rqr block no. 1048). 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1994 0— 161-016 



PIN: 007163-000