COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND FORCE PROTECTION
PART-1
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR J&K UNITS IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT URI TERRORIST ATTACK
Keshav Mazumdar
Antiterrorism Officer
As- Deg Military Sc,Dip Criminolgy (Level-A),HRC,CAS,CPO,ASC,CMAS,FNWMC
Intelligence has two objectives:
First, it provides accurate, timely, and relevant
knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.
The second intelligence objective is that it assists in
protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence
includes both active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable
information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes
activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism.
Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping
the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security
measures.
Stated differently it acts as an early warning system by
attempting to provide accurate and timely information about the adversary’s
intention, and the surrounding environment. It also provides a
counterintelligence tool to deny the adversary valuable information and also to
combat terrorism, subversion and espionage. Thus intelligence is protective,
exploitative and positive in that it supplies us with positive intelligence
about the adversary and protects our own infrastructure. Intelligence thus
renders our actions either offensive or defensive.
“Intelligence supports the commander’s force protection
needs by estimating an enemy’s intelligence, terrorism, espionage, sabotage,
and subversion capabilities as well as recommending countermeasures against
those capabilities’’
Today’s war scenario is of the 4th Generation type.
Asymmetry has factored in most battle or tactical operations to a great deal.
In fact most of the conflicts around the Globe are asymmetrical in nature ,
with the players in the combat environment being terrorists, insurgents with
very limited firepower , elusive and most of the time operating while mobile ,
very less identifiable with no conventional forces insignia , very limited
personnel strength , distributed and sporadic operational tactics, undefined
infrastructure logistical capabilities on one hand and a national power or
allies with a formidable military, attack and defense platforms and a central
military organization with subordinate headquarters and units spread at unique
identifiable geographic locations. Hence not to be subdued by this disparity
between themselves and govt. forces the asymmetric adversary
resorts to sudden, sporadic, hit and run type attacks on
the forces bases , installations , camps , ordnance depots, communication
systems, personnel and information systems with the sole objective to degrade
the forces combat capability and kinetic termination of its key leaders at top
echelons or middle and ground level tactical units. A kill is a kill. A kinetic
hit is a kinetic hit. Whether it’s a bazooka attack destroying an armored
personnel carriers drive system immobilizing it or whether it’s a timed
explosion resulting in the destruction of a combat helicopter in the hangar ,
the end result is the same….we have lost combat capability. In this fashion
attacks on our installations,camps,bases,personnel and information
systems/communications are designed to degrade our capabilities, exhaust our
ordnance on nonexistent targets or dummy targets / proxy targets (deceptive
measures of the adversary) –this realm of Threat to our forces itself while in
transit or before deployment or in personnel stations and bases and the Govt.
forces actions to thwart these threats with intelligence feeds predicating the
plans/COAs design is called Force Protection.
CI supports Command Force Protection efforts by:
∙Identifying the potential threat forces and
multidisciplinary threat intelligence
∙Identifying threat capabilities and intent together with
the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action
(keeping all the possible COAs parallel for review)
∙Using deception to mislead the enemy about our
capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions.
CI & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:
∙Protecting classified information
∙Protecting critical resources
∙Protecting weapons and weaponry systems
∙Safeguarding visitors to the installation
∙Protecting dignitaries
∙Protecting Senior government officials or military
senior stafdf visiting the installation or areas outside the installation but
falling within military jurisdiction
∙Sustain mission objectives
∙Protect information systems
Within the installation thee may be specific
person/s,resources,assets,activity,operation or information that if targeted by
the enemy can adversely affect the installation operations , mission objectives
or any risk dimension—in other words it has ‘’Target value’’ to the adversary.
During security planning such entities should be identified (in most cases
using red-teaming or counterintelligence support to vulnerability assessment)
and secured against enemy actions. Include with this the need to ascertain what
adverse effects the local threat can have over the installation as a whole and
what missions or contingency plans can be designed to support the installation,
and what results is the minimum security requirements in the light of the
threat perceived due to the existence of local threat forces.
Local threat assessment usually provides a threat picture
specific to a single installation or grouping of installations based on the
threat factors mentioned above. This means that each installation may have
specific security requirements tailored to its individual assessment.
Resource economy-probably the most important factor in
inefficient Force protection
Due to erroneous planning, or improperly defining
intelligence requirements or even due to enemy deceptive/denial measures it
could very well be that the Commander deploys his resources, combat power and
other combat-related assets in the wrong place and time thus exhausting/wasting
them and hence resource economy is of prime consideration during any mission
and to this end the value of intelligence cannot be overstated. These false
responses can be limited and brought down to a minimum by specific, timely and
accurate intelligence. Intelligence helps the commander to prioritize his
security options. The commander can direct his efforts towards the most
important requirements, such as handling the most serious security risks first,
mitigate the threat/s which is of lesser severity and accept the inevitable
danger and be prepared for risks which are of least severity. Thus the
countermeasures will be more appropriately directed against the enemy without
any wastage of resources, manpower or lessening in combat effectiveness. All
this proper threat driven intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the
term ‘’threat-driven’’ assuming greater significance as it then goads the
commander to know the unknown aggressively. It should be emphasized that other
security agencies should be consulted and information shared with them, both
horizontally and vertically to get a complete picture of the threat.
CI/HUMINT Support to Force Protection: Whether conducting liaison, a Threat/ Vulnerability
Assessment (TVA), or a HUMINT collection operation, the focal point for most
CI/HUMINT operations is providing support to Force Protection. There are three
critical pieces to this support mission on which we focus:
a. Know the Threat: The development of a MDCI Estimate is
critical prior to any deployment. Once contingency areas are identified, the
HUMINT Single Source Cell within the Control HQ begins developing and maintaining these products.
As the Battalion operational plan
develops, HUMINT operation management teams aid HUMINT Single Source in
gathering information on the AO. The turf is broken down and CI/HUMINT teams
work to become subject matter experts on the customs, culture, government, and
geography of their given areas. Once in the contingency area, conducting
liaison is always the first step. Without the initial preparation to gain
knowledge of the area, the team would be incapable of "hitting the ground
running" and making the initial liaison contacts required to quickly
assess the threat to the force. We look to identify and maintain contact with
local police, intelligence, and security agencies; Private Volunteer Organizations
(PVO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO); and allied counterparts.
Through this liaison the development of CI Force Protection Source Operations
(CFSO) occurs. CFSO operations provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) of
potential threats to our Forces.
b. Know your Vulnerabilities: Once the threat has been established,
the CI/HUMINT teams move their focus toward conducting Threat/Vulnerability Assessments
(TVA) on critical army assets and potential enemy targets. The identification
of friendly critical assets is derived from determining what the Army Commander
considers as his centers of gravity and those assets that compose and support
it. Some traditional critical assets include C3 nodes, logistics sites, aviation and
ADA assets, and counterfire radars. The TVA analyzes all the aspects of
physical security, personnel security, information security, and communications
security. The TVA measures the current threat capabilities against emplaced
security measures and operating procedures to identify vulnerabilities. Again,
without the previous research in identifying the threat and in conducting
liaison, the team would be incapable of making a valid identification of
vulnerabilities.
c. Provide Countermeasures: Providing valid countermeasures is
often a difficult task to strike the right balance of security with the given
assets and environment. Too restrictive of security measures rapidly degrades
operational sustainment and builds
distrust in the people we are trying to protect as we continue to throw
barriers between us and them. Too lax of security measures provides the enemy
with his target of opportunity and forces the Army to pay for a costly mistake
in the loss of lives, material, and status in the world's eye. Providing predictive
intelligence coupled with valid countermeasures is the apex of CI/HUMINT
support to force protection. One
tool that we can use with good success
in providing predictive intelligence is the 24-hour time-event chart. The
24-hour time-event chart graphically depicts incident reporting on a 24-hour
clock chart. Over the span of a couple days, the chart displays the enemy's
operational patterns. From this pattern, the analyst can determine enemy sleep
cycles, movement, and attack times, aiding the analyst in predicting enemy
activities over the next 24 hours. Countermeasures can then be applied to avoid
enemy contact on unfavorable grounds and increase defense measures during most
likely times of enemy attacks.
DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CI AND HUMINT:
CI Does
Not Equal HUMINT
CI and HUMINT , although sharing
most of the time similar collection techniques , are not the same thing in the
sense that CI is not a subset of HUMINT.HUMINT is an intelligence discipline
whereas CI is a multidiscipline function supporting HUMINT.We should not
confuse the information collection methods and operational intention. This
incorrect doctrinal terminology error will lead to a weakening of both/
HUMINT is solely concerned with
collection , not the purpose of collection of the
information or
the requirements which predicate this collection. Yes the HUMINT collector is
aware that the purpose of his collection efforts are
geared to collecting information from designated human sources using specific
collection techniques. In this sense he is conducting a ‘’pure’’ collection
effort, not concerned with what this information will be used for and what
necessitated the collection in the first place.HUMINT
collection includes “operations conducted using
HUMINT collection techniques regardless of the ultimate use of that
information.” HUMINT
activities include a great variety of operations, analysis, and liaison duties.
CI on the other hand uses human
sources too as source of information but goes few steps further in that CI is
aware of the intent of collection and aggressively uses specific techniques to
either neutralize or exploit the enemy intelligence activities using the
gathered information. Most of the techniques in his repository are similar to
that of the HUMINT agent; It is this use of HUMINT skills, particularly
investigation and source operations that has created the confusion. CI is a
multidiscipline function with the purpose to
detect,identify,deter,exploit.neutralize the enemy’s collection
Hence we
must not tend to associate CI solely with HUMINT collection nor define HUMINT
in terms of CI.Commanders should understand this.It should not be the
prerogative of only intelligence personnel.Commanders,staff officers of
operations etc functions should understand this intelligence issue clearly so
as to synchronize ops well with intelligence.ISR effort should not be degraded
by weaknesses in both HUMINT and CI as a result of this confusion.CI and HUMINT
are highly complimentary. Very true but of opposing mindsets.
Conclusion
HUMINT collection and CI are and
will continue to become increasingly important as we enter the 21st century.
Both efforts are vital to mission success across the entire spectrum of
operations. The understanding of the doctrinal distinction between HUMINT
collection and CI is fundamental. This distinction drives the doctrinal
description of both efforts and our understanding of how they are mutually
supportive and intertwined in stability operations and support operations.
Whatever be the divisions in
function or overall structure, HUMINT and CI are indispensable to thwart enemy
intelligence activities, to conduct force protection in a optimum manner, to
keep our forces
Improving
Army CI Doctrine
The first step in improving the
Army’s ability to collect force protection intelligence is building appropriate doctrine that clarifies the role
of Army Intelligence and CI personnel.
Make its information operations doctrine more complete by publishing
comprehensive CI doctrine. This doctrine should explain the primary CI missions
of collections, investigations, operations, and analysis and production.
Doctrine
guides the employment of military forces, and shapes how military professionals
“think about the use of the military instrument of national power”. Army
doctrine details a basic understanding of the tactics , techniques and
procedures to be employed to support combat requirements. Air Force doctrine
provides commanders and their staffs a basic understanding of how various Air
Force organizations can be used to meet or support combat requirements.
INDIA historically lacked
comprehensive CI doctrine.This lack of doctrine has resulted in confusion, and
hampered the ability of Force commanders to use CI to improve force protection
efforts.
Force protection efforts must be
threat driven.Vulnerabilities should be identified , the corresponding threats
identified and then protective measures are put in place.To this end MI and CI
play a very important role.This should be the basis for the creation of a
comprehensive CI doctrine. .
“CI is the systematic acquisition
of information concerning espionage, sabotage, insurgency, and related foreign
activities conducted for or on behalf of foreign nations, entities,
organizations, or persons and that are directed against or threaten our
military interests.” To this end a variety of HUMINT sources , like walk ins ,
casual sources , defectors , official sources , liaison contacts , recruited
sources are employed by CI elements. CI collections and investigations lead to
a repository of information on threats.Thereafter by cueing other intelligence
disciplines and using all source analysis a complete picture of the threat is
obtained.Thus we reach our main objective— the precise warning of hostile
attack and we also identify the probable targets of the attack and the time of
attack.In a nutshell CI usage of HUMINT is the first line of defence.
Army force protection requires a
separate force protection doctrine. Not only intelligence personnel will
benefit from the doctrine directly but also tactical commanders who must have a
basic knowledge about force protection so as to understand what requirements
ought to be defined and handed over to the intelligence and counterintelligence
personnel to adequately protect the force.
The commanders battlefield operating system at his disposal are
fire support and maneuver and here is where intelligence and
counterintelligence act as force multipliers
They can
then better understand the limitations and capabilities of the CI support
elements. Force protection doctrine requires intelligence and
counterintelligence personnel to obtain and analyze information on:
∙Enemy units
∙Terrorist groups
∙Insurgent groups
∙Enemy special forces
∙Criminal enterprises
∙Cybercriminals
∙Radical elements
∙That part of the local populace
which supports the enemys ideals
∙Environmental/chemical/health/radiological/biological
hazards
∙Weaponry systems of the enemy
units,terrorists,insurgents and crimninal enterprises
Force
protection doctrine should compel the creation of Service capabilities to
collect, receive, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate all information on
terrorist activities,strength,capabilities,organization,intent,past history,
current activities in the area in question or areas of interest and indicators
of imminent attack.
We can categorize the threats
based on intent. This can be incorporated in the force protection doctrine.
Hence we can allocate HUMINT resources in an appropriate manner without any
duplication or wastage. Type 1 can be criminal activity geared towards army
bases ,Type 2 can be penetrative reconnaissance and sabotage operations,
terrorist and insurgent attacks , and Type 3 can be major land , amphibious ,
air and missile attacks.
TYPE1, 2 and 3 threats can be
adequately determined by the employment of counterintelligence assets which use
HUMINT sources to collect force e protection information and conduct
investigations , security surveys ,threat and vulnerability assessments. Casual
sources, official sources, liaison contacts and recruited sources comprise the
source database of the CI repository. All source intelligence is also used for
all the threats, particularly TYPE4.These include HUMINT, SIGINT.MASINT, IMINT,
ELINT AND OSINT.Fusion of all information from multidisciplinary intelligence
platforms with data from national level intelligence agencies result in far
better situational understanding of the Commander. ISR synchronization is a
must if we have to have a robust advance warning system to avoid the element of
surprise.
We can make certain observations
after studying force protection failures from around the globe:
ØHUMINT was not given priority in
force protection efforts , neither the HUMINT support was precise, effective
and tailored to the Commanders needs. Instead standard operating procedures
detailing standard and routine defensive methods and access control were
implemented.HUMINTs capability in predicting on how , where and when a
terrorist attack might take place was ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific
target ,time and nature of attacks.
ØLack of organic intelligence
capability at tactical level.. “They did not have a dedicated, organic, and focused [force protection] intelligence
analytical capability.”Plus there is a weakness in both collection and analysis
of force e protection intelligence. If intelligence capability can be
pushed down to company/platoon level with the soldiers being augmented with
ØMilitary intelligence lacked the
necessary impetus to devote time, effort and resources for
ØThe installation in question fell
prey to terrorist attacks because the intelligence arrangement at Command level
in higher headquarters or at the installation headquarters itself was focused
on outward attacks like tactical missions, or defensive postures dictated by air
threat and totally ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based
intelligence collection for ground defense of the installation, personnel,
information and communication facilities.
To execute a CI operation
successfully liaison is needed with other civil agencies and with the
intelligence agencies of the 3 services.To effectively build up a liaison time
is required,it cannot be achieved overnight.In case of COIN operations liaison is
much needed with the local administrations intelligence branch and with the
police as they are the ones who know the local area,population,criminal
elements and insurgency profile in terms of attack history, police records of
personalities and elements who have been apprehended and surrendered..the
latter can be put to use by the counterinsurgents as
We can transfer say
Simply transferring will not
suffice, proper training in counterintelligence need to be given. But this wont
be a problem as the MI soldier already has basic intelligence training and
acumen. Yes they need to be granted clearance to access compartmentalized
intelligence information and hence prior to transfer the soldiers need to
undergo a counterintelligence investigation process as to their suitability.
The CI effort focuses on the
overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive
threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the
geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of
the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage,
terrorist, and subversive organizations.
What Are
We Protecting?
In
protecting an installation and its information systems, operations and general
security from enemy multidisciplinary intelligence threat we must identify the
vulnerable and critical areas to be given more weightage during security
review. Not all assets and activities warrant the same level of protection. To
this end a careful and thorough vulnerability analysis needs to be conducted
resorting to red teaming methodology.
It should
be noted at this juncture that it is always the attempts of the enemy
intelligence service to subvert our knowledgeable personnel. In a military
production unit , say ordnance factory , the senior engineers and quality
control scientists have access to sensitive designs and information related to
weaponry systems. Similarly classified and top secret documents/information are
in the hands of cleared senior personnel. These people are often the target of
aggressive enemy counterintelligence agents.
The five
basic categories include the following:
1.People
2.Military personnel
3.Activities/Operations
4.Intelligence collection/analysis
5.Sensitive movement of operations/personnel
6.Conduct of sensitive training
7.Communications/networking
8.RDT&E and sensitive technology
9.Production of sensitive technology
10.Protection of nuclear/chemical/biological materials
11.Protection of weapons, explosives, and equipment
12.Information
13.Classified
14.Sensitive Compartmented Information
15.Top Secret
16.Secret
17.Confidential
18.Unclassified
19.System designs
20.System capabilities/vulnerabilities
21.Sensitive methods
22.Facilities
23.Headquarters
24.Field offices/administrative
buildings
25.Training facilities
26.Storage facilities
27.Production facilities
28.R&D laboratories
29.Power plants
30.Parking facilities
31.Aircraft hangars
32.Residences
33.Equipment/Materials
34.Transportation equipment/vehicles
35.Maintenance equipment
36.Operational equipment
37.Communications equipment
38.Security equipment
39.Weapons
40.Automated information systems equipment
Now that the CI agent is
knowledgeable about these assets and activities that need protection, he can
execute a vulnerability and criticality analysis and recommend suitable
protective measures as well as countermeasures to the Commander. He can
recommend which critical units need protection first and what resources to
allocate and how and where to implement general security and countermeasures.
UNIT
PROTECTION:
We will define unit not be size
or specific function but by any military group capable of offensive, defensive
or stability operations.
Unit protection is the process
through which combatant and noncombatant personnel, physical assets and
information are protected from adversarial threats including adversarial
multidisciplinary intelligence threats.Multi layered, active/passive,
and
passive measures (for example, weapons,
The Army
must:
ØDetect the threat
ØAsses the threat capability to
degrade the units combat capabilities
ØDecide on protective measures ,
whether offensive or defensive
ØAct to implement these protective
measures
ØRecover in very less time from
any damage inflicted by the adversary so that
technical
countermeasures and tactical procedures may be employed so as to bring back the
unit to full operational status in the least time possible.
In order for unit protection to
be 100% effective we need to ensure that the following are taken into
prioritized consideration by the unit commander:
vPersistent surveillance
vActionable intelligence
vPrecise target recognition
vInterrogation
vCommanders situational awareness
vAccurate identification of unit
security related intelligence gaps The above factors are contained in the
In addition unit Command and
Control must be properly defined as C2 aids the Commander to take proper
decisions in the light of what needs to be done exactly to protect the unit and
ensure that this is carried out efficiently.
Protection: Protection is a
function which should be given a holistic treatment. Protection should not
separately focus on weapons deployment ,
employed
to screen contract workers and suppliers. A counterintelligence review should
be conducted periodically on unit personnel. Red teaming should be taken up by
the commander and his staff to ascertain unit vulnerabilities and critical
areas.
Add to Detect , Assess and Decide
the functions Act and Recover and we have the foundation for a complete
protection system on which to base our decisions regarding collection of
intelligence , fortifying and strengthening/hardening our bases, decide on the
optimum courses of actions , employ forces optimally to act on these decisions
and in case of an attack which could not be prevented , recover in the shortest
possible time without the base collapsing totally during/after the attack using
redundancy measures/backups and thorough protection of critical assets. We
should also remember protection has yet another dimension. The enemy might know
the protective measures we have employed using intelligence and might attempt
to block /prevent/deter our
Protection means
For protection intelligence is
critical as everything needs to be known about the enemy , environment and
self. The last factor is determined by counterintelligence reviews , technical
experts and red teaming.All intelligence platforms and ops must be thoroughly
integrated to handle attacks fro m land , air, information ,
electronic,CBRNE,and intelligence domains of the enemy. This integrated
approach heightens the commander’s situational awareness considerably , thus
acting as a force e and
Thus it is clear from the above
that protection must be proactive ,
Objectives
of unit protection are:
Install a
warning system
Intelligence preparation of all
areas adjoining the base ,camp , the route along which the troops movement
takes place
∙Protection must be proactive ,
lethal and nonlethal both.
∙Intelligence is the primary tool
in protection
∙Increase active/passive protection measures
∙Rapid seizure of initiatives
∙Rapid transition to decisive
operations
∙Rapid decision making capacity as
tactical operations in unit protection are ‘’time- critical’’.Damage to our
forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an assymetrical combat , in
hilly/urban/jungle terrain but away from base is different than that of an
attack on an unsuspecting troop movement or installation/base itself where an
attack means catching us off guard , unprepared and things move so fast due to
the element of surprise our forces do not have enough time to recover , regroup
and counterattack in time to thwart the enemy.The enemy may have critical
assets in mind when they attack the installation/camp/base.Thus tactical
operations are
∙Reducing vulnerability to minimum
∙Identifying critical assets ,
protecting them priority of all unit protection systems
∙Understanding that most
operations will be in a
∙Should understand that a complete
360 degree hemispherical protection system must be installed which must be a
thoroughly integrated intelligence and operations function keeping the factors
DAD in perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act , Finish and
Recover
The
following types of threats should be expected in any future conflict-
∙Attacks
∙Critical assets will be targeted
with precision munitions.
∙Staging areas , critical choke
points may be targeted using missiles with
∙Random attacks so as to be
unpredictable , IED attacks , terrorist and insurgent attacks and Special
Forces attacks may be conducted with twin objectives or any of
them..Viz..Effect destruction/undermine our fighting capability and to force
the commander to waste resources , ammunition, and unnecessarily divert forces
to protect facilities and personnel which in fact are not threatened.
We must
remember we are now facing a fourth generation enemy , who will attempt to put
in use every means including confusion and deception to overcome the
asymmetry/mismatch by increasing uncertainty and making us more susceptible to
the element of surprise. The enemy will resort to continuous , random, and
HUMINT and CI are two disciplines
which help in detecting enemy capabilities, intent and countering enemy
intelligence collection activities. In a typical Army Intelligence structure,
the intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having
a HQ company and Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific
collection/counterint discipline. For example there can be a Ops Bn , a
reconnaissance Bn , a tactical exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn ,or a
strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.
Military intelligence brigades
coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance; they conduct
collection management,
Unit protection must integrate the protective attributes of
different Army Corps. The capabilities in brief of the Corps are as follows:
∙The Air Defense artillery
provides protection by acting as a warning system , intercepting threats
directed from air in the form of missiles and aerial attacks (heliborne..etc)
and also provide locational grid information for otrher supporting forces to
target.
∙Military Police provides security
by executing proactive intelligence led policing.
∙Engineer Corps protect our force
by contributing to its mobility and countermobility thus heightening its
survivability.provides the capabilities of survivability, mobility, and
countermobility to the force.
∙Military intelligence provides
security to our force by adequate synchronized utilization/deployment of ISR
assets and counterintelligence capability
∙Signals protects our command and
control nodes directing/controlling communiucation,computers,and intelligence
operations. Siugnals intelligence directly supports HUMINT operations to
validate information,increase the situational understanding oif the Commander.
∙Field Artillery provides security
to the force by contributing to the direct/indirect firepower,predicting impact
points.
∙Ordnance Corp contributes to
recovery by deploying its ordnance disposal systems.
Unit
Protection Functions
It’s very true that conventional
military threats exist and are given priority in intelligence activities but
the existence and threat capabilities of asymmetric , nonconventional threats
cannot be undermined. Add to these new emerging threats of this category. At
the tactical level it is very important to address this type of threat by
determining its identity, leadership, capabilities, tracking its location and
gauging its intent. We need to detect the enemy entire range of hostile
activity including intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities,
use this information to assess its capabilities and intent to arrive at the
common operation picture COP which brings to light the
relationship
between the terrain,enemy,mission,troops,time and the civil environment thus
enabling the commander to enter the enemy’s decision cycle, gauge its intent
more accurately, deliver warning to force s in the area and develop suitable
courses of action. After the asses step is over the commander moves on to the
decide function wherein an action is decided upon or any existing action is
altered or monitiored.Therafter the act function takes over where the course of
action decided upon is implemented by tasking the tactical fighting unit to
deliver kinetic.nonkinetic attack on nominated targets or passive protection
measures..all with the intent to protect the force. Protecting the force should
not entirely be passive in nature, the soldiers need to go out and attack
nominated targets so as to deter attacks or fail plans to attack our
installations.
ACTIVE
MEASURES FOR UNIT PROTECTION:
Active
measures will provide at
∙We designate a
∙Just like we have a C2 system
with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with
respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated
with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlled
∙As for passive measure steps
should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside
a restricted area/protected area .Areas within
buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be
effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal
systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken with priority to deter
personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again
using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both
active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
∙There can be instances of enemy
fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to
include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built
up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated
again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the
passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on
intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned
protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any
infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian
contractors. Or we can
effectively
liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of
probable
From the
force protection perspective CI and HUMINT functions:
Recommending
countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected
courses of actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.
∙Threat intent
∙Identify Threat leadership. Key
commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
∙Identify threat C2 nodes
∙Identify threat logistic routes
∙Identify threat social reach,
network, and contacts
∙Identify threat affiliates in
other criminal networks, enterprises
∙Identify threat sympathizers in
own area of control
∙Identify political/administrative
figures that support threat ideology
∙Threat attack /defense operations
location parameters.
∙Gauge potential attack/defense
methods of threat.
∙Recommend C2 setup to thwart
threat attack.
∙Estimate with reasonable accuracy
the expected time of attack.
∙Possible locations of Threat
listening post/observation posts
∙Determine possible escape routes
of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
∙Possible enemy IED techniques,
infiltration routes, emplacement
∙Gauge IED detonation methods/means
∙Gauge IED timings
∙Possible routes for IED
∙Staging areas
∙Safe houses
∙Weapons and ammunitions storage
locations
∙Production facilities for IED and
other ammunitions/explosives.
∙Find out what supplementary
operations threat may resort to
∙Recommending countermeasures to threat IED
∙Recommending countermeasures to
threat ISR/EW
∙Determining threat indirect fire
parameters, key indirect fire
WARNING
Warning. Once actionable intelligence is
obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a
timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement
of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminatin.
Warning
is of two types:
(a)Defensive warn
(b)Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving
actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations
security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be
digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated
the fact through
It is very important that warning
should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific,. In addition to this it
should be actionable. Warning can be graduated , meaning the level of warning
may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy
which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily
but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in
the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The
warning system must have the following features:
∙It should allow for redundancies
in our act capability systems.
∙It should allow for passive
proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets,
command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the
installation/.protected area.
∙It should provide a system of
integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our
installation , its C2 and critical assets.
∙Provide warning of threat
intelligence activities.
∙Provide warning of existing
threat C2 nodes
∙Provide warning of threat
capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
∙Provide warning of threat
logistic routes.
∙Provide warning of threat
sympathizers.,
∙Provide warning of threats
possible attack COAs
∙Provide warning of the defense
capability of the threat
∙Provide warning of threats
peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
∙Provide warning of threats history
∙Provide warning of threat
movements
∙Provide warning of threat
leadership
∙Provide warning of threat
detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
∙Provide warning of Threat attack
/defense operations location parameters.
∙Provide warning of potential
attack/defense methods of threat.
∙Provide warning of the expected
time of attack.
∙Provide warning of possible
locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
∙Provide warning of possible
escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
∙Provide warning of possible enemy
IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
∙Provide warning of IED detonation
methods/means
∙Provide warning of IED timings
∙Provide warning of possible
routes for IED
∙Provide warning of Staging areas
∙Provide warning of Safe houses
∙Provide warning of weapons and
ammunitions storage locations
∙Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other
ammunitions/explosives.
∙Provide warning of supplementary
operations threat may resort to
∙Provide warning of threat
indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
Future Modular Force leaders must be trained to aggressively
manage information and instill trust in the output of decision support tools
that automated systems provide. Other major implications include adoption of a
lifetime of education paradigm and the creation of knowledge centers configured
to support professional leader education. Leader development questions include,
but are not limited to-
(1)How do we develop leaders ready
to deal with the complexity of the contemporary operating environment, threats,
and interagency implications?
(2)How can we develop more adaptive leaders, versatile in UP
operations?
(3)How do we provide collaborative,
distributed training problem solving and decision aids that empower battle
command to support commanders, as well as staffs to advising commanders during
planning, preparation, rehearsal, and execution of UP exercises and operations?
(4)How are leaders enabled to know
the terrain and weather and appreciate their tactical implications for tactical
concealment, employment of weapons, mobility, and seeking positions of
advantage?
(5)How are leaders empowered to
understand the operational environment as well as, or better than, the threat
in order to execute UP detect, assess, and decide functions?
(6)How will units enable leaders to
know the enemy, friendly unit locations, and their capabilities?
(7)How will units adapt to emerging UP situations more quickly than an adversary?
UP is not force protection, although the application of protection capabilities will positively affect force protection. By integrating the protection capabilities outlined in this CCP, a commander, and consequently, the force will be offered superior protection abilities.