TARGETING IN COIN

Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS

( For ECCIU Unit Fort William )

Kinetic Targeting is a process by which physical action is taken to kill/capture insurgents or for that matter any enemy in the area of operations in order to negate their activities/operations in the AO.For example HUMINT reports bring in information about an insurgent facilitator of IEDs supply.Kinteic Targeting , that is killing this element severely affects the IED supply thus limiting the usage of IEDs by the insurgents. Here it is very important to choose carefully the targets. They should be critical nodes in the network , destruction of which will hamper the overall operations of the network , not just cut off one single line of operation. Thus targeting C2 nodes , critical lines of communication and logistics , important couriers and informers of the enemy , prime facilitators from among the local populace , HUMINT agents from among the local populace and anything or anyone close to the or collocated with the perceived center of gravity of the network will in effect disrupt enemy operations as well as planning severely. For example we have identified and located a high profile insurgent and a drone attack results in his elimination. Thus we have successfully removed a node in the network. Now if we study the second and third order effects of this attack , that is the resultant action on his colleagues or men under his command and the effect on the local population(our HUMINT and CI people keeping a tab on enemy movements, enemy suspects and activities of local suspected sympathizers , facilitators) we get further leads for further targeting actions. It could be , for instance , that after removing this critical node there is a flurry of activity in the local community among a select group of people , or maybe demonstrations are held thus pinpointing the actual sympathizers(these can now be included in non-kinetic operations) or the activity of insurgents themselves which become observable and thus amenable for intelligence action.

Conventional war sees both adversaries attempting to utilize the entire spectrum of combined arms warfare to:

· Annihilate the others forces

· Cause severe attrition to erode the overall enemy strength and projecting capability so as to penetrate our defenses or mount a piercing attack or in intelligence terms , be deprived of projecting interim intelligence enabled combat troops. same time attritting the adversary’s strength and their ability to project force. 

Coming to asymmetric warfare like guerillas , insurgents and terrorists here attrition is not a solution as most of them , going by Mao’s principle , are intent on conserving their forces—that is strength , capabilities as they are far outnumbered in and they cannot afford to take in more casualties by foraying enmasse into enemy territory like conventional forces or for that matter projecting their force is not an option for them. They carefully choose their targets and the location where they will deliver the attack. All this done by small line squads while the majority of the insurgents stay safe at the bases.

Local Population-HUMAN Terrain

Here is where we can arrive at a very important inference. If the insurgent must conserve his forces which means as his primary objective is to cause harm to the security forces without exposing himself unnecessarily , attacking from deep cover , or ambush , he needs perfect information about the nature , identity and location of his target/s.To this end intelligence capability is critical. If he employs his own intelligence assets , which are very very limited , his own men who can keep an eye on troops movements from afar or from a top vantage point—and that is quite risky some times , the insurgent leadership then turn to their main resource base , the local populace. The limited HUMINT agents of the insurgent group now recruit sympathizers and others who support their ideology , or those who bear a grudge against the local administration , police and the security forces themselves and now these very innocuous looking people of the local community in the AO become the eyes and ears of the enemy. As per Mao’s principle , we can infer the insurgents should conserve this HUMINT capability in order to conserve their forces. This further leads to the fact that they will also protect their informers and sources and like a professional intelligence organization will surely conduct secret meetings to indoctrinate them on security principles , how to handle their captors if caught by the security forces and other psychological instructions.

Whatever be the case the local populace is and should be the main target of the Army intelligence apparatus—detect , identify and locate the HUMINT elements. History , Malaya , Philippines , Iraq , etc ..has proved time and again that a successful insurgency emerges only with the support of the local population.

Hence comes into the picture –non-kinetic targeting. Now it is clear that the insurgents will do everything possible to keep the population on their side. If not the entire local populace , well all those who sympathize or believe in its ideology or others. As for those elements of the population who are some way or the other disinterested in the insurgency movement or even averse to it , these people are kept in leash by the insurgent leadership. Intimidation , fear , torture and even killing—these tactics are resorted to. But generally the elements of the population who are so labeled as averse to the insurgents ideology prefer to keep quiet. These people must be identified by our intelligence personnel. As they are part and parcel of the community they can offer valuable intelligence on the elements of the population who work for the enemy. They are the best ones suitable for surveillance , static observation of the neighborhood , getting good access and placement to suspects (after transmittal of the idea that they are pro-insurgency) , reporting on strangers in the village , attending propaganda meetings and hate-seminars , and knowing the entire terrain very well so as to advise the security forces during intelligence preparation of the Area of Operations.

That said , the Army should and must wage a full scale parallel war with the insurgents in controlling and influencing the minds of the population in their favour.This love/hate triangle is in fact the most important mission objective.You control the population , you know the local informers and logistical supporters of the enemy.Also the safe houses , staging areas and all clandestine meetings in the area.Going a step further , detaining such individuals and interrogating them , or more the better keeping them under tight surveillance using those friendly elements of the population you can now detect and identify their enemy HUMINT contacts.Further surveillance or arrest and detention followed by interrogation can lead to weapon caches , staging areas , other enemy personnel concentration points , transit camps , bases—in short you get nearer and nearer to the insurgent center of gravity.

This parallel war is in effect information operations. Information operations , such as periodic or random announcements by the loudspeaker and other media enabled platoon , PSYOPS platoon , coupled with community development programmes such as road repairs , distribution of food and sweets to children at regular intervals in primary schools , helping in the digging of wells , improving sanitary conditions , supplying ‘kambals’ in winter , supply of free educational books and materials , informing the community of social service programmes and financial schemes for the poor taken up by the elected Government , highlighting the insurgents atrocities elsewhere , impressing upon them the insurgents concept that he has to influence the population in order to survive , and many other steps/activities which can easily be undertaken by the Army as resources for such activities are not expensive , easily available and can also be supplemented by the local administration. The main point which should be driven home is the population must feel more secure and happy with the presence of the Army and other security forces and should understand that the only objective of the movement is violence and target is the Government , and that they are least bothered about the local community , but consider it their safe haven where they can hide during the day , where they can get food , shelter and where they can brainwash and recruit people to serve their ends.

1. MISSION PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: THE POPULATION SHOULD CEASE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS TOTALLY.

2. MISSION SECONDARY OBJECTIVE: FULL SCALE NON KINETIC OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE.

One of the oft-overlooked consequences of just about anything is what we call second- and third-order effects. Once we have targeted someone or something we must know how this has influenced the local population , the insurgent network and even other criminal enterprises in the AO. Second and third order effects which might emerge are:

· We might lose local cooperation.

· We might gain local cooperation.

· More enemies may result if the kinetic attack results in vengeance. Going a step further , the removal of the insurgent/s may effect certain civilians (apparent by antagonistic actions , disappearance from their residence apparently to join the insurgents).Which means we can now zero in on them as suspects.

Deconfliction

Another difference exists between conventional battles and COIN ops.In conventional battles we detect , identify , get the precise location and then nominate as a target , be it a high value target or a high payoff target.Now Counterintelligence activities ofcourse happen during conventional warfare but not as offensively as in a limited war against insurgents in a limited AO.What I mean to say is it can be one or several of our agents have infiltrated the network or that we have penetrated the network by turning one or few insurgents to work for us.Now in the same AO it could well be that a company platoon is engaged in ops against the enemy in the Eastern part of the AO.Now if this platoon is not aware of the agents (infiltrators) in the enemy who might be selected for targeting by our platoon intelligence section , then this is a grave error. Or say we could be using a rouge insurgent unit (turned) who are up against the insurgents and they could equally well do the same thing—target our agents. Hence the number one priority is deconfliction. The targeting cell generates intelligence requirements which the HUMINT collection cell satisfies by its collection operations.Now the two cases cited above or even in a case where our soldiers are fighting behind enemy lines (in the case of COIN we can roughly define that as deep into their territory , say the insurgents dominated Assam jungles) , the platoon may not be able to access the HUMINT cell for information or the current targeting list and then it will autonomously choose and finish off the target—who can very well be one of our own agents. So how do our units avoid targeting our own agents that have been infiltrated within adversarial organizations? WE NEED TO HAVE A CENTRAL AUTHORITY , AN INTELLIGENCE UNIT , WHOSE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE TO DECONFLICT TARGETING CELL AND HUMINT CELL ASSETS.This is very important as in most insurgencies , we have to resort to infiltration.We must remember an agent placed in the network is worth 50 machine guns.We cannot afford to lose him due to lack of deconfliction.We then suffer a counterintelligence defeat in the hands of our very own units.

Need for Intelligence

There is a great difference between intelligence driven targeting and targeting based on surveillance and reconnaissance. Intelligence is crucial. If it is not present integrally in the targeting process , you can not remove the targets efficiently. The success rate will be incredibly low. Intelligence drives the fight. It is required to detect , identify , locate the target precisely , gauge beforehand what can be the second and third order effects , aid in creating target folders as per category , aid in target reduction – in short it is CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. And Mind you , counterintelligence should go hand in hand as it protects this very same intelligence cycle , vetting the sources , determining if they are genuine , or planted. It helps in knowing and locating important targets of the enemy. It is crucial in intelligence planning.It generates positive intelligence.It is not exactly an intelligence discipline but it is more than that—it is an intelligence and force enabler.In COIN it is indispensable.Its offensive techniques like penetration or infiltration can literally destroy the center of gravity of the enemy.

In any COIN mission , or operation , just launching an attack (kinetic that is) on the enemy using military commonsense or standard combat tactics and techniques/procedures will not be sufficient. Yes here also you are targeting , but this targeting is the usual destruction/removal of adversial elements in the course of combat as per standard doctrine. You need to have ‘’targeting ability’’ , not just manage a team of trigger pullers. And the management of these ‘’trigger pullers’’ , the Company or Bn must have the ‘’intelligence element’’ as its brain. Then only you have the required targeting ability so critical for success in COIN. Be it kinetic or personality targeting or non-kinetic or psychological targeting.

Develop the Human Terrain

Going back to the parallel war –that is the control of the local population by both the insurgents and the Army is essentially Information Warfare.That includes propaganda and PSYOPS.I must drive home the most important point in COIN—THE LOCAL COMMUNITY /POPULATION IS THE BEST ASSET OF THE INSURGENTS AND OUR GREATEST THREAT IN TERMS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.This is the ‘human terrain’ distinct from the physical terrain (or developed infrastructure terrain , that is the security forces configure existing buildings etc so as to provide force protection and also building attack resistant/delaying structures ) which is usually scanned /surveilled and reconnoitered for intelligence preparation of the battlefield.Ignoring this human terrain , not developing it and utilizing it to our advantage places all gains from intelligence preparation of the battlefield considering the physical terrain , the enemy , the weather and environment to a minimum.We must consider non-kinetic targeting with the same importance like kinetic targeting.We need to manipulate the minds of the population.They are the ones who can provide us hard much needed information.If we lose their support , the insurgents get their support.

Take a case in point.An army platoon is engaged in a combat action with a group of insurgents and things go wrong.The platoon was initially firmly emplaced in a built up area , protected and hardened against enemy fires.But a prolonged combat resulted in rapid depletion of ammunition and now the soldiers must flee as reinforcements will take long to reach the area.Fine—they did just that.The Company Commander had always recognized the need to influence the human terrain and today this platoon got saved just because of their Commanders foresight.How? On escaping they took refuge among the local population who gave them shelter , hiding them from the enemy , and also intelligence about enemy movements ( they are now on the lookout for the platoon) both to the soldiers and team leader and also to the headquarters by dispatching a couple of villagers. So they are now the teams cover , intelligence collectors and also supply points.Thats the benefit of information operations in COIN. If you can win the battle for CONTROL , then you’ll make the battle of attrition much more difficult FOR THE ENEMY.Period. 

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Next submission: 100 TTPs / points for a successful insurgency in the eyes of the insurgent leader.( COIN Red Teaming)