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INTELLIGENCE

1 Coy Int Platoon

 Every Soldier
is a Sensor



Bn Int Section



REPORT # 001

PROJECT ARMY XXII

Proposal for fighting unit
of



PROJECT ARMY INT XXII


EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR



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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF FOR INF REGT COMMANDER (BIHAR WARRIORS , SALT LAKE). 23-02-2017

INVERTING THE INT PYRAMID



Coy level intelligence cell.

To increase the tactical and situational awareness picture of the Int staff at Higher HQ and the Coy Cdr and identify target packs using organic intelligence capability.

Combat intelligence derived from combat reconnaissance patrols debrief is no longer the

mainstay when planning for COIN operations. We are now fighting battles, not wars. It's now precision warfare evolved into a sort of discriminatory warfare. It's no more the sole domain of maneuver warfare. Right now we are more occupied with targeting an enemy which is highly asymmetric, can blend into the local community and attack from within thus forcing us to discriminate and selectively target the insurgent/terrorist from within aggrieved locals, coerced fighters, criminals, drug mafia and others who are either in some way benefitting from the insurgents or are of use to the insurgents. These other groups also merit kinetic action but to a markedly less degree; in fact the civil agencies and police can very well deal with them. My point is, we can no longer dwell on solely kinetic attacks, killing is no more the solution. Precision selective targeting of course is the answer when we are completely sure about the identity of the enemy and when killing him/them will not create second or third order effects—ripples amongst the local community; the very essence of COIN is to alienate the insurgents from the locals wherein lies their center of gravity, not in C2 nodes or other conventional tactical physical structures/communication systems. In COIN both parties, the insurgents and the counterinsurgents attempt to win over the local communities as the insurgents have to maintain their credibility before them in order to survive (cover and concealments amongst the villagers, ration and arms/ammo supply using locals, couriers, informers) and the counterinsurgents must see to it that all psychological ops conducted by the insurgents do not affect the locals, nullify the effects of coercion by the insurgents not by kinetic means but by non-kinetic psychological methods, make arrangements for community/social development so as to settle their boots more firmly in the area of operations as such initiatives will raise their credibility in the eyes of the populace and so on.

Current COIN operations which the Army is conducting at NE or Kashmir are local in nature, tackling village by village, valley by valley with the platoons and companies doing most of the work. Each platoon/company has their own AO, locally fight the insurgents while conducting independent patrols and missions. Most often than not they are operating far from their bases amongst the local population. Now due to this reason, company level tactical units have to do their own intelligence gathering. They do not have access to sophisticated overhead sensors or support from intelligence units at higher headquarters. It is important to note that these are combat soldiers, not intelligence military occupational specialty personnel who have to do on their own the collection, analysis, target nomination and development. This is where the need of an organic small intelligence cell arises. This cell will be staffed by these very same non-int soldiers who are given training in tactical questioning, elicitation, on the spot interrogation, observation and surveillance skills—these are not difficult to learn and do not require detailed knowledge of standard intelligence TTPs.....capability/knack against Int Corps affiliation/rank being the primary requirement. We need intelligence-savvy personnel to staff these small organic cells, not intelligence corps personnel. And these soldiers we induct from the very same company to which they belong.

In a wide area of operations, involving a Brigade, companies enabled with their own organic intelligence cells renders the collection capacity as a whole far greater than that what is possible with the limited intelligence detachments/units spread across the North

East for example. We now have a much greater quantity of trained personnel , and if as per my earlier paper on NE INT NET where I have suggested creating tactical operations centers TOCs , each catering to a group of Companies/Bn wherein all information is channelized to respective Desk NCOs and then through a LAN/WAN network to a centralized intelligence database covering the whole of NE,then we have a complete intelligence architecture with information flowing bottom-up from these organic cells of the Companies. In essence the conventional intelligence pyramid is now inverted. The “top-down” intelligence no longer drives today’s operations. Instead, current operations produce numerous lower-level information and intelligence reports that higher headquarters must gather, analyze, and synthesize. The sheer volume of these reports and the depth and breadth of information they provide often exceed the capacity of the intelligence organizations at the various headquarters echelons.

For non-linear distributed battle space as against a conventional one , where we are dealing with an highly asymmetric enemy , the intelligence architecture needs to be modified. And the individual soldier is the key and he can be of any military occupational speciality , basically the infantryman. **He is our primary sensor.**

Of all the intelligence disciplines which are employed to derive all-source intelligence after fusion of information from sensors characteristic to each discipline, it is HUMINT that offers most of the information. The conventional approach to warfare by the Division no longer works in a COIN environment. Here there is a much more need of HUMINT personnel than technical sensors. It is very important to recognize the fact that the Division has to increase its HUMINT strength. If possible include a HUMINT platoon to support 3-4 companies , or create organic HUMINT platoon for Battalion/Coy support intelligence team. Or at the minimum , a 4-5 man cell created out of the Coy infantrymen , the CLIC.

Often combat operations at tactical level yield intelligence which has strategic implications. This should be recognized by higher HQ intelligence staff (at strategic levels)and every effort should be made to understand and appreciate the existing situations at district/village levels and not only focus on the national level.

In a nonlinear distributed battle space we have numerous tactical operations going on , with independent platoons/companies engaged in their own way. Here the mass of information gathered cannot be effectively pushed up to higher HQ , there is little sharing of intelligence information among the units engaged (horizontally—sharing can help a lot....).Point is here intelligence is generated at boot level and the flow is upward—the intelligence pyramid characteristic of conventional battles becomes inverted. This is where the need for TOCs.....is.

Information collected at tactical levels by ground soldiers has assumed yet another significance which affects more advanced technical intelligence collecting platforms in a very positive way. We have GEOINT platforms which conduct the very important task of locating the place where a particular event occurred and the time associated with it. We get access to maps and up-to-date imagery both at higher HQ and tactical levels, made possible by computer technology and no longer soldiers and platoon/company commanders have to huddle around making maps before deployment. But here something is missing-or was missing. What about specificity, context and meaning about these maps, imagery? Some of the content is of course provided by these specialized imagery software after data is collected by GEOINT platforms. Say the focus is on an inhabited area with buildings so we have imagery consisting of colored images of the locality and buildings within it. But then what about the occupants who stay inside those buildings, their affiliations, ethnicity, how long they have been staying there, occupation, antecedents etc? A sort of census data, and now this is practically unfeasible by strategic level intelligence platforms..for this we need the tactical units, and they collect this information while on patrols, cordon and search ops, checkpoints and roadblocks, tactical questioning and interrogation of detained persons/suspects .elicitation from village people/panchayat leaders and observation/surveillance.

The era is now hence of discriminatory warfare with precision warfare coupled with kinetic and non-kinetic modes of attack—a proper mix of these two is what should be the main goal of the rifle Coy. To this end, we must recognize that combat reconnaissance patrols cannot get all the intelligence that a simple 4 man cell (made up from among the rifle Coy, the best and brightest NCOs) can glean from everyday routine overt patrolling in the village and outskirts, tactical questioning sessions involving suspects/detainees/outsideers. Higher HQ does not assign full priority to subunits that are operating in isolated areas and austere locations; Coy commanders should recognize this fact. You cannot expect the intelligence resources at higher HQ to be deployed for your unit, be it HUMINT/Tech, if you are far off and away from Base. You have to be creative, on your own and that means you start collecting your own intelligence, shape your “own” battle space armed with this information, and convert this information into actionable intelligence. At higher HQ a well directed effort is needed to translate information acquired through sensors at various intelligence platforms corresponding to various intelligence disciplines, and it must be noted the intelligence cycle theoretically gives the intelligence analysts at that level only a logical framework to proceed; actually the interrelationships between the parts of the cycle and concurrency leads to complication while inferring and analyzing information—couple this with the fact that backlog of information, requests for information by other units and headquarters, process and protocol and requirement of reliable corroboration, contextual awareness and specificity, protection of sources and capabilities, all these go into making the intelligence 90% accurate but not on time. In other words we can say a 70% solution is far better than a 90% one, if the solution is delivered on time, and that is what we can say is the essence of actionable intelligence. Hence depending on higher HQ to deliver is always not practicable; the Coy needs to have that 70% solution done on its own. A

determined enemy cannot be defeated with late or ephemeral 90% accurate intelligence , a 70% accurate one can turn the odds in the commanders favour. Self-help that is , initiative of the Coy commander to create a more focused rubric at the tactical level and that is possible if he creates the Coy level intelligence cell. Trained manpower is usually not available , as I mentioned about higher HQ priorities; this manpower needs to be generated internally, from among the rifle Coy. Am not asking for the creation of talented HUMINT personnel like those from the intelligence Corps; what we are making is basically a cell , organic cell which will be manned by infantrymen trained in basic skills of observation , surveillance , tactical questioning, document exploitation , and when opportunities arise , say in friendly encounters/environment with locals , elicitation. Tactical questioning is a framework wherein spot open-ended, not close-ended questions (which evoke at the maximum a yes/no) force the detainee/suspect to answer with truthfulness, even if partially. TQ can be learnt very easily.

The best actionable intelligence cannot be got even from higher HQ always (even if the team is operating not far off , imagery needs to be corroborated by other intelligence disciplines , takes time , similarly geoint products are okay in terms of overall profiles of area/buildings but not specific as to the inhabitants inside those buildings/their affiliations/no of people etc., processes and protocol further delay the deliverance of intelligence at the right time to the squad on the ground; again overhead sensors are of no point over canopies in a jungle or in a built up area in urban terrain where line of sight matters) but can be acquired in a far better fashion by rifle Coy soldiers during their routine overt patrols and the relationships they build with the local communities , police , other security agencies , NGOs , panchayat members etc during the course of their duties. This intelligence resource pool can be exploited in a much better fashion if the rifle Coy has its own organic intelligence cell , tailorable with the mission. When required they go for full combat , when patrolling or while engaged in a cordon/search operation questioning a newcomer to the village/detainee (they resort to tactical questioning, two of them questioning and observing him while he answers , one jots down in his report to be tabled later to the Coy Ops Officer while the other keeps guard as well as keeps a tab on the external environment (security)) or when interrogating a suspect/confirmed enemy personnel. Or all four can assume very friendly outlook when conversing in a friendly atmosphere with locals , carefully using basic elicitation techniques ... Thus we are not now dealing with Dets (far less in number than that what is required to support all units in a wide area of operations) but with self-forming , decentralized and localized Coy/platoon intelligence cells , far greater in number than the int Dets , and in much direct contact with the enemy and the population together. (Later I will show that deploying tactical ops control centers , LAN , WAN .. We can create complete intelligence architecture to give a centralized command and control at top echelons, with this decentralized intelligence setup at the boot level.). In essence we are handling a non-linear , distributed , disaggregated battle space in a much more uniform way by installing Coy intelligence cells at the tactical level and networking all the companies through their own tactical ops centers with the higher echelons through a LAN/WAN grid; thus what we achieve here is that fleeting moments of opportunity (“intelligence-opportunity”)

from disparate tactical battles , intelligence that would otherwise have been lost due to the wide area of operations and isolation of the sub-unit engaged in battle or any nonkinetic mode of attack and which could have had strategic implications or even translated into actionable intelligence for some other Coy/unit another part of the AO or even in another AO –this ‘intelligence-opportunity’ is well exploited by intelligence analysts and policy makers at higher HQ and other echelons. Again lateral intelligence exchange is also made possible ,among Coy commanders , courtesy the TOCs. We talk of enhancing situational awareness of the commander .

Situation development by satisfying his priority intelligence requirements by deploying intelligence assets under a careful requirements and collection management program. This is fine. But how about enhancing the situational awareness of the basic infantryman , not usually intelligence-savvy but smart and bright enough to spot irregularities and suspicious behavior in the people he meets every day? What if his situational awareness propels him to learn a few techniques in tactical questioning, observation and surveillance , elicitation and on-the-spot interrogation and also how to exploit seized documents? This situational awareness and curiosity to learn can be brought about by the Coy havildar major or the Sr JCO,after he is explained the benefits of having the Coy’s own organic intelligence cell which not only will translate that situational awareness into actionable intelligence , delivering a good kill ratio/non-kinetic success but also security to the Coy personnel through intelligence gathered from the force protection perspective—such intelligence usually comes as a by-product from the civilians/locals who give information about possible suspects. We must remember the asymmetric enemy is clever enough to create conditions where if we proceed with a target pack successfully , collateral damage also results as a by-product of the kinetic attack. This collateral damage will alienate the locals from us , alienating from us means getting closer to the insurgents , thus shifting our center of gravity towards them. Center of gravity in COIN is the local population , the community. Hence we need to understand the atmospherics , the locals , the total area of operations , the other parties involved in the villages/valleys , and the second and third order effects any kinetic/non kinetic action may result. Sounds a long sentence with many variables , but given the consideration that COIN is a long drawn out game and the time rifle Coy men get to spend with the local environment (given the opportunity by rotating them frequently between observation posts , patrol duty , social meetings ,liaison with police/security agencies),they already have a grip on the situation prevailing in their area of operations; now what if this same thing is seen from the perspective of the small Coy intelligence cell which is trained in the basics of TQ , interrogation , DOCEX , elicitation , observation and surveillance? Much enhanced situational awareness for the commander. Means good leads for actionable intelligence.And this is possible because you need to be closer to the ground to understand a COIN environment in order to extract actionable intelligence , and this is not always possible for overhead sensors , other technical intelligence collection platforms like Geoint or even signals intelligence.HUMINT is the answer , if trained manpower cannot be deployed as support by higher HQ then we need to create from

within the Coy. And hence , the need of the hour is CLIC.

The rifle Coy may have certain combat assets like snipers who can deliver first hand intelligence as they can provide some of the best observation and reporting skills to the unit. Hence snipers are int-enablers. We need to change the way we do things, we can achieve the same result—what is required the comprehension of the fact that not always can we depend/get intelligence support from higher HQ; we need to work on our own, particularly in a high threat environment where timely actionable intelligence is the prime mover of operations. Thus we can see from the sniper example that one of the best kinetic capabilities of the combat team can deliver very good non-kinetic effects , like surveillance, search , reassure.

The main point is we need to translate the situational understanding of the Coy soldiers into serviceable target packs and with the creation of the organic Coy intelligence cell and Coy commanders guidance (if possible, apart from the Coy second in command , if we set up the Sr JCO as ops officer ,then a good degree of synchronization between ops/intel can be achieved with the ops officer and Coy Int Sr NCO working hand in hand) as the driving force.

KESHAV MAZUMDAR

[This page is written in such a manner so that in plain english without too much int jargon a presentatable format

is placed before the Commander of an infantry unit so as to heighten his perceptual awareness about the value

of an organic int unit to his unit , how his soldiers can be easily trained to act as secondary collectors , with procurement of actionable intelligence being reduced to basic observation , surveillance,tactical questioning,DOCEX skills coupled with elicitation keeping the

human terrain in perspective and understanding fully that an asymmetric enemys center of gravity is in this human terrain which needs to be exploited.The requirement to seek int assistance from higher HQ no longer will be an inhibiting factor , particularly for units far flung in

the AO away from command HQ..EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR--THATS THE IDIOM OF THE FIELD.PERIOD]

The Counterintelligence Doctrine that exists today in our Army is composed of manuals , training pamphlets , SOPs in written form , training provided to special agents and from individual to individual. In addition to this , personal experience of the middle and upper

officer ranks in the CI Officer Corps takes precedence over a comprehensive written doctrine.

Had a complete doctrine existed with clearly defined mission , fundamentals , concept of Warning , difference between HUMINT , Clandestine HUMINT and CI highlighted with stress on the need to integrate CI with HUMINT and not relegate it to the backbench, CI functions and tactics , techniques and procedures, CI operations , both offensive and defensive, the need and steps of CI planning , training standards and the concept of introducing the professional element in CI education and training , especially for Commanders as what we need is a professional CI force which can adapt to any changes/deception tactics of the enemy and be professionally managed in terms of operations by CI “Managers “/Commanders , the very important but often ignored concept of Force protection with CI as an enabler , CI Investigations and tactical questioning , the integration of CI with HUMINT teams for mobile screening/interrogation at forward areas and all across the battlefield , not just keeping CI for rear areas , the need to project CI beyond the areas of operations and interest, integrating CI with ops totally, establishing a CI-Det network throughout the area of ops rather than focusing only on the rear, a smooth battle handoff between forward and rear CI elements so that the rear party gets up-to-date intelligence and do not have to keep valuable time aside for fresh intelligence operations—in war continuity in operations must flow smoothly and rapidly, CI and multidisciplinary intelligence cueing, broadening defensive CI to include infrastructure protection , Technology and R&D protection, insider threats , OPSEC Integration, Denial and Deception and its extreme importance in ops and during planning,and more other factors , then we would have been better prepared with the Commanders visualization of the battlefield/Concept of operations COP/Situational development more complete and thorough.

EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

“No echelon has all the organic intelligence capabilities it needs to fully support The commander. Commanders and Military Intelligence leaders at higher Echelons should anticipate the intelligence needs of the lower echelons and “Push” tailored intelligence support down to them.”

Tactical units engage in combat with intelligence inputs coming from the MI dep’t from higher echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario the Company-level units should also have its own organic intelligence structures with very few personnel and assets deployed. They can act on available intelligence from the ground themselves without having to wait for collected, collated, analyzed information from Brigade Int section or other agencies which takes time—add to it the dissemination delays. In addition to conducting mission specific analysis and kinetic or non kinetic attack, the Company-level unit can also disseminate the intelligence acquired to subordinate units, parallel units or higher headquarters as these intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as often

intelligence about the enemy in one area of operations can help units in other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting similar tactics or other behavioral factors.

It is very important to recognize the lack of an intelligence structure at Company-level levels. The Company-level unit should have collection and analytical capabilities. There have been instances of lethal attacks on camps and bases itself—a force protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely on civil police and other intelligence agencies to supply us intelligence about the threat which usually is biased, and influenced by political and regional faction influences. The soldier on the ground who is a part of say the Infantry battalion engaging the insurgents, is face to face with the reality—the enemy, the local population and other parties of interest. Say during a reconnaissance patrol his team may come across a valuable source. After rapidly dismounting and ensuring he has no weapons, the team's intelligence component can start source ops like

Company-level or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc and if a counterintelligence agent is also present the more the better for HUMINT collection.

Let us assume a Command (set up for COIN ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State) which has everything in order such as Command chain, combat machinery, defined communication channels, civil administration support and police, civil intelligence agencies support lacks only an organic intelligence unit and depends on Higher HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil agencies for intelligence information.

It should be noted here that the necessary information is requisitioned first in the form of Request of Information document, which will go through various processing nodes as characterized by administrative channels, then finally landing in the collection manager's hands from the requested agencies higher authority to whom the request was directed. Now the collection manager will access already present records database and national databases to explore if the needed information is already available—if so he further initiates request for information, gets the information and passes it on to the commander of the unit. If not available he prioritizes the requested information as per the supported commands requirements, evaluates availability of suitable assets, allocates the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity and speciality, the assets are deployed, information collected, again sent up channels for evaluation of information quality, credibility (if source-submitted), analyzed, transformed into intelligence product and then finally disseminated to the supported commands commander.

All the above processes takes time, sometimes very long time, rendering the information useless as intelligence can at times be highly perishable, especially combat intelligence. The commander needs actionable intelligence fast and to enable this it would be far better if he himself has an organic modular intelligence unit, ready to take up assignments, if needed be integrated with the strike platoons itself for much faster information gathering and analysis and immediate action by the platoon commander. Company level/Platoon level intelligence capability can tremendously increase the competitive edge of the commander over the enemy, increase his situational awareness and be a force enabler.

Doctrine, Personnel, Training and Education, Leadership, Materiel Development, Organization, and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if intelligence assets need to be pushed down to the lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed in Company-level operations on the battlefield. If they are intelligence capable the Commander will get the best up-to-date and regularly updated (in the fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground situations) intelligence inputs thus heightening his situational understanding immensely and thus giving him that decisive competitive edge over the enemy.

The need for projected intelligence capability is all the more important if the commander has to deploy to an unfamiliar area, inhabited by an asymmetric threat which unlike a conventional enemy has no defined order of battle, organization, discernible patterns, does not employ standard military tactics and where ops may be simultaneous, non-linear and distributed. In such a situation the commander needs to project his force by sending in interim combat enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams who have intelligence gathering ability as well as

counterintelligence asset, not the usual reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are composed only of scouts and which do not answer the "why" of things observed.

Today we are facing an enemy which is very unlike conventional adversaries who can be identified using intelligence as to their leadership, TOE, order of battle, strength, dispositions or anything which is determined by set doctrinal military tactics, techniques and procedures. Today's enemy in low intensity warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge among the urban or rural community who act as enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly or partially depending on the degree of acceptance of insurgent ideology and insurgent leaderships always try to influence the local communities to the maximum as they are well aware of the benefits of sanctuary among the latter. The enemy recruits, rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst the population. Here intelligence directly focused on the enemy is difficult in practice; the enemy is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional attack modes and very adaptable but the enemy's source of sustenance and very survival depends a great deal on the local populations support. The company and platoon sized units need immediate on scene intelligence support to deal with such a population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such even the smallest fighting unit must be capable of intense collection and analysis of information to get actionable intelligence instead of waiting for intelligence from higher headquarters which may entail time thus letting go of opportunities in combat. It is always not realistic to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence. We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the smallest unit on the ground. The main criteria here is to shorten considerably the time between deciding on intelligence priorities, detecting the enemy's OB, Strength, disposition, capabilities and T&OE, delivering the attack sequence and assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming intelligence from ‘bottom-up’ for successful kinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units need to be trained and tasked with intelligence collection. It is near impossible to dedicate the very few specialized intelligence assets to all the operating forces in the area of operations. Here are the key challenges of bottom- up collections:

(1)Determining what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.

(2)Determining where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain (human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist operations (This can be termed operations

against networked criminal enterprises) are different in that the intelligence preparation of the battle space takes into consideration not only threat elements but also the human terrain—that is the local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in conventional operations (kill/capture) in COIN operations on-kinetic attack modes are often the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks taking into account civilian community heads, population psychological operations, insurgent targets social network, targeting his social contacts to judge his resultant movements and tracking him to finally locate his cell members or leadership, exploitation of targets other community traits—in effect besides personality targeting we are also concerned with the fact (non-kinetic fires) that units must project the second and third order of effects after they mount

any operation. Operations on a population, with which the targeted individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area—in the former case SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of information about his immediate network , if his communications are verbal and physical meet ups surveillance will be the preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound to contact his team members , move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield much more intelligence than just by acquiring battle order intelligence. Only resorting to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground are those who are frequently in direct contact with community members (and hence those of them who are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to gain intelligence information by conducting tactical questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or by casual elicitation methods in normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company level intelligence cell and enabling tactical teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in intelligence collection and also counterintelligence activities.

There needs to be a change in focus of effort between command levels.

1) Stress should be given to the fact that tactical company and platoon level units conduct operations with a high degree of success and hence higher levels of command must push intelligence staff and information down to lowest points of collection (initial points), that is the company/battalion levels.

2) At the same time low density high demand ISR assets need to be stretched and spread across the area of operations to gain a better situational understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command Headquarters will not lose control over its intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining situational understanding exclusively. On the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs of individual ground units or any feedback from them was generally ignored what with the Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the intelligence summary report to higher headquarters with the overall intelligence picture of the area of operations falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized intelligence assets to every operating force in the Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and the fact that majority of the information required for targeting flows 'bottom-up' (that is the lowest level troops) necessitates the creation of intelligence collection units at troop level either organic to the tactical combat ground unit or as a modular unit capable of plugging into any company or unit as per requirements. This fact should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for targeting, particularly in asymmetric type

warfare where the network must be targeted and where delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific intelligence.

Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the military intelligence collection process.

While military intelligence officers help in developing intelligence requirements, it is the commander who is responsible for designating an intelligence requirement as a priority. The intelligence staff regularly updates the commander on its progress toward answering each PIR. Speaking, that a military intelligence officer (STAFF INT OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.

Additional intelligence requirements aimed at filling gaps in commanders' understanding of the operating environment and requests for information may come from higher

echelons, lower echelons, and lateral organizations, or from the intelligence staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with that are most important.

While emphasis shifts in various doctrinal publications, PIRs are generally supposed to:

1. Ask a single question.
2. Be ranked in importance.
3. Be specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or activity.
4. Be tied to a single decision or planning task the commander has to make.
5. Provide a last time by which information is of value (LTIOV).
6. Be answerable using available assets and capabilities.

Usually, a commander only designates three to five intelligence requirements as PIRs at any one time.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September 2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. The recon unit along with the embedded HUMINT /CI element conducts area reconnaissance and community operations involving atmospherics, thus establishing a PIR framework before resorting to tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation by using the PIRs to force conversations, gain community perspective and prepare engagement summaries for analysis...The engagement summaries are analyzed, community feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn to recommend the targets that are the driving causes of the insurgency.

We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:

The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO, 2 havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the Bde. The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and Bn staff. The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sources, contacts and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources between the Bn, the line companies, the platoons and the HUMINT units is very important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence, local politicians and councilors, surface and witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful, can supply information of rich intelligence value but need protection which

will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations.

Just like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at the Divn Bn level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which requirements are tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies and even to the line platoon base camps. The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate units.

To further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies level and platoon level , we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to take over as intelligence representative and co-located at the platoon level. During patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected information will be filtered , categorized and forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also requisition intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.

Secondary Collectors:

HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary collectors. HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never reported) by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil affairs personnel.

Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the soldier feels could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the source in focus by detaining him or questioning him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source finishes his narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the source and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets the Bn Int section officer and fills him up with all the information he has gathered. Thereafter one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the HUMINT operative with the contact details of the source.

In a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache , which he recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly. In both cases he won't tell his colleagues or anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and ears open, can create a

good surface contacts base , thus reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues like prioritized intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of the line soldiers or other secondary collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus creating a secondary source base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and secondary collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the chain of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical or influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary source may have links with the individual dealing with the secondary collector or any other link and this can be of value to the primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be personal contact and liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.

Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not intelligence personnel, but come across information on tactical questioning—secondary collectors)

Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:

Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements who can be subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the involved personnel in tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and preparation/execution of the said activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit intelligence officer

Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of so much importance (combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without delay.

During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.

All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.

Platoon Leader:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full debriefing.

Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this regard.

Company/Troop/Battery Commander:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.

Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.

Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY of critical value.

Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:

Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them through the Staff headquarters.

Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame tactical questions better.

See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.

Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons therein come into regular contact with the local communities, local administration, village heads and panchayats, and the enemy itself. The battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it does the section is very understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other agencies. These inputs come as a result for requests for information from the ground and the process of requesting, tasking the request to brigade intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection platforms and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national agencies and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time resulting in untimely intelligence feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the human and enemy terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low level of

situational understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever intelligence they gather is based on standard TTPs and intelligence sharing with other agencies. Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI assets but as this is fraught with dangers and requires highly talented agents adept in deception and which is lacking in our intelligence headquarters intelligence acquisition using infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human terrain, the local populace and higher headquarters intelligence personnel will not commit to regular interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground do during patrols or securing an area after an operation or mopping up operations or during a cordon/search operation. Higher commands are not fully meeting their intelligence requirements of the companies and platoons in a timely manner; nor at the level of detail necessary for company commanders to successfully operate in the asymmetric defined battlespace. The company and platoon commanders must be able to portray the threat and disposition accurately nominate targets-both for kinetic and non-kinetic attacks and conduct successfully battle damage assessments so that the option of restrike does not get overlooked for example. For this is required a company level intelligence cell and pushing down further an intelligence enabled platoon. The infantry company requires and organic capability to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to increase their operational effectiveness in full spectrum conflict. Infantry units require company level intelligence cells (CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped to address this capability gap.

Each company (and in many cases several platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops where the company level intelligence team or platoon level intelligence cell conduct intelligence collection activities and proper synchronization of ISR and integrating with the targeting process is invariably attained as all round collection

involving the soldiers who are now the sensors leads to a far better situational understanding.

Primary tasks: Threat situation and disposition, Target nomination, BDA, Combat/security operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.

The troops fighting on the ground are fed intelligence from Brigade level intelligence HQ. There are certain limitations which must be taken cognizant as well as the offered solutions (points 1,6 , highlight the need for company level intelligence structure)

Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-

1. Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually lacking.
2. Single-source collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception. Multiple sources need to be deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms should be employed.
3. Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or DF'd) thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence collection effort gets degraded by the enemy.
4. Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.
5. Inability of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous support.

Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.

Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency successfully by gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing first hand combat intelligence. This tactical environment needs our fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an asymmetric enemy.

When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at battalion level we usually see that the battalion itself rarely executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves into sub-divisions which take up strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are set up in these strategic areas and these posts /sections create and maintain unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes, locational economics, topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the political forces operating in the community together with any other criminal enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING I PLAN TO TRAIN NON-INT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SOLDIERS LIKE INF BN SOLDIERS

TACTICAL QUESTIONING

Framed to ask local civilians on detention , suspected insurgent informers/agents and insurgents. Questions can be phrased in simple language and ground soldiers like Cobra troops need no extensive special training. This is not interrogation but tactical questioning-to gain information of possible intelligence value on the spot.

Collecting Information

Soldiers patrol the same area day after day. Sometimes they go in for deep area patrolling and reconnaissance. All this is done with the intent to collect combat information. In any operational environment soldiers should always be primed , alert to collect information. Of particular mention here is the word ‘‘change’’. While patrolling the soldiers may discern a ‘‘change’’ in normalcy of the surroundings. While studying the surroundings , like the people, terrain, infrastructure the soldier should recognize any changes in the environment. Often than not these changes are important indicators of enemy activity or intent. The soldier may not be able to find out the reason behind the change , still it’s very important he report it to the intelligence personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as

- **Armed Elements:** Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.
- **Homes and Buildings:** What is the condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock?
- **Infrastructure:** The presence of functioning stores, service stations, etc.
- **People:** Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

- Contrast: Has anything changed?

If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the information requirements. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the information requirements and their responsibility to observe and report

While handling detainees and EPWs keep the following in mind:

1. Segregate the detainees and EPWs based on nationality , sex , profession , ethnicity (civilians) and rank , insignia , and regiment (may be belonging to enemy intelligence unit , thus game for special interrogation)
2. While searching the person of the detainee or EPW search thoroughly. Keep separate the records of documents , seized equipments and weapons(capture tags).Describe all documents,equipments and weapons as completely as possible.This is not DOCEX or Captured equipment exploitation in its entirety—that will later be done by trained HUMINT personnel and with help of technical assistants.What is being done here is tactical exploitation , just like tactical questioning—on the spot intelligence extraction.
3. Intelligence is perishable and combat intelligence is highly perishable , action is required as soon as possible and for that the intelligence must reach the targeting platform without any delay.But there are procedures.The prisoners and detainees who are felt will yield more information on further questioning must be moved as soon as possible to the rear where interrogators are waiting.Bear in mind that with time the detainee/EPW emboldens , the initial panic which he had on point of capture wears away , he gets time to think and also harbors escapist thoughts—escape from captivity.We are here talking about the duties of secondary collectors , the line troops who must move them fast to rear after ascertaining that they do have information of value.There are mobile interrogation teams to handle cases right on the spot at forward areas and composed of a mix of HUMINT/CI but that is *tactical HUMINT and will be dealt within my book on Counterintelligence.*
4. Keep a tab on the detainees , EPWs and all others so that they do not communicate with each other.
5. Remember the personal safety and protection of all detained for questioning can be a cause for concern under certain circumstances and hence they must be safeguarded.For example someone from the line troops may vent his personal anger on the enemy by attempting rough handle the detainees or prisoners.Sexual harassment is also an issue.Whatever be the case , they must be treated humanely.

Key Considerations for Talking

- You must be aware of the existence, nature and type of threat in your area and the vulnerabilities of the protection measures taken by your commander which are liable to be tapped. Overall you should know the force protection measures taken by your unit.
- Be careful about the local culture, traditions, customs.
- Your body language should project a friendlier flavor, not an intimidating one. Point weapons away from the accosted person.
- Talk to people in normal surroundings. Don't lead them to an isolated area, an alley or any place which will make them suspicious. Always be polite. Remove sunglasses.
- If you are speaking to a woman know local courtesies.

Questions

Questions should be so structured so as to be simple, straightforward, should open and maintain the conversation, should start with an interrogative, and should prompt a narrative answer. Interrogatives are what, why, when, who and where. Questions should not be closes provoking only an "yes" or "no" as answer but should be "open". Avoid asking questions that are confusing. Characteristics of open questions:

- Act as an invitation to talk.
- Prompts the person to answer comfortably and feel encouraged to continue with the conversation.
- Not too specific but broad in nature.
- Encourage discussion.
- Creates a situation favorable for the soldier to be the listener (and observer) for a major part of the conversation.
- Does not cause the person to feel intimidated or threatened.
- Invokes curiosity of others and allows them to get involved in the discussion spiritedly.
- Gives the person the opportunity to tell his opinions, his judgment, what he feels is important, what he feels should be done.
- Should invoke a conversation, not a question-answer scenario.

Be subtle, don't just jot away on paper the answers –that is not conversation and always be friendly, cooperative, observing him carefully but not arousing any suspicion, studying his body language and be courteous and reserved.

Questioning to Fill Out the Capture Tag

You are manning a check post or roadblock. Before being deployed to do so your unit commander has briefed you about the intelligence requirements as per current mission. The Battalion prioritized intelligence requirements lead to the generation of intelligence requirements for each company and subunits. These intelligence requirements as spelled out to you will guide you in framing the questions to be asked of individuals at the check post/roadblock. Once you, the soldier, have screened and detained a person categorized either as a detainee or EPW you must now obtain all possible details from him so that on

subsequent questioning/interrogation of the person by the HUMINT or CI agent, the latter is well prepared initially with the information you have supplied. You must fill out a capture tag which will facilitate further questioning/interrogation. The capture tag must include:

What is your job? What is your speciality? Are you a combatant? If so what is your rank, number and unit? Who are in your chain of command? Whom do you report—that is who your immediate superior is? What is the mission of your unit? Are you a civilian? Then why are you here? Who is your immediate boss and what is the name of your company? At the time, place and point of capture, detention what was your immediate mission—that is to say why were you there and what were you doing or what were your plans? Were you supposed to conduct any mission/job when you were captured/detained? What are your future plans and what is the future mission of your unit/company? You might note he is carrying documents, maps, identification papers; photographs. Here is where you might find things out of the ordinary. The map might be of another place or even this place: Why are you carrying this map? The photo/s might be of someone else: Who is this person and why are you carrying his photograph? The ID papers may belong to other persons and hence you ask him why is he carrying other peoples identification papers and why. And where are these persons as they are in a disturbed area and that too without identification papers. All these exploitable documents can now be handed over to the MI section together with the detainee/EPW.

Remember your questions should be guided by your unit's intelligence requirements and as briefed to you but on no count should the person being questioned get a whiff of these requirements or your mission. Everything should be done in an atmosphere of normal conversation.

Example Questions

Questions must be framed in such a manner so as not to elicit vague or misleading answers. They should be direct, pointed but at the same time broad so that the person being questioned does not misinterpret it or has any room for maneuver. For example the following questions were designed for soldiers manning check posts/roadblocks. Modify them to accommodate EPWs/detainees, local population as per your mission, situation and unit requirements.

- What is your name (Match this with any identification document found on his person) Cross-check with CI White list, Black list and Grey List)
- Where do you live and full address, where were you going and why, how did you arrive here. From here to your final destination point—what will be the route and why? In what way is it safer or convenient for you? Who will facilitate your journey? That reminds me, who facilitated your journey till here, financially or otherwise? (All these must be specifically answered or obtained)
- What is your present occupation, your specialty-if any and your qualifications (see if he has any technical expertise)?
- What was the type of physical terrain you travelled to get here? During your travel what all obstacles you faced and how did you manage to overcome/circumvent them. While travelling did you observe anything out of ordinary in your surroundings? Or any unusual activity?

- What currency are you carrying and how much? What is the money intended for (if found to be a big sum)?
- Can you name anyone whom you know personally who is averse to Indian security measures/ops here in this area? On being answered immediately follow with ‘‘who else’’. Do you know or are you aware of the nature and type of any anti-Indian security operation/any other activity here or anywhere else and dates or time of such activities? Can you tell me the reason for our forces to be here? Do you support our activities?

DO NOT’s

- Ask questions which might reveal your intent or which might make him aware of your units mission, intelligence requirements.
- Jot down answers before him.
- Don’t resorts to quid-pro-quo. They are not permanent sources to be given goods/money in exchange for information and neither are you an intelligence specialist. The same goes for EPWs and detainees.
- Do not resort to coercion. You may be reported to social media. Or the police. Remember we are all governed by Geneva Conventions.
- If you are handling EPWs and detainees escort them to the interrogation center as soon as possible. You are only supposed to ask basic questions to civilians in conversational mode. Yes if situation is fluid, like in battle and you accost suspicious civilians you may resort to interrogation based tactical questioning, but only to ascertain if they are of interest to HUMINT/CI personnel and carefully examine any captured documents. In such cases escort them quickly to detention centers from where the MP will take them to interrogation centers.
- Pay money for information.
- Do not be so cooperative so as to tell them their rights that can be handled later. First the information from them.

Reporting

For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit intelligence section to factor in all useful tactical information gained during the small units activities in the overall planning of the mission (and also update ISR planning):

Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical value. The soldier may resort to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to arrive at his judgment.

- Normal reporting
- Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.
- Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.

Document Handling

When there are documents on the person of the detainee efforts should be immediately made to:

- Classify them
- Seize , Impound or return them
- Determine if they contain information which can be exploited further by trained intelligence personnel (DOCEX).

Remember that any document, even though it may seem irrelevant on first sight, may on close inspection reveal information of interest, might satisfy intelligence requirements and with other seized documents give a bigger picture of enemy intent.

Classification:

Documents can be Personal such as letters, diaries, photographs, flyers posted in cities and towns, etc, Identity such as identity cards, passport, drivers license, ration cards or Official such as documentation government/military information, for example military books, field manuals, military reports, files, maps etc.

CED (Captured enemy document) is a piece of recorded information seized from the captured person belonging to the enemy forces or any civilian in collusion with the latter. We can also name our own military documents CED that were in the possession of the enemy. DOCEX of such documents can reveal what they know about us, or if anyone was involved on our side in transferring these documents to the enemy then we are alerted to the fact and going by the nature of the document or its origin we can put our CI agents to track him down. CEDs can be found on the person of EPWs/detainees, abandoned military areas, on the bodies of killed enemy personnel, old enemy command posts, destroyed enemy forward tactical headquarters.

A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs can also be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can be found almost anywhere; some locations include abandoned training sites, old enemy command posts, deceased persons, cafes, town squares, or in the possession of EPWs/detainees. Written or typed material, drawings, audio, and/or video recordings, computer disks, etc can constitute the content of a CED.

Once you have critically studied the CED you have to decide on three actions:

- Return them to the owner as they are very personal items and do not contain any military or governmental information
- Impound the CED with the intent to return them later as these documents being of personal nature contain information pertaining to the military but which after examination is found not to have any bearing on current situation or having any affiliation with the enemy. Still they will be sent for DOCEX and if the initial assumptions are true, they will be returned.
- Confiscate the CED as it contains military or governmental information (all official documents)

Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred for DOCEX.

The capture tag should contain the

1. Unit details who captured the CED
2. Location of capture : Grid coordinates
3. Time and date of Capture
4. Identity of the person from whom it was captured including brief description (Rank , unit etc)
5. Prevailing circumstances under which the capture was made
6. Description of the CED

The need for ground level analysis APPLIED TO COIN

Strategic Intelligence in military terms means the intelligence which goes into formulation of military policy and strategies. Operational intelligence on the other hand focuses on support to planning operations at the theater or regional level while Tactical intelligence is at the local level—intelligence that goes into driving operations locally.

Traditional intelligence doctrine does not take into account the asymmetric enemy which does not have an Order of Battle from the conventional enemy point of view—rather is dispersed, of loose cellular structure with all command identities unknown to cell members and is transnational..all in all near invisible with no military uniform that can identify him as in conventional battle , which does not resort to standard TTPs and other combat techniques, whose logistical, supplies and other support services are totally unlike the support arms of the conventional enemy and out of view, nearly invisible, hidden among sympathizers and communities resources. Thus if we consider COIN operations in a region, whether urban or jungle or hilly, the operational intelligence doctrine must be adaptive to include these factors. Further the intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms applied to conventional wartime and peacetime situations may not be as effective in situations involving, say COIN in an urban environment.

Hence we cannot just stay limited to traditional approaches to operational intelligence. We can adapt by say endeavoring to create new indigenous HUMINT sources, capturing indigenous insurgent technology conducting source operations by using sources from the local community by bridging the gap between them and us soldiers (developing close relationships, respecting their customs and abiding by it, being more of a civilian than a soldier by wearing civil attire and sharing tea/coffee with them, respect for their religion, etc all contributing to a conducive environment suitable for elicitation and oblique tactical prodding without raising any doubts) and conducting security reviews with such as the modern day IED in perspective..Information from all these being aligned with the intelligence requirements of the commander thus increasing the depth of his situational awareness.

The main goal of collection is to acquire data about the enemy's environment, resources, and activities. This is summarized as follows:

We need to know the current activity of the enemy, its objectives/goals, whether these goals are directed against us—the intent, whether it has the capabilities to achieve these goals and taken for granted it succeeds in its attempts—that is it succeeds in achieving its intent, then what will be the consequences for us—the damage.

Intelligence here is crucial. We must determine the intent of the enemy. But like we are always striving to secure our installations, all related information systems and movements from enemy prying eyes so does the enemy who takes pain to cloak its behavioral indicators which might give out its intent. Now if there are no behavioral indicators, however we may suspect the enemy of possessing intent to cause harm, we are nowhere when it comes to determining it accurately. We need to go for deep intelligence collection and access a myriad of sources so that slowly the behavioral characteristics are discerned.

Here let's touch on Indicators and Warning concept. So vital to security. This is also known as Early Warning. If the enemy has intent it will decide on a course of action/actions—COA/s. We have to design a thorough collection system so that we can target the indicators (on a continual basis so as to confirm the enemy's COAs or negate our assessments of its COAs until finally we confirm accurately) and hence get an idea about the intent. And then lay down the potential COAs in parallel (parallel mind you) and after matching with the capabilities (yes, that too needs to be determined first) we choose the most probable COA of the enemy. The Early Warning system is more of a proactive-intelligence approach rather than a reactive-intelligence one.

For each intent they can take a course of action (or we zero down to a course of actions from a list of probable course of actions corresponding to the intent by considering more factors such as information gleaned from open sources, attack mode types or weapon types/delivery mode as per prevailing security hardening of target/security environment around/proximity of target etc) which we determine as most probable by considering factors like capability, behavior or other indicators. We can have a Most Likely Course of Action or in the extreme the Most Dangerous Course of Action. It all depends how successfully we ascertain their intent, capabilities, behavior and how far accurately we can infer their other characteristics and past criminal/terrorist/military offensive activity from past records/database **past threat assessments, past activity records, personality profiles, weapons/combat capability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports.** For example a military unit, while assessing the threat can pull intelligence (of course on request and need to know basis) from higher headquarters, from adjacent units, from its own sources and from whatever ISR tools they have. Adjacent units or other units who share the same communication network or who is accessible by the unit can supply intelligence on the threats past behavior—say an

engagement with the other unit. From that the unit can , within a good confidence level ,determine the enemy's tactics, techniques and procedures. Inputs like this can help in determining the probable course of actions. We can list out possible consequences for each course of action.

First the Intents, then ascertaining the Capabilities—not exactly “then”...the collectors tasked by the CMO generally busy themselves with sourcing information on both and by pulling on information from R&S teams. Thereafter the Commander brainstorms with his staff the possible COAs by backwards iteration to the Intent/s and evaluating the COAs in the light of the Capabilities and also the possible consequences for the enemy/effects as battle damage or simply damage for us. A terrorist attack may more be directed at the Parliament House than a Mall because of the Symbolic and Political-Seat flavor). Again it can equally be likely that one enemy COA generates a crippling counterattack by our forces whereas another COA is less obvious and also causes less damage or less repercussion. The enemy too war games and may decide to forego the first COA and go for the second one. Another example could be the enemy's COA is simply intelligence activities directed against us with a timeframe to determine what they intend to determine, knowing very well that our CI teams will move in and take tentatively that time frame to expose their intent—hence their COA could be go on with the intelligence activities before the deadline—that is before they are exposed. There are several courses of actions, each in context of different scenarios. That is why it is immensely important to gain a perfect or near perfect situational understanding. Thus during this evaluation the Commander and Staff narrow down to the most possible Course of Action or the Most Dangerous Course of action for each Intent. Whatever every COA the enemy takes we must look for observable INDICATORS. This is the task of the Collection teams. Once these indicators are identified we look for patterns. Once we discern them we begin exploitation.

In other words, we need to judge the Intent of the adversary. Our intelligence collection teams should look for indicators, indicators which will tell us what he is doing today. Supported by more information about the capabilities of the adversary, , past threat assessments, past activity records , personality profiles , weapons/combat capability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports).

We make an educated guess of the intent or a list of intents with confidence level/s and then list out the corresponding course of actions with possible consequences for each course of action. Continuing the iteration further we select the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action by studying the consequences along with the capabilities and intents.

The following grossly sums up the steps in the intelligence cycle.

1. Develop intelligence requirements.

2. Collect information to answer intelligence requirements.

3. Triage information for accuracy and consistency, analyze collected information, deconflict inconsistent information (if necessary), and identify other intelligence requirements (re-task collection, if necessary).

4. Compile analyzed information (timely, accurate, specific, and predictive!), and produce a finished intelligence product for dissemination and community consumption.

This all goes back to collection. What are the goals of the adversary? What's he trying to accomplish; what's his intent? What is the Order of Battle of the enemy? In other words what are the strengths, dispositions and capabilities of the enemy? What is the inventory and type of their equipment/weapons? How will the terrain affect enemy's movements, possible courses of actions (this applies to us also), what are the possible concealment areas offered by high ground or foliage, how does the terrain afford ambush points and where they can possibly be, how does the current and future weather predictions act as enabler or otherwise for the enemy and us, what is the present enemy situation, if the enemy is an asymmetrical one like the terrorist/insurgent then does it have the capability to attack hard targets, what was the modus operandi in the past of the asymmetrical enemy, target history and who were/are its leaders/sympathizers, what were the safe houses then and possible locations at present, what ideology the terrorist group pursues and what are its aims as demonstrated by its propaganda or by website declarations and so on. *This will allow us to identify indicators. We identify indicators, then patterns, and then we exploit them.*

Tracking adversary capabilities is a continual process, and should be updated per changing conditions in their strength, disposition, equipment, or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Requirements Determination –The Collectors

To properly collect information during war or any situation involving ground troops and the enemy, be it a tactical operation or stability operation we need individuals who can interrogate or EPWs or detainees in an efficient manner without invoking unnecessary delays .

To this end we need persons with good interrogation skills, ability to conduct tactical questioning and good debriefing skills. *Soldiers on the ground need to be trained in HUMINT capabilities, apart from HUMINT specialists, so that when the soldier encounters the EPW right at the front or in areas other than the rear, he can quickly interrogate and extract HUMINT/CI relevant information and then pass on the prisoner to the interrogation facility. If the soldiers manage to extract information this way, it could very well be that the said information can be of immediate tactical use to the unit the soldier belongs. The chances of detaining an individual with no information or intelligence of target value are also lessened considerably. On the other hand involving soldiers this way helps the commander and upper echelons get a first hand good situation assessment.*

Besides this we need trained HUMINT specialists to act as enablers for the commander while assessing the situation. They will conduct source operations to throw light on the enemy order of battle, his capabilities, plans and intentions. The collection manager with all the inputs from the HUMINT specialists can then assist the Commander with updating his intelligence requirements and with the capabilities and intent of the enemy in perspective now, he can devise appropriate COAs.

As for the intelligence component CI we need to realize the full import of the latter. Thus we need CI specialists/soldiers with the skill to identify, detect, counter, neutralize or exploit the enemy's intelligence approaches to gain information about our plans, capabilities and other factors. The CI soldier must be well versed in polygraph and technical countermeasures as there can be cases of treason and subversion and he will have to identify, detect such individuals and also establish their complicity in the crime and report to the executive. Foreign language ability will be an asset. CI soldiers need to exploit documents seized and these may be in a foreign language. CI teams can be augmented with an interpreter in case the soldiers lack the ability to converse in a foreign language.

Finally we need soldiers/specialists trained to coordinate collection activities, deconflict and synchronize all HUMINT/CI activities and interact effectively with higher and lower echelons.

ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED ORGANIC INT UNIT FOR PARAMILITARY BN FIGHTING INSURGENCY

I WILL FIRST OUTLINE INT ARCHITECTURE AT HIGHER HQ THEN LIST A TACTICAL INT CAPABILITY, FORMED FROM Coy RIFLEMEN , NOT INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using resources, planning for and employment of forces, and ensuring that forces accomplish assigned missions. Leaders and staffs exercise control to facilitate mission accomplishment.

We can have the following organizational structure:

The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)

HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)

Operations Support Cell

Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority

HUMINT Teams

HUMINT TEAM HQ - Analysis & Control Element: An Intelligence mission management and analytical hub at the division, corps, or theater level, where intelligence is gathered from the individual intelligence disciplines and fused together to form a composite intelligence picture. Gaps in intelligence are identified and tasked out to the respective collection assets.

ACT - Analysis Control Team: An intelligence cell which aids tactical combat brigades or battalions in managing assigned or attached intelligence assets and conducting analysis.

OMT - Operational Management Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a Captain the OMT is designed to manage two to three subordinate CI/HUMINT Operational Teams (OT). The OMT is a self-contained operational and technical control and analysis element. The OMT is capable of plugging into an ACT, ACE, Rear Area Operations Center(RAOC) or any element which has a CI/HUMINT requirement.

HOT – HUMINT Operational Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a JCO, the OT performs CI/HUMINT operations, investigations, and collection functions.

TET - Tactical Exploitation Team: The TET is subordinate to the Corps MI Brigade and contains the Corps CI, IPW, and LRS assets.

The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)

HUMINT reports and other operational feeds need to be worked upon, processed, and derivations made. Cross cueing with reports from other sensors sometimes becomes necessary. HUMINT validates IMINT, SIGINT. What we need is a cell where all these feeds are fused together, processed and timely actionable intelligence derived. Extrapolation is also done to impact operational and strategic considerations with the available intelligence products plugging into the overall

intelligence system. The HUMINT analysis cell also indicates gaps in reporting.

The HAC:

Produces HUMINT reports and feeds for intelligence summaries. Conducts dissemination.

Maintains database of all HUMINT activities in the AO and this database is directly accessible to all HUMINT teams and lends very good support to their collection operations.

HAC plugs in ACE so as to use analysis tools for immediate and long term analysis and collection plans. It analyses the trends and patterns discerned after collection or during collection. Analyses source reliability and credibility by various comparative tools and assists the collector to know his sources better and assign tasks accordingly or stop all source-handler operations with sources of negative attributes.

HAC helps in compiling target folders. Now future collection efforts can be affected based on the information in these target folders. The target folders are updated time to time and a repository maintained.

HAC supports CI entities by supplying information of CI interest and provides feeds to CICA

Provides collection requirements input to the HOC.

Supports RM through the development of HUMINT SIRs based on command PIRs.

Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.

HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)

Coordination and synchronization of all HUMINT activities is of utmost importance. Proper technical control and deconfliction among adjacent and higher/lower HUMINT elements is the job of the Operations cell. The HUMINT Operations Cell HOC. The HOC keeps a track of all activities conducted by all HUMINT and operational teams (which are a mix of CI and HUMINT operators) and coordinates them.

HUMINT TEAM STRUCTURE

Operational Management Team

The OMT is manned by 3-4 persons and provide technical control, operation coverage and guidance, collection and operational advice and focus to 2-4 HUMINT teams who are engaged in the actual collection and other HUMINT activities. The OMT can have an analysis element (to help in quick dissemination of actionable intelligence) to assist in boot-level analysis and mission analysis. It reports teams equipment status and other variables which may affect the HUMINT teams capability to the HOC and unit headquarters. It works in close tandem with the ACT to develop current threat assessments and answer the commander's intelligence requirements. Provide the collection and operational focus for HUMINT teams.

Integrates the HUMINT teams directly into the commander's ISR planning. Keeps the commander abreast of all activities, capabilities and limitations of the deployed HUMINT teams.

HUMINT Team

The HUMINT team consists of 4-5 persons who carry out the actual HUMINT functions and are trained in the entire spectrum of the latter, and they may be deployed to execute mission- focused activities of interrogation, debriefing, contact operations, tactical questioning or DOCEX.

The HUMINT-CI mix (Tactical HUMINT team) functions:

CI/HUMINT Preparation of Battlefield:

CI/HUMINT team will study all environmental factors and the effect they will have on both the enemy and our forces.

Attention areas:

Threat profile including Intent,OB,Dispositions,Strength,TOE,

Demographics,population,politics,culture,language,ethnicity,history,religion,military,terrorism,in surgency,information structures, communication lines, centers of gravity and other criminal groups who support enemy/sympathizers from local community intentions/attitudes.

Enemy's Composition, Disposition, Strength (often mnemonic zed with):

SALUTE: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment

Exercise:

I as the Commander have a Goal. To determine the Threat capability of the enemy. To this end I define the mission as explicitly as possible. Thereafter I set down the PIRs. At the same time the HUMINT resources I can spare are allocated tasks to collect information after my planning team in concert with the collection manager sets up cells each catering to certain IRs broken further into several SIRS. The teams of HUMINT and TACHUMINT are guided, controlled and overseen by the OMT, HAC....

Goals: We need to determine the intent of the enemy (threat) ,as formulated by the command (top hierarchy whose identity we need to determine),its strength, disposition and capabilities and all the possible courses of action, the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action.

PIRs: What are the intentions of the enemy and is it capable of carrying out the threat?

TASK: Each team derived from each cell will consider all factors and generate the intelligence requirements. They will then task themselves with identifying all indicators that support or deny these intelligence requirements

Identify the threat's likely objectives/desired end state.

Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.

Develop each COA.

Evaluate each COA.

Prioritize each COA.

Identify threats to aviation operations for each COA (Aviation-specific).

Identify initial collection requirements.

Identify initial production requirements.

Identify initial dissemination requirements.

A.We can create a basic intelligence team structure with the GOALS:

1.To identify the enemy top-tier officials

2.The enemy intent (current tactical goals and strategic goals)

3.The strength, disposition, capabilities assets, and organization structure of the enemy.

4.Organizations TO&E

5.The most likely COA and the most dangerous COA.

B.From the above we identify our primary intelligence requirement/s:

The immediate threat posed by the enemy. What are the goals of the adversary? What's he trying to accomplish; what's his intent? Answer what he's doing today in order to

answer what he's going to do tomorrow and beyond.

C. Next we create teams, say 2-3 manned teams, each team assigned a separate task of collection. The team leader should exhort his members that given the intelligence requirement by HQ they should strive to generate further IR based on the information available and during collection as new information may require further probing and exploration. Members and team leader should be proactive. Intelligence too is both reactive and proactive. An indicator associated with an IR propels the agent to look for corroborating information--that's reactive. Sometimes we are totally unaware of the unknown. Well the intelligence agent can have an informant/source network in place which constantly looks for say enemy movements or any change in enemy positions—which on first sight can be a normal movement/displacement but on further probing reveals an offensive intent. To this end the intelligence agent needs to have a proactive mindset, always curious, probing and exploratory.

We also set up covert or overt civilian collection units whose members are either having access to physical addresses frequented or inhabited by the enemy or are geo-located in close proximity to the latter.

Our teams are exhorted to resort to open intelligence frequently OSINT such as any news/enemy propaganda/private and government discussion boards, analyses/TV panel discussions on current situations with reference to the disturbing elements posted on the web, in dailies, or aired on radio / TV programmes. It should be borne in mind that globally 90% useful intelligence is collected from OSINT sources and the remaining from ISR platforms.

Our teams can be based on the following factors – ATTENTION AREAS:

- Organization, Composition, Disposition, Strength (the command structure and organisation of headquarters and subunits, geographical locations of unit headquarters and subunits, Strength expressed in units and weight of fire delivered by its weapon systems)
- Leadership
- Intent
- Weaponry and Equipments
- Capabilities / Combat effectiveness
- TTPs—historical in the concerned area of operations and area of interest. (Tactics used by the enemy unit and Miscellaneous data related to specific task, mission or operations... this will help in determining enemys most likely course of action. Unit history used to judge expected performance based on its past performance)
- Threat ranking-by violence or activity
- Enemy propaganda
- Recent incidents of violence irrespective of sporadic or concerted nature
- Local community and political support
- Other friendly groups / criminal gangs sympathetic to enemy causes or having same ideology/political goals
- Logistics

Keeping the above factors in perspective we can create cells comprising of HUMINT collectors (and also admixture of HUMINT/CI , TACHUMINT—when information of CI Interest is emerges when the HUMINT collector is conducting questioning , he will

transfer the source to the CI team). These cells may be:

- Leadership Cell
- Enemy units cell
- Strategic Cell
- Threat Cell
- TO&E Cell

Each team cell will generate its intelligence requirements. These requirements are all predicated by the Commanders PIRs. SIRs or sets of SIRs corresponding to each IR are developed, keeping in view the indicators. Thereafter tasking begins.

The current teams are C2, Strategic, Lower HQs and Units, TO&E AND THREATS.

C2 Cell – The enemy organization leadership formulates the strategy and hence the individual leadership personalities, their affiliations, intent, movements, social contacts etc should be gauged accurately by identifying the indicators so as to defeat their ongoing or future deliberate operations. The hierarchy should be determined which will give us an idea of the functions and span of control of each level. Thus the C2 cell will focus on the command and control of the organization.

Strategic Cell: Decides on the overall strategy. Is composed of the Command staff, planning, logistics, operations and intelligence/CI advisors.

Lower HQs and Units cell – The organizations middle and lower level management is composed of lower HQs/Section HQs and units. The capabilities of these should be determined and it should be assessed properly as to which deptt or unit has a significant part in the current operations against our forces and thus we can assign a priority ranking. This ranking can be based on the threat potential or activity predicated by the overall intent of the organization which has prompted it to conduct current operations. That is to say those HQs and units should be prioritized as per their threat capabilities and activities which have a direct bearing in the offensive operations.. Triage all these HQs and units and feed the report to the TO&E cell.

TO&E cell – The TO&E cell will evaluate the report submitted by the Chapter cell. It will evaluate the strength, assets and activities and draft a table of organization and equipment.

Threat cell: The task of this cell is to identify all the possible courses of action to be undertaken by the enemy and distill them to infer the most likely and most dangerous course/s of actions. The threat cell will consider all the inputs from the other cells. In addition it will undertake an intelligence preparation of the battlefield. It will study the past violent behavior of the enemy, take cognizance of its intent/s, capabilities, dispositions, strengths, affiliations with other support elements such as criminal enterprises, terrorists and create intelligence requirements, prioritized which will lead to tasking of its operatives to identify the indicators supporting or denying these threat activities.

COLLECTION SUMMARY

Assessment of threat capabilities, operations and, current and expected threat actions across the battle space to provide the commander with an assessment for the development and execution of countermeasures.

Recommending countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.

Threat intent

Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
Identify threat C2 nodes
Identify threat logistic routes
Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts
Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises
Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control
Identify political/administrative figures that support threat ideology
Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.
Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of attack.
Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
Gauge IED detonation methods/means
Gauge IED timings
Possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Staging areas
Safe houses
Weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
Find out what supplementary operations threat may resort to
Recommending countermeasures to threat IED
Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW
Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire

WARNING

(a) **Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminating.**

Warning is of two types:

Defensive warn

Enemy warn

In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary's possible attack the installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or virtual.

In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn't done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks.

It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific. In addition to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated; meaning the level

of warning may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.

WARNING SYSTEM:

The warning system must have the following features:

It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.

It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets, and command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.

It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation, its C2 and critical assets.

Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.

Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes

Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle

Provide warning of threat logistic routes.

Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,

Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs

Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat

Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi

Provide warning of threats history

Provide warning of threat movements

Provide warning of threat leadership

Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.

Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.

Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.

Provide warning of the expected time of attack.

Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts

Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense

scenario Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes,

emplacement Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means

Provide warning of IED timings

Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration

Provide warning of Staging areas

Provide warning of Safe houses

Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations

Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.

Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to

Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire

(b)Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-

We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active

measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area

Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a

C2 mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be

integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely

controlled lethal/non-lethal measures.

As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside a restricted area/protected area. Areas within buildings, facilities, structures, airfields, ammunition depot, etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances.

Measures should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems.

Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.

There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on

intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probable anti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal group's affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit protection.

METHODOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION:

The commander, the staff, and the higher and lower headquarters across the depth and width of the battlefield must coordinate with the CM section while formulating plans for future operations and to support ongoing missions. Variations in enemy actions or changes in perception of the enemy's movements give rise to new sets of intelligence requirements and the CM section should take this into account. The battlefield is an area of high fluidity and hence changes must be expected and Requirements Management must be flexible enough to incorporate these changes.

The two most critical steps in collection management is identifying and prioritizing the intelligence requirements. To this end 6 areas of interest must be considered and they are force protection, situation development, targeting, battle damage assessment BDA, indications and warning and IPB. The intelligence requirements stems from these areas and all of the competing requirements needs to be consolidated,. Thereafter the collection plan is created and the scarce IEW resources are tasked more efficiently.

Requirements Management, Mission Management and Asset Management constitute the Collection Management process. They are treated separately but together constitute integrated operations as a whole.

The six steps in the CM process are:

- Develop Requirements,
- Develop a Collection Plan,
- Task/Request Collection,
- Disseminate,
- Evaluate Reporting,
- Update Collection Planning.

The various activities inherent in these steps need to be synchronized and placed under constant review.

While devising the Collection plan, the intelligence officer in charge of designing the plan (henceforth known as Collection Manager CM) takes into account the following:

- Commanders Priority Intelligence Requirements
- Low Priority Intelligence Requirements
- Requests from subordinate units,
- Taskings from higher HQ's
- Intelligence requirements for targeting purposes

Now, he prioritizes these keeping in mind the Commands intelligence needs and the commanders priority intelligence needs.

When BICCE study was initially conducted with the development of possible enemy COAs, the intelligence analyst attempts to develop all indicators of these COAs. (Indicators are those details of enemy action/inaction that may suggest an enemy COA)

COLLECTION FORMAT

There are two collection plans. One designed for conventional battlefield operations whereas the other caters to a LIC environment. LIC battlefield operations tend to be dispersed. The PIR and IR's are highly diverse and collection becomes a tough task.

In the latter case the following steps are followed:

- List the PIRs and IRs, prioritize them and enumerate them using control numbers and alphabets. This helps in prioritization.
 - Now ascertain the indicators
 - Determine potential indicators-prioritize those that will answer the PIR and IR.
 - Delete all indicators that do not answer the intelligence requirements.
 - Develop specific intelligence requirements. These are the requirements as stated by the commander, prioritized and general, broken down into manageable specific requirements. A PIR may have several specific intelligence requirements.
 - Analyze these SIRs and the target characteristics keeping all the indicators in perspective.
- Finally prioritize the SIRs and determine the suitable collection discipline/platform/agency keeping its capabilities, limitations, backlog of collection tasking allotted to it and whether adjacent units, lower units are also using it.
- Prepare the tasking list by creating a prioritized SIR list and deploy the collectors.

Indicator analysis is the basis for recommendations to the commander for a specific COA.

Note:

1. Intelligence should be timely, accurate, predictive and specific. The last term is very important especially in the case when actionable intelligence is needed. The HUMINT agent reports:

Observed movement of Bodo insurgents in NAI 6.

Observed that they are moving south towards the rice fields near the Tarmung village. Now these two reports are timely as they are happening right now, predictive as we know they are moving south towards the rice fields near an identified village. But what about specificity. What is the strength of the insurgents in terms of manpower? How many of them? Any idea how heavily are they armed and what weapons are they carrying? Do they possess mortars, bazookas, rocket launchers (shoulder mounted)? Where are they exactly in named area of interest 6? Whenever you report keeping the factors Size, Activity, Location and Time in perspective, you need to be as specific as possible. That way we can not only gauge their exact intentions and courses of actions but also formulate our course of action, as we can now pin-point them.

Enemy Capabilities and Limitations can be mnemonicized with **DRAW-D, Defense, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw and Delay**. The Order of Battle and Table of Organization and Equipment (ORBAT and TO&E) are two areas intelligence must dwell upon thoroughly. The ORBAT refers to the enemy organizations disposition, capabilities assets and composition whereas TO&E refers to its organization table of units and associated equipment. Thus the Commander is made aware with this strength, disposition, organizational and capabilities brief of the enemy.

Tasking is meted out considering:

Type of collection platform to be used. Here it's HUMINT

Availability of HUMINT resources. It could well be resources are very limited. Maybe time is of essence. It could well be that actionable intelligence is required fast and there is no room to send the collected information up the chain for collation, processing and dissemination to targeting platforms by the end-users—here the Commander. This time constraint may mean we have the analytical element right at boot-level, who will be a part of the collection team. This will cut down on the time involved in the intelligence cycle from collection to dissemination. Moreover availability of HUMINT resources also means the Commander has other priorities with other tactical missions or maybe a part of the HUMINT resources are away accompanying patrols to get intelligence from neighborhoods, civilians etc. So availability of resources is a criteria to be taken into account.

NOTE: A MUCH SIMPLER CONFIGURATION CAN BE SET UP INITIALLY
MANNING THE ORGANIC Coy INT CELL

WITH 4-5 ENLISTED INF RIFLEMEN , A SR NCO/JCO.TECHNIQUES OF
TACTICAL QUESTIONING , ELICITATION

OBSERVATION/SURVEILLANCE,DOCEX,AND ROUTINE INTERROGATION
CAN BE TAUGHT EASILY TO THE HANDPICKED

MEN.THE SET UP IS BEING ENVISIONED FOR AN INF REGT AT KOLKATA.

SUMMARY OF THE ORGANIC SETUP ABOVE IS GIVEN IN NEXT PAGE

**Proposal for fighting units
of**



Bn Int Platoon - 1 Coy Int Cell

Alpha Coy 1st Int Platoon

The First Army Intelligence HQ (Tactical) created
on the lines of proven American Army Intelligence TTPs.

[PLTN SITE](#) [HQ SITE](#)



OPERATING BASES

MAIN BASE
FORWARD BASE
INTERIM BASE

INT PLATOON

With security section.

Platoon Commander
Platoon second-in-command

Radio Section
CE Section
DOCEX CEE Section
Interrogation & Interview Section

Elicitation Section
PsyOps Section
Topographical Section
R&S Section.

SKILLSET


>>>>> Tactical Questioning/Surveillance - Observation -Reconnaissance/Terrain/DOCEX/
Basic Interrogation-Interviewing-elicitation/Report writing and using formats/Data entry/
Inputting information in "contact" portal>>>>>>>

BASIC TOE

OPERATING BASES : MAIN/INTERIM/FWD

Communication channel:
With Main Base
With forward base.

MAIN BASE<>TOC of concerned/supported Bn



COMMAND ECHELONS

BN INT HQ STAF OFFICER -INT/OPS

HQ Element HQ Support RTO

 HQ Element
OPS INT Tech Cntrl Element

 OPS INT RTO
Radio teams Int Cells



The objective is to train and equip the line soldiers so that they may conduct basic ISR tasks in keeping with properly defined intelligence requirements of the Coy Commander who in turn is tasked by the Bn Int Staff Officer. These intelligence requirements include intelligence gaps and are prioritized as per importance with respect to the current battle situation.

1. The selected infantrymen will be trained in basic tactical questioning (different from interrogation),
 2. elicitation techniques,
 3. reading and understanding seized documents/images/maps (DOCEX),
 4. observation skills (movement of men/vehicles/particular behaviour patterns reflecting enemy attributes/distinguishing local and outsiders dress characteristics/language-dialect of locals so as to capture any variations during conversation with the subject-suspect/eye contact/facial features during conversation and tactical questioning/signs of nervousness, jittery behaviour, eye twitching, trembling hands and fingers, stuttering, undue perspiration, glancing askance, avoiding eye contact, alluding to some thing other than the subject of conversation and enquiry etc/topographical survey from distance with sector by sector eye sweeping skills/concentrating on one vegetation or bush spot and then dissolving to see the whole and repeat to discern anything hidden or covered by the bush/footprints and vehicle tyre tracks and gauging how recent and in which direction/faeces and whether fresh, warm or of few days back, urination signs and any other sight or signatures that may reflect enemy presence/looking for signs of sympathy for insurgents among the local population and marking them mentally--this support for insurgents can also be ascertained during tactical questioning and elicitation or casual conversation in civil attire at local tea shops
 5. debriefing patrols returning from routine duty
 6. sharing information with other unit int platoons
 7. radio communication
 8. report writing
 9. map reading
10. befriending and recruiting sources, should be limited to max 3-4

11. terrain profiling ,this is very important so as to avoid incidents of ambush , suggest routes for safe convoy passage,design ambush points,emplace camouflaged weapons--also using small tops and hills for the same,deciding on approach and exit routes through jungles and waterways,design of temporary observation posts and command posts,design and location of forward bases and interim bases.

THE DETAILS OF EACH CELL/SECTION/PLATOON

TACTICAL INT



Bn Int Platoon - 1 Coy Int Cell



THE UNIT INT SECTION

BLIP/CLIC

Under the command and supervision of the Inf Bn STAFF INT OFFICER intelligence platoons can be created. From among the Bn soldiers according to capability, availability and performance should be selected.

There will be two echelons in each platoon.

SECTION A supports Bn HQ. The Bn Int HQ Section will be composed of one Int officer, one intelligence specialist of the rank of JCO, and 3 enlisted soldiers. The Int officer can serve both as staff officer for the Bn Command and also as Commander of the operating forces in the Company. He is responsible for analyzing intelligence and planning deployment and tactical employment of ISR assets. The intelligence specialist can be a ground recon specialist whose duties involve observe and report on enemy activity and other information of military importance in close operations.

(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy's ability to interfere with that maneuver.)

SECTION B is the CLIC. Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)

Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which

will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups. Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bn conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn

Company Level Intelligence Cells

Coming to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence directly at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect the data matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyse and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for intelligence feeds. C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.

Functions/responsibilities:

CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander, assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture), managing and supervising CLIC ops, interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow.

If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.





KESHAV MAZUMDAR
Antiterrorism Officer




1. BLIP/CLIC Battalion Level Int Platoon: Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.). One platoon. Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

2. Company Level Int Capability : CLIC PLATOONS.

CLIC-> 2 SECTIONS
 COLLECTION SECTION
 ANALYSIS & PRODUCTION SECTION

TOC Coy ----- 2 CLIC PLATOONS




The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC, collection and analysis & production are looked after by the officer in charge, usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers, one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are

Functions/responsibilities:

CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Commander, assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture), managing and supervising CLIC ops, interacting with adjacent units, lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow. If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids. The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups. Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bnb conduct lateral communication, exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training, the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn.

3. Reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. Fighting for information CAPABILITY. INTERIM COMBAT TEAM --(FI-FO-INFO CAPABLE)-- WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO



RS PATROLS (EACH PATROL=3MAN SQUAD, EACH SQUAD HAVING 1 CI SOLDIER)

RS SQUADS (NORMAL COMPOSITION +1 CI SOLDIER)

The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.

The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier.

We can optimally have in the recon patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability.

After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy's strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn't have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don't see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.

LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They are not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions.

PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY

Reason for creation of interim team:

Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMINT collection ability. AND COMBAT CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF..(Details in HQ PORTAL.)

HUMINT Collection Operations

- ❖ Combating terrorism support
 - ❖ Rear operations support
- ❖ Civil-military operations support❖ OPSEC support
- ❖ Information operations support
 - ❖ Civil disturbance support
- ❖ Local operational data collection
 - ❖ Debriefing and interrogation
 - ❖ HUMINT threat assessment

Reconnaissance HUMINT Missions

- ❖ Elicit information from the local populace.
 - ❖ Interrogate EPWs and Detainees.
 - ❖ Debriefing Ops
 - ❖ Document exploitation.
 - ❖ Threat vulnerability assessments.
 - ❖ Source screening operations.



Int Architecture --For Indian Army
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