Keshav Mazumdar
Antiterrorism Officer

ALWAYS DEFINE MISSION STATEMENT PRECISELY.

MISSION STATEMENT: TO IDENTIFY THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE THREAT OPERATING IN AO ALPHA547.

(Why definition of mission statement is most important:
)

1.ESTIMATE THREAT INTELLIGENCE CHARACTERISTICS FROM KNOWN DATA AND ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE :
At this stage the CI operative is engaged in studying the current threat intelligence profile characteristics and looks for windows of opportunity to explore questions which normally arise during the course of obtaining information about the adversary intelligence service.Mind you , these are NOT the information gaps the commander needs to find out.Proper determination of these intelligence gaps , prioritizing them will come next..At this stage he is more concerned
with the threat profiles known characteristics,whether the threat intelligence collection system operating in our AO is part of a larger system,what are its capabilities,who are the personnel involved,how is the adversary intelligence doctrine put to use,in what manner does the enemy intelligence service collects information,what are its collection assets operating in our AO,what are the locations of these collection systems(in case of enemy SIGINT the location of the emitters, ).
The CI opperative may have to resort to requests for information from other lateral units or higher HQ intelligence Branch.It may be that certain characteristics of the adversary collection systems he could deternmine but not all are available from local sources.As an example he might be able to pinpoint the enemy HUMINT agent but he discovers the latter uses certain equipments whose technical characteristics are unknown to him.My concept of networking all the TOCs , with each TOC desk NCO handling a specific intelligence discipline operatives feeds,enables one of the lateral TOCs to supply the CI opeative with the information he is not able to collect from sources available to him.It could well happen that from another TOC desk NCO this TOC desk NCO gets information about this particular RFI as perhaps the intelligence teams in that group of companies faling under the purview of the TOC have had exactly the same experience as our CI operative and in their case have acquired the missing information and forwarded it to the TOC Desk NCO.Hence it is very important that all distributed tactical ops going on in a wide AO be networked through TOCs;thus a centralized command /control and push-pull of intelligence is achieved on an erstwhile non-linear , distributed , decentralized tactical battles profile where without these TOCs the lowest rung , i.e. the platoons and companies cant effectively push information up the echelons or share amongst themselves.

2.PREPARE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS :
From the first task above , while conducting a study of the adversary intelligene service , the CI operative comes across information shortfalls , as noted above.He then request information from adjacent units,higher echelons and national level assets.Each level assists by supplying the information or deploying their organic intelligence assets to help him.If any echelon cannot handle the RFI wih its limited organic assets , the RFI is sent up the chain to the next higher echelon with a new RFI.

***** It is here that the TOC plays a very important role.Be it a HUMINT agent/CI agent or the company rifleman turned intelligence operative (ES2 CONCEPT--MY PROJECT),in a very wide AO where the heat of battle makes conditions very fluid as in a conventional operation or like the asymmetric battle environment predominant today where the companies are spread far out in far flung AO and hance cant effectively push/pull intelligence,the operative finds it much easier to send in the information to the local TOC Desk NCO catering to his intelligence discipline speciality, of the particular sector of the AO where his company and other few companies are engaged.

3.ANALYSE THREAT INDICATORS AND DATA :

All the collected information (see above) are examined for key components.The key components are further reviewed,organized and processed by evaluating them,comparing them with information in the database , are operated upon to discern patterns , trends of the enemy threat.These patters/trends will throw light on the enemy intelligence capabilities , methods of operation , and most importantly intentions(CI ESTIMATE).
A single component may yield information what intelligence-specific COA the enemy might resort to as an initiative collection-attack or as a counter to our counterintelligence-attack. (Here the term ''attack'' is not the usual kinetic attack by tactical combat teams , but i invented the intelligence-specific-attack term to highlight the fact that counterintelligence should be on a totally aggressive footing , offensive , hard hitting (collection , deception wise , not fires),continuous and no-holds-barred (use of any type of deception , psychological,exploitation of suspects/detainees/sources--both own and turned etc,DOCEX tactics , techniques) non-fire combat system.I want to view counterintelligence as a non-fires combat system , both for offensive and defensive purposes.If we inculcate in ourselves this fighting-mentality then we can pitch all our collection assets and tactics/techniques and procedures with full force and destroy the enemy intelligence service totally,like what happens when a combat team embarks in a fire-fight.
Apart from CI ESTIMATE these components , key components that is , can also help in identifying the enemy intelligence operating in our AO and help us to assess its capabilities and intentions , whether they can be successfully deployed and the intent carried out.To this end red-teaming and int-COA/int-wargaming is carried out , with other staff elements , particularly the ops staff element helping in the process.
Here target development and target nomination options open to the threat intelligence service are considered in red-teaming mode.

To summarize , the analyse step consists of :

###@@@ NOTE: WE CAN CREATE DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES CORRESPONDING TO VARIOUS TARGETS/SITUATIONS CALLING FOR SPECIFIC KINETIC/NONKINETIC INTELLIGENCE-ATTACK TACTICS , TECHNIQUES OR COMBINATIONS IN LINE WITH ENEMY INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE.THIS IS POSSIBLE.TO CREATE A DOCTRINAL DATABASE.NOW WE CAN MATCH CURRENT ESTIMATED SITUATION WITH THE TEMPLATES AND CHOOSE THE ONE THAT HAS THE GREATEST SIMILARITY WITH A DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE.

BUT HERE SOMETHING ELSE NEEDS TO BE POINTED OUT.WHAT IF ITS NOT THE CONVENTIONAL ENEMY WHICH GOES BY STANDARD TTPs?WHAT IF ITS AN ASYMMETRIC ENEMY OR AN HYBRID ENEMY?ASYMMETRIC ENEMY DOESNT HAVE A SET PRACTICE OF USING STANDARD TTPs , THE STRENGTH OF THE ASYMMETRIC ADVERSARY IS ITS CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO OUR ACTIONS , CHANGING ITS TACTICS/TECHNIQUES , EVOLVING NEWER ONES THUS HEIGHTENING THE ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY.WE CANNOT HAVE THE USUAL DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES AS WE CAN HAVE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL REGULAR FOE.THIS I WILL ADDRESS LATER.

4.ESTIMATE PROBABLE THREAT:
Here the attention areas are the geographic AO and Areas of Interest , the discerned capabilities and intentions of the adversary int system.
LOCATION OF COLLECTORS/ID OF COLLECTORS:Every target can be surveilled and depending on the mobile status of the target (immobile,fixed or moving) , it is susceptible to avenues of approach , observation channels( directions and angles) which ,though may be more than a few , can be ascertained in advance and countersurveillance/.counterreconnaisance mounted.Apart from surveillance the CI operative can also determine how the particular target is suspectible to which means of information collection by the enemy agent.Every target possesses a predictable surveillance/observation and collection of information profile.Thus it is possible to locate the collectors.
ANALYZE TERRAIN/WEATHER EFFECTS:Terrrain and weather affect enemy collection of information.Aerial surveillance for example is hindered by canopy,dense foliage , building density as a clear straight line of sight for the sensors is hampered.Similarly a a direction finding system must have a clear line of sight to the target which is emitting radio signals.Weather conditions or terrain profile that block this line of sight affects information collection.For every possible target study the associated terrain and weather characteristics to determine how susceptible it is to enemy intelligence-attack.Say out of a list of 5 possible targets it is found that weather/terrain cause great difficulty for enemy observation/collection platforms,including enemy CI-HUMINT agents (here force proitection measures , physical/perimiter security/OPSEC/access contro,systems also play an important part in preventing human agents access/observation/reconnaissance) in case of 3 targets , then we have reduced the attention areas w.r.t targets to 2.We can now plan suitable countermeasures for these 2 tpossible targets leveraging our resources more optimally and in a focussed direction.

5.CONFIRM THE THREAT.
Confirm existing collected data.
Here the CI agent should study current intelligence reports/assessments stored/updated in the database (this he gets after he files a request for information), compare them with what he has collected (after all the steps above) and should make a careful note from earlier /current assessments and what he has collected and estimated if there is any change in capabilities and intentions.If there is, it indicates that the enemy intelligence service has either acquired new capabilities or is employing hitherto not used capabilities (to collect information on the possible targets).A change in enemy intent also reflects he has acquired/used for first time already existing capabilities IF the target/s present more difficulty for enemy agents forcing them to change capabilities.Mind you determining enemy intent does not solely translate to mean enemy intent w.r.t targets only , it also reflects enemy intent to change its own capabilities/TTPs so as to effect better targeting.
Hence if more information on enemy capabilities are required , the CI agent sends more RFI to organic/support intelligence units of parent Bn or those spread laterally or up the command chain to higher HQs.
If he thus access new information on enemy capabilities/intentions , he carefully places them against the estimated situation , that is his assessment and thus updates the entire operating picture.
(If again in future intentions/capabilities are discerned to be changing/changed ,the cycle is repeated.).

''COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE''

--not the same as Intelligence Estimate--

We have to conduct a counter intelligence study of the area of operations, so as to ascertain details about the enemy ,the existing situation , the military geography, weather, characteristics of the local population from the perspective of the enemy- that is to say who are the sympathizers, corroborators of the enemy, where and how the enemy intelligence operates, how it conducts sabotage - terrorist- subversive and counter intelligence and counter reconnaissance activities. We must estimate the effects of Enemy counter intelligence and intelligence activities on our mission, operations ,capabilities and all steps that are undertaken to attain mission success. Details about the enemy must include[ in counterintelligence context] location and disposition, composition, strength which should include local abettors and sympathizers, replacements and to what extent they are available, how much efficient are the enemy organizations that conduct intelligence, sabotage, subversive and terrorist activities. We must take into account all what the enemy counter intelligence services know about our intelligence and counter intelligence efforts. Historical, recent and present intelligence, sabotage, terrorist and subversive activities of the enemy should be maintained in database form which can be queried whenever required especially during mission formulation and counterintelligence planning. Those activities which are highly significant must be highlighted and all movements of the enemy during the conduct of such operations must also be recorded. We must know in detail the peculiarities and weaknesses of the enemy counter intelligence service and we must be fully aware of the operational tactical and Technical capabilities of the enemy as well as the type of equipment used by the enemy. All other factors must be recorded in fact sheets which must be attached to the estimate or recorded as annex.

After determination of the above we must now analyze the intelligence , counterintelligence ,sabotage , subversive and terrorist capabilities of the enemy.

1.. Maintain separate enemy capability data sheets, capabilities ranging from intelligence , subversive sabotage, terrorist and those that adversely affect our assigned missions and operations.

2. Every enemy capability datasheet must contain information about what the enemy can do with that capability, how, where, when, in what strength the enemy can carry out its operation. The data sheet should contain information about the time the enemy can devote given the constraints due to our/friendly military security , force protection and intelligence/ counter intelligence operations.. The time when the enemy intends to start its activities should also be entered in the datasheet.

3. This counter intelligence estimate is made by thinking like the enemy and hence we consider all courses of action that can be undertaken by the enemy. Keeping these courses of action in perspective we analyze each capability of the enemy. During this analysis we consider all the factors in para 1, that is all the intelligence we gathered about the enemy counter Intelligence service, existing situation, all the estimated effects on the enemy counter intelligence service and Intelligence Service by the weather and the terrain and also the effect on our intelligence and counter intelligence operations and capabilities/measures, its strength, disposition ,table of organization and equipment ,local affiliations..

4. With all the above information we now attempt to forecast the probable time of the most probable course of action of the enemy. In other words we try to determine the estimate of the probability of occurrence of the most likely enemy counterintelligence activity.

5. Every capability must be seen in the light of factors that will act as enablers or that will go against its adoption.

6. A capability must be seen in the light of its associated strength and vulnerabilities.

7. There should be a detailed discussion in the capability data sheet about all indicators that point towards adoption of that capability by the enemy.

8. The data sheet should contain information exactly how that capability will affect our mission accomplishment—how that capability will be put to use, its role in the course of action of the enemy.

The capabilities of the enemy should be categorized as intelligence capabilities , subversion capabilities , terrorist capabilities and sabotage capabilities. All known and estimated methods of operation should be recorded. Regarding sabotage capability all three that is military , political and economic sabotage should be taken into consideration. Both agent and guerilla types of sabotage should be considered. Subversion capabilities should include propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection and terrorist activities should also include information on enemy cooperation that will help in the evasion or escape of hostile locals. Regarding terrorist capability we must have all data about the terrorist organization capabilities in the area of operations and also the capabilities of the main personalities of the organization.

We must utilize all our intelligence and counter intelligence resources to get information of all the centre of gravity of Enemy counter intelligence services, command and control , table of organization and equipment, areas of vulnerability and criticality of the enemy counterintelligence apparatus and whether or not this vulnerability can be exploited and to what extent or do we have to neutralize them. We must create a list in which from the beginning till the end we put down the enemy courses of action from the most likely to the least likely corresponding to each capability, and the most dangerous course of action singled out after considering all the possible courses of action. Finally we must put down all information that will indicate in an estimated from the effects that this course of action will have on our assigned mission or in other words we can say the estimated effects of the capability that the enemy will put to use to execute that most likely course of action to defeat our mission.

The final part of the counter intelligence estimate will now dwell on an analysis of our counter intelligence measures to be adopted against these estimated enemy courses of action and whether there is any need of additional requirements or emphasis.

Keshav Mazumdar

Antiterrorism Officer

TACTICAL HUMINT

Tachumint

HUMINT is collected information which we term positive intelligence after processing.HUMINT collectors access human sources and multimedia to gain information about enemy intent,composition,disposition,capabilities,table of order and equipment, command control nodes, centers of gravity,leadership,personnel—this is also called Order of Battle when conducted prior to a combat situation. The Commander specifies his intelligence requirements explicitly and going by these requirements , prioritized , human sources,informants,and other human elements possessing information compatible with the said requirements are utilized by application of specific techniques like tactical questioning,debriefing,document exploitation, eliciting and interrogation and reconnaissance and surveillance. The HUMINT collectors are not intelligence operatives with general intelligence education and training but specialists.

Counterintelligence is also a collection oriented discipline like HUMINT but not an intelligence discipline in the strictest sense. It is concerned with enemy intent while HUMINT is concerned with collection part only so as to satisfy Commanders intelligence requirements in order to answer certain information gaps.CI attempts to prevent sabotage,assassination,terrorism,subversive and enemy intelligence activities , deny the enemy access to installations and sensitive information , acts as a protective shield for the Commander by supporting OPSEC and force protection and acts in an advisory capacity recommending countermeasures to enemy intelligence activities.CI is a protection component in the Commanders repository of defensive tactics and techniques and CI also protects the intelligence cycle. Several definitions exclude personnel, physical, document or communications security programs from CI purview , but on close inspection it will be seen that CI invariably is resorted to while implementing force protection and denial/deception measures (information warfare) thus bringing in play the security aspects of personnel , physical,documents.CI support tio physical security , infrastructure, technology protection, military security,HUMINT –all these some way or the other involve those elements that are kept out of general definitions.

Definitions can be very confusing, may render doctrine imperfect and lead to redundancy. For example the Army ten ds to maintain a general perspective on threat—statements like our forces are prepared to deter /attack/defend against a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from criminal activity in our jurisdiction which may abet our main enemy, terrorism , subversion to small wars, wars and battles. Now this generalized concept is fine in that we can have several security programs, each tending to one specific threat type in the entire spectrum. But the disadvantage in this approach is we cannot focus on the main threat, say terrorism, and as security concepts like force protection, deception operations, physical security, military security,etc all have certain elements in common we land up with redundant programs designed to handle these security concerns. For example antiterrorism and force protection both have in common physical security as a passive defensive subcomponent where the installation critical points are protected after vulnerability assessments and red teaming. The same subcomponent is the major component in a physical security program. Thus there occurs good redundancy if we do not have a focused view of the threat and counter threat measures become diffused over the broad spectrum.

The same goes with the definition of intelligence and CI. Or rather I should say the general perspectives held by most Commanders and even intelligence officers.

The main idea is to remove uncertainty and gain a decision advantage. This should be the prime objective of the Commander.HUMINT and CI are both shaping operations but with a critical difference.HUMINT shapes the Commanders view of the battle space by providing him accurate intelligence about enemy order of battle. Plus other information requirements when ops are in progress.CI on the other hand penetrates the enemy commanders decision cycle and shapes his views ‘’like the way’’ our Commander desires by denying the enemy commander access to our operations, plans and information systems , and using offensive methods like penetration , infiltration and also denial/deception operations. Both shaping operations have one thing in common as goal. To act as force enabler. To heighten the Commanders situational understanding. In other words to gain that ‘’decisive ‘’ advantage. .To get a ‘’positional’’ advantage. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces.

HUMINT shapes the understanding of the ‘’Blue forces’’ with respect to the ‘’Red forces’’ while CI does the reverse. True both use several techniques which are in common like interrogation and other low level source operations but going by what has been discussed CI is not HUMINT and not in the least a subset of HUMINT. Being a subset would mean CI operations would be counter-HUMINT only. But CI looks beyond that, by conducting offensive operations, denial and deception operations , exploiting enemy intelligence activities ,neutralizing them through collection of evidence and subsequent prosecution for national security crimes, and supporting tactical and theater operations by feeding inputs to the decision cycles. Thus we see CI goes far beyond Counter-HUMINT operations.

Interrelationship

CI also provides positive intelligence about the enemy as a byproduct of its operations.CI and HUMINT operations overlap in that very similar techniques are often used. In fact in tactical operations a mix of HUMINT and CI operators plus a linguist carry out tactical HUMINT operations where the roles of both are more overlapping and confusion arises when either may operate like the other. We should not always justify HUMINT source operations..this leads to the mistaken impression that CI only lends support to HUMINT and has no other function and that HUNMINT and CI are the same thing.NO.Whereas HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s organization,composition,capabilities and decision making without any focus on the intent of collection , only collecting all require information laid down in the commanders prioritized intelligence requirements order , and reporting it through proper channels (and here full stop) CI will go much further , exploiting , neutralizing the enemy intelligence activities or doing both…CI is concerned with enemy ‘’INTENT’’.HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s decision making cycle to gain information for the Commander whereas CI attempts to ‘’INFLUENCE’’ that decision cycle and shape it the way we want it in order to achieve winning objectives. Thus the HUMINT operative tasking end after detecting and identifying enemy intelligence activities while the CI agents tasks begin afresh.

From all this discussion we can derive two things.

HUMINT and CI are different.CI is not a subset of HUMINT.

2.As HUMINT and CI have many similar lines of operation , if both can be combined to satisfy tactical requirements ,(during theater or national-level requirements they can revert to individual role-this capability must be retained) , we will have an intelligence operator who will be more versatile,adaptable.and can confirm easily to all army requirements at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence formations can execute this tactical HUMINT asset (the operator) to satisfy commanders requirements. Merging the capabilities of HUMINT and CI results in a task organization of skills for the Commander—definitely an improvement over either HUMINT or CI enabled operations. Tactical HUMINT operations are most suitable for developing and maintaining an excellent informant/source base that provides timely, specific and accurate information. Tactical HUMINT operations combine both HUMINT and CI techniques and together with linguist assistance , are more capable of developing and maintaining contacts than only HUMINT or CI ops.For example , the Tactical HUMINT team comes across few individuals of interest near the forward area , the HUMINT operators conduct tactical questioning to extract information of intelligence value and then pass them over to their CI colleagues for further interrogation if they discern any information of interest to the CI operators. This can be switched to and fro and the application of the combined faculties of both results in more refined, relevant and timely/accurate information. If the individuals are of the witting type or have voluntarily offered to deliver information or are community members sympathetic to the forces, then they can be inducted into the source repository by establishing rapport/giving incentives etc and then later their assistance taken for more information. Tactical HUMINT teams can act as mobile interrogation teams at forward areas, quickly disposing off sources after tactical questioning and interrogations, thereafter detailing escort for those who may render more information or who, it appears are suppressing tactical information, sending them to detention centers and collocated interrogation areas near forward areas or in the rear. The standard procedure of detaining and escorting to rear interrogation areas is hereby bypassed as in this procedure , the time taken to assess , detain , segregate , and transport to rear areas can negate the availability of timely intelligence—intelligence is highly perishable ,. Especially combat intelligence, where time is of essence.

Hence as the repository of sources grows, the quality and content of available information is enhanced and for the commander tactical intelligence, most of the time, is at his fingertips. Compare this to the situation where earlier, HUMINT or CI operations had to be complemented by intelligence from theater or national agencies, and it so happens they cannot provide real time, ground intelligence always for combatant commanders.

The soldiers will be given language training, Basic CI training, operational debriefing training so that as and when required they can shift from tactical to operational briefing to CI functions. The focus of training should be cultivating the capability to conduct contact and informant operations, recognize information of CI value, and execute tactical questioning of civilians, and screen EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter.

Tactical HUMINT team functions:

Tactical tasks with Language training
HUMINT Ops=Strategic Debriefing
CI

Here it should be stressed that intelligence nowadays is tactical—the focus should be at tactical level as soldiers fight wars nowadays more than battles. Small-wars in fact. Hence the dire need for actionable intelligence/tactical intelligence. Here the players are combatant commanders who must move swiftly in their maneuver and strike decisively. Higher echelons are there for planning, average intelligence support, but it is for the ground based Tactical HUMINT teams to do most of the work. And they do it—as their composition is quite what the modern day warfare demands.

CI/HUMINT

Counterintelligence functional services are provided to promote the Commanders situational understanding.

Define and analyse mission
Execute CI Surveys
Prepasre a brief on CI Awareness
Execute CI Vulnerability Assessment
Execute CI Threat assessment
Execute CI Inspections
Execute CI Reviews
Execute CI Evaluations

Conduct CI support to HUMINT activities

Identify, exploit and counteract foreign intelligence activities across the full spectrum of HUMINT activities. CI activities include, but are not limited to, identifying friendly and hostile capabilities and vulnerabilities; providing CI review of HUMINT activities; conducting CIdamage assessments; providing support to Counter Espionage (CE) investigations; conducting and/or assisting in asset validation by physical and technical means.

Perform CI/HUMINT operational planning.

Supervise the preparation of CI products, as required.
Obtain necessary approvals.
Supervise CI support to HUMINT operation.
Supervise asset validation procedures.
Conduct post-mission analysis.
Disseminate required reports/products.

CI/HUMINT Collection management

The CI/HUMINT officer/JCO will match the requirements with the collection assets in hand , checks availability , usage by other adjacent units , deployable possibilities etc and then determines the best collection plan.

Receive prioritized intelligence requirements from higher headquarters or collection manager , conduct analysis
Create the collection plan
Study all CI/HUMINTcollection assets available and match them with the requirements
Decide on the course of action to fulfill collection objectives

Docex

The CI/HUMINT officer/Jco must be acquainted with the exploitation setup and the units exploitation SOP so that he may, after receiving, accounting and sending the captured materials he may be able to follow-up for results and give future feed inputs to the exploitation cell/agency.

Understand exploitation agency infrastructure
Identify exploitable materials
Categorize them as Biometric Examination or Forensic Examination.
Take possession of exploitable materials
Account for and categorize exploitable materials
Prepare catalogues
Dispatch the materials to exploitation agencys custody
Followup with the agencies for results

Identify orders of battle in given Area of operations

Identify Ground military attack and defense capability, Air-defense and attack capability, naval capability and all associated military weaponry systems and equipment, such as ground combat systems, antiaircraft systems, naval vessels, etc.Study the enemy infrastructure and locate/identify the keys areas.

Intelligence support to Targeting.

This includes identifying enemy targets , both high value and high payoff , nominating in order of priority , recommending kinetic or non kinetic attacks, and thus assist the Commander to destroy, neutralize or exploit the target in a manner which is in line with the units mission and in keeping with the Commander and his staffs requirements.

The Unit intelligence supervisor who controls the target intelligence collection and associated ops/recommendations to the Commander must be as thorough as possible, evaluating all factors and intelligence inputs carefully, studying imagery data and compiling and organizing target information efficiently so that while nominating to the Commander and making recommendations there is absolutely no ambiguity. Target descriptions including composition, location, importance, imagery, graphics, construction—all of these are spelled out correctly and particularly for HVTs/HPTs their location, significance, all associations determined and influence with respect to the leaderships decision cycle/battle space situation.

Identify:

Targeting Categories
HVTs/HPTs
Areas of Target value
Build a list of targets
Locational factors of each target
Associations of each target(COIN)
Social circles of each target (COIN)
Assess target significance/value
Determine whether to employ kinetic or non kinetic attack
Contribute to attack guidance
Assess effect of removal of targets on battle space
Create and maintain target folders
Decide on target intelligence requirements
Create target nomination list
Combat assessment
Update target folder based on combat assessments.
Contribute to IO
decide on restrike options

Evaluate the Threat

Determine threat intent, capabilities, vulnerabilities, possible courses of action and the most dangerous course of action.

It is of prime importance to study enemy activity and indicators to assess his capability to attack, defend, withdraw, reinforce. Focus on the intelligence gaps and this focus can determine the direction of collection of intelligence. Enemy activity patterns should be studied.

Factors influencing the intelligence product are the time available for collection, assets available, unit size, the intelligence requirements, AO features and the mission. The enemy, terrain, weather, local populace are taken into consideration. Identify:

Enemy Intent
Enemy Capability
HVT
HPT
G.
Critical areas: Capabilities,Requirements

(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to interfere with that maneuver.)

SECTION B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)

Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bnb conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn,

Company Level Intelligence Cells

Coming to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence directloy at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect the data matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyse and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.
Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander,assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture),managing and supervising CLIC ops,interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow.
If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.
After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.
LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They arc not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions.

PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY
Reason for creation of interim team:
Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.
The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINTcollectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.

C2:
The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO
Operations Battalion
Collection Management Section
Production Section ASPD & OB Teams
BDA & TGT Team