(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to interfere with that maneuver.)
SECTION B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)
Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.
The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bnb conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn,
Company Level Intelligence Cells
Coming
to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat
intelligence directloy at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is
needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from
sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect
the data matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence
section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for
evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery
obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often
so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out
of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain,
analyse and act on readily available combat intelligence without having
to wait for intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are
hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at
the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The
two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are
looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be
two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch
and are assigned to the company combat ops center.
Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC
If required, the CLICs now have
the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support
operations such as cordon and searches and raids.
After an area of
operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex
terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need
to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT
assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry
organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment,
physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an
intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s
strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking
force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is
to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by
an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear
simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an
enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily
identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear
and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional
enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for
collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter
determining the center of gravity of the enemy.
LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and
PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY
Reason for creation of interim team:
Without
sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding
it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need
is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target
nomination
The
recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should
also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational
understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here
the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance
platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its
HUMNINT collection ability.
The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINTcollectors
and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to
an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data
gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to
the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the
brigade's collection plan.
C2:
The
reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain
one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier.
Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the
deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus
increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection
capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3
HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO
Operations Battalion
Collection Management Section
Production Section ASPD & OB Teams
BDA & TGT Team
