Asymmetric threats and hazards, including those from insiders , will increasingly challenge personnel, facilities and assets. Note: The definition of FP includes all hazards, but this expanded definition does not expand the Intel support mission to include all hazards. Understanding how these threats and hazards affect the mission is the first step toward developing an effective FP program that will help commanders assess their ability to deter, pre-empt, negate or mitigate hostile actions or events.
1.2. Antiterrorism is one element of FP, which is a collection of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile acts against Defense personnel, resources, facilities and critical information. A commander’s FP program should be designed to integrate all available information for its best possible application. Intelligence operations can assist commanders in this effort by providing threat information to drive the planning and execution of FP activities. Accomplishing this requires a change to our Army culture, thus affecting the ways commanders use and deploy intelligence personnel, products and services, and challenging our intelligence analysis paradigm to include support to ground-based operations. Intelligence personnel must be organized, trained and equipped to support the FP mission and FP customers. They must also be poised to help protect personnel, resources, critical assets and information from threats that could destroy, damage or compromise the capability of the AF to perform its assigned missions.
1.3. Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) is analyzed, all-source intelligence information that, when integrated or fused with other FP information, provides an assessment of the threats to army missions, people or resources. FPI is proactive and drives FP decisions in support of the commander’s intent.
1.4. Fused FP information and assessments provide the best-available picture of the intent and capability of terrorists or extremists, criminal entities and enterprises, Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS), opposing military forces and, in certain instances, environmental/medical hazards, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and insider threats. Intelligence personnel must be organized to provide credible support and trained to understand and anticipate FP requirements. They must also be equipped with the right tools to support FP customers at all echelons.
1.5.   FP assessments are performed collaboratively by intelligence, CI , and security forces (SF) personnel and in cooperation with several other entities. These entities include operations, weather, medical, communications, etc. FP customers include all personnel from commanders to armymen, but more tailored, specialized support can be provided to: commanders, soldiers, SF, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil engineers, medical personnel, antiterrorism officers (ATO), security teams, CI Teams, threat working groups (TWG), antiterrorism working groups (ATWG), integrated defense working groups (IDWG), base defense operations center
 CRG, or other associated units. FP information assessments should include all relevant information.

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Boot level Int

1.6. Intelligence supports FP directly through unit deployments, readiness training, mission planning support, and threat analysis. Intelligence also supports the Integrated Defense (ID), Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM), and indirectly, the Emergency Management elements of the FP mission. Outside the borders, intelligence collection activities target foreign adversaries. Within the borders, however, CI works with CENTRAL, state, tribal and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify, exploit and neutralize criminal, terrorist and foreign intelligence threats to the Army, MOD, and Indian Government . Generally, intelligence personnel provide the following support to FP operations:
1.6.1. Indications and warning (emerging crisis situations).
1.6.2. Current intelligence (adversary intentions, courses of action).
1.6.3. General military intelligence (adversary Order of Battle [OB], cultural awareness information).
1.6.4. Near-real-time/real-time situational awareness and understanding.
1.6.5. Intelligence preparation of the operating environment (IPOE) (adversary capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures [TTPs], terrorist group historical background and intent, comm message traffic, finished intelligence, terrain analysis, route analysis, man-portable air defense system [MANPADS]/stand-off weapons footprints, cyber threat, etc.). Note:  
1.6.6. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), target intelligence (maps, charts, imagery, target studies, and target folder development and, if appropriate, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).
1.6.7. Combat assessment (pre-/post-mission briefings/debriefings, mission assessments).
1.6.8. Scientific and technical intelligence (weapon characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and effectiveness).
1.6.9. FPI-related commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), develop priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and essential elements of information (EEI).  
1.6.9.1. This should not be interpreted as authorization for intelligence personnel to collect and maintain information on Indian persons without an authorized mission to do so.
1.6.9.2. While Intelligence Oversight (IO) policy restricts collection of information on Indian persons to units with an authorized mission, it should not be interpreted as excluding FPI-responsible intelligence personnel from receiving, viewing, fusing, analyzing or passing such information to the proper entity (MI or CI) responsible for mitigating
 the threat. In most matters regarding US persons’ information, intelligence personnel will defer to CI in its role as a designated counterintelligence (CI) component
http://securityantiterrorismtraining.org/CI/FP/