Asymmetric threats and hazards, including those from insiders , will increasingly challenge personnel,
facilities and assets. Note: The definition of FP includes all
hazards, but this expanded definition does not expand the Intel support
mission to include all hazards. Understanding how these threats and
hazards affect the mission is the first step toward developing an
effective FP program that will help commanders assess their ability to
deter, pre-empt, negate or mitigate hostile actions or events.
1.2.
Antiterrorism is one element of FP, which is a collection of actions
taken to prevent or mitigate hostile acts against Defense personnel, resources, facilities and critical information. A
commander’s FP program should be designed to integrate all available
information for its best possible application. Intelligence operations
can assist commanders in this effort by providing threat information to
drive the planning and execution of FP activities. Accomplishing this
requires a change to our Army culture, thus affecting the ways commanders
use and deploy intelligence personnel, products and services, and
challenging our intelligence analysis paradigm to include support to
ground-based operations. Intelligence personnel must be organized,
trained and equipped to support the FP mission and FP customers. They
must also be poised to help protect personnel, resources, critical
assets and information from threats that could destroy, damage or
compromise the capability of the AF to perform its assigned missions.
1.3.
Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) is analyzed, all-source
intelligence information that, when integrated or fused with other FP
information, provides an assessment of the threats to army missions,
people or resources. FPI is proactive and drives FP decisions in
support of the commander’s intent.
1.4. Fused FP information and
assessments provide the best-available picture of the intent and
capability of terrorists or extremists, criminal entities and
enterprises, Foreign Intelligence and Security Services (FISS),
opposing military forces and, in certain instances,
environmental/medical hazards, infrastructure vulnerabilities, and
insider threats. Intelligence personnel must be organized to provide
credible support and trained to understand and anticipate FP
requirements. They must also be equipped with the right tools to
support FP customers at all echelons.
1.5. FP assessments are performed collaboratively by
intelligence, CI , and
security forces (SF) personnel and in cooperation with several other
entities. These entities include operations, weather, medical,
communications, etc. FP customers include all personnel from commanders
to armymen, but more tailored, specialized support can be provided to:
commanders, soldiers, SF, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil
engineers, medical personnel, antiterrorism officers (ATO), security teams, CI Teams, threat working groups (TWG),
antiterrorism working groups (ATWG), integrated defense working groups
(IDWG), base defense operations center
CRG, or other associated units. FP information assessments should include all relevant information.
www.flash-templates-today.com.
Boot level Int
1.6. Intelligence supports FP directly through unit deployments,
readiness training, mission planning support, and threat analysis.
Intelligence also supports the Integrated Defense (ID), Critical Asset
Risk Management (CARM), and indirectly, the Emergency Management
elements of the FP mission. Outside the borders, intelligence collection
activities target foreign adversaries. Within the borders, however, CI
works with CENTRAL, state, tribal and local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to identify, exploit and neutralize criminal,
terrorist and foreign intelligence threats to the Army, MOD, and Indian
Government . Generally, intelligence personnel provide the
following support to FP operations:
1.6.1. Indications and warning (emerging crisis situations).
1.6.2. Current intelligence (adversary intentions, courses of action).
1.6.3. General military intelligence (adversary Order of Battle [OB], cultural awareness information).
1.6.4. Near-real-time/real-time situational awareness and understanding.
1.6.5.
Intelligence preparation of the operating environment (IPOE) (adversary
capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures [TTPs], terrorist
group historical background and intent, comm message
traffic, finished intelligence, terrain analysis, route analysis,
man-portable air defense system [MANPADS]/stand-off weapons footprints,
cyber threat, etc.). Note:
1.6.6.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), target intelligence (maps, charts,
imagery, target studies, and target folder development and, if
appropriate, Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).
1.6.7. Combat assessment (pre-/post-mission briefings/debriefings, mission assessments).
1.6.8.
Scientific and technical intelligence (weapon characteristics,
capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and effectiveness).
1.6.9.
FPI-related commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR),
develop priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and essential elements
of information (EEI).
1.6.9.1. This should not be interpreted
as authorization for intelligence personnel to collect and maintain
information on Indian persons without an authorized mission to do so.
1.6.9.2. While Intelligence Oversight (IO) policy
restricts collection of information on Indian persons to units with an
authorized mission, it should not be interpreted as excluding
FPI-responsible intelligence personnel from receiving, viewing, fusing,
analyzing or passing such information to the proper entity (MI or CI) responsible for mitigating
the
threat. In most matters regarding US persons’ information, intelligence
personnel will defer to CI in its role as a designated
counterintelligence (CI) component
http://securityantiterrorismtraining.org/CI/FP/