WARNING
WARNING
(a) Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminating.
Warning is of two types:
Defensive warn
Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks.
It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific. In addition to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated; meaning the level 
of warning may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The warning system must have the following features:
It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.
It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets, and command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.
It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation, its C2 and critical assets.
Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.
Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes
Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
Provide warning of threat logistic routes.
Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,
Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs
Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat
Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
Provide warning of threats history
Provide warning of threat movements
Provide warning of threat leadership
Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Provide warning of the expected time of attack.
Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means
Provide warning of IED timings
Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Provide warning of Staging areas
Provide warning of Safe houses
Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives. Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to
Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire 
(b)Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-
We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area
Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlledlethal/non-lethal measures.
As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on 
intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probableanti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit protection.