TACTICAL INT CAPABILITY

INT SUPPORT TO Coy

Keshav Mazumdar ATO

The targeting process is the culmination of another involved process, beginning from sensor

collection activities, sent higher up to the intelligence section where collation, analysis is done,

the finished intelligence product now being routed for dissemination to the targeting platform.

Information flow is from down-up preceded by request for information from the troop level. All

this entails time and intelligence is perishable, in that it is needed to be not only accurate and

specific but also timely. To avoid this time delay or to put it this way: to reduce the time between

sensor collection to targeting, we need to distill the targeting process down to the company or

platoon level. If collation and analysis can be pushed down to that level, a great deal of

enhancement in situational awareness and operational efficiency would result. One of the most

effective of these was the distillation of the targeting process into a Troop/Company-level tool.

We can have a Company intelligence support cell which will help in the creation of Company

and platoon level intelligence teams or grant assistance to units who have no organic intelligence

capability.

The squads or platoons at ground level usually accost the enemy in rapidly changing

environments with the element of surprise against them. In such situations the soldiers have to

adapt real fast and there is no time for sending information requests to Bn Intelligence officer or

higher up and waiting for intelligence...timely specific and accurate intelligence that is. Here

‘’timely intelligence’’ is crucial. Troops on most occasions find themselves operating unilaterally

against insurgents conducting IDF, DF and IED attacks and have to adapt quickly. It is here that

the intermediate level Company intelligence support cell can help by creating a squad targeting

process by supporting the squads with raw operational intelligence by fielding its HUMINT and

CI assets with the squad itself. Later it will be detailed how the HUMINT and CI enabled

platoons are formed with the CLIC in the lead.

In the absence of the CLIC the usual intelligence summary report briefed to the Bn and Bde

commanders omits the ground critical information need of the squad/platoon. The picture usually

presented takes into account the operational success/failures as a whole and dwells on the

priority intelligence requirements, not the immediate intelligence requirements of the tactical unit

on the ground involved in combat. But if we have the CLIC setup, then the CLIC can increase

the situational awareness at higher levels by sending in intelligence reports through the lens of

the squad firefight.

SIGINT resources required to conduct effective personality-centric targeting are not available at

the Company or Troop level.

All the information collected at the troops level is exploited where proper categorization and

collation is executed. It is at the exploitation stage that the soldiers work is evaluated and decided

who needs further training to collect information properly. Because the correct manner of

collection of information is very important at the troop level. It must be duly ensured that he has

properly conducted tactical exploitation of the area , of the captured materials, and of the human

terrain. It must be seen to it that his knowledge of tactical questioning is thorough. All these

performance indexes are reflected when the platoon intelligence unit or company intelligence

unit submits their intelligence reports. This exploitation phase will require a great deal of

administrative functions to assess the soldier’s capability and also to assist in the collation of all

collected information. Although at this phase nothing strong is produced against the insurgents,

but further operations tend to be driven with the collected intelligence. This is where the Bn

Intelligence officer or the Company intelligence officer decides on the technical control aspects

of the collection being done by line soldiers and ensuring that they adhere to it now and in the

future.

It can very well be that the projecting intelligence capability option is used where it is not

practicable for having own intelligence unit. There can be the Company intelligence support

unit/s, modular and available to all the Companies operating in the area of operations. These

units can for example debrief returning patrols of the company. Returning patrols are a very

important source of intelligence—this fact should be understood clearly. Now just coming and

telling the Platoon section headquarters or the Company headquarters intelligence officer what

information they have will not suffice the purpose. This information needs to be sent to higher

echelons and that too systematically after being entered into the Company’s knowledge

management system, collated and analyzed. It is not that difficult as a computer system can be

set up and today dozens of map tracking or link analysis softwares are available together with

database management system software for small units.

The debriefs of the patrols should include what they have observed about the local population –

any changes from earlier situations perhaps?—pictures taken, any information to satisfy the units

intelligence requirements, any engagements with the enemy and if so where, any information

from any civilian upon being questioned etc etc.

One thing that can and should be incorporated in a COIN environment is the ground level or

company level intelligence units biometric collection and exploitation capability. If the soldiers

can properly take DNA samples from members of the population enrolled in a DNA collection

scheme and then all biometric information recorded in the database, in any future case of

insurgent attacks all biometric evidence can then be cross-referenced with that contained in the

database , thus if there are matches insurgent personalities get i9dentified , driving further

operations , kinetic or arrest and prosecution.

Analyze

In this phase the Company intelligence support teams will study all information submitted by

patrols (HUMINT reports), by special forces who went on raids , by forces returning from

encounters with captured material and spot intelligence from EPWs etc , sort them and then

study how they are reflected in earlier Bde or Bn intelligence summaries , to find out common

information. This step is different than most intelligence analysis steps generally used in INDIAs

COIN operations. We have cases like Dantewada or several cases of ambush. If the company

intelligence support teams find that there exist past reports of ambushes and IED activity similar

to the current patrols debrief and located in or near specific areas of the area of operations then a

pattern emerges , indicating for example insurgent concentration points or say the terrain in

these areas are conducive for ambush or IED placement. Or it can also mean that whenever our

forces are visiting those areas they are being ambushed or IEDed so that they do not reach

certain areas in close proximity which could be the insurgents operational headquarters or

anything important for their operations or maybe containing population who are sympathetic to

their cause, and whose questioning or area search may yield intelligence vital to the success of

the forces and detrimental to the insurgents. Hence from the force protection perspective, finding

reflections in intelligence summaries of higher headquarters is something the company

intelligence unit gives high importance. Reflections will also help the Commander to make an

idea about the effectiveness of patrols as any desirable effect on the insurgents, like capture, or

increased movements or a spike in the behavior of certain elements/groups in the local

population paves the way for further patrolling and enabling the Commander to act more

decisively.

Disseminate

This phase is perhaps the most difficult one and also the most important one in that after the

present company/s toil for a year collecting and maintaining intelligence information, relief

troops need to be filled in with that information properly and it is vitally important that the Bn,

company and lower levels need to be disseminated all pertinent intelligence in time , maintaining

specificity , accuracy and timeliness. Thus dissemination is the most important part of the

targeting process and how that information is utilized. The relief units coming in and being

disseminated properly enables continuity in operations. Any break in this continuity is an

advantage for the insurgents in that they get time to regroup etc while the relief company’s are

consolidating or trying to consolidate their position with little information from the departing

units.

During dissemination the usual recourse is to pinpoint grid locations on a map where caches are

located , or have been found and where encounters have been experienced or probable areas for

encounter. This is not the correct way. Efforts should be made with the help of software or

reasoning that ‘’linkages’’ are established between these points. So that a larger picture of the

area of operations results with interconnecting nodes.Say we have a local village panchayats

house located a few blocks away from a madrasa which information collected shows it to be a

school for insurgents , being indoctrinated at night. Further some patrols have pointed out that in

other areas around the madrasa there have been few arrests at evening times by the local police.

Thus we find layers of intelligence makes the entire area involving the mosque and the adjoining

areas very important from the security point of view. Then one fine day on doubt the panchayat

leader was detained for an hour. Keeping the security importance of the madrasa in

perspective—it as the threat—then we can extrapolate further and associate the panchayat leader

with the madrasa activities and all activities near the madrasa under the scanner (the panchayat

leader is a locally powerful man and happenings in a madrasa near his place of living cannot

happen without his knowledge--#assumption) and the nodes are thus portrayed by connecting all

the dots , here two of them being the leaders house and the madrasa.