Please click on above to hear lectures .

Relevant menu items are ''SHOWS'' & ''EPISODES'

[ This page is written in such a manner so that in plain english without too much int jargon a presentatable format

is placed before the Commander of an infantry unit so as to heighten his perceptual awareness about the value

of an organic int unit to his unit , how his soldiers can be easily trained to act as secondary collectors , with procurement of actionable intelligence being reduced to basic observation , surveillance,tactical questioning,DOCEX  skills coupled with elicitation keeping the

human terrain in perspective and understanding fully that an asymmetric enemys center of gravity is in this human terrain which needs to be exploited.The requirement to seek int assistance from higher HQ no longer will be an inhibiting factor , particularly for units far flung in 

the AO away from command HQ..EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR--THATS THE IDIOM OF THE FIELD.PERIOD]

The Counterintelligence Doctrine that exists today in our Army is composed of manuals , training pamphlets , SOPs in written form , training provided to special agents and from individual to individual. In addition to this , personal experience of the middle and upper officer ranks in the CI Officer Corps takes precedence over a comprehensive written doctrine.

Had a complete doctrine existed with clearly defined mission , fundamentals , concept of Warning , difference between HUMINT , Clandestine HUMINT and CI highlighted with stress on the need to integrate CI with HUMINT and not relegate it to the backbench,CI functions and tactics , techniques and procedures,CI operations , both offensive and defensive, the need and steps of CI planning , training standards and the concept of introducing the professional element in CI education and training , especially for Commanders as what we need is a professional CI force which can adapt to any changes/deception tactics of the enemy and be professionally  managed in terms of operations  by CI “Managers “/Commanders , the very important but often ignored concept of Force protection with CI as an enabler , CI Investigations and tactical questioning , the integration of CI with HUMINT teams for mobile screening/interrogation at forward areas and all across the battlefield , not just keeping CI for rear areas , the need to project CI beyond the areas of operations and interest, integrating CI with ops totally, establishing a CI-Det network throughout the area of ops rather than focusing only on the rear, a smooth battle handoff between forward and rear CI elements so that the rear party gets up-to-date intelligence and do not have to keep valuable time aside for fresh intelligence operations—in war continuity in operations must flow smoothly and rapidly,CI and multidisciplinary intelligence cueing, broadening defensive CI to include infrastructure protection , Technology and R&D protection, insider threats , OPSEC Integration, Denial and Deception and its extreme importance in ops and during planning,………and more other factors , then we would have been better prepared with the Commanders visualization of the battlefield/Concept of operations COP/Situational development more complete and thorough.

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 EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

“No echelon has all the organic intelligence capabilities it needs to fully support The commander. Commanders and Military Intelligence leaders at higher Echelons should anticipate the intelligence needs of the lower echelons and “Push” tailored intelligence support down to them.”

Tactical units engage in combat with intelligence inputs coming from the MI dep’t from higher echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario the Company-level units should also have its own organic intelligence structures with very few personnel and assets deployed. They can act on available intelligence from the ground themselves without having to wait for collected, collated, analyzed information from Brigade Int section or other agencies which takes time—add to it the dissemination delays. In addition to conducting mission specific analysis and kinetic or non kinetic attack, theCompany-level unit can also disseminate the intelligence acquired to subordinate units, parallel units or higher headquarters as these intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as often intelligence about the enemy in one area of operations can help units in other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting similar tactics or other behavioral factors.

It is very important to recognize the lack of an intelligence structure at Company-level levels. TheCompany-level unit should have collection and analytical capabilities. There have been instances of lethal attacks on camps and bases itself-a force protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely on civil police and other intelligence agencies to supply us intelligence about the threat which usually is biased, and influenced by political and regional faction influences. The soldier on the ground who is a part of say the Infantry battalion engaging the insurgents , is face to face with the reality—the enemy , the local population and other parties of interest. Say during a reconnaissance patrol his team may come across a valuable source. After rapidly dismounting and ensuring he has no weapons, the teams intelligence component can start source cops like

Company-level or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc and if a counterintelligence agent is also present the more the better for HUMINT collection.

Let us assume a Command (set up for COIN ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State) which has everything in order such as Command chain, combat machinery, defined communication channels, civil administration support and police, civil intelligence agencies support lacks only an organic intelligence unit and depends on Higher HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil agencies for intelligence information.

It should be noted here that the necessary information is requisitioned first in the form of Request of Information document, which will go through various processing nodes as characterized by administrative channels, then finally landing in the collection manager’s hands from the requested agencies higher authority to whom the request was directed. Now the collection manager will access already present records database and national databases to explore if the needed information is alreadyavailable—if so he further initiates request for information, gets the information and passes it on to the commander of the unit. If not available he prioritizes the requested information as per the supported commands requirements, evaluates availability of suitable assets, allocates the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity and speciality,the assets are deployed, information collected, again sent up channels for evaluation of information quality , credibility (if source-submitted),analyzed, transformed into intelligence product and then finally disseminated to the supported commands commander.

All the above processes takes time, sometimes very long time, rendering the information useless as intelligence can at times be highly perishable, especially combat intelligence. The commander needs actionable intelligence fast and to enable this it would be far better if he himself has an organic modular intelligence unit, ready to take up assignments, if needed be integrated with the strike platoons itself for much faster information gathering and analysis and immediate action by the platoon commander. Company level/Platoon level intelligence capability can tremendously increase the competitive edge of the commander over the enemy, increase his situational awareness and be a force enabler.

Doctrine, Personnel, Training and Education, Leadership, Materiel Development, Organization, and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if intelligence assets need to be pushed down to the lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed in Company-level operations on the battlefield. If they are intelligence capable the Commander will get the best up-to-date and regularly updated(in the fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground situations) intelligence inputs thus heightening his situational understanding immensely and thus giving him that decisive competitive edge over the enemy.

The need for projected intelligence capability is all the more important if the commander has to deploy to an unfamiliar area ,inhabited by an asymmetric threat which unlike a conventional enemy has no defined order of battle,organization,discernible patterns ,does not employ standard military tactics and where ops may be simultaneous , non-linear and distributed. In such a situation the commander needs to project his force by sending in interim combat enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams who have intelligence gathering ability as well as

counterintelligence asset , not the usual reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are composed only of scouts and which do not answer the ‘’why’’ of things observed.

Today we are facing an enemy which is very unlike conventional adversaries who can be identified using intelligence as to their leadership,TOE,order of battle,strength,dispositions or anything which is determined by set doctrinal military tactics, techniques and procedures.Todays enemy in low intensity warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge among the urban or rural community who act as enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly or partially depending on the degree of acceptance of insurgent ideology and insurgent leaderships always try to influence the local communities to the maximum as they are well aware of the benefits of sanctuary among the latter. The enemy recruits, rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst the population. Here intelligence directly focused on the enemy is difficult in practice; the enemy is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional attack modes and very adaptable but the enemy’s source of sustenance and very survival depends a great deal on the local populations support. The company and platoon sized units need immediate on scene intelligence support to deal with such a population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such even the smallest fighting unit must be capable of intense collection and analysis of information to get actionable intelligence instead of waiting for intelligence from higher headquarters which may entail time thus letting go of opportunities in combat. It is always not realistic to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence. We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the smallest unit on the ground. The main criteria here is to shorten considerably the time between deciding on intelligence priorities ,detecting the enemy’s OB,Strength,disposition,capabilities and T&OE ,delivering the attack sequence and assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for successfulkinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units need to be trained and tasked with intelligence collection. It is near impossible to dedicate the very few specialized intelligence assets to all the operating forces in the area of operations. Here are the key challenges of bottom- up collections:

(1)Determining what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.

(2)Determining where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain (human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist operations (This can be termed operations

against networked criminal enterprises) are different in that the intelligence preparation of the battle space takes into consideration not only threat elements but also the human terrain—that is the local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in conventional operations (kill/capture) in COIN operationsnon-kinetic attack modes are often the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks taking into account civilian community heads, population psychological operations, insurgent targets social network, targeting his social contacts to judge his resultant movements and tracking him to finally locate his cell members or leadership, exploitation of targets other community traits—in effect besides personality targeting we are also concerned with the fact (non-kinetic fires) that units must project the second and third order of effects after they mount

any operation. Operations on a population, with which the targeted individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area—in the former case SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of information about his immediate network , if his communications are verbal and physical meet ups surveillance will be the preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound to contact his team members , move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield much more intelligence than just by acquiring battle order intelligence. Only resorting to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground are those who are frequently in direct contact with community members (and hence those of them who are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to gain intelligence information by conducting tactical questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or by casual elicitation methods in normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company level intelligence cell and enabling tactical teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in intelligence collection and also counterintelligence activities.

There needs to be a change in focus of effort between command levels.

1)Stress should be given to the fact that tactical company and platoon level units conduct operations with a high degree of success and hence higher levels of command must push intelligence staff and information down to lowest points of collection (initial points) , that is the company/battalion levels.

2)At the same time low density high demand ISR assets need to be stretched and spread across the area of operations to gain a better situational understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command Headquarters will not lose control over its intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining situational understanding exclusively. On the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs of individual ground units or any feedback from them was generally ignored what with the Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the intelligence summary report to higher headquarters with the overall intelligence picture of the area of operations falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized intelligence assets to every operating force in the Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and the fact that majority of the information required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’ (that is the lowest level troops) necessitates the creation of intelligence collection units at troop level either organic to the tactical combat ground unit or as a modular unit capable of plugging into any company or unit as per requirements. This fact should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for targeting, particularly in asymmetric type

warfare where the network must be targeted and where delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific intelligence.

Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the military intelligence collection process.

While military intelligence officers help in developing intelligence requirements, it is the commander who is responsible for designating an intelligence requirement as a priority. The intelligence staff regularly updates the commander on its progress toward answering each PIR.speaking, that a military intelligence officer (STAFF INT OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.

Additional intelligence requirements aimed at filling gaps in commanders’ understanding of the operating environment and requests for information may come from higher echelons, lower echelons, and lateral organizations, or from the intelligence staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with that are most important.

While emphasis shifts in various doctrinal publications, PIRs are generally supposed to2:

1.Ask a single question.

2.Be ranked in importance.

3.Be specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or activity.

4.Be tied to a single decision or planning task the commander has to make.

5.Provide a last time by which information is of value (LTIOV).

6.Be answerable using available assets and capabilities.

Usually, a commander only designates three to five intelligence requirements as PIRs at any one time.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September 2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. The recce unit along with the embedded HUMINT /CI element conducts area reconnaissance and community operations involving atmospherics, thus establishing a PIR framework before resorting to tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation by using the PIRs to force conversations, gain community perspective and prepare

engagement summaries for analysis...The engagement summaries are analyzed, community feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn to recommend the targets that are the driving causes of the insurgency.

We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:

The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the Bde.The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sorces , contacts and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence , local politicians and councilors , surface and witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich intelligence value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations.

Just like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at the Divn Bn level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which requirements are tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies and even to the line platoon base camps. The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate units.

To further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies level and platoon level , we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to take over as intelligence representative andco-located at the platoon level. During patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected information will be filtered , categorized and forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also requisition intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.

Secondary Collectors:

HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never reported) by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil affairs personnel.

Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the soldier feels could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the source in focus by detaining him or questioning him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source finishes his narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the source and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets the Bn Int section officer and fills him up with all the information he has gatrhered.Therafter one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the HUMINT operative with the contact details of the source.

In a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache , which he recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly. In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and ears open, can create a good surface contacts base , thus reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues like prioritized intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of the line soldiers or other secondary collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus creating a secondary source base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and secondary collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the chain of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical or influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary source may have links with the individual dealing with the secondary collector or any other link and this can be of value to the primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be personal contact and liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.

Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not intelligence personnel, but come across information on tactical questioning—secondary collectors)

Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:

Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements who can be subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the involved personnel in tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and preparation/execution of the said activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit intelligence officer

Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without delay.

During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.

All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.

Platoon Leader:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full debriefing.

Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this regard.

Company/Troop/Battery Commander:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.

Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.

Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY of critical value.

Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:

Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them through the Staff headquarters.

Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame tactical questions better.

See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.

Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons therein come into regular contact with the local communities, local administration, village heads and panchayats, and the enemy itself. The battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it does the section is very understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other agencies. These inputs come as a result for requests for information from the ground and the process of requesting, tasking the request to brigade intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection platforms and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national agencies and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time resulting in untimely intelligence feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the human and enemy terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low level of situational understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever

intelligence they gather is based on standard TTPs and intelligence sharing with other agencies. Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI assets but as this is fraught with dangers and requires highly talented agents adept in deception and which is lacking in our intelligence headquarters intelligence acquisition using infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human terrain, the local populace and higher headquarters intelligence personnel will not commit to regular interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground do during patrols or securing an area after an operation or mopping up operations or during a cordon/search operation. Higher commands are not fully meeting their intelligence requirements of the companies and platoons in a timely manner; nor at the level of detail necessary for company commanders to successfully operate in the asymmetric defined battlespace.The company and platoon commanders must be able to portray the threat and disposition accurately nominate targets-both for kinetic and non- kinetic attacks and conduct successfully battle damage assessments so that the option of restrike does not get overlooked for example. For this is required a company level intelligence cell and pushing down further an intelligence enabled platoon. The infantry company requires and organic capability to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to increase their operational effectiveness in full spectrum conflict. Infantry units require company level intelligence cells (CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped to address this capability gap.

Each company (and in many cases several platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops where the company level intelligence team or platoon level intelligence cell conduct intelligence collection activities and proper synchronization of ISR and integrating with the targeting process is invariably attained as all round collection involving the soldiers who are now the sensors leads to a far better situational understanding.

Primary tasks: Threat situation and disposition, Target nomination, BDA,Combat/security operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.

The troops fighting on the ground are fed intelligence from Brigade level intelligence HQ.There are certain limitations which must be taken cognizant as well as the offered solutions ( points 1,6 , highlight the need for company level intelligence structure)

Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-

1.Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually lacking.

2.Single-source collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception.Muliple sources need to be deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms should be employed.

3.Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or DF’d) thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence collection effort gets degraded by the enemy.

4.Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.

5.Inability of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous support.

       Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.

Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency successfully by gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing first hand combat intelligence. This tactical environment needs our fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an asymmetric enemy.

When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at battalion level we usually see that the battalion itself rarely executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves intosub-divisions which take up strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are set up in these strategic areas and these posts /sections create and maintain unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes.locational economics, topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the political forces operating in the community together with any other criminal enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING I PLAN TO TRAIN NON-INT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SOLDIERS
LIKE INF BN SOLDIERS

TACTICAL QUESTIONING

Framed to ask local civilians on detention , suspected insurgent informers/agents and insurgents. Questions can be phrased in simple language and ground soldiers like Cobra troops need no extensive special training.This is not interrogation but tactical questioning-to gain information of possible intelligence value on the spot.

Collecting Information

Soldiers patrol the same area day after day. Sometimes they go in for deep area patrolling and reconnaissance. All this is done with the intent to collect combat information.In any operational environment soldiers should always be primed , alert to collect information.Of particular mention here is te word ‘’change’’.While patrolling the soldiers may discern a ‘’change’’ in normalcy of the surroundings. While studying the surroundings , like the people,terrain,infrastructure the soldier should recognize any changes in the environment.Often than not these changes are important indicators cof enemy activity or intent.The soldier may not be able to find out the reason behind the change , still it’s very important he report it to the intelligence personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as

• Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.

• Homes and Buildings: What is the condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock?

• Infrastructure: The presence of functioning stores, service stations, etc.

• People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

• Contrast: Has anything changed?

If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the information requirements. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the information requirements and their responsibility to observe and report

While handling detainees and EPWs keep the following in mind:

1. Segragate the detainees and EPWs based on nationality , sex , profession , ethnicity (civilians) and rank , insignia , and regiment (may be belonging to enemy intelligence unit , thus game for special interrogation )

2. While searching the person of the detainee or EPW search thotoughly.Keep separate the records of documents , seized equipments and weapons(capture tags).Describe all documents,equipments and weapons as completely as possible.This is not DOCEX or Captured equipment exploitation in its entirety—that will later be done by trained HUMINT personnel and with help of technical assistants.What is being done here is tactical exploitation , just like tactical questioning—on the spot intelligence extraction.

3. Intelligence is perishable and combat intelligence is highly perishable , action is required as soon as possible and for that the intelligence must reach the targeting platform without any delay.But there are procedures.The prisoners and detainees who are felt will yield more information on further questioning must be moved as soon as possible to the rear where interrogators are waiting.Bear in mind that with time the detainee/EPW emboldens , the initial panic which he had on point of capture wears away , he gets time to think and also harbors escapist thoughts—escape from captivity.We are here talking about the duties of secondary collectors , the line troops who must move them fast to rear after ascertaining that they do have information of value.There are mobile interrogation teams to handle cases right on the spot at forward areas and copmposed of a mix of HUMINT/CI but that is tactical HUMINT and will be dealt within my book on Counterintelligence.

4. Kep a tab on the detaines , EPWs and all others so that they do not communicate with each other.

5. Remember the personal safety and protection of all detained for questioning can be a cause for concern under certain circumstances and hence they must be safeguarded.For example someone from the line troops may vent his personal anger on the enemy by attempting rough handle the detainees or prisoners.Sexual harassment is also an issue.Whatever be the case , they must be treated humanely.

Key Considerations for Talking

• You must be aware of the existence, nature and type of threat in your area and the vulnerabilities of the protection measures taken by your commander which are liable to be tapped. Overall you should know the force protection measures taken by your unit.

• Be careful about the local culture, traditions, customs.

• Your body language should project a friendlier flavor, not an intimidating one. Point weapons away from the accosted person.

• Talk to people in normal surroundings.Dont lead them to an isolated area, an alley or any place which will make them suspicious. Always be polite. Remove sunglasses.

• If you are speaking to a woman know local courtesies.

Questions

Questions should be so structured so as to be simple, straightforward, should open and maintain the conversation, should start with an interrogative, and should prompt a narrative answer. Interrogatives are what, why, when, who and where. Questions should not be closes provoking only an ‘’yes’’ or ‘’no’’ as answer but should be ‘’open’’.Avoid asking questions that are confusing. Characteristics of open questions:

• Act as an invitation to talk.

• Prompts the person to answer comfortably and feel encouraged to continue with the conversation.

• Not too specific but broad in nature.

• Encourage discussion.

• Creates a situation favorable for the soldier to be the listener(and observer) for a major part of the conversation.

• Does not cause the person to feel intimidated or threatened.

• Invokes curiosity of others and allows them to get involved in the discussion spiritedly.

• Gives the person the opportunity to tell his opinions, his judgment, what he feels is important, what he feels should be done.

• Should invoke a conversation, not a question-answer scenario.

Be subtle, don’t just jot away on paper the answers –that is not conversation and always be friendly, cooperative, observing him carefully but not arousing any suspicion, studying his body language and be courteous and reserved.

Questioning to Fill Out the Capture Tag

You are manning a check post or roadblock..Before being deployed to do so your unit commander has briefed you about the intelligence requirements as per current mission. The Battalion prioritized intelligence requirements lead to the generation of intelligence requirements for each company and subunits. These intelligence requirements as spelled out to you will guide you in framing the questions to be asked of individuals at the check post/roadblock. Once you, the soldier, have screened and detained a person categorized either as a detainee or EPW you must now obtain all possible details from him so that on subsequent questioning/interrogation of the person by the HUMINT or CI agent, the latter is well prepared initially with the information you have supplied. You must fill out a capture tag which will facilitate further questioning/interrogation. The capture tag must include:

What is your job? What is your speciality? Are you a combatant? If so what is your rank, number and unit? Who are in your chain of command? Whom do you report—that is who your immediate superior is? What is the mission of your unit? Are you a civilian? Then why are you here? Who is your immediate boss and what is the name of your company? At the time, place and point of capture, detention what was your immediate mission—that is to say why were you there and what were you doing or what were your plans? Were you supposed to conduct any mission/job when you were captured/detained? What are your future plans and what is the future mission of your unit/company? You might note he is carrying documents, maps, identification papers; photographs.Here is where you might find things out of the ordinary. The map might be of another place or even this place: Why are you carrying this map? The photo/s might be of someone else: Who is this person and why are you carrying his photograph? The ID papers may belong to other persons and hence you ask him why is he carrying other peoples identification papers and why. And where are these persons as they are in a disturbed area and that too without identification papers. All these exploitable documents can now be handed over to the MI section together with the detainee/EPW.

Remember your questions should be guided by your unit’s intelligence requirements and as briefed to you but on no count should the person being questioned get a whiff of these requirements or your mission. Everything should be done in an atmosphere of normal conversation.

Example Questions

Questions must be framed in such a manner so as not to elicit vague or misleading answers. They should be direct, pointed but at the same time broad so that the person being questioned does not misinterpret it or has any room for maneuver. For example the following questions were designed for soldiers manning check posts/roadblocks. Modify them to accommodate EPWs/detainees, local population as per your mission, situation and unit requirements.

• What is your name (Match this with any identification document found on his person) Cross-check with CI White list, Black list and Grey List)

• Where do you live and full address, where were you going and why, how did you arrive here. From here to your final destination point—what will be the route and why? In what way is it safer or convenient for you? Who will facilitate your journey? That reminds me, who facilitated your journey till here, financially or otherwise? (All these must be specifically answered or obtained)

• What is your present occupation, your specialty-if any and your qualifications (see if he has any technical expertise)?

• What was the type of physical terrain you travelled to get here? During your travel what all obstacles you faced and how did you manage to overcome/circumvent them. While travelling did you observe anything out of ordinary in your surroundings? Or any unusual activity?

• What currency are you carrying and how much? What is the money intended for (if found to be a big sum)?

• Can you name anyone whom you know personally who is averse to Indian security measures/ops here in this area? On being answered immediately follow with ‘’who else’’.Do you know or are you aware of the nature and type of any anti-Indian security operation/any other activity here or anywhere else and dates or time of such activities? Can you tell me the reason for our forces to be here? Do you support our activities?

DO NOT’s

• Ask questions which might reveal your intent or which might make him aware of your units mission, intelligence requirements.

• Jot down answers before him.

• Don’t resorts to quid-pro-quo.They are not permanent sources to be given goods/money in exchange for information and neither are you an intelligence specialist. The same goes for EPWs and detainees.

• Do not resort to coercion. You may be reported to social media. Or the police. Remember we are all governed by Geneva Conventions.

• If you are handling EPWs and detainees escort them to the interrogation center as soon as possible. You are only supposed to ask basic questions to civilians in conversational mode. Yes if situation is fluid, like in battle and yu accost suspicious civilians you may resort to interrogation based tactical questioning, but only to ascertain if they are of interest to HUMINT/CI personnel and carefully examine any captured documents. In such cases escort them quickly to detention centers from where the MP will take them to interrogation centers. • Pay money for information.

• Do not be so cooperative so as to tell them their rights that can be handled later. First the information from them.

Reporting

For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit intelligence section to factor in all useful tactical information gained during the small units activities in the overall planning of the mission (and also update ISR planning):

Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical value.The soldier may resort to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to arrive at his judgment.•

• Normal reporting

• Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.

• Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.

Document Handling

When there are documents on the person of the detainee efforts should be immediately made to:

· Classify them

· Seize , Impound or return them

· Determine if they contain information which can be exploited further by trained intelligence personnel (DOCEX).

Remember that any document, even though it may seem irrelevant on first sight , may on close inspection reveal information of interest , might satisfy intelligence requirements and with other seized documents give a bigger picture of enemy intent.

Classification:

Documents can be Personal such as letters, diaries, photographs, flyers posted in cities and towns, etc ,Identity such as identity cards , passport, drivers license , ration cards or Official such as documentation government/military information , for example military books , field manuals, military reports,files,maps etc.

CED (Captured enemy document) is a piece of recorded informnation seized from the captured person belonging to the enemy forces or any civilian in collusion with the latter.We can also name our own military documents CED that were in the possession of the enemy.DOCEX of such documents can rev eal what they know about us , or if anyone was involved on our side in transferring these documents to the enemy then we are alerted to the fact and going by the nature of the document or its origin we can put our CI agents to track him down.CEDs can be found on the person of EPWs/detainees , abandoned military areas , on the bosies of killed enemy personnel , old enemy command posts , destroyed enemy forward tactical headquarters.

A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs can also be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can be found almost anywhere; some locations include abandoned training sites, old enemy command posts, deceased persons, cafes, town squares, or in the possession of EPWs/detainees.Written or typed material, drawings, audio, and/or video recordings, computer disks,etc can constitute the content of a CED.

Once you have critically studied the CED you have to decide on three actions:

· Return them to the owner as they are very personal items and do not contain any military or governmental information

· Impound the CED with the intent to return them later as these documents being of personal nature contain information pertaining to the military but which after examination is found not to have any bearing on current situation or having any affiliation with the enemy. Still they will be sent for DOCEX and if the initial assumptions are true , they will be returned.

· Confiscate the CED as it contains military or governmental information (all official documents)

Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred for DOCEX.

The capture tag should contain the

1. Unit details who captured the CED

2. Location of capture : Grid coordinates

3. Time and date of Capture

4. Identity of the person from whom it was captured including brief description (Rank , unit etc)

5. Prevailing circumstances under which the capture was made

6. Description of the CED

KESHAV MAZUMDAR