ADVISORY BRIGADE OR CORPS - SITUATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

We have 5 geographical combatant Command HQs handling day to day administrative duties (theater command?) and in case of sudden major operational task would require major reinforcements.Yes Corps HQ can be deployed to run the operation but it remains to be seen to what proximity to the potential warzone are they located.The 5 ComandHQs are located far from these war zones and emergency deployment is impracticable.

We must conduct a thorough study to calculate the optimum combatant command requirement considering all operational plans if the need arises for simultaneous multiple fights.

Administratively focussed theater armies (the 5 Command HQs) cannot fulfill the purpose so why not amalgamate the CHQ and the Corps HQ into operations focussed Corps organization? All can be termed Corps?India is a place with diverse culture , language and relationships.We must build up on these regional knowledge and relationships if we have to effectively combat the enemy , particularly in North East and elsewhere and mind you the Command HQ Staff are in no position to develop this situational awareness/cultural understanding CU (Leading to the all important Situation Development SD for mission success) by being located inside major cities far away from action-zones.What is needed the newly formed Corps HQs can be deployed permanently forward in their assigned theater of operations so much better regional knowledge and relationships can be built up , facilitating , say COIN operations.

But it has been to date a terribly difficult task to build up such regional knowledge and relationships.For example a Coy may get deployed to an insurgent affected area in a NE State for some period and then get phased out with another unit replacing it.Already we do not use intelligence products in a systemised fashion ( military intelligence is not just ''military intelligence'' ..its a war fighting function and like all the other 5 war fighting functions it has an execution and management profile , cutting through all possible enemy patterns (courses of actions) and to facilitate this its process , institutional and product representations all go into creating specific product packages , intelligence products , aptly named and categorized , like the current int summary , the intelligence estimate , threat assessment ,vulnerability assessment , counterintelligence review of the camp/installation , counterintelligence estimate , force protection review , intelligence preparation of the battlefield,pre-RSTA IPB Report(lack of this is exactly what is responsible for deaths of our deep recce troops beyond LOC..same applies for SOF troops too operating deep into enemy area),local human terrain reports which include everything from insurgent sympathizers to supporters to enemy agents etc..some of these are invaluable during battle-handoff as the new unit takes over provided the outgoing Bn/Coy has its own organic int staff officer who turns over the estimates to the incoming units SO thus enabling him to take security measures , foremost force protection--URI could have been avoided) and hence now the incoming unit is new to the area without any regional knowledge and no relationships to build upon save trained in combat.Extrapolating this , summation of all deployed components of the Corps HQ the picture is the same ..we are fighting the enemy without full situational understanding  including the local human terrain factor.

Hence not only getting primed for combat but also regional knowledge (geography,demographics,other atmospherics like cultures , language , customs , political system , religion factors etc ) and relationships are extremely important when taking cognizance of the entire area of operations..so instead of creating small disparate advisory ad hoc teams out of combat units it is far better and practicable to have dedicated units with language skills and regional knowledge.Or else the conventional troops will have to do the job with little or no training at all.

Why not create an Advisory Brigade or a Security Assistance Brigade or an Advisory Corps? Echeloned under the newly Corps HQ in the particular geographic command area?Further we can set up an Advisory School.Now say the Brigade has 200 personnel.These personnel can rotate amongst the various Companies/.units ..impart training and stay in that commands geographical area their entire career and intermittently attend refresher and other courses to keep abreast of current knowledge in the Advisory School.Again and again they would return to the same units to impart knowledge and training. In the long run the Army Command will have the pulse of the region and the deployed units too , and the factor of uncertainty and surprise by the enemy will be reduced significantly giving our forces a heightened SD and that competitive combat edge for effective and accurate kinetic/non kinetic targeting and overall mission success.

To build up and retain talent and institutional memory of COIN ops we require this organizational and cultural change. Mind you , how many individual platoons really have combat experience in COIN operations? Apart from routine parade and combat training and deployment to peace areas throught the country? It is not important to assess how the current COIN ops are being handled; it’s important to note how quickly experiences in COIN operations are fading."Experiences’’..Soldiers trained in COIN operations in real time ..not soldiers who are graduating out of COIN schools and only a very small fraction getting deployed  , that COIN combat patch..and then being routinely phased out to a peace area unit..The experience going to a waste. In any given platoon or Coy its roughly 15-20% who have actual COIN experience—look 5 years further? Maybe dwindled down to 5%.??

I leave an open question here. I am not an army personnel but whatever I have voiced here I think it holds water.

Another thing..my concept of organic int units can also alleviate the problem to some degree because the training regimen I have designed for them includes human terrain collection  and IPB…by normal riflemen , not int operatives and with basic training , not involved intelligence education/training.

Keshav Mazumdar