ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
HUMINT/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REVISITED
What is called “foreknowledge” cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from
gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be
obtained from men who know the enemy situation..
—Sun Tzu
Subject Matter Expert
Keshav Mazumdar (CMAS, ATO)
City and State of Publication: Kolkata, West Bengal, India
Title : ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle : HUMINT-CENTRIC OPERATIONS ES2
HUMINT/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Author : Keshav Mazumdar , Antiterrorism Officer,
Sr VP ATAB USA
Published by: ANTITERRORISM ACCREDITATION BOARD USA
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information
storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the author, except for the inclusion
of brief quotations in a review.
First Edition, 2013
Dedicated to
This book is dedicated to my Heavenly Father
Capt. Diptendra Narayan Mazumdar
Epigraph
"Cheshire Puss." she began rather timidly..." would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go
from here?" "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." said the cat. Alice in
Wonderland
Foreword
In this book that is published by the Research Institute for European and American Studies
(RIEAS) office in India, we sought to ask about the state of serious, academic research on
intelligence and counterintelligence applied to asymmetric warfare. The purpose of the book is,
first, to improve understanding and lay out suggestions for where additional research might fill
gaps or enrich understanding.
To that end, Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS ,Advisor –RIEAS has done a splendid job in
bringing forth the concept of EVERY SOLDIER IS A SENSOR ES2 and the need…high need of
HUMINT & Counterintelligence from this perspective.
The outcome is a book that is different from many other recent volumes on intelligence and
counterintelligence. The content is beyond standard doctrinal principles and TTPs.The Author
has recommended solutions to a wide array of intelligence management problems.
I wish to thank Keshav Mazumdar, who did a great job in attempting to build better
understanding in the hope of improving the practice of intelligence and counterintelligence. A
theme that runs through the entire book, and is turned to explicitly in the conclusions, is where
counterintelligence and intelligence stands as a profession.
To be sure, the usual caveat remains to the editors of the book since we are responsible for any
remaining errors or gremlins in what follows.
Prof. John M. Nomikos
Director
Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)
Athens. Greece.
Acknowledgement
I have not attempted to cite in the text all the authorities and sources consulted in the preparation
of this manual. To do so would require more space than is available. The list would include
departments of various governments, libraries, industrial institutions, periodicals and many
individuals.
The Following works and Archives have been accessed for certain information:
O'Connor, T. (2013). "Terrorist Network Detection," MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
K. David Du HOMELAND SECURITY: ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE,
COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Agency USA Unclassified Documents and Training materials
US Army FMs
Wikipedia
Torchbearer National Security Report
Culper:Guerrilamerica
I am especially thankful to Admiral Peter Kikareas (NATO) for his guidance throughout the
project and to Keith Flanigan , Chair ATAB for his continued support.
The concept of ES2 and CI is highlighted with information from Field Manuals and US Open
source intelligence papers.The book is a research attempt with the intention to propagate
successful US intelligence concepts in the Global War On Terrorism - GWOT.
I am indebted to my mentor Mrs Pushpita Majumdar for goading me in my pursuits of
intelligence studies.
I am thankful to Ms Deepshikha Bhattacharjee to be of enormous assistance in the proof reading
of the project.
And finally I am indebted to My Mother Mrs. Sumita Majumdar for giving me constant
encouragement in the face of impossible odds.
INTRODUCTION
An efficient intelligence service must conduct planning, deployment and management of
collection assets and platforms, execute, control and evaluate the operations with the primary
mission to retain a decision advantage over the opponent, both in peace time and during
War/LIC.Two main approaches must be embodied: Criminalization Strategy and Prevent disrupt
and counter the enemy’s multidimensional intelligence threat. In the first approach the
apprehended elements are captured and convicted as per court of law whereas in the second
strategy we intend to thwart enemy actions using HUMINT/Counterintelligence. Intelligence
feeds into both strategies in four modes of deployment: to make strategic assessments, including
of the sources, nature and levels of threat, and the need for new resources or security measures;
to feed into criminalisation operations in which individuals may ultimately be dealt with through
the courts; to feed into control operations such as disruption and surveillance; to feed into control
operations which deal with individuals by overt executive measures. These modes are not
exclusive to terrorism, save for the final option.
HUMINT is generally considered ‘’passive’’—assets and platforms in the form of HUMINT
operatives and governmental/commercial (or official cover/unofficial cover) bases. This is an
approach with a fallacy---HUMINT should be proactive, sometimes defensive and not always
reactive. A patrol debrief tells us there is a sudden troop movement in named area of interest
alpha and so we begin intelligence activity.Thats reactive.Had we depoloyed HUMINT agents
well in advance to look beyond the forward areas by intermingling with the local population on a
daily basis, eliciting information, keeping continuous contacts with the sources/informers,liasing
with local police, keeping a tab on political developments and open source intelligence like
publications,newspapers,media,rallies,public meetings, information gleaned from the internet
about enemy govt policies, their arms purchases, their foreign policies with respect to our
nation—all these will definitely give the HUMINT agent a feel of the pulse in the area of
operations and if there is any ‘’imminent’’ change in it (mind you, I didn’t say any ‘’change’’ in
it like the reported deployment) he is bound to catch the new pulse. Before deployment to an area
of operations HUMINT and CI personnel should move in first to secure the ‘’human terrain’’ as
well as the physical terrain from the intelligence perspective. This is what we can term –
‘’intelligence and force projection capability’’ for an area of operations which is unknown to us
in all terms. This is frequently the condition when the tactical commander successfully wraps up
an operation in a defined AO and then is suddenly ordered to move into a new area much
forward and totally unknown and occupied by enemy provocateurs and agents. Had he projected
his force and available intelligence assets(after deploying his main assets for current operation
and earmarking those available for projection tasking , like HUMIT,CI..) in the new AO while he
was conducting his ops in the present AO , he could have been well prepared when the order
came in. Here intelligence preparation of the battlefield will focus on both the local populace and
the physical environment. The intent is to act as a forewarning system for the to-be deployed
troops. This is also a force-protection intiative.Similarly when operations are being conducted in
one Area of operations during a larger campaign commander’s pitch in all platforms of
intelligence collection systems to accomplish a tactical victory. That is fine and is the standard
procedure in the event of a conflict. What the commander doesn’t think is to extend his view
beyond the Area of operations far away in hostile territory which is yet to see our troops in
action and which is in control of the enemy. We need to project a part of our intelligence
collection assets into that area/territory.
Foremost in the analysis of Intelligence tactics/strategies are the following questions: what was
the quality of the intelligence; what were the processes in which the intelligence was used and
did they put the intelligence to a suitable test?
An exercise-specific chapter has been included to show how to set up an intelligence collection
unit comprised of functional cells (staffed with HUMINT personnel)and defining and setting up
the control mechanism comprised of headquarters and technical control/analysis/in-process team
management centers-the entire exercise being driven by the intelligence need of the commander
as specified in the carefully worded mission which will spell out the needed intelligence
requirements in general which will further be broken down into IR and SIRs after observing the
indicators by deploying the HUMINT operatives in accordance to a carefully built up collection
plan. The exercise is not an extensive one but highlights the need of proper definition of the
mission (which implies the commander knows the intelligence gaps) thus enabling the
commander to specify the intelligence requirements accurately.(and this is often not the case
resulting in wastage of collection resources and platforms by focusing on less priority
intelligence needs and overlooking the real requirement—deployment of collection systems in
this manner also affects other operations outside the current area of operation as too little or no
intelligence collection platforms available for intel collection/analysis in those areas).Secondly
the exercise attempts to clearly show how to develop priority intelligence requirements, develop
a strategy to answer those requirements(mission, goals) and creating a mechanism for the
collection assets to answer those requirements. What is also intended here by the exercise that in
any LIC/COIN environment, at the tactical unit level, the commander can create a unit for
collecting intelligence and not depending entirely on other agencies supporting the operation—
for example in Maoist areas of West Bengal ,India, the CRPF can create its own unit without
always resorting to the intelligence departments of the State police,IB.An organic unit sometimes
comes very handy. Training personnel in intelligence operations can be done with the assistance
of agencies who have HUMINT/CI units like the Armed forces. If the Army can help in training
the CRPF for example in jungle warfare and other COIN specific combat, then surely it can also
train soldiers in HUMINT and CI.Apart from intelligence specialists , the soldiers , MP
personnel , civil affairs personnel etc are the Secondary collectors who by virtue of their regular
contact with the local populace at checkposts,roadblocks,during patrolling or even during battle
at forward areas when they encounter and detain civilians , EPWs , come across information –
combat information which they can recognize of having intelligence value and quickly forward it
to the intelligence specialists. Just training the soldier on the ground in Tactical Questioning
without making him go through the rigors of intelligence training will sufficiently empower him
to recognize and extract combat information from daily encounters. The concept of Every
Soldier is a Sensor can revolutionize the entire intelligence concept of the Army.
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE & MILITARY PLANNING
Identify, Define, and Nominate Objectives
Military planning is dependent on clearly defined, achievable, and measurable objectives. There
has to be a strong comprehensive understanding of IDAD strategy by JFC accompanied by an
awareness of the central mission andthe resources available. Intelligence should provide an
understanding of the adversary’s probable intentions, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, critical
vulnerabilities, and human factors. Objectives should be based on adversary critical factors
(capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities), COGs, strategic approaches, campaign plans,
and COAs.
Support the Planning and Execution of Operations
After the objectives, nature, and scope of COIN operations are determined, intelligence is
essential to plan, direct, conduct, and assess operations. Intelligence is crucial to identify and
select specific objectives and targets. Intelligence will further enable analysis of desired and
undesired effects, and determine means, operations, and tactics to most efficiently achieve
overall mission objectives.
Counter Adversary Deception and Surprise
Despite the apparent weight of indicators and decision maker predisposition, intelligence
analysts must remain sensitive to the possibility that they are being deceived. Intelligence
analysts should therefore consider all possible adversary capabilities and intentions. For example,
an absence of insurgent attacks or suicide bombings does not necessarily mean that the
insurgency has been defeated. In fact, it may be that the insurgents have moved to another area,
transitioned to an earlier phase of operations, or are preparing to change their focus of activity.
Support Friendly Deception Efforts
Misleading or creating uncertainty in the mind of the adversaryhelps to achieve security and
surprise; however, deception is difficult in COIN due to the need for transparency with the
population. Intelligence also supports effective friendly IO, through human factors analysis of
the adversary leadership. This analysis can assess insurgent leaders’ beliefs, information
environment, and decision-making processes. Intelligence personnel also conduct assessments to
determine how the adversary is reacting to the friendly deception effort. The process of
identifying deception objectives to complement operational objectives should be an interactive
process, with the HN, US, and security commanders in a central role orchestrating the efforts of
operations and intelligence resources.
Assess the Effectiveness of Operations
Intelligence assesses operations’ impact on the population, insurgents, and other relevant aspects
of the OE. Intelligence should assess whether operations are creating positive or negative effects.
It should further assess when objectives have been attained and when unplanned opportunities
can be exploited. It is fundamental for HN representatives to participate in this process. There
must be a balance of indigenous and outside participants to conduct a COIN assessment.
HUMINT FUNCTIONS:
Provide intelligence support to Problem Framing.
Provide intelligence support to Course of Action Development.
Provide intelligence support to Course of Action Wargaming.
Provide intelligence support to Course of Action Comparison and
Decision.
Provide intelligence support to Orders Development.
Provide intelligence support to Transition.
Provide Intelligence support to Rapid Response Process
THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Intelligence estimate. The intelligence estimate is derived from the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (lPB). It is based on all available intelligence and considers everything of
operational significance. It will help point out gaps in the intelligence database. It is from
these gaps that requirements are derived. It will provide information on the mission, AO,
weather, terrain, enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and conclusions. It will cover all of
the standard OB topics
These intelligence feeds by the units upwards which aid finally in the preparation of the
intelligence estimate, is the result of taskings handed down to the collectors/HUMINT personnel
by the Collection Manager. It is here where the intelligence efforts of the HUMINT/collector
agents come into play which is governed by the intelligence cycle.
In the Army at the Division or higher HQ level the intelligence estimate is prepared by the
Intelligence Officer and his staff...it is instrumental in devising the COAs by the Commander.
The estimate sums up the intelligence factors affecting the mission. It identifies the enemy’s
probable COAs and the order of their adoption. It takes into account the Terrain and weather
characteristics which might affect both the gauged intentions of the enemy and our mission and
details the area of operations, the enemy situation and the capabilities of the enemy. The estimate
is continually updated so as to keep the Commander abreast of any latest developments or
changes in the intent of the enemy. This intelligence estimate is briefed at the Brigade/Battalion
level. The intelligence estimate is predicated by the Intent of the enemy. Or Intents. The Staff
Running Estimates helps each staff officer recognize and interpret the indicators of enemy
intentions, objectives, combat effectiveness and potential enemy COA‟s which may counter the
commanders end state. Thus the aim of the commander is to study the intents and devise
appropriate course/s of actions taking into account several factors including order of battle,
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, behavioral indicators, table of organization and
equipment, enemy capabilities and so on.(Order of Battle refers to the compilation of a
systematic and methodical analysis of assets, capabilities, composition, and disposition of an
adversarial organization, whereas TO&E refers to the organization table of units and associated
equipment.)
To prepare this very important document the intelligence officer and his staff draw on the
intelligence reports prepared earlier by the intelligence units detailing the terrain, weather
characteristics and enemy strengths, capabilities and limitations and the intelligence officer's
IPB
Direct Evaluation of the threat's capability to Attack, Defend, Reinforce,
or Retrograde (ADRR) .
Define the operational Environment/battlespace environment.
Describe environmental effects on Operations/describe the battlespace
effects.
Evaluate the threat/adversary.
Determine threat/adversary courses of action.
conclusions about the total effects of the area of operations (AO) on friendly courses of action,
the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the enemy, and the effects of exploitable
enemy vulnerabilities. In other words we’re conducting a CAPABILITIES BRIEF of the ENEMY
Our MISSION is to develop an understanding of the ENEMY through the collection and analysis
of available information, and then create an Intelligence product for dissemination.
Mission Formulation-The Intelligence Element
Mission drives intelligence and intelligence in turn drives tactical operations or battle. Stating the
mission as protecting our forces from enemy attack is not a well defined mission statement. We
need to take into account the threats before they materialize and the attacks before they are
launched by the enemy. Proper Mission Planning and Analysis is required to understand the
battle.
Defend.
Defending our installation, our troops, and our information is a priority. We need to understand
our vulnerabilities, our weaknesses. At the same time we need to know the threat so as to
strengthen those weaknesses. What exactly is the threat aimed at? To properly defend ourselves
we have to both harden ourselves (meaning pose before the enemy a hard target) and at the same
time resort aggressively to enemy activities and multidisciplinary threat.
We need HUMINT/CI to know the enemy and hunt him down. Our primary Defend mission is to
protect our battle space, our Area of operations.
Diminish.
Diminishing the enemy’s resources is our next mission. The enemy’s logistical networks need to
be identified. All facilitators of the enemy, its support systems, its weapons caches, its safe
houses where it stacks communications equipment, weaponry and all supply routes need to be
identified with aggressive application of intelligence. We need to choke off, destroy these
logistical and facilitation networks, thus crippling the enemy’s combat capability.
Deny.
Denying the enemy a pull-back safe area or safe haven is our next mission. The insurgents resort
to hit and run tactics. When the hit us, attack us they do so with the surety that they have places
to retreatto,back-up places where they are hidden,safe.The stronger this assurance the greater
impunity with which they launch attacks. They also fall back in the human terrain—the
communities of our area of operations where they easily mingle. Using intelligence as well as
counterintelligence we need to identify this physical and human terrain based safe havens. We
must identify the community members who lend them support. We need to strike and strike hard
these safe havens, make them feel very unsafe. It is in these safe havens that planning of
operations is conducted. It is here they are least aware of any impending surprise attack. We can
catch them off-guard and destroy them if and only if with the proper application of intelligence
we are able to locate these safe areas of the enemy. We must make it a point, a very strong point
at that , that if they attack us by encroaching on our area of operations, we attack them with 10
times the might at ‘’their’’ safe havens. We must Deny them the sanctuary of safe havens, fall
back positions—they will have nowhere to escape.
Defeat.
Defend, Diminish and Deny all go into making the enemy very vulnerable to our attacks.We
destroy their sense of safety while hardening their attack objectives and choking off their
supplies. This, if properly executed, that is the 3 mission objectives of Defend, Diminish and
Deny, and then we can be sure of defeating the enemy right to the core. Thus DEFEAT
BECOMES OUR FOURTH AND FINAL MISSION OBJECTIVE.
Conclusion. Thus Intelligence is not only crucial but an ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY
FUNCTION to determine enemy intentions in advance. Without intelligence we are
NOWHERE—it’s like the tiger without its teeth. We may be formidable with advanced
weaponry platforms with accurate delivery capabilities, we might have a formidable manpower
strength but we fail to realize that intelligence, although it is in the information domain and not
belonging to the firepower BOS—NEVERTHELESS IT HAS AN EQUAL DESTRUCTIVE
CAPABILITY…DESTROYING ENEMY INTENTIONS AND ALSO SUPPORTED BY CI
DESTROYING ENEMY COMBAT CAPABILITY, ITS PHYSICAL AND HUMAN
RESOURCES BY PROVIDING TARGETING GUIDANCE TO THE COMMANDER.
Intelligence is the foundation of military operations.
Specific functions include:
Information operations help in shaping the battle space in favor of the Commander and
also prevents the enemy to carry out his operations successfully.IO is enabled by
effective intelligence and counterintelligence support.C2 Attack, C2 Exploit and C2
Protect, the 3 components of information warfare are executed with success provided the
commander leverages his intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and
counterintelligence assets with precision.
Conduct intelligence collection and production. All intelligence disciplines and
associated sensors are included.
Conduct intelligence operations in support of force protection. In support of force
protection, the FP brigade leverages its resources associated with counterintelligence
resident in the collection and exploitation battalion to include host nation liaison teams,
strategic debriefing, and polygraph to support the JFLCC J- 2.
The objective of intelligence in direct support of the war fighter is to collect, analyze,
produce, and disseminate combat information and intelligence to assist the direction and
synchronization of maneuver and support forces. The intelligence functions include the
capability to conduct indications and warnings (I& W), intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (IPB), situation development, targeting, force protection, and battle damage
assessment (BDA). These functions are briefly described in the following paragraphs.
1. Indications and warnings (I& W). I& W involve the continuous development
and refinement of threat activities and possible intentions. This allows joint
operational intelligence staffs to determine changes in the political, military,
economic, and diplomatic behavior of an adversary using all- source intelligence
to avoid surprise.
2. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB is the systematic, continuous
process for developing databases for each potential operating area. Data is analyzed to
determine the potential impact of the enemy, weather, and terrain on both enemy and
friendly operations; and presents the results, usually in graphic form. IPB supports
situation development, targeting, force protection, and BDA.
3. Situation Development. Situation development is the continuous process providing the
commander an estimate of the situation and threat intentions. Products include order of
battle (OB) updates; threat intentions and probable courses of action (COA); dynamic,
graphic intelligence summaries with predictive assessments; decision- support, doctrinal,
event, and situation templates; and weather, light, and terrain decision aids.
4. Targeting and Target Development. Targeting is the process providing timely and
accurate targeting data to support effective attack by fire, maneuver, or electronic means.
The targeting process is able to direct and redirect organic and supporting collection
assets as well as detect, locate, identify, and report threat maneuver, fire support, combat
service support, C3 elements, and high payoff/ high value targets (HPTs/ HVTs) such as
nuclear and chemical weapons systems within the area of interest.
5. Force Protection. Force protection includes all active and passive measures designed to
provide security to the friendly force. This includes all operational security (OPSEC)
support, counter- SIGINT (C- SIGINT); counter- reconnaissance, intelligence,
surveillance, and target acquisition (C- RISTA); deception support; and reconnaissance
and surveillance measures taken to identify and counteract threats to the friendly force's
physical and operational security.
6. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). BDA is the process of assessing the physical
damage done to personnel and equipment in support of order of battle analyses and
predictive estimates of future threat capabilities, activities, and intentions. This includes
an analysis of the threat’s ability to direct, support, and sustain his force.
INTELLIGENCE—THE PRIMARY NEED
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The success of offensive operations at all levels is predicated by sound
intelligence about the enemy order of battle,intent,enviroinmental factors
including but not limited to the political and human terrain dimensions.In
order to gain a decisive advantage in the competitive battle environment
intelligence seeks to define the battlefield characteristics known as IPB,the
strength,composition,capability and dispositions of the enemy,the intent of the
enemy,the limitations of the enemy and all the possible
courses of actions to be taken by the enemy with the most
probable course of action and most dangerous course of
action in perspective.The intent here is to have a
forewarning system to prevent or minimize surprise and
adversely affect the enemy commanders decision cycle.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
In the case of defensive operations intelligence provides
information about our own vulnerabilities as seen by the
enemy,risk/threat assessment by considering the order of battle and intent of
the enemy along with a full picture of the organization and
hierarchy.Intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance operations are
conducted in a synchronized manner to gain information about the enemy’s
intent,possible courses of actions,strength,disposition,capability so as to
heighten the situational awareness of the commander.Threat and vulnerability
assessments are paramount for successful defensive operations.Post TVA the
critical areas are identified and secured.Intelligence helps the commander to
deploy sufficient combat power at those areas(which were earlier identified
again with intelligence inputs) where the enemy intends to direct its major
efforts.Force protection is achieved with a proper admixture of HUMINT and
CI assets.With all these information and defensive capabilities in his hands the
commander can buy time to plan appropriate courses of actions,secure his
bases and keep the critical areas fully defended.The commander can now
apply the economy-of-force principle more apopropriately,utilize his forces
without wastage in manpower and equipment , hold enemy forces buying time
for reinforcement and counteroffensive,hold key terrain,destroy enemy
combat power and shape the battlespace as per his will—the latter being his
intent to gain full decision advantage over the enemy and prevent a surprise or
thwart an impending attack/attack in progress and perform follow-on
operations.Intelligence helps to identify the critical vulnerable nodes of the
enemy(say the C2 nodes) where the commander can focus his strike forces to
inflict maximum damage.
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
During a conflict army commanders use a mix of operations,sequentially or
simulataneously to achieve victory.This full spectrum of
operations(decisive,shaping and sustaining) include
offensive,defensive,stability and support operations.Intelligence drives each of
these types of operations.It is inherent in the operations itself.The success of
these operations is determined by accurate,timely intelligence input to the
operations planners and commanders at all levels.
• Offensive operations,as the name implies,are intended to attack and
defeat the enemy. • Defensive operations are conducted to stop an
enemy attack from progressing,defeat the attack,hold the attack while
reinforcements are built up and also give sufficient time to the
commander to shape the battlespace and render conditions favourable
for a counteroffensive.Thus regaining the initiative is made possible.
• Stability operations are conducted in peacetime and are intended to
influence and configure in a positive manner compatible with national
interests the political, threat and information aspects of the operational
environment and developmental, collaborative, or even pressure tactics
are used to effect this objective. The overall intention is to promote
regional stability after a crisis.
Threat and the battlefield environment is always associated with uncertainty during the very first
perception.This uncertainty must be identified,refined ,quantified if possible and prioritized.This
uncertainty prioritized is an intelligence requirement of the commander.There may be more than
one intelligence requirement.The Commander and Staff conduct wargaming.During wargaming
certain critical decisions are taken and information requirements which are needed to execute
them are determined.Intelligence Requirements are required information about the
enemy,weather, terrain.Intelligence Requirements direct collection efforts.Situational
understanding is extremely important for the Commander. It is very important to gauge
accurately the threat characteristics and the operating environment.Requirements are conceived
at higher echelons and as the Commanders intent and are passed down to a central control
element which tasks the collectors with collecting information which answers these intelligence
requirements.
Intelligence Requirements
We keep looking for information about the enemy.The commander visualizes the battlefield or
the AO through intelligence acquisition.The intelligence preparation of the battlefield aids in this
respect.To heighten situational awareness the commander needs complete information if
possible.But that is not always the case.There arises a necessity to know something about the
enemy which he doesn’t know yet.Information gaps can be something which we needed to know
yesterday—and something we need to know in the future.The former is Critical Intelligence
Requirement whereas the latter is something the enemy is planning to do after a certain time
period, does not warrant immediate action which must supersede any action necessitated after
the knowledge of CIR.The commander , through certain information inputs may sense an
imminent threat or he may need to know on an urgent basis why has the identified HQ of the
enemy moved.These are intelligence requirements,gaps in his information repository which
needs to be known.
Intelligence requirements must meet four criteria:
Necessity
Feasibility
Timeliness
Specificity
Necessity is a factor which must be borne in mind always.We must carefully define our
requirements.Or else we waste time and resources…and resources are limited and sometimes
time is too limited.The commander may have inadequate collection assets or the number may not
be able to satisfy collection/surveillance operations for a number of intelligence requirements.If
we decide upon an requirement which is not that necessary then we are wasting time and
resources collecting information to satisfy it.Hence it is paramount to know whether the
requirement figures high on the ‘’necessity’’ scale.
Feasibility: We must determine if we can feasibly collect the information.We have collection
assets but it is possible that they may not feasibly collect the information.Say for example
technically we know that in an urban insurgency environment the terrorists or insurgents are
holed up in certain safe houses—that is technically—but we have aerial surveillance assets and
the line of sight of these assets get blocked due to the building density of the urban terrain.We
need to resort to HUMINT teams to locate the safehouses.Thus it may be technically possible but
not feasible to satisfy an intelligence requirement.We must be sure the collection platforms we
are equipped with can feasibly satisfy an intelligence requirement , given that the information in
our hands being technically possible.
Timeliness: This is a very very important factor.Intelligence can be perishable,particularly in
case of ‘’actionable intelligence’’—actionable intelligence is intelligence about the enemy
(disposition,strength,composition,occupied terrain profile)which is disseminated to the , say ,
fire-team at the right time for perfect targeting.In a tactical situation if intelligence comes in late
then it is of no use.To this end our intelligence requirement which gives us this perishable
intelligence must be timely.If we can identify the need to know the intelligence gap on time
then we can devote our resources with full dedication and acquire the information,process it on
time and pass it on to the commander in time.The commander must always be kept abreast of
pertinent intelligence requirements in his AO.
Specificity. Is our intelligence requirement specific? Yes, our requirement is specific because
it’s limited to our AO. Aksing When will the enemy attack and where? offers two very vague
questions and isn’t an ideal intelligence requirement. It’s not very specific, and much harder to
answer. We want our requirements to be answered with satisfactory information, so we must
make them easier to answer.
Intelligence requirements should continually be reviewed in the context of our criteria. If the
requirement doesn’t meet our criteria, then it needs to be updated, refined, or removed
All the above boils down to one fact. We need intelligence and counterintelligence to be always
in the lead. Intelligence is the most important prerequisite for any mission to be successful.
Without intelligence, however well armed we may be, however qualified officers we have,
however strong our support and ancillary units may be, we can never be sure of defeating the
enemy.
Hence we should formulate our mission by taking into account these 4 basic mission variables.
Targeting is the process of identifying areas of instability or networks/elements of insurgency
including criminal elements supporting the insurgency.
There are two approaches in targeting, productive and destructive. The former takes into
consideration environmental/demographic factors and attempts to influence the target/s whereas
the latter is the physical destruction of the target/s. The Commanders intent, guidance, priorities,
vision and operational objectives should not adhere only to the often resorted to campaign plan
of physical destruction--Reducing or limiting the use of violence as “the means to an end”
prevents the regeneration of a systemic problem …the insurgents .Targeting begins in the
early phases of intelligence preparation of the battlefield.IPB takes into account the terrain,
weather and infrastructure and assesses the impact of these on the security forces as well as the
enemy. After careful examination of all the variables involved the decisive points in the area of
operations as well as the larger area of influence are determined. This further leads to the
prediction of the enemy’s COA’s and corresponding to each COA we develop our COA to
counter it.IPB thus assists in determining the enemy’s intention, objectives, combat effectiveness
and possible courses of action. Here is where it is very important to underscore the fact that
assessment of these enemy attributes must be made with the analysis of the local
population/communities, the insurgent movement, the political environment and the
counterinsurgency line of effort in the background. Solely focusing on the enemy with the intent
to use kinetic/lethal techniques to annihilate him is the wrong decision. This will only embolden
the enemy, make him more determined and give rise to the birth of more insurgents.
Target Selection Standards
Targeting is a process wherein the detection platforms successfully acquire the target and
transmit the required information to the delivery platform to service the target.
Target selection standards depend a great deal on intelligence about the enemy.
TSS depends on the enemy activity determined by intelligence collection and the availability of
attack platforms capable of accurately destroying the target.This depends on perfect intelligence
input about target location.If there is error in locating the target accurately Target Location Error
results.We must have intelligence about the size of the enemy,whether point or area,as the size is
proportional to the attack system which will be used to destroy the target.Proper detection about
the status of the target and its activity and timeliness of the information transmittal greatly
impacts the Commanders decision to service the target with the attack platforms at his disposal.
The Targeting Process
The overall campaign has as its objectives strategic gains. To enable this are required operations
which shape the battle space in such a way so as to achieve the strategic objectives. These
shaping operations are interdicted by insurgents and allies and also sympathizers from among the
administration and populace. These elements are vetted properly and a Target listing compiled.
During vetting by the Targeting Officer it is very important that the target meet set down
selection criteria and after engagement the results should satisfactorily contribute to the overall
objectives. At the end of the targeting process the Commander approves the Target list and it is
sent over to the various subordinate units for execution of the approved targets. Thereafter
combat assessments are conducted from the bottom echelons wherein lies the fire support system
and these assessments outline the successes or failures as the case may be. Throughout the
Targeting Officer tasking involve selection, vetting and approval of all targets that hamper the
shaping operations.
The targeting process is a very involved process. From the intelligence standpoint, the
Targeting officer assumes a very critical position in the process. He assists in deciding what,
where, when and how to detect the target in question (it can be a personality like a High Value
Individual Target or it can be a network) and what, how, when and where to deliver or attack that
target in question. At this juncture it is important to point out that both physical and behavioral
targeting should be incorporated in the process, that is to say the targeting officer must assess the
consequences of kill or capture of the target on the local populace, religious groups and the other
insurgent groups (this intelligence assessment can also point out the sympathizers of the target in
the community ).It should be noted here that it is a fact that resorting to outright kill at the very
first emboldens the threats rather than defeating their morale or forcing them into submission.
The offensive nature of targeting often leads to community discontentment and swift
repercussions from the insurgents thus now the commander has to deal with new situations as a
result of the kill operation. It is very important that in the event of a kill or capture the village
leaders or the provincial leaders communicate to their communities the reason behind the
removal of the element
and justify the causes.
Targeting should not and
never be a combat patrol
operation with the
objective to kill. The kill
equation goes like this.1
kill=10 new insurgents.
The removal of one HVT
may send shock waves in
the brethren or the
insurgent group with
the former usually
vowing to avenge the
death even if they are not
in the insurgency
movement with the result
10 more join the ranks,
not to mention the
repercussions being
planned by the insurgent
group itself. We must permanently bind behavioral and physical targeting venues under one
Targeting Process at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Simply put, we must place
emphasis on influencing targeted areas consistently throughout; before, during and after every
combat patrol which is resourced and designed as a last resort to kill or capture an HVT.
Conduct intelligence functions and operations which support
targeting by identifying target systems, critical nodes, high-
value/highpayoff
(includes high value individuals) targets and providing intelligence
required to most effectively engage targets in sUpport of unit mission,
commander and staff.
1. Identify applicable target methodology for a given situation.
2. Develop a list of targets.
3. Conduct target development.
4. Conduct target value analysis.
5. Conduct target system analysis.
6. Develop target nomination list.
7. Contribute to the development/maintenance of a no strike/restricted target
list.
8. Develop high-payoff target (HPT)/high-value target (HVT) matrix.
9. Develop an Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM).
10. Develop Battlespace Shaping Matrix (BSM).
11. Develop a target folder.
12. Develop Target Intelligence Collection Requirements.
13. Coordinate combat assessment collection.
14. Perform combat assessment.
15. Recommend re-attacks as required.
The need for ground level analysis
Strategic Intelligence in military terms means the intelligence which goes into formulation of
military policy and strategies. Operational intelligence on the other hand focuses on support to
planning operations at the theater or regional level while Tactical intelligence is at the local
level—intelligence that goes into driving operations locally.
Traditional intelligence doctrine does not take into account the asymmetric enemy which does
not have an Order of Battle from the conventional enemy point of view—rather is dispersed, of
loose cellular structure with all command identities unknown to cell members and is
transnational..all in all near invisible with no military uniform that can identify him as in
conventional battle , which does not resort to standard TTPs and other combat techniques, whose
logistical, supplies and other support services are totally unlike the support arms of the
conventional enemy and out of view, nearly invisible, hidden among sympathizers and
communities resources. Thus if we consider COIN operations in a region, whether urban or
jungle or hilly, the operational intelligence doctrine must be adaptive to include these factors.
Further the intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms applied to conventional
Table 1-1. Primary Intelligence Tasks
Intelligence Tasks
Commander's Focus
Commander's Decisions
Support situational understanding.
• Conduct intelligence preparation of
battlefield/AO
• Situation development
Force protection
Secondary collectors intelligence operations ,
Military Police Intel Ops.
•
Define mission , Prepare
intelligence assessments ,
Prioritize intelligence
requirements , plan , execute
mission , See to it that the force
is secured so as to contain its
lethality and efficiency to the
maximum and no degradation
by the enemy
Decide on the COA out of all
the possible COAs arrayed
against expected enemy COAs.
Support strategic responsiveness.
• Correctly gauge Indications and Warning
• Keep intelligence capability to the maximum
• Assessment of neighbouring countries policies
• Intelligence assessment of neighbouring
countries and foreign area studies
Define national intelligence
priorities and support
government policies by
intelligence feeds , thus
focusing on contingencies.
What readiness on our part is
dictated by intelligence
reports?Do we increase or
maintain as it is?Should our
forces take readiness steps?Do
we go ahead with our plans to
offset the expected enemy
action?What can be the fallout
if expectations go awry
Conduct ISR.
• Synchronize ISR
• Integrate ISR.
• Tactical Reconnaissance Ops
• Surveillance
Plan, prepare, execute, and
assess the mission.
Are priority intelligence
requirements defined
exactly.Do we have enough
assets for conducting ISR
ops?Do the necessary
requirements match available
ISR capabilities?Are the assets
free from adjacent units
usage?Can the assets be
deployed suitably to collect
information on HVTs , HPTs
and can they be positioned
accurately on these?Finally
which deciusion points , HVTs
and HPTs need to be put under
ISR scanner?DPs are points
along the enemy decision cycle
which are critical and
detyerminative of enemy
successes.
Provide intelligence support to effects.
• Targeting
Battle damage assessments and other post
combat assessment
Kinetic/non-kinetic destruction
of targets to include
neutralization, exploitation and
suppression. Strike and destroy
intelligence assets. and Assess
post-battle damage Consider
restrike options
Do we execute lethal or non-
lethal attacks?Or as in COIN do
we go for attack the network
plan?What about restrike
options?Are they necessary to
completely destroy the
target?Or is it neutralized so
well that it retains no future
capability?
wartime and peacetime situations may not be as effective in situations involving, say COIN in an
urban environment.
Hence we cannot just stay limited to traditional approaches to operational intelligence. We can
adapt by say endeavoring to create new indigenous HUMINT sources, capturing indigenous
insurgent technology conducting source operations by using sources from the local community
by bridging the gap between them and us soldiers (developing close relationships, respecting
their customs and abiding by it, being more of a civilian than a soldier by wearing civil attire and
sharing tea/coffee with them, respect for their religion, etc all contributing to a conducive
environment suitable for elicitation and oblique tactical prodding without raising any doubts )
and conducting security reviews with such as the modern day IED in perspective..information
from all these being aligned with the intelligence requirements of the commander thus increasing
the depth of his situational awareness.
Tactical intelligence is required to answer intelligence requirements at the tactical level in
response to enemy TTPs.Military operations are conducted to locate the enemy, determine its
strength and aligning all these information with the efforts to apply proper tactics and use
suitable weaponry to cause defeat. Thus tactical intelligence is a significant force multiplier if
collected and applied properly.
One change that must be effected is that the time period between collection, analysis and
dissemination to the commander and then routed to the targeting team/fire team...this should be
reduced as much as possible. To do this the tactical analyst should be at ground level along with
the collectors or in close proximity. Take for example one of the most commonly and
increasingly modified weapon of the insurgent...the IED. Now if the tactical analyst is at ground
level he can directly access the IED without wasting time, study its nature, composition and the
source and its type,whether ir is roadside bomb or body-borne or vehicle-borne
explosive.Therafter the analyst reports to the commander with the details and suitable attack and
surveillance platforms are used to detonate the IED remotely or detect the planting of the
explosive or even kill the bearer of the explosive. The analyst’s information may trigger further
surveillance using video to track the bomb storage and factories.
Combat Information is that data that arises of time sensitive information , such as ‘’target
acquisition’’ where a HVT emerges from the information collected and we have very short time
to effect a kill thus forcing the tactical analyst to utilize the ISR assets most effectively so as to
get the ‘’most timely and accurate information’’.Thus the analyst coordinates with those assets
that can provide target acquisition information rapidly and to this end the analyst must have good
access to these ISR platforms. This is Combat Information and can be shared with commanders
before further analysis if immediate action is required or if there is any other urgent need.
The targeting officer must be aware of the COA development exercise, how many intelligence
platforms he has to detect the targets and the status of the attack delivery platforms. substantial
organic and complementary intelligence platforms and capabilities to be successful. Often times,
these platforms are employed beyond their carrying capacity. Intelligence sourcing capacity is
linear not cyclic so these platforms and capacity must be carefully managed. If these
platforms/capabilities are focused on everything, then they are not focused on anything’’.
The targeting officer deploys HUMINT personnel and other appropriate intelligence platforms to
assess the following:
1. Listing of HPT (personality/network targeting)-HPTL
2. What is the intelligence value, operational value and tactical value of the target?
3. Implications of the targeting on the local populace, tribes, province, religious groups
Thereafter he should decide on the fire delivery mode and for every High Payoff Target in the
list he should associate one fire task. Then he should decide on the what, where, how and when
to deliver the attack on the HPT.
Thereafter he should decide whether to kill/capture the target or continue with the existing
intelligence gathering process or counterintelligence processes. He must also weigh the pros/cons
of the targeting operation, the payoffs or what we lose in the bargain. To this end his HUMINT
agents must give him sufficient and accurate intelligence on the behavioral aspect of the
targeting, as alluded above and on the impact on the insurgent movement by direct elimination of
the HVT.
The Intelligence Cycle
There are seven battlefield operating systems that build quality
combat power. These include: intelligence, maneuver, fire
support, air defense, mobility counter-mobility survivability,
combat service support and command and control. Intelligence
battlefield operating system (BOS) includes HUMINT, which
allows for timely, quality, actionable, information to reach the
necessary individual(s). The intelligence BOS is essential to help
depict the enemy’s schedules, tactics, environment, and resources.
Intelligence BOS follows a particular process: plan, prepare,
collect, process, and produce.
Intelligence Operations follow a five-phase intelligence process known as the intelligence cycle.
They are:
* Plan and Direct the collection effort.
* Collecting the information.
* Processing the collected information.
* Producing the intelligence information.
* Disseminating and using the collected information.
The intelligence cycle is focused on the commander’s mission and concept of operation. The
overreaching principle of the cycle is intelligence synchronization. Each step within the cycle
must be synchronized with the commander’s decision-making and operational requirements to
successfully influence the outcome of the operation.
The planning step adheres to setting the vision. The commander must gather, analyze, address,
and decide what the pertinent information is. The commander must determine how to use the
information given for synchronization of the ISR operation. The commander utilizes the
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), priority information requirements
(PIRs), friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), to plan the intelligence operations. All
of these activities are essential to assess the situation and environment to optimize the likelihood
of obtaining the desired outcome. Planning is not a static process, but revolving and interactive
to obtain and maintain intelligence expectations. Through planning and direction by both
COMMANDERS INTENT-OPERATIONS PROCESS AND INTELLIGENCE PROCESSRELEVANT
INFORMATION WHICH INCLUDES INTELLIGENCEFACILITATES SITUATIONAL
UNDERSTANDING(COMMANDER AGAIN AS END USER)
1.OPERATIONS PROCESSPROVIDES GUIDANCE AND FOCUS THAT DRIVES THE
INTELLIGENCE PROCESSCONSISTS OF:PLAN/PREPARE/EXECUTE
2.INTELLIGENCE PROCESSPROVIDES CONTINUOUS INTELLIGENCE INPUT ESSENTIAL TO
THE OPERATIONSS PROCESSCONSISTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE STEPS.
collection and production managers, the process converts acquired information into intelligence
and make it available to policymakers and consumers.
The main goal of collection is to acquire data about the enemy’s environment, resources, and
activities. This is summarized as follows:
We need to know the current activity of the enemy, its objectives/goals, whether these goals are
directed against us—the intent, whether it has the capabilities to achieve these goals and taken
for granted it succeeds in its attempts—that is it succeeds in achieving its intent , then what will
be the consequences for us—the damage.
Intelligence here is crucial. We must determine the intent of the enemy. But like we are always
striving to secure our installations, all related information systems and movements from enemy
prying eyes so does the enemy who takes pain to cloak its behavioral indicators which might
give out its intent. Now if there are no behavioral indicators, however we may suspect the enemy
of possessing an intent to cause harm, we are nowhere when it comes to determining it
accurately. We need to go for deep intelligence collection and access a myriad of sources so that
slowly the behavioral characteristics are discerned.
Here lets touch on Indicators and Warning concept. So vital to security. This is also known as
Early Warning. If the enemy has intent it will decide on a course of action/actions—COA/sewer
have to design a thorough collection system so that we can target the indicators (on a continual
basis so as to confirm the enemy’s COAs or negate our assessments of its COAs until finally we
confirm accurately)and hence get an idea about the intent. And then lay down the potential
COAs in parallel(parallel mind you) and after matching with the capabilities(yes, that too needs
to be determined first) we choose the most probable COA of the enemy. The Early Warning
system is more of a proactive-intelligence approach rather than a reactive-intelligence one.
For each intent they can take a course of action ( or we zero down to a course of actions from a
list of probable course of actions corresponding to the intent by considering more factors such as
information gleaned from open sources, attack mode types or weapon types/delivery mode as per
prevailking security hardening of target/security environment around/proximity of target etc)
which we determine as most probable by considering factors like capability,behavior or other
indicators. We can have a Most Likely Course of Action or in the extreme the Most Dangerous
Course of Action.It all depends how successfully we ascertain their intent,capabilities,behavior
and how far accurately we can infer their other characteristics and past criminal/terrorist/military
offensive activity from past records/database past threat assessments, past activity records ,
personality profiles , weapons/combat capability-strength,social networks (all these can be
ascertained from open source,government records,criminal database,and detailed past
activity reports.For example a military unit,while assessing the threat can pull intelligence
(ofcourse on request and need to know basis) from higher headquarters,from adjacent units,from
its own sources and from whatever ISR tools they have.Adjacent units or other units who share
the same
communication network or who is acessble by the unit can supply intelligence on the threats past
behavior—say an engagement with the other unit.From that the unit can , within a good
confidence level , dcetermine the enemys tactics,techniques and procedures.Inputs like this can
help in determining the probable course of actions.We can list out possible consequences for
each course of action.
First the Intent/s , then ascertaining the Capabilities—not exactly ‘’then’’..the collectors tasked
by the CMO generally busy themselves with sourcing information on both and by pulling on
information from R&S teams.Therafter the Commander brainstorms with his staff the possible
COAs by backwards iteration to the Intent/s and evaluating the COAs in the light of the
Capabilities and also the possible consequences for the enemy/effects as battle damage or simply
damage for us.A terrorist attack may more be directed at the Parliament House than a Mall
because of the Symbolic and Political-Seat flavor).Again it can equally be likely that one enemy
COA generates a crippling counterattack by our forces whereas another COA is less obvious and
also causes less damage or less repercussion.The enemy too wargames and may decide to forego
the first COA and go for the second one.Another example could be the enemys COA is simply
intelligence activities directed against us with a timeframe to determine what they intend to
determine , knowing very well that our CI teams will move in and take tentatively that time
frame to expose their intent—hence their COA could be go on with the intelligence activities
before the deadline—that is before they are exposed.There are several course of actions , each in
context of different scenarios.That is why it is immensely important to gain a perfect or near
perfect situational understanding. Thus during this evaluation the Commander and Staff narrow
down to the most possible Course of Action or the Most Dangerous Course of action for each
Intent. Whatever every COA the enemy takes we must look for observable INDICATORS.This
is the task of the Collection teams.Once these indicators are identified we look for patterns.Once
we discern them we begin exploitation.
In other words, we need to judge the Intent of the adversary. Our intelligence collection teams
should look for indicators , indicators which will tell us what he is doing today. Supported by
more information about the capabilities of the adversary, , past threat assessments, past activity
records , personality profiles , weapons/combat capability-strength, social networks (all these can
be ascertained from open source,government records,criminal database,and detailed past activity
reports)
we make an educated guess of the intent or a list of intents with confidence level/s and then list
out the corresponding course of actions with possible consequences for each course of action.
Continuing the iteration further we select the most likely course of action and the most
dangerous course of action by studying the consequences along with the capabilities and intent/s.
HUMINT/CI SUPPORT TO WAR GAMING
Provide Intel Update.
Support red cell.
Refine Threat COAs.
Provide input into relative combat power assessment.
Provide an initial estimate of supportability.
Update center of gravity analysis as required.
The following grossly sums up the steps in the intelligence cycle.
1. Develop intelligence requirements.
2. Collect information to answer intelligence requirements.
3. Triage information for accuracy and consistency, analyze collected information, deconflict
inconsistent information (if necessary), and identify other intelligence requirements (re-task
collection, if necessary).
4. Compile analyzed information (timely, accurate, specific, and predictive!), and produce a
finished intelligence product for dissemination and community consumption.
This all goes back to collection. What are the goals of the adversary? What’s he trying to
accomplish; what’s his intent? What is the Order of Battle of the enemy? In other words what are
the strengths, dispositions and capabilities of the enemy? What is the inventory and type of their
equipment/weapons? How will the terrain affect enemy’s movements, possible courses of actions
(this applies to us also),what are the possible concealment areas offered by high ground or
foliage, how does the terrain afford ambush points and where they can possibly be, how does the
current and future weather predictions act as enabler or otherwise for the enemy and us, what is
the present enemy situation , if the enemy is an asymmetrical one like the terrorist/insurgent then
does it have the capability to attack hard targets, what was the modus operandi in the past of the
asymmetrical enemy, target history and who were/are its leaders/sympathizers, what were the
safe houses then and possible locations at present, what ideology the terrorist group pursues and
what are its aims as demonstrated by its propaganda or by website declarations and so on. This
will allow us to identify indicators. We identify indicators, then patterns, and then we exploit
them.
Tracking adversary capabilities is a continual process, and should be updated per changing
conditions in their strength, disposition, equipment, or tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs).
Requirements Determination –The Collectors
To properly collect information during war or any situation involving ground troops and the
enemy, be it a tactical operation or stability operation we need individuals who can interrogate
or EPWs or detainees in an efficient manner without invoking unnecessary delays .
To this end we need persons with good interrogation skills, ability to conduct tactical questioning
and good debriefing skills. Soldiers on the ground need to be trained in HUMINT capabilities,
apart from HUMINT specialists, so that when the soldier encounters the EPW right at the front
or in areas other than the rear, he can quickly interrogate and extract HUMINT/CI relevant
information and then pass on the prisoner to the interrogation facility. If the soldiers manage to
extract information this way, it could very well be that the said information can be of immediate
tactical use to the unit the soldier belongs. The chances of detaining an individual with no
information or intelligence of target value is also lessened considerably.On the other hand
involving soldiers this way helps the commander and upper echelons get a first hand good
situation assessment.
Besides this we need trained HUMINT specialists to act as enablers for the commander while
assessing the situation. They will conduct source operations to throw light on the enemy order of
battle, his capabilities, plans and intentions. The collection manager with all the inputs from the
HUMINT specialists can then assist the Commander with updating his intelligence requirements
and with the capabilities and intent of the enemy in perspective now, he can devise appropriate
COAs.
As for the intelligence component CI we need to realize the full import of the latter. Thus we
need CI specialists/soldiers with the skill to identify, detrect, counter, neutralize or exploit the
enemy’s intelligence approaches to gain information about our plans, capabilities and other
factors. The CI soldier must be well versed in polygraph and technical countermeasures as there
can be cases of treason and subversion and he will have to identify ,detect such individuals and
also establish their complicity in the crime and report to the executrive.A foreign language
ability will be an asset.CI soldiers need to exploit documents seized and these may be in a
foreign language.CI teams can be augmented with an interpreter in case the soldiers lack the
ability to converse in a foreign language.
Finally we need soldiers/specialists trained to coordinate collection activities,deconflict and
synchronize all HUMINT/CI activities and interact effectively with higher and lower echelons.
Collection comprises 5 main components:Command and control,collection
platforms,sensors,processing and exploitation and data exfiltration.As the intelligence units
collection manager you should devise a collection strategy using these five components in a
most optimum fashion so as to gather accurate,specific and timely information about the
target/
Proper Intelligence management offers decision-advantage capability. Intelligence only
provides an advantage if the information isdelivered to the appropriate decision maker in a
timely, relevant manner, giving that decision maker an edge over an adversary with inferior
intelligence.
Intelligence is technically speaking composed of four attributes,
collection,anticipation,transmission and efforts to degrade an enemy’s efforts to execute the first
three. In cases where maueuver is priority such as counterterrorism collection is more important
than the other attributes. In counterterrorism or tactical maneuvers sometimes intelligence is
required urgently by the combat units to achieve a tactical decision advantage over the opponent
and to this end there is no room for all-source fusion (collection of intelligence using various
collection platforms and fusing this intelligence)and analysis and then dissemination—what is
required is HUMINT collection..a single source collection to deliver timely intelligence. One
intelligence collection system may be suited to collection operations against a conventional
foreign army units activities but may not at all be suitable for collection of intelligence about a
terrorist group.
What is most important to realize is there exists a competitive environment if we view the
intelligence architecture of both parties from a third-person perspective.That is to say our
intelligence system and the enemy’s intelligence system are both involved in a competitive-
enterprise , each seeking to gain a decision-advantage over the other,to remain one step ahead of
the other in order to maintain this decision advantage.Hence we should model our collection
system exactly with this guiding principle in mind.Target selection for example is very important
while devising collection strategys.The nature of target influences intelligence collection.As
pointed out above one collection system may collect more optimally but another might
not.HUMINT is totally suitable in urban COIN operations but not aerial imagery as the building-
density will block straight-line view and also there are many other factors.When immediate
intelligence is required IMINT has less value as time is required to interpret the images.If we
shift the target from the insurgent in urban area to the mobile intercepts of terrorists in Kandahar
then SIGINT and satellelite based targeting is more appropriate.Again the dense foliage of a
jungle where Maoists have taken refuge will preclude any idea of employing aerial assets for ISR
operations.
To maintain the decision advantage we need to build such an intelligence collection system so
that is flexible enough to accommodate various targets as situations demand or unfold.
Following are the intelligence disciplines that aid in collection of information:
1. Signals intelligence (SIG1NT) includes information derived from intercepted
communications, radar, and telemetry. The National Security Agency (NSA), a component of the
Department of Defense, is responsible for collecting, processing, and reporting communications
intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence (FISINT). The National SIGINT Committee within NSA advises the Director, NSA,
and the DCI on SIGINT policy issues and manages the SIGINT requirements system.
2. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) includes both overhead and ground imagery. The National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), another Department of Defense component, is the
functional manager for all imagery intelligence activities, both classified and unclassified, within
the government including requirements, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination,
archiving, and retrieval.
3. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived intelligence data
other than imagery and SIGINT. The data result in intelligence that locates, identifies, or
describes distinctive characteristics of targets. It employs a broad group of disciplines including
nuclear, optical, radio frequency, acoustics, seismic, and materials sciences. Examples of this
might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific aircraft systems or the chemical composition
of air and water samples. The Central MASINT Organization, a component of DIA, is the focus
for all national and DoD MASINT matters.
4. Human-source intelligence (HUMINT) involves clandestine and overt collection techniques.
The following are some of the principal types of collection associated with HUMINT:
• Clandestine source acquisition of information (including photography, documents, and other
material) of intelligence value.
• Overt data collection by civilian and military personnel assigned to US diplomatic and
consular posts.
• Debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad or have access to foreign
information.
Official contacts with foreign governments, including liaison with their intelligence and
security services.
5. Open-source information is publicly available information appearing in print or electronic
form. It may include radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases,
and videos, graphics, and drawings.
Preparation is allowed to begin once the operations order (OPORD) or warning order (WARNO)
is received by the commander. The commander can also improve the unit’s performance and
survivability by conducting activities to generate additional quality intelligence for the ISR
operation.
The main goal of collection is to acquire data about the enemy’s environment, resources, and
activities.
Processing the data gathered is essential for commanders to make decisions. The data needs to be
manageable, concise, and thorough in order for immediate decisions to be made that may affect
the OPLAN. Conversion of large amounts of data to a form suitable for the production of
finished intelligence" includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of information stored
on film and magnetic media through the use of highly refined photographic and electronic
processes. Processing this information involves sifting through the essential and non-essential
information such as intelligence information collected by HUMINT, GEOINT, IMINT,
Special reconnaissance (SR) is conducted by small units of highly trained military personnel, usually
from special forces units or military intelligence organizations, who operate behind enemy lines, avoiding
direct combat and detection by the enemy. As a role, SR is distinct from commando operations, although
both are often carried out by the same units. The SR role frequently includes: covert direction of air and
missile attacks, in areas deep behind enemy lines, placement of remotely monitored sensors and
preparations for other special forces. Like other special forces, SR units may also carry out direct
action (DA) and unconventional warfare (UW), including guerrilla operations.
Special Reconnaissance is the conduct of environmental reconnaissance, target acquisition,
area assessment, post-strike assessment, emplacement and recovery of sensors, or support of
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations.
In intelligence terms, SR is a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection discipline. Its operational control is
likely to be inside a compartmented cell of the HUMINT, or possibly the operations, staff functions. Since
such personnel are trained for intelligence collection as well as other missions, they will usually maintain
clandestine communications to the HUMINT organization, and will be systematically prepared for debriefing.
They operate significantly farther than the furthest forward friendly scouting and surveillance units; they may
be tens to hundreds of kilometers deeper.
MASINT, OSINT, SIGINT, TECHINT, MEDINT, and FININT. This culmination of data may
appear as a puzzle pieces and it is the processing individual’s job to analyze all the data to help
create actionable intelligence.
The production process essentially packages the final intelligence product(s). These manageable
groups are divided by priority and are synchronized with the OPLAN essentials. . Integration,
evaluation, and analysis of all available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence
products, including timely,single-source, event-oriented reports and longer term finished
intelligence studies. Most intelligence organizations assign analysts to a particular geographic or
functional specialty. Analysts obtain information from all sources pertinent to their areas of
responsibility through the collection, forwarding, and processing systems. Analysts absorb
incoming information, evaluate it, produce an assessment of the current state of affairs within an
assigned field or substantive area, and then forecast future trends or outcomes. Analysts are
encouraged to include alternative futures in their assessments and to look for opportunities to
warn about possible developments abroad that could either threaten or provide opportunities for
US security and policy interests. The analyst also develops requirements for collection of new
information. Counterintelligence and counterterrorism analyses provide strategic assessments of
foreign intelligence and terrorist groups and prepare tactical options for ongoing operations and
investigations. Longer range, more intractable intelligence challenges are addressed by grouping
analytic and operational personnel from concerned agencies into closely knit functional
units.When information has been reviewed and correlated with information available from other
sources, it is called "finished intelligence."
Categories of Finished Intelligence
Five categories of finished intelligence are available to the consumer:
1. Current intelligence addresses day-to-day events, seeking to apprise consumers of new
developments and related background, to assess their significance, to warn of their near-
term consequences, and to signal potentially dangerous situations in the near future.
Current intelligence is presented in daily, weekly, and some monthly publications, and
frequently in ad hoc written memorandums and oral briefings to senior officials.
2. Estimative intelligence deals with what might be or what might happen. Like all kinds of
intelligence, estimative intelligence starts with the available facts, but then it migrates
into the unknown, even the unknowable. The main roles of estimative intelligence are to
help policymakers navigate the gaps between available facts by suggesting alternative
patterns into which those facts might fit and to provide informed assessments of the range
and likelihood of possible outcomes.
3. Warning intelligence sounds an alarm or gives notice to policymakers. It connotes
urgency and implies the potential need for policy action in response. Warning includes
identifying or forecasting events that could cause the engagement of US military forces,
or those that would have a sudden and deleterious effect on US foreign policy concerns
(for example, coups, third-party wars, refugee situations). Warning analysis involves
exploring alternative futures and low probability/ high impact scenarios. The National
Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning serves as the DCI's and the IC's principal adviser
on warning. All agencies and intelligence staffs have designated warning components,
and some have specific warning responsibilities.
4. Research intelligence is presented in monographs and in-depth studies by virtually all
agencies. Research underpins both current and estimative intelligence; there are also two
specialized subcategories of research intelligence: • Basic intelligence consists primarily
of the structured compilation of geographic, demographic, social, military, and political
data on foreign countries. This material is presented in the form of maps, atlases, force
summaries, handbooks, and, on occasion, sandtable models of terrain. The Directorate of
Intelligence in CIA, NIMA, and the Directorate for Intelligence Production in DIA are
major producers of this kind of material. • Intelligence for operational support
incorporates all types of intelligence production—current, estimative, warning, research,
scientific and technical; it is tailored, focused, and rapidly produced for planners and
operators. The top priority of DIA is to satisfy the intelligence needs of operational forces
and their commanders. DIA also provides near-real-time intelligence to military forces in
peacetime, crisis, contingency, and combat operations. To accomplish this, it operates the
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) and deploys National
Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) as needed, - worldwide. The Associate Director of
Central Intelligence for Military Support, via CIA's Office of Military Affairs, Oversees
deployment of CIA components of NISTs.
5. Scientific and technical intelligence includes information on technical developments
and characteristics, performance, and capabilities of foreign technologies including
weapon systems or subsystems. This information is derived from analysis of all-source
data, including technical measurements. Generally, such technical analysis and reporting
responds to specific national requirements derived from the weapons acquisition process,
arms control negotiations, or military operations. It covers the entire spectrum of sciences,
technologies, weapon systems, and integrated operations. This type of intelligence is
provided to consumers via in-depth studies, detailed system handbooks, executive
summaries, focused assessments and briefs, and automated databases.
Dissemination. Delivering the products to consumers who request and need them.
Feedback. Interaction between consumers of finished intelligence and the producers to help
intelligence managers evaluate the effectiveness of support, identify intelligence gaps, and focus
more precisely on consumer needs. Feedback takes many forms and channels; it may be direct or
through liaison contacts and consumer surveys.
Other Categories of Intelligence further explained
Each intelligence collecting method is most effective during particular scenarios and timeframes.
Each of the nine main areas of intelligence gathering allow for obtaining actionable intelligence
that may be used by the higher echelons to synchronize and analyze data in order to meet the
vision during the intelligence process.
HUMINT uses people as the main medium with which to collect information. The information
may be gathered, analyzed, and exploited for the ideal outcome. Since humans are such diverse
beings, there are a variety of methods which are adapted for every situation, environment, and
battlefield operations. There are a multitude of sources that can lead up to HUMINT collection
from diplomatic relations to travelers to local and military personnel. Most of these encounters
do not require a cost, thus illustrating how HUMINT is flexible, diverse, and cost effective.
Depending on the available training and education of the HUMINT collector, intelligence can be
obtained with speed and allow actionable intelligence decisions to be made quickly.
Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) provides feedback to the appropriate individual(s),
commanders and soldiers regarding the current geographical situation of the desired area on
earth. This would assist in the unit in obtaining relevant information about an area they may have
never seen before. Unfortunately, the intelligence method requires very expensive equipment
and qualified personnel to run it.
Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is the intelligence of space and earth. High tech equipment is used
to extract information on certain geographical areas. Space equipment, aircrafts (manned and
unmanned), and high definition aerial photography is used to obtain analyze and record this data.
Usually, this data requires time and resources and significant cost exhausted in the collection of
this data.
Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) requires the use of mathematics, physics,
chemistry, biology, and other scientific disciplines to obtain intelligence. These analysts search
for consistencies, inconsistencies, and a variety of measurements to identify the source of each
measurement. This method requires time and highly specialized personnel to interpret and
produce actionable information which may or may not be of immediate use to the soldiers on the
battlefield.
Open source intelligence uses information gained through unclassified material and other
outlets. Intelligence gained through this method comes from sources such as television, radio,
newspapers, magazines, the internet, etc. Analysts view, read and study these sources and link
seemingly harmless bits of information together to obtain legitimate intelligence.
Signals intelligence is a form of collecting intelligence by intercepting signals between
entities. Those entities can be human to human, machine to machine or a combination. Since
these signals are often encrypted, analysts require equipment that not only intercepts the
transmission, but can also “break the code” on the encryption, or the analyst has to take the
intercepted transmission and feed it through a system that can read the encrypted message(s).
There are several subcategories of SIGINT. These categories include communications
intelligence, electronic intelligence, foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, and telemetry
intelligence. Signals intelligence is very diverse and effective.
Technical intelligence is the branch of intelligence that provides our armed forces an
advantage when going into a conflict. It informs us of the enemy’s weapons systems,
capabilities, limitations, strengths, weaknesses, etc.
Medical intelligence is another branch of intelligence that ensures our armed forces are
informed and able to prepare for matters they may encounter in a conflict. Medical intelligence
focuses on the medical, environmental, and bio-scientific information that is of interest and may
affect strategic planning. MEDINT also feeds into military medical planning and operations
allowing friendly forces to prepare for conditions in a specific geographic location and obtain
necessary immunizations before entering an area.
Financial intelligence is a complex matter. In financial intelligence the financial
transactions or patterns of individuals, groups, countries, etc. are scrutinized. Money transferred
to or from monitored accounts is followed electronically. Information gained through this
method is shared with other intelligence services.The other methods of intelligence collection are
used to validate the information and target the suspect or suspects.
Advantages and disadvantages of Other Categories of Intelligence
Although all of the intelligence gathering methods are important and effective they each
have advantages and disadvantages. For example, most of the intelligence gathering methods
such as GEOINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, TECHINT, and FININT require very expensive
equipment, highly trained,and highly paid personnel to operate the equipment. Additional
personnel are required to decipher the information gained from that particular equipment. This
equipment is not only expensive to acquire, but it’s also expensive to maintain, operate, keep up
to date with the latest software, and other upgrades. Another disadvantage of these methods is
the time commitment. Frequently, by the time the information gained is translated into
intelligence and relayed to the person or agency that needs it most or who is in the best position
to act on the intelligence, it is too late to obtain the desired results. This emphasizes the need for
a change in our military intelligence culture to reflect the growing demand for faster accurate
intelligence.
The advantage to all of the above mentioned intelligence gathering methods and
including MEDINT and OSINT is that they do not require humans to be on the ground and in
danger to acquire the information. This reduces risk to our most valuable resource…humans.
Advantages and Disadvantages of HUMINT
The reverse is true when referring to human intelligence. Most HUMINT methods do not require
expensive equipment. Instead a moderately trained individual can gain a tremendous amount of
information and intelligence through such seemingly simple methods as talking to a patrol after
they complete a mission, having a conversation with a detainee, refugee, a non-governmental
organization (NGO), or watching the activities in or around a specific area. The disadvantage to
HUMINT is that in most cases it requires a human being to go into dangerous areas and
situations to gain information or intelligence. This risk can be remedied and reduced through the
education and training of Soldiers and commanders on the HUMINT methods.
Strategic,Operational and Tactical Intelligence:
Strategic Intelligence in military terms means the intelligence which goes into formulation of
military policy and strategies. Operational intelligence on the other hand focuses on support to
planning operations at the theater or regional level while Tactical intelligence is at the local
level—intelligence that goes into driving operations locally.
Traditional intelligence doctrine does not take into account the asymmetric enemy which does
not have an Order of Battle from the conventional enemy point of view—rather is dispersed, of
loose cellular structure with all command identities unknown to cell members and is
transnational..all in all near invisible with no military uniform that can identify him as in
conventional battle , which does not resort to standard TTPs and other combat techniques, whose
logistical, supplies and other support services are totally unlike the support arms of the
conventional enemy and out of view, nearly invisible, hidden among sympathizers and
communities resources. Thus if we consider COIN operations in a region, whether urban or
jungle or hilly, the operational intelligence doctrine must be adaptive to include these factors.
Further the intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms applied to conventional
wartime and peacetime situations may not be as effective in situations involving, say COIN in an
urban environment.
Hence we cannot just stay limited to traditional approaches to operational intelligence. We can
adapt by say endeavoring to create new indigenous HUMINT sources, capturing indigenous
insurgent technology conducting source operations by using sources from the local community
by bridging the gap between them and us soldiers (developing close relationships, respecting
their customs and abiding by it, being more of a civilian than a soldier by wearing civil attire and
sharing tea/coffee with them, respect for their religion, etc all contributing to a conducive
environment suitable for elicitation and oblique tactical prodding without raising any doubts )
and conducting security reviews with such as the modern day IED in perspective..information
from all these being aligned with the intelligence requirements of the commander thus increasing
the depth of his situational awareness.
Tactical intelligence is required to answer intelligence requirements at the tactical level in
response to enemy TTPs.Military operations are conducted to locate the enemy, determine its
strength and aligning all these information with the efforts to apply proper tactics and use
suitable weaponry to cause defeat. Thus tactical intelligence is a significant force multiplier if
collected and applied properly.
One change that must be effected is that the time period between collection, analysis and
dissemination to the commander and then routed to the targeting team/fire team...this should be
reduced as much as possible. To do this the tactical analyst should be at ground level along with
the collectors or in close proximity. Take for example one of the most commonly and
increasingly modified weapon of the insurgent...the IED. Now if the tactical analyst is at ground
level he can directly access the IED without wasting time, study its nature, composition and the
source and its type ,whether ir is roadside bomb or body-borne or vehicle-borne
explosive.Therafter the analyst reports to the commander with the details and suitable attack and
surveillance platforms are used to detonate the IED remotely or detect the planting of the
explosive or even kill the bearer of the explosive. The analyst’s information may trigger further
surveillance using video to track the bomb storage and factories.
Combat Information is that data that arises of time sensitive information , such as ‘’target
acquisition’’ where a HVT emerges from the information collected and we have very short time
to effect a kill thus forcing the tactical analyst to utilize the ISR assets most effectively so as to
get the ‘’most timely and accurate information’’.Thus the analyst coordinates with those assets
that can provide target acquisition information rapidly and to this end the analyst must have good
access to these ISR platforms. This is Combat Information and can be shared with commanders
before further analysis if immediate action is required or if there is any other urgent need.
HUMINT
What is HUMINT?
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) has been in
existence since the first time one individual
spied on another. Over the centuries, it has
become more intriguing as it spans the gambit
from personal observation reports to covert
operations. Since the HUMINT discipline is so
large in breadth, this book will address only
those elements applicable to actionable
intelligence.
counterinsurgency doctrine is impoverished with respect to the role of HUMINT. Paradigmatic
works pay lip service to the importance of HUMINT in general but offer few concrete lessons for
commanders or collectors in particular. In this essay I aim to fill this gap.
while all counterinsurgents collect operational reporting as they perform their daily functions—
what is frequently termed “passive” collection—HUMINT requires “active” collectors who are
specially trained to conduct military source operations and interrogations.
“Most of the time, however, intelligence provides indications that an opponent is undertaking
some sort of initiative before that initiative is fully underway and begins to generate observable
activities. Espionage allows intelligence managers to focus collection efforts on the suspected
activity.”
Yet counterinsurgency doctrine is impoverished with respect to the role of HUMINT.
Paradigmatic works pay lip service to the importance of HUMINT in general but offer few
concrete lessons for commanders or collectors in particular.
While all counterinsurgents collect operational reporting as they perform their daily functions—
what is frequently termed “passive” collection—HUMINT requires “active” collectors who are
specially trained to conduct military source operations and interrogations
The HUMINT collector represents a low-density, high-demand asset, one that should be
carefully and selectively employed to collect against intelligence requirements that cannot
be answered by passive collectors. If this is not clearly understood, HUMINT will suffer
from “errant, opportunistic tasking.”HUMINT collection is the sine qua non of
counterinsurgency success. Its value is clear and inarguable.
DEFINITION OF HUMINT:
“The collection of information by a trained human intelligence collector from people and their
associated documents and media sources to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,
dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities.”
More broadly, counterinsurgency may shift or blur the line between operational information
and intelligence information, but the threshold between the two still exists and necessitates
dedicated professional collection. This is particularly true in an information environment
saturated with un-vetted information, where professional HUMINT collectors are critical to
ensuring that information quantity does not supplant information quality.
More broadly, counterinsurgency may shift or blur the line between operational information
and intelligence information, but the threshold between the two still exists and necessitates
dedicated professional collection. This is particularly true in an information environment
saturated with un-vetted information, where professional HUMINT collectors are critical to
ensuring that information quantity does not supplant information quality.
HUMINT is the collection of foreign information to identify elements, intentions, composition,
strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. This collection is done by
trained HUMINT collectors that obtain a plethora of information from mediums such as people
and multimedia. HUMINT actively and passively uses human intelligence sources to obtain
viable information to cross-cue other intelligence disciplines and provide the commander with
sufficient data to make decisions.
HUMINT was the first intelligence discipline and continues to be the most effective for long-
term development against asymmetric warfare targets. Nothing provides better actionable
intelligence then knowing who, what, when, where, why, and how an enemy plans to operate by
gathering information from within the targeted organization. However, these types of covert
HUMINT operations often take years, if not decades, to establish sources high enough within an
organization to provide actionable intelligence and vice corroborative intelligence. The overt
HUMINT activities are an excellent source of actionable intelligence against asymmetric targets.
The debriefing of patrols, interrogation of detainees, liaison with a host nation,interaction with
non-government organizations, document exploitation, and the development of sources through
HUMINT contact operations all capably support actionable intelligence needs of Army
commanders.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is defined as a category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources [INSCOM, 2001]. It is a Foreign Intelligence Activity focused on the penetration of
an adversary’s decision making architecture to obtain information regarding capabilities, vulnerabilities,
disposition, plans and intentions [INSCOM, 2001]. Its components are categorized by directed conventional
activity, military intelligence liaison, and field HUMINT (military intelligence reconnaissance, screening,
debriefing, interrogation, contact handling, agent handling, covert passive surveillance and specialist technical
support) [JWP, 2000].
HUMINT is one of the most versatile and powerful information sources available for situation awareness and
decision-making. Its low cost and ready availability could make it the silver bullet of intelligence.
HUMINT, SIGINT, and History
The two disciplines of most use in obtaining actionable intelligence against asymmetric
warfare targets are HUMINT and SIGINT. Although IMINT, especially the use of UAVs, is an
integral part of asymmetric warfare operations, it is normally tasked only after other intelligence
indicators have already been identified in HUMINT or SIGINT to justify the sustained use of
assets against probable targets. MASINT tends to be used for longer-term intelligence analysis
against asymmetric warfare targets such as examination of post blast sites to help identify origins
of enemy support material. This does produce actionable intelligence, but not necessarily for the
immediate combat commander.
The French Army used HUMINT almost extensively for actionable intelligence during
the Battle for Algiers in their asymmetric warfare confrontation with Islamic Liberation Front
(FLN) extremists during Algerian independence efforts in the 1950’s and 60’s. While SIGINT
did play a small part in their efforts, the majority of the actionable intelligence came from their
use of torture and other HUMINT interrogation, document evaluation, debriefings, and tactical
questioning techniques to disassemble the structure of the terrorist cells operating in the capital
city. The use of torture was primarily implemented because the insurgent forces relied on
their compartmentalized cells as a method for ensuring operational security and reduced
their communications between cells to specific human-to-human contacts. This type of
coercive HUMINT collection provides actionable intelligence in a timely manner, but is only
sustainable in the short-term; it lacks production over the long-term. In other words, it can
produce effective actionable intelligence against the immediate asymmetric targets being
countered by local forces, but creates long-term problems involving “hearts and minds” that
detrimentally affect other over HUMINT collection efforts. Again, HUMINT, even overt
HUMINT collection takes time to develop sources, but provides excellent actionable intelligence
against asymmetric adversaries.
Special Forces efforts to stop the Taliban in Afghanistan at the beginning of OEF in late
2001 received some extremely timely actionable information from SIGINT sources. This
intelligence allowed the Special Forces units not only to quickly identify which Northern
Alliance factions were most supportive of United States efforts, but also the who and when
questions for various high priority Taliban targets. As the battlefield quickly changed in
Afghanistan, SIGINT continued to play an active role in locating and eliminating asymmetric
threats and preempting adversary activities. As the operation developed beyond the one year
mark enemy countermeasures to SIGINT collection had an effect, but one that was outweighed
by the growing HUMINT capability in the country. Whether HUMINT or SIGINT take a lead
against the asymmetric warfare threat, they both eventually complement efforts to product a
more complete picture of enemy capabilities and intentions to provide the combatant
commander with actionable intelligence.
HUMINT FOCUS:
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) has been in existence since the first time one individual spied on
another. Over the centuries, it has become more intriguing as it spans the gambit from personal
observation reports to covert operations. The HUMINT discipline is so large in breadth; this
essay will address only those elements applicable to actionable intelligence.
HUMINT is the collection by a trained HUMINT Collector of foreign information from people
and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics,
equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection
methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s
intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT was the first
intelligence discipline and continues to be the most effective for long-term development against
asymmetric warfare targets. Nothing provides better actionable intelligence then knowing who,
what, when, where, why, and how an enemy plans to operate by gathering information from
within the targeted organization. However, these types of covert HUMINT operations often take
years, if not decades, to establish sources high enough within an organization to provide
actionable intelligence vice corroborative intelligence. The overt HUMINT activities are an
excellent source of actionable intelligence against asymmetric targets. The debriefing of patrols,
interrogation of detainees, liaison with host nation and non government organization, document
exploitation, and development of sources through HUMINT contact operations all capably
support actionable intelligence needs of Army commanders.
The two disciplines of most use in obtaining actionable intelligence against asymmetric warfare
targets are HUMINT and SIGINT. Although IMINT, especially the use of UAVs, is an integral
part of asymmetric warfare operations, it is normally tasked only after other intelligence
indicators have already been identified in HUMINT or SIGINT to justify the sustained use of
assets against probable targets. MASINT tends to be used for longer-term intelligence analysis
against asymmetric warfare targets such as examination of post blast sites to help identify origins
of enemy support material. This does produce actionable intelligence, but not necessarily for the
immediate combat commander. The French Army used HUMINT almost extensively for
actionable intelligence during the Battle for Algiers in their asymmetric warfare confrontation
with Islamic Liberation Front (FLN) extremists during Algerian independence efforts in the
1950’s and 60’s. While SIGINT did play a small part in their efforts, the majority of the
actionable intelligence came from their use of torture and other HUMINT interrogation,
document evaluation, debriefings, and tactical questioning techniques to disassemble the
structure of the insurgent cells operating in the capital city. The use of torture was primarily
implemented because the insurgent forces relied on their compartmentalized cells as a method
for ensuring operational security and reduced their communications between cells to specific
human-to-human contacts. This type of coercive HUMINT collection provides actionable
intelligence in a timely manner, but is only sustainable in the short-term, it lacks production over
the long-term. In other words, it can be produce effective actionable intelligence against the
immediate asymmetric targets being countered by local forces, but creates long-term problems
involving “hearts and minds” that detrimentally affect other over HUMINT collection efforts.
Again HUMINT, even overt HUMINT collection takes time to develop sources, but provides
excellent actionable intelligence against asymmetric adversaries.
Special Forces efforts to stop the Taliban in Afghanistan at the beginning of OEF in late 2001
received some extremely timely actionable information from SIGINT sources. This intelligence
allowed the Special Forces units not only to quickly identify which Northern Alliance factions
were most supportive of United States efforts, but also the who and when questions for various
high priority Taliban targets. As the battlefield quickly changed in Afghanistan, SIGINT
continued to play an active role in locating and eliminating asymmetric threats and preempting
adversary activities. As the operation developed beyond the one year mark enemy
countermeasures to SIGINT collection had an effect, but one that was outweighed by the
growing HUMINT capability in the country. Whether HUMINT or SIGINT take a lead against
the asymmetric warfare threat, they both eventually complement efforts to product a more
complete picture of enemy capabilities and intentions to provide the combatant commander
with actionable intelligence.
HUMINT Source, Collector, and Questioning
A HUMINT source is an individual who provides actionable intelligence to the HUMINT
collector. The source can provide information about environment, resources, personnel, tactics,
etc. through first or second hand knowledge. Typically, the HUMINT collector analyzes the sight
or sound information that the source provides. The source may individuals or organizations such
as an NGO, civilians, friendly military or non-military forces, and detainees.
SOURCES:
Placement,access and motivation are the criteria while choosing the source for HUMINT source
operations.A source’s proximity to the adversary’s decision making architecture or personnel in
general is a crucial factor.If the source has inside access then we have reliable inside
information—different than information supplied by sources who are on the periphery of the
targets transactional profile.
The source can be self-motivated or the HUMINT operator can motivate him—in the latter case
he should be susceptible to motivation,monetary or ideological.
The source may be witting(he is aware that his information is of good intelligence value and this
also purports he is aware of the domain/field of activity in which the HUMINTer is interested) or
may be un-witting.In either case the source must be responsive to tasking—here tasking means
the utilization of the source to meet the needs of the HUMINT operative in order to satisfy the
intelligence requirements.
The HUMINT collector has special training, certification, and education that allows for the
optimal extraction of information to respond to the intelligence information demands.
HUMINT questioning encompasses a variety of methods that the collector must be familiar and
flexible. The five basic phases of all HUMINT questioning includes planning and preparation,
approach, questioning, termination, and reporting that may or may not be chronological in order.
The HUMINT Process
HUMINT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
There are four components within HUMINT operations: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and
Assess.
PLAN
HUMINT planing refers to the collection plan.What are the objectives,when to task the
collection activities and which resources are to be allocated the collection taskings.The
Commander of those units who have HUMINT collection assets at their disposals allocate
proper resources based on the intelligence requirements that arise during ISR planning. The
Commander makes a judicious choice of the collection operatives based on their placement and
access.The Commander SHOULD take into consideration the technical control aspect of the
collection activities.They should adhere to the proper TTPs,existing policies and regulations and
the Commander should provide technical information and relevant guidance.Technical control is
the optimal management of source databases,sensitive information databases,contingency and
incentive finances related to intelligence,deconfliction of operations and liaison with other
agencies in the domain of HUMINT.Technical control provides HCTs with specific requirements
and data that they need to conduct operations and, in certain circumstances, specific instructions
on how to execute missions.
PREPARE
In the PREPARE phase the Commander and his staff as well as the various HUMINT
control sections conduct a review and assessment so as to assure themselves that all areas in the
mission are properly covered and included in the rehearsals.HCT usually accompany other units
like tactical combat units on a mission , for example, and good rehearsal is necessary not only for
collection activities,but also in regard to emergency in cases of casualties (like
evacuation),communications and fire support.Coordination in an optimal manner is paramount
with regard to the supported unit..They should be familiar with the security plan.Mission
duration must be carefully understood with all allowances for p[possible emergencies and the
unexpected.The HUMINT collector conducts a thorough review of the collection plan ,
understands the requirements and proceeds to prepare the questioning plan.The HCTs coordinate
with the OMT in all plans.
(Summary - In the planning and preparation phase, the collector uses relevant research and
operational planning to create questions andexplore potential tactics to question the source in
addition to other specific collection inquiries. The approach phase encompasses the ability of the
HUMINT collector to obtain rapport with the source to gain confidence for optimal extraction of
intelligence information. )
EXECUTE
This is the actual collection activity phase where information is collected according to
the ISR plan.In this phase the HCT leader determines , after careful study of the requirements
placed before him , who in his team are best suitable to carry out the collection tasks which will
answer these requirements in the most satisfactory manner and then tasks these personnel.The
requirements become specific team tasks.Mission execution consists of the collection of
information in accordance with the integrated ISR plan. The requirements manager validates the
requirements based on command guidance. The G3 tasks the requirements to the units and the
individual asset managers (that is, OMT) to identify the assets best capable to answer the
requirement. When requirements are levied against a specific HCT, the HCT leader decides
which of his team's contacts can best answer the requirements. He then turns the requirement
into specific team tasks.
ASSESS
Assessment is the continuous monitoring-throughout planning, preparation, and
execution-of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against
criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments.
Throughout the questioning phase the collector uses a variety of methods to interrogate the
source. Questions may range from applicableOPLAN to be thorough in extracting relevant
information from the source. Termination requires that the collector completes all questioning
with the source. The collector may establish the understanding with the source that further
contact may be required in regards to the operation. The reporting phase may not fall
chronologically within the phase due to any pertinent information that is reveled to the collector,
during interrogation. The HUMINT collector writes, summarizes, and sends any applicable
documents to the relevant individuals requiring the information.
There are eight main HUMINT collection categories: tactical questioning, screening,
interrogation, debriefing, liaison, human source contact operations (SCOs), document
exploitation (DOCEX), and captured enemy equipment (CEE) operations. While HUMINT
collection supports DOCEX and CEE operations, they are usually analyzed by a collector when a
source is available to be questioned. Tactical questioning can be performed by members of any
DOD personnel. The general purpose of screening is to identify whether or not a source is able
and willing to participate in the questioning. The collector can also identify if the source has any
relevant information to answer requirements. This screening process saves time and helps
identify the level of knowledge, the level of cooperation, and the placement and access of a given
source. Screening operations may include the local employees, checkpoints, and refugees. \
Interrogation is an essential part of the intelligence process. It requires authorized personnel to be
able to ask direct or indirect questions to a source keeping in mind the objective- to answer all
requirements. Interrogation is performed by all types of military organizations and personnel.
HUMINT collectors understand the importance of following the Laws of War when interrogating
a source regardless of the situation or environment. HUMINT collectors are efficient and
qualified to extract as much information as possible. Soldiers on the front may also be able to
interrogate using HUMINT methods, but require that they treat all information as actionable
intelligence. The source may cooperate or be extremely difficult, but either way a variety of
techniques must be used based on the source. Certain facilities may be more or less available or
prepared to receive sources for interrogation. Interrogation requires a high level of planning, tact,
the knowledge and experience to know the optimal time to use a given technique.
Source information may also be extracted and evaluated through cooperating sources during
debriefing. Debriefing includes refugee émigré operations, local and civilian debriefing
operations, and friendly force debriefing operations. All of these areas contain sections in which
intelligence must be relayed from individuals to US forces or unites to satisfy and answer
requirements. Typically refugee sources do not require immediate extraction of intelligence.
Later on, these sources may be willing to contribute information. This may be due to the personal
situation which may include being in custody or detained. All debriefing areas must comply with
the appropriate law, including US law and Laws of War. For friendly forces, debriefing process
must occur with US units only. Local and civilian debriefing operations may or may not have
sources in custody; similar to the refugee émigré operations.
Once all the debriefing has occurred there are activities available for commanders, Soldiers, and
other US personnel to coordinate with allied forces. This may include exchanging additional
information with NGOs, planning for future activities, targets, reconnaissance, etc. Civilian
agencies may also be involved in the liaison operations.
Human source contact operations (SCO) are essentially organized, formal, and planned meetings
between US forces and sources that intend on providing essential information. This ranges from
potential threats to actual dangers, to warnings. HUMINT sources may be one-time contacts or
constant sources of information. They may strengthen or provide tactical, environmental and
resource information. HUMINT sources are great to obtain accurate and subjective information
such as attitudes and intentions based on actions. Human SCO requires trained, educated, and
certified personnel to bring together the source and collector in a formal setting. Collectors may
then analyze information appropriately. All of the HUMINT collection methods lead to the
successful and effective contributions to the military decision-making process (MDMP) and
therefore, should be utilized by Soldiers to assist on the battlefield.
Another HUMINT collection method, DOCEX, is not strictly part of HUMINT collection, but
may be used by other agencies and intelligence categories. DOCEX operations are the systematic
extraction of information from open, closed, published, and electronic source
documents.Computers,telephones,GPS,Personal Digital Assistants yield a lot of information
stored in them which is of intelligence value and may match collection requirementsThe
HUMINT collector will assess the importance and relevancy of the information,if need be cross-
cue it with other intelligence disciplines and then forward it to the intelligence cell.
DOCEX is of particular importance to HUMINT collection due to the tangible results.
Essentially, DOCEX views all types of documents from different physical and electronic sources
as actionable intelligence. When enemy documents are acquired, the documents are usually
truthful due to the fact that the enemy writes them for their own use. HUMINT collectors exploit
these documents and screen each one based on the information that may be best suited for
another department or source collecting agency. Many captured documents provide insight into
the enemy and provides information to multiple operations. These documents may also be time-
sensitive. It is appropriate for the collector to screen these documents quickly since the
intelligence may be a part of a bigger picture. DOCEX may be used as an intelligence attack
method to deceive the enemy. This method may proceed with false information falling into the
hands of the enemy. Once this occurs, enemy decisions may be to our advantage.
All of the DOCEX methods need to be verified, preferably, by multiple sources. Although it is a
fact that as a deceptive measure the captured documents with typed/written matter on it may
yield misleading information , in DOCEX most documents yield accurate and true information
and has high intelligence value.Linguistics support is called for if the captured document has
content of foreign language.To prevent from being trapped in deception the HUMINT collector
should adopt a policy of not relying on single-source information.These captured documents
often contain critical and sensitive information and hence should be assessed and exploited as
soon as possible.They sometimes,in addition to tactical intelligence,also yield political and
important technical information.
HUMINT collectors can be effective gatherers of information from multiple sources and
able to provide timely analyses to whichever agency needs it. Tactical intelligence, political
waves, and technical data contribute to forming the details on actionable intelligence. Currently,
soldiers have access to these methods on a day to day basis. Being able to hone in on the most
useful data by using HUMINT collection methods can provide superior actionable intelligence
on the battlefield and during operations.
CEE OPERATIONS : CEE includes all captured material from detainess/EPW.They are
examined thoroughly to see if they reveal anything of intelligence value.Whether they satisfy any
collection requirement or do they have any military application.
Items that may have intelligence value include:
All electronic communications equipment with a memory card, including computers,
telephones, PDAs, and GPS terminals
All video or photographic equipment
Items that may have technical intelligence (TECHINT) value include
New weapons
All communications equipment not immediately exploitable for HUMINT value
Track vehicles
Equipment manuals
All CEE known or believed to be of TECHINT interest
Weapons and equipment/material found with the detainee should be confiscated , tagged and
evacuated immediately.
CEE operations are also part of the HUMINT collection process. CEE operations gather
all data, physical possessions, and environmental queues from the battlefield and captured
enemies. Manuals and equipment are just a couple of the tangible HUMINT collection
intelligences. These physical possessions may lead to actionable intelligence; however this may
not be the case. Although the information may not be immediately useful for HUMINT resources,
it may be of use to the other methods of intelligence collection such as TECHINT. CEE
operations tract and tag all confiscated equipment and data from the geographical locations of
battlefields and personnel.
HUMINT COMMAND AND CONTROL
Commanders that conduct HUMINT operations take responsibility for :
Constituting task organizations
Assigning missions
Execution of the mission
Mission accomplishment
Designating the AO for each mission tasking.
Commanders must ensure mission accomplishment by optimally allocating resources and
logistics to support HUMINT operations,keeping in mind the constraints and time.The
Commander should make adequate arrangements of training of his MI unit personnel.There
should also be cross training of HUMINT operators and HUMINT applications personnel.Each
should know the others method of operation.Thus he can ensure the operational readiness of his
personnel.The Commander analyses higher headquarters intelligence requirement,requests for
information from adjacent and subordinate units,tasks his organization,states the mission,tasks
the HUMINT collectors,executes the mission,accomplishes it and conducts a post operation
review,manages any discrepancies or gaps in intelligence(maybe again tasking his men).He is
accountable to and responsible for all HUMINT activities and should see that they confirm to
doctrinal guidelines.At this juncture he should fully liaise with the technical control team and
OMT. He issues mission orders to subordinate unit commanders, being as deatailed as possible
and giving as much time as can be allowed.
Commanders must:
Must understand and know the enemy,his organization,his ISR capability,his
counter-ISR capabilities,his threat platforms,the terrain over which it exercises
control and how the terrain can be an enabler for his HUMINT/C-HUMINT
operations.
As regarding his own HUMINT units he should understand the
constraints,technical and operational,under which they function
Should ensure synchronization of operations with intelligence
Should ensure the best training of all personnel in his units
Optimum reconnaissance and surveillance in close co-ordination with higher HQ ,
adjacent units,subordinate units and staff is very important--he should implement
this.
Should keep higher HQ informed of manpower,equipment ,logistical and
operational updates,any shortcomings,requirements or any enhancements
required.Advises higher HQ of capabilities and limitations of his HUMINT assets.
Should continually supervise each and every operation,create a feedback system
and use the feeds to ensure high quality and technical control of both the
operations and HUMINT products.
Ensures personnel are working within legal, regulatory, and policy guidelines.
STRUCTURE
ACE - Analysis & Control Element: An Intelligence mission management and analytical hub at
the division, corps, or theater level, wherein analytical tasks are conducted over intelligence
fused from all sources and interpretations/assessments made to give the commander a total
picture and situational understanding.It is here that gaps or critical missing information are
identified and passed on to the collection manager who in turn tasks the collection assets with the
requirements.
ACT - Analysis Control Team: This is a tactical version of the ACE and aids in analysis and
management of acquired intelligence at the tactical level.
OMT –Caters to CI/HUMINT requirements and in modular form can be plugged into an ACE or
ACT.Composed of HUMINT and CI elements and manages 2-3 subordinate Operational
Teams.It is an operation,technical control and analysis entity.
OT - Operational Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers it performs CI/HUMINT
operations, investigations, and collection functions.
TEB - Tactical Exploitation Battalion: The TEB contains the CI, IPW, and LRS assets.
The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)
HUMINT reports and other operational feeds need to be worked upon , processed , and
derivations made.Cross cueing with reports from other sensors sometimes becomes
necessary.HUMINT validates IMINT , SIGINT.What we need is a cell where all these feeds
are fused together,processed and timely actionable intelligence derived.Extrapolation is also
done to impact operational and strategic considerations with the available intelligence products
plugging into the overall intelligence system.The HUMINT analysis cell also indicates gaps in
reporting.
The HAC:Produces HUMINT reports and feeds for intelligence summaries.Conducts
dissemination.
Maintains database of all HUMINT activities in the AO and this database is directly
accessible to all HUMINT teams and lends very good support to their collection operations.
HAC plugs in ACE so as to use analysis tools for immediate and long term analysis and
collection plans.It analyses the trends and patterns discerned after collection or during
collection.Analyses source reliability and credibility by various comparative tools and
assists the collector to know his sources better and assign tasks accordingly or stop all
source-handler operations with sources of negative attributes.
HAC helps in compiling target folders.Now future collection efforts can be effected based
on the information in these target folders.The target folders are updated time to time and a
repository maintained.
HAC supports CI entities by supplying information of CI interest and provides feeds to
CICA
Provides collection requirements input to the HOC.
Supports RM through the development of HUMINT SIRs based on command PIRs.
Answers HUMINT-related RFIs.
HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)
Coordination and synchronization of all HUMINT activities is of utmost importance.Proper
technical control and deconfliction among adjacent and higher/lower HUMINT elements is the
job of the Operations cell.The HUMINT Operations Cell HOC.The HOC keeps a track of all
activities conducted by all HUMINT and operational teams(which are a mix of CI and
HUMINT operators) and coordinates them.
Ensures technical control and deconfliction of all HUMINT activities.
Maintains the HUMINT source database.Updates it.
Manages the collection requirements for HUMINT
Expedites intelligence products preparation and dissemination.
Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
The CICA coordinates all CI activities for a deployed force.
HUMINT TEAM STRUCTURE
Operational Management Team
The OMT is mannede by 3-4 persons and provide technical control,operation coverage and
guidance,collection and operational advise and focus to 2-4 HUMINT teams who are engaged
in the actual collection and other HUMINT activities.The OMT can have an analysis element
(to help in quick dissemination of actionable intelligence) to assist in boot-level analysis and
mission analysis.It reports teams equipment status and other variables which may effect the
HUMINT teams capability to the HOC and unit headquarters.It works in close tandem with the
ACE to develop current threat assesments and answer the commanders intelligence
requirements· Provide the collection and operational focus for HUMINT teams.Integrates the
HUMINT teams directly into the commander's ISR planning.Keeps the commander abreat of
all activities,capabilities and limitations of the deployed HUMINT teams.
HUMINT Team
The HUMINT team consists of 4-5 persons who carry out the actual HUMINT functions and
are trained in the entire spectrum of the latter, and they may be deployed to execute mission-
focussed activities of interrogation, debriefing, contact operations, tactical questioning or
DOCEX.
HUMINT products
HUMINT products consist of, but are not limited to, target nomination, input to threat
and vulnerability assessments, intelligence estimates, and intelligence information reports.
Finalized intelligence derived from HUMINT activities is incorporated into joint and national
intelligence databases, assessments, and analysis products. HUMINT products are also
incorporated into the COP to support situational awareness. HUMINT production takes place at
all levels.
· Operational and tactical production includes tactical alerts, spot reports, and current
intelligence; input to threat and/or vulnerability assessments tailored to specific activities, units,
installations, programs or geographic areas, and target studies to support contingency planning
and major exercises; studies of military activities and capabilities.
· Strategic products include assessments supporting national and Army information
requirements on foreign technology development; worldwide assessments of the organization,
location, funding, training, operations capabilities and intentions of terrorist organizations;
analyses of the capabilities of international narcotics trafficking organizations.
UNIT SUPPORT TO HUMINT COLLECTION (Secondary Collectors)
Small units contribute to HUMINT collection through a number of different ways.
Tactical Questioning
Every soldier is a Sensor—this statement is a major transformation in Intelligence Doctrine.It
should be strongly emphasized that dedicating/deploying only multidisciplinary intelligence
collection assets is NOT enough.The soldier on the ground,who is in direct contact with the
local environment,be it at times of small scale operations,patrolling missions,handling
EPWs/detainees or captured documents – HE IS THE EYES AND EARS OF THE
COMMANDER.
Hence a culture of intelligence collection , or in other words a natural tendency to probe
and collect information—should be inculcated in each and every soldier,irrespective of
trade or speciality.This is Tactical Questioning which is guided by the units
SOP,ROE,and the order for that mission. Tactical questioning aids in proper
visualization of the existing situation (Situational Understanding of the Commander) by
enabling the soldier to conduct expedient enquiries in order to extract critical mission-
specific information of immediate tactical value.
Soldiers can conduct TQ when they are:
1. Manning a check post/roadblock
2. Executing traditional offensive/defensive operations
3. Handling detainees/EPWs during the very initial stages of apprehending them
4. Handling captured documents
5. Occupying an OP
6. On a patrolling mission
7. In conversation with the local populace after an operation and securing the area
8. Conducting questioning as MP personnel
9. Passing through an area in a convoy
10. Involved in any operation whatsoever where they get the opportunity to observe and
report on environmental factors – factors pertaining to the mission/Area of operations
(See Appendix for more)
ISR Operations
The soldier conduct Tactical Questioning which needs to be passed up the chain of
command.In tactical operations the soldier conducts TQ which offer critical information which
are of immediate tactical value and may affect mission success positively by enabling the
Commander and staff to plan the ongoing operation more efficiently.Careful and expedient
handling of EPWs/detainees and captured documents lends good support to the overall ISR
operations.
For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit
intelligence section to factor in all useful tactical information gained during the small units
activities in the overall planning of the mission (and also update ISR planning):
• Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical
value.The soldier may resort to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to
arrive at his judgement.•
• Normal reporting
• Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.
• Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.
ANALYSIS
IPB, all-source, and single-source analysis are conducted to understand enemy order of
battle.Analysis aids the commander to get a complete picture (situational understanding0 which
gives him a decision advantage over the enemy.HUMINT elements study and analyse
operational taskings carefully to tailor the intelligence requirements(prioritized) to available
collection assets.Analysis is a continuous process.As information is analysed they are fed into
other collection platforms and
fused with intelligence from other sources ,interpreted and translated into intelligence
products.The analysed information is also fed back to the HUMINT collectors to refocus
collection efforts.Raw information,open source and finished intelligence are analysed by the
analysis team.Analysis occurs at the tactical,operational and strategic levels.
TRAITS OF A HUMINT COLLECTOR
HUMINT collection is a fine-tuned science and a delicate work of art. Although many
HUMINT collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT collector
requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and under all circumstances.
What makes a good HUMINT collector?
The Commander specifies the Intelligence Requirements. This is also known as the Commanders
Intent. The GS(Int) then operates on this intent and formulates several requirements satisfying
questions based on the intent. Thereafter the process continues down to the collector who is
tasked to gather information that satisfies an intelligence requirement. It is the collector on the
ground who plays ultimately the most important function in the military decision making process
leading to generating course of actions to offset enemy course of actions. The collector should be
proactive, not just be content with gathering and passing information just satisfying the
intelligence requirement. He should ask more questions, should explore further to collect more
information.Three prerequisites for an intelligence collector are curiosity, the ability to problem
solve, and the ability to operate independently.
The collector interacts with one or more sources that provide him information. For the collector
source management and tasking is a daunting task, sometimes even posing a threat to his
physical self. Sources usually are motivated by a variety of factors to deliver information to the
collector. Some of the motivations are inducements generated by the collector while some are
more self centered with respect to the source.A source may be reluctant to provide further
information as he may perceive a danger to himself from the elements on whom he is providing
information. A source may demand more money or he may say about his perception of lax in
security for self and family. A source may intentionally provide erroneous information with the
intent to settle personal scores with personal enemies.Still further the source can be acting as a
double agent after being exploited by enemy intelligence.This could be hazardous for the
collector.These are problems the collector can face and hence the collector should have excellent
problem solving ability.The enemy is always on the lookout for its enemy’s intelligence
agents,one of them the collector himself.The collector should be aware of enemy
counterintelligence agents.His source can get identified by the enemy CI agent.Thereafter the
source can be exploited by the CI agent.
In conventional conflict,whether be it a tactical operation or on a larger scale involving a greater
battlespace we have dedicated ISR platforms to connect the collector (in most cases the soldier
on the ground himself as the sensor) with the control element higher up in the intelligence
apparatus through encrypted communication systems,delivering real time information so as to
assist in targeting.But this is not the case in asymmetrical warfare or low-intensity conflicts in
urban areas.Here it might take days for the information to reach the higher echelons.The
collector has no or very less direct contact with the control elements in the intelligence
apparatus.He has to be in the field for days working with the sources independently.Hence he
should have tenacity,ability to weigh risks,ability to survive against all odds and much more
important ability to avoid surveillance.
Effective HUMINT collectors have certain personal skills that are well-developed. These
individuals have adequate education in regards to being able to extract actionable intelligence. In
order to create rapport and trust with the source, an experienced collector has patience, is alert,
credible, objective, has self-control, adaptable, perseveres, has initiative, and proper demeanor.
When a collector attempts to extract information he does so with the understanding that he has
certain requirements to answer. One of the first things a source looks at is the collector’s
appearance. Ensuring that the collector has a professional demeanor is very important. This
would directly affect the way the source interacts with the collector. If the collector appears very
professional and prompt, this portrays control and power. Other types of attire may come across
to the source as nonchalant and therefore uncaring of the information they may provide. After the
initial meet, there are a variety of personality types that the collector must be familiar with and
be able to exploit for the most information possible. In order to do this, the collector must be
adaptable and alert. The source may provide certain physical or auditoryqueues that would allow
the collector to change his tactics. He may change the type of questioning from indirect to direct
or try a different method all together. There may be frustrating or uncomfortable situations or
comments that would arise during intelligence collection, but the collector must keep composure
and self-control. H must not let the source obtain the power and control over the conversations;
after all, the collector’s job is to obtain answers for his requirements, not to become emotional.
In order to be most effective, a collector may at times, attempt to provide compensation for
information. Being credible and objective allows for trust to develop between the source and
collector. Once trust is established, it becomes easier to extract information and the source may
be more willing to provide additional information. Establishing trust is difficult, but saves time,
energy, and cost in the long run. All these situations may only be done if the collector is alert and
perseveres. Skills of an experienced HUMINT collector may be learned and developed. Many
Soldiers can value and be effective sensors with appropriate education and training. The art of
intelligence collection is dynamic, so having a variety of solders and commanders acting as
intelligence collectors would help directly on the battlefield. Soldiers would not only be
empowered to protect themselves with equipment and weapons, but be empoweredto protect the
unit in their minds- one of the greatest assets to the unit.
Although there are many imperceptible qualities in the definition of a “good” HUMINT
collector, certain character traits are invaluable:
Alertness. The HUMINT collector must be alert on several levels while conducting
HUMINT collection. He must focus on the information being provided by the source and be
constantly evaluating the information for both value and veracity based on collection
requirements, current known information, and other information obtained from the source.
Simultaneously, he must be attentive to not only what the source says but also to how it is
said and the accompanying body language to assess the source’s truthfulness, cooperation,
and current mood. He needs to know when to allow the source to rest and when to press the
source harder. His safety and the safety of his source must also be in his constant thoughts.
Patience and Tact. The HUMINT collector must have patience and tact in creating and
maintaining rapport between him and the source as this would greatly improve the chances of
success during questioning. Displaying impatience may harden the resolve of a difficult
source to remain unresponsive for a little longer sensing that the HUMINT collector may
stop questioning. The lack of tact may cause the source to lose respect for the HUMINT
collector hence affecting the process negatively.
Credibility. The HUMINT collector must present a clear and professional image and exude
confidence in his capabilities. He must be able to articulate complex situations and concepts.
The HUMINT collector must also maintain credibility with his source. He must present
himself in a believable and consistent manner, and follow through on any promises made as
well as never to promise what cannot be delivered.
Objectivity and Self-control. The HUMINT collector must also be totally objective in
evaluating the information obtained. Without objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the
information acquired and may also be unable to vary his questioning techniques effectively.
He must not lose the initiative during questioning by displaying anger,irritation,sympathy or
weariness. His self-control must also allow him to fake any of these emotions as necessary.
Adaptability. A HUMINT collector must adapt to the many and varied personalities he will
encounter. He must also acclimatise to all types of locations, operational rhythms and
environments.He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being so flexible,
he can smoothly vary his questioning techniques according to the operational environment
and the personality of the source.
Perseverance. A tenacity of purpose can be the difference between a HUMINT collector
who is merely good and one who is superior. A HUMINT collector who becomes easily
discouraged by opposition, non-cooperation, or other difficulties will not aggressively pursue
the objective to a successful conclusion or exploit leads to other valuable information.
Appearance and Demeanor. The HUMINT collector's personal appearance may greatly
influence the conduct of any HUMINT collection operation and attitude of the source toward
the HUMINT collector. Usually an organized and professional appearance will favourably
influence the source. If the HUMINT collector's manner reflects fairness, strength and
efficiency, the source may prove more cooperative and more receptive to questioning.
Initiative. Achieving and maintaining the advantage are essential to a successful questioning
session just as the offensive is the key to success in combat operations. The HUMINT
collector must grasp the initiative and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. He does
not have to dominate the source physically; but knows his requirements and take the lead that
would make him achieve his target.
REQUIRED AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE. The HUMINT collector must be knowledgeable in
a variety of areas in order to question sources effectively. The collector must prepare himself for
operations in a particular theatre or area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR) by conducting
research.
The G2 can be a valuable source of information for this preparatory research. The HUMINT
collector should consult with order of battle (OB) technicians and analysts and collect
information from open sources and from the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET)
to enhance his knowledge of the AOIR.
Some of these areas of required knowledge are
The area of operations (AO) including the social, political, and economic institutions. The
geography, history, language and culture of the target area must be given serious
consideration. Collectors must be aware of all ethnic, social, religious, political, criminal,
tribal, and economic groups and the interrelationships between these groups.
All current and potential threat forces within the AOIR. Information of the insurgents’
organization,motivation, technical capabilities, limitations and normal operational
methodology would be of great advantage. HUMINT collectors must abide by the applicable
laws, including the Geneva Conventions where applicable, and relevant international law.
Additionally, local agreements and the applicable execute orders and rules of engagement
(ROE) may further restrict HUMINT collection activities. However, these documents do not
allow interrogation actions that would be illegal applicable laws.
The collection requirements, including all specific information requirements (SIRs) and
indicators that will lead to the answering of the intelligence requirements.
Cultural awareness in the various AOs will have different social and regional
considerations that affect communications and can affect the conduct of operations. These
may include social taboos, customs, and courtesies. The staff must include this information in
pre-deployment training at all levels to ensure that personnel are properly equipped to
interact with the local populace.
Understanding basic human behaviour. A HUMINT collector can relate better to the
source’s personality and reactions when he understands basic behavioural factors, traits,
attitudes, motivations and inhibitions.
Neurolinguistics. Neurolinguistics is a behavioural communication model and a set of
procedures that improve communication skills. The HUMINT collector must be in tune
with the specific neurolinguistic clues of the cultural framework in which he is operating.
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
HUMINT collection capabilities include the ability to:
Collect information and cross-reference from an almost endless variety of potential sources
including friendly forces, civilians, detainees, and source-related documents.
Focus on the collection of detailed information not available by other means. It also includes
building interiors and facilities that cannot be collected on by other means due to restrictive
terrain.
Corroborate or refute information collected from other R&S assets.
Operate with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational environments in support of
offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction operations, or civil support operations.
Based on solid planning and preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of manoeuvre elements.
HUMINT collection limitations include
Interpersonal abilities. HUMINT is dependent on the subjective interpersonal capabilities of
the individual rather than on the abilities to operate collection equipment
Requirements set out before the HUMINT operation starts are used as drivers for identifying
sources who have access to the pertinent information.There are a multitude of sources but
locating these knowledgable sources and proper identification is required so that they have
the required information. .
Limited numbers. There are never enough HUMINT collectors to meet all requirements.
Limited assets must be placed in order of importance in support of units and operations based
on their criticality.
Time limitations. Time is a factor affecting HUMINT collector operations especially Source
Operations as much more time is required to form a solid reliable source base.The
requirement listed out at the beginning of the HUMINT operation should allow sufficient
time for collection.
Language limitations. Although HUMINT collectors can normally use an interpreter, the lack
of language proficiency by the collector can significantly slow collection efforts. Time is
required to develop the proficiency.
HUMINT collectors are sometimes assigned taskings meant for the military police,
counterintelligence unit or any other speciality.This is usually due to a misunderstanding of
the HUMINT mission.
Timely reporting and immediate access to sources. Except in tactical situations when
HUMINT collectors are deployed in direct support of maneuver units, HUMINT collection
and reporting require a lot of time. In military operations, sources need to be assessed and
developed. Once a suitable partnership has been established with the sources, they need to
remain in contact with the HUMINT collector. This takes time and a lot of coordination.
Sometimes the terrain may be an obstacle, i.e. urban areas, mountains and deserts, as these are
places where the insurgents and other opponents take cover. The terrain can also wreak havoc on
sophisticated technical intelligence equipment and the weather also plays its part in sabotaging
the equipment.
The human factor is also another obstacle. Intelligence units should pay attention to the support
of the local population. Without support of the local population, actionable intelligence will be
difficult if not impossible to get.
Language is another form of obstacle especially in joint operations. Use of a common
languagefor communication would reduce the obstacle. In addition, understanding between
interrogators and interrogated persons is very important, where trustworthy, and well-educated
interpreters are used.
HUMINT TACTICAL
QUESTIONING, DEBRIEFING, INTERROGATION
HUMINT is considered the backbone for any intelligence operation .The information flowing
circuit is the large amount of live people who are part of the network. Within intelligence, there
is no possibility of substitute for the human interface. The net of FIS cannot be breached unless
there is presence of intelligence personnel with soft skills.
Collecting HUMINT
The screening of human sources is the first step of the HUMINT collection. This process
includes conducting interviews that would be cross-indexed as well as recorded on an essential
basis. Small bits of information can state different meaning in the HUMINT context which is
why it is required that the interview should be planned carefully and intelligence collection
discipline is observed. This planning is also essential when the interrogator is not part of the
same culture of the respondent and does not speak the same language.
Recruiting Special Reconnaissance Patrolling
Special reconnaissance is carried out by uniformed individuals who are required to observe the
activities of the enemies beyond the border lines of their own country or beyond the area of
o0perations deep into enemy territory, sometimes 100s of miles deep. These soldiers are part of
the HUMINT organization and are trained specialists who communicate clandestinely to
headquarters.. In a systematic manner, they are debriefed on a constant basis by the HUMINT
officers present within the organization. These officers are very much familiar with the
techniques for information collection. Within the special reconnaissance organization, there
would be some information which is extremely vital and sensitive and is held on a need to know
basis. These operations are carried out 100s of kilometres deep and could be further than the
furthest forward friendly scouting and surveillance units. Several ways may be used to enter the
operation area and their mission is to avoid direct combat. Their entry plan usually includes
collection of information, observations, reporting or directing the team to carry out the artillery
or air attacks upon the enemies. Even if they are engaged in directions, they try their best to
remain covert. The enemy is likely to know that they would be attacked but who is actually
helping conduct this attack must be unknown.
Basic Differentiation by Subject Type
To extract vital information, the method of torture seems to be the first option. However, there
exists a certain level of disagreement upon this activity and it is required that it should be
disposed. It is possible that mental of physical torture would help extract information, but this
information may not be true and could be misleading. There are legal and a moral issue also
related to the process and is not considered as the practical solution to all situations.
Information is shared by different subjects in different circumstances in a voluntary or
involuntary manner. It is essential that a relationship based on trust, friendship, fear or any
human emotion must be built between the interrogating personnel and the person being
questioned. The state of mind of the respondent must be understood and the correct method
should be applied accordingly. A tough guy attitude may arise from the respondent if simple
torture is carried out. Members of some organizations are told that the other party always uses
torture to extract information. If this is the case, the fear must be managed well. It was due to
this reason that the Japanese prisoners in WWII were eager to commit suicide when captured.
Screening
The HUMINT assets deployed to conduct source operations are always
exceeded by the number of available prospective sources and documents.
Hence screening is of utmost importance and an absolute necessity to
determine the right sources who will offer the right information and in another
scenario are not enemy agents themselves. Efficient usage of limited
HUMINT resources thus becomes feasible.
HUMAN SOURCE SCREENING
Screening is of two types.Human source screening and document screening.In Human source
screening it is determined whether the source truly has prioritized information
needed by the Commander , meaning whether he does have the required
placement and access to the information.A predetermined source-profile is
often laid down after ascertaining the intelligence requirements.Screening
attempts to locate sources who match this source-profile.Screening also
determines whether he has any information useful to any other agency , such
as the CI unit and hence is referred to the unit by the HUMINT operative (this
is the case in tactical HUMINT units and mobile interrogation teams , which
besides being composed of HUMINT assets have a 2-3 CI member team
included).It should be remembered that already HUMINT resources are
insufficient , and hence a balance should be maintained between employing
them for screening and those that conduct interrogation,debriefing and other
HUMINT operations. Screening is an integral part to all HUMINT
collection operations. While questioning an individual source, a HUMINT
collector may switch between screening (finding out general source areas
of knowledge) to interrogation, debriefing, or elicitation (finding out
detailed information about a specific topic). Screening is not an information
collection technique,it is the evaluation of prospective HUMINT sources but it
is very necessary for the collection operations to succeed as it targets those
sources who can be exploited best by the HUMNINT agents to extract the
prioritized information requirements as per the HUMINT mission or higher
headquarters needs.Hence screening should be conducted by personnel who
are totally knowledgable of all HUMINT collection operations , the
intelligence requirements as laid down by the collection manager and who are
sufficiently matured and experienced to study the source and make well
reasoned judgement based on limited information.Yes,to optimize HUMINT
assets deployment collection (interrogation,debriefing,elicitation) can be
integrated with the screening process but then this slows down the overall
tempo of the HUMINT mission.
The purpose of screening is to
• Identify those select individuals among the target audience who have information of potential
value and who are willing or can be persuaded to cooperate.
Identify individuals who match certain criteria that indicate them as being potential subjects
for source operations or matching the profile for collection by special interest groups such as
TECHINT or CI.
During screening certain preliminary criteria are kept into consideration
which are indicators of a source possessing potential information of use to
the Commander.These criteria include rank , position , gender , appearance
and location. Criteria such as occupation may require questioning.Others
may be determined simply by observation.
Screening is of prime importance,in fact the most difficult HUMINT task.Only if screening is
done properly can HUMINT assets deployed be put to the most efficient use,otherwise
time,effort and HUMINT expertise wasted and tactical or mission objectives not
attained.HUMINT assets are frequently very few in number compared to the enormous quantity
of detainees during an ongoing operation.There can be no room for wastage of these assets or
working on wrong/useless information extracted from a poorly screened source.Screening places
in the hands of the HUMINT operatives the right sources with the right placement and access to
information required.If screening is done incorrectly or without focus , say without the exact
collection requirements in mind then what results is a mix of sources with little or absolutely no
information.As such screening is of prime importance and requires very trained personnel.They
should have long experience,should be aware of local cultures and norms,should be able to
understand the psyche of the source,have good assimilation,analytical and questioning skills
language capability,and the ability to understand perfectly collection requirements , break them
down into all possible indicators and look for source-profiles who can give information relating
to these indicators.The screener should also be able to examine the source carefully and
determine if he has any information of use to other intelligence disciplines.
One very important point to be noted here is that screening may have to be executed in a very
short span of time , say at the front or near the front during combat operations and where the
detained personnel need to be examined very fast for actionable intelligence.Before the
HUMINT/CI operatives do that the screener should rapidly segregate and process the
detainees.Thus he should be highly skilled in screening.Yes screening and other HUMINT
operations like interrogation can be switched to and fro on the same detained personnel group to
save time.
SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
As mentioned before screening should be driven by collection requirements.
Just like any other HUMINT operation is driven by intelligence
requirements. The collection requirements should be very clearly understood
by the screener. They should not be vague , but explicitly clear. If not then
the screener must extend his faculties and imagination to create indicators
from these vague requirements (IR,SIR).Screening is relating the
knowledgibility brief of the source with the information requirements and
ascertaining how close does it match the latter.
Usually the intelligence officer breaks down the PIRs into SIRs and looks
for indicators.If not done yet the screener should be adept in determining the
indicators corresponding to the SIRs and these indicators must reflect the
anticipated source-profile to identify EPWs and detainees who might possess
information pertinent to these indicators. The source must be presented with
an enquiry which should be more elaborate or else good selection of sources
isn’t possible as the HUMINT operative cannot gauge the knowledge of the
source with regard to the intelligence requirement at hand.For example
asking the source ‘’Are you aware of any camps of te insurgents in your
area’’ wont be of much help—its vague.The source might not know anything
at all of the existence of insurgent camps in his area.But he might very well
know that certain elements of dubious nature carrying arms frequently go
south towards the remote jungle area,strangers visit his village occasionally
and rent homes for few days etc.Hence the HUMINT operative must frame
his questions(SIRs).These indicators must relate to source
personality,characteristics and types. For example, a refugee probably will
not know if the threat intends to defend a particular ridgeline. However, he
might know whether or not there are threat forces on the ridge, if an
improvised explosive device (lED) is being employed on a route, if they are
digging in, or if engineer type equipment is in the area.
• Area Conducive to Screening Operations. Effective screening operations must allow the
HUMINT collector to speak to the source where the source is not exposed to outside influences
or dangers that may inhibit his responses. For that reason, sources should never be screened
within the sight or hearing of other potential sources.
• HUMINT collectors can use rooms within a building, tents, or other field-expedient
methods to isolate the individual being screened. Screening a source within view or
hearing of other potential sources may not only pose a danger to the source but also will
tend to inhibit the source from freely cooperating.
• Security. The personnel conducting the screening need to be able to
concentrate on the individual being screened. Although the collector is
ultimately responsible for his own personal security, screening is
facilitated by having dedicated personnel present (for example, MPs)
who are responsible for security. Screeners coordinate with MP or
other security personnel concerning their role in the screening process.
SCREENING OPERATIONS In screening operations the target is usually the permanent and
transitory population in the AO such as refugees,locals,EPWs and other detainees.
SCREENING OF SOURCES TO DETERMINE USABILITY
Determination must be made as to whether the source is of any intelligence value to the
HUMINT collector. The TACHUMINT team will place the sources under
the scanner to determine their usefulness. The HUMINT collector will
basically place the source within one of four categories.
Persons who have information of immediate intelligence interest.They are interrogated or
debriefed as the case may be on the spot.The mobile interrogation teams come in handy
at this juncture.
Persons who may be of interest to other intelligence disciplines.For example the source
may have information of TECHINT value.In that case the HUMINT collector can take
the services of a technical savvy operative to interrogate or debrief the source.Again
HUMINT collectors are presented with the ‘’profile of interest’’ by CI agents.If the
source matches these requirements the HUMINT collector first extracts all what he can
relevant to his domain and then transfers the source to the CI team for questioning.All
this is coordinated by the OMT.
Persons who may provide good intelligence in the future by virtue of their placement and
access to the enemy intelligence services or organization.The HUMINT collector after
careful assessment comes to the conclusion that this individual has the potential to be a
good source.As such his name is entered in the database in the folder of potential sources.
Persons who can provide no information of any intelligence value.
Screening is of the following types:
Tactical Screening
Checkpoint Screening
Local population screening
Collection facility screening
Local employee screening
Refugee
EPWs
Other detainees.
Tactical Screening. Tactical screening is conducted during combat or contingency
operations.The prime requirement is to extract information of immediate tactical value
expeditiously without going into elaborate approach techniques and quickly evacuate to a secure
area,Time is of essence during operations,particularly in forward areas.There is no time to plan
approaches or how to frame questions,Approach techniques may be used but only those that is
allowed in the limited time,especially in forward areas where situation is very fluid during
tactical operations.What is required here to elicit co-operation quickly.The
EPW,refugees,detainees at the point of capture or the local civilians apprehended during a rapid
cordon/search operation – these people are screened for priority tactical information ,the
HUMINT collector passes on that information to the Commander and then after the HUMINT
collector ascertains that the detainee has more information of tactical value he is evacuated to a
secure area where with recommendation to the Commander that the detainee may be detained
further for additional questioning , say information suitable for counterintelligence,hence he
may be interrogated by the CI team—whatever the case may be.All screening persons evacuated
to secure areas belonging to higher echelons for further detailed questioning must be
accompanied with all information extracted on proper formatted information sheets.
• Checkpoint Screening. People entering the AO or exiting the AO often do in large
numbers.Then there are refugees, enemy personnel masquerading as normal
local civilians,other hostile elements in seemingly simple attire and concealed
weapons—the Checkpoints set up in the AO assist in screening these people
during transit through the AO.This can either be static or mobile.In static
screening the checkpost is stationary.In mobile screening the security personnel
move around in vehicles intercepting the people in transit in and out of the AO
and the AOI.Refugees who are entering from areas ahead of AOI/AO must be
given particular attention than detainees.These refugees know the area very well
and may co-operate more easily giving sound information of tactical value..
• Local Population Screening. Before deployment of the force to a totally new area
HUMINT teams are the first to arrive.They encounter the local population and
instantly seize the opportunity to conduct tactical questioning if the locals exhibit
cooperation/interest in giving information which is in their PIR list.
• Local· Employee Screening.. This is very important. Whether be it peacetime or
during operations in AO/AOI.There are local hires or employees who may be
security risks or may give information of value. These persons should be
periodically screened by HUMINT personnel in conjunction with CI assets .
FOR CI REQUIREMENTS
The HUMINT elements in the TACHUMINT team liaise with the CI elements so as to
know their requirements before conducting screening.This profile of interest is of two
types.Persons of the enemy’s intelligence service conducting collection operations fall in
the first category.Persons who can provide details (identifications,locations or
activities)about the persons in the first category constitute the second profile of
interest.Generally CI operatives are interested in persons who :
• Have no identification documents.
• Have excessive or modified identification documents.
• Possess unexplainable large amounts of cash or valuables.
• Are illegal border-crossers.
• Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
• Are on the CI personalities list, which includes members of an intelligence service.
• Request to see CI personnel.
• Have family in the denied area.
• Speak a different language or dialect than is spoken in the area.
Segregation: Screening operations should focus on EPWs and other detainees/refugees
separately.To this end all persons should be segregated so as to be screened in two separate
locations—one reserved only for EPWs and the other for refugees and local detainees.Further
while segregating EPWs enlisted personnel must be kept separately from officers.Moreover
NCOs must be separated from lower enlisted personnel.Segregation assists in rapid screening
and tactical questioning I is executed well.Keeping officers away prevents them from influencing
enlisted personnel so as not to give in during questioning.Refugees should be treated humanely
and not out rightly detained unless sufficient reasons exist that indicate they can be an
intelligence or security threat,in which case they will be treated as detainees.They will be
accorded privileges as per Geneva norms.
SCREENING AT FORWARD LOCATIONS
6-10. Its very important that areas s far forward as operationally possible
should be given priority in screening operations by qualified HUMINT
collectors.These areas should be selected for the initial questioning and
screening process.At this point the civilian or military detainee should be
initially questioned as to his name,rank,unit,job type,why he is here,if in
uniform the insignia and papers,IDs or any other documentation with him—
all these will go into preparing an initial source file which can be handed
over to the interrogation team and also preclude duplication later.At these
areas no personnel other than qualified HUMINT collectors should conduct
initial questioning as HUMINT collectors are fully aware of the intelligence
requirements.
IMPORTANT: It is very important to properly process and identify the
captives and their equipment such as weapons and documents or other
material having intelligence value.Biographic data unique to the individual are
recorded in a tag which may include name,rank,insignia,unit,mission,location
of capture , service/serial number etc.Any items seized from them including
documents are also tagged and bagged.These are then handed over for further
exploitation.Evacuation of the captive and these tagged items must be done
separately and under no circumstances the captive should be removed with the
items on his person.
SCREENING AT REFUGEE CAMPS OR DETENTION FACILITIES
Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations
Further screening is conducted after the detainee is brought to the internment facility.This
screening is much more intyensive.The Military police have an important function here.That of
classifying and separating them as EPWs,refugees,retained civilians,protected
persons,EPWs,rrefugees,retained civilians,protected persons etc.EPWs should have the following
characteristics to be labeled thus:
1.Bearing rank,insignia or any distinctive symbol
2.There is evidence that he belongs to a unit commanded by a senior officer
3.At the time of capture he was engaged in any operation as per rules of war
4.Was armed and was carrying it openly.
Protected persons are people of the local community for example who perceive threat from
theenemy forces on account of their affiliation with the friendly forces.
The term “detainee” may also refer to enemy combatants. In general,an enemy combatant is a
person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed
conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful
enemy combatants.”
Every detainee,EPW ,civilian internee and protected person is assigned a serial number for
identification purposes.A tag is prepared,capture tag containing at the minimum information
about the detainees unit,where exactly he was captured,under what circumstances he was taken
in.Any documents with him must be examined to ascertain his identity,unit,mission and any
other background information like family,affiliations,experience,expertise/speciality or
education.The interrogators can frame approach techniques in later part of questioning with this
knowledge and also choose the appropriate source for questioning on a related topic.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
MPs can assist the intelligence personnel in several ways.They are the ones who are in close contact
with the detainees so they can observe behavior of the latter,overhear conversations or when one is
being questioned thery can observe the reactions of the others who are placed separately from the
individual being interrogated.All these observations they can convey to the intelligence personnel.Any
search on the person of the detainee are conducted only by MPs and out of sight of the other
detainees.The MPs assist MI screeners by identifying captives who may have answers that support
PIR and IR.
SCREENING FOR OTHER TECHNICAL COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Other technical areas such as TECHINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, or other services need to supply the
HUMINT collectors with a profile of the individuals with whom they wish to speak. The HUMINT
collectors upon identifying such an individual will contact the requesting agency after extracting PIR
Information.
SCREENING PROCESS The initial screening at the internment facility depends on whether urgent
information is inherent in the intelligence requirement (in which case he is questioned immediately)or
whether identification is required for future questioning. The objective in screening is to identify the
detainee, his mission, his background,affiliations,personal history, documents carried with him (to ascertain
all what has just been said and maybe more),to determine level of cooperation which can be expected of
him, and vulnerability to select approach techniques to be adopted by interrogators later.Therafter he is
passed on to the questioners with all information in a specified written format along with the detainee serial
number and capture tag.If the source is very cooperative the screener exploits the information fully and
compiles a report.If the source is highly knowledgable with regard to intelligence requirements then the
officer in charge of the interrogation facility is informed who will determine whether the screener should
continue questioning the source(if he is well acquasinted with the technicalities inherent in the disclosures
by the source,say he understands the information being offered) or whether the source be passed on to a
more qualified HUMINT operative for questioning.
The source is assigned a screening code as follows:
Cooperation level:
A—Responds very well to questioning
B---Responds hesitatingly to questioning
C—No response at all to questioning
Knowledgeability level—
1—Possess extensive knowledge in keeping with the priority intelligence
requirements.Highly likely he will be able to answer them.
2—There is likelihood of him to be able to answer IRs
3—Does not appear to have any information.
SCREENING METHODOLOGIES
6-28. A HUMINT agent cabn assume roles of screener and tactical questioner
alternatively during the process of initial screening.While accompanying a patrol and
meeting a source or a detainee,he may first screen the source by asking some general
questions to assess his cooperation and knowledgability levels and if it deems fit he may
switch over to debriefing the individual in matters related to PIRs.After this is over he
again screens the individual with the intent to know his knowledgability in other areas of
interest,say the IRs.If he feels the source has information of tactical value to
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
counterintelligence personnel he refers the source to the latter.If he finds the source has
information but is too technical he may refer him to a technical expert.He may have to
take the assistance of a linguist if the source can only speak in a dialect not known to
him.Usually the detainees/sources are prioritized and listed so that they are questioned by
a separate HUMINT team on specific topics.If the HUMINT collector cum screener finds
in initial screening that the individual has no information of tactical value or his
cooperation level is very low and the time in hand is also very less,the individual is no
longer debriefed.So we see that screening can take separately but also it can be integrated
with HUMINT collection operations depending on:Knowledgability and cooperation
levels and the timeframe.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
INITIAL DATA AND OBSERVATIONS :The screener may have to make a rapid ‘’prescreen’’ in order
to filter out the individuals who have no information.This prescreening is necessitated by the fact that
sometimes screeners encounter a big number of detainees/sources and time in hand is not sufficient.In such
cases prescreening is done based on visual and other aids.He can make a quick mental profiling of the
source by studying his behavior and things on his person and his appearance.Uniforms and their
condition,rank,insignia,medals,documents,dialect,business suits or traditional attire etc can all provide
indications of the echelon to which he belongs,his knowledgability level,the area from where he is
coming.His behavior can be good pointers.If he is trying his best to mingle in the crowd,avoiding eye
contact,trying to stay in the middle of the line or center of the group,intentionally switching over to a wrong
segregation group,exhibits anxiety,perspiring,stammering when questioned—all this indicates he may have
information of value.
Method of Screening
1. Screening it to be defined and the interrogation operations role is explained
2. Leads for EPW/detainees to be identified through lead development specifically for those who
retain pertinent tactical information.
3. The screening operations role carried out by personnel must be provided with a brief holding area
4. The EPW/detainee knowledge should be assessed by identifying, extracting, using relevant and
present information.
5. The assessment of the EPW/detainee knowledge to be carried out by the question holding area
personnel.
6. If enough time is available, the EPW/detainees must be observed for personal appearance as well as
the demonstrated behaviour.
7. The EPW/detainees personal data is to be obtained, confirmed and corrected by asking questions.
8. The EPW/detainees must be motivated to answer the pertinent questions and for this purpose the
questions must be formed appropriately for screening.
9. Confirmation of the initial EPW/detainees knowledge must be assessed which is why the screening
questions are to be asked accordingly.
10. The screening report information of EPW/detainees must be recorded
11. The EPW/detainee screening category must be assigned appropriately.
Prisoners or free subjects can be subjected to screening. Free subjects are those who can be known and
identified. If the subject is a random prisoner then real skills are required. Particular details of the subject are
to be analyzed by the screener even though he may not be the main interrogator.
1. The information regarding sources of capture which includes the how, when, where, whom and so
on is provided by the Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) captive tag.
2. Rank insignia.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
3. Map sections, letters, identification cards etc are the documents captured with the source or any
other documents which could provide vital information regarding the source, his mission,
organization, family background, race, knowledge etc.
4. Equipment and uniforms
5. The source behaviour demonstration
6. Information related to foreign material as well as foreign material
7. Signs of nervousness, fear or anxiety
8. The kind of behaviour exhibited by the subject
9. The requests that have been made by the subject
10. How the subject responds to order and his behaviour
11. The intentional joining with the wrong segregation group
12. The screeners must note any behaviour or appearance that he is willing to talk or is attempting to
talk to the guards.
Debriefing and interrogation are the two basic types of interviews identified.
Debriefing
Especially on a military mission, when questioning is carried out to extract information or gather
intelligence, it is known as debriefing. The process includes conducting controversial sessions which are
conducted to share and examine information after a specific event occurs. Several purposes are served by
debriefing and this entirely depends on the situation. Individuals from the interviewers’ organization are
tasked or then non-asked individuals may also be willing to undergo the process of debriefing. These people
are subjected to the rules and regulations formed by the HUMINT organization if the interaction takes place
over the electronic mediums or are face to face.
Complex information is shared using extensive and formal methods but the tasked personnel make use of the
SALUTE method to share the brief reports. Before the interview takes place, it is essential that the collector
has all vital information regarding his personality as well as his motivation. The source would be much more
comfortable and cooperative if his surroundings and interview environment is customary to his requirements
and beliefs. During the debrief process, these are tangible and discreet product which may arise. When the
subjects are willing to contribute, the best general approach would be carry out planned elicitation of
information maintaining specific objectives and goals. Based on shared interests, the rapport which exists
between the source and elicitor would be recognized as the key to elicitation. During the initial stages, it is
observed that the collector limits his discussion of elicitation to harmless topics like sports or social aspects.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
The focused topic would be started by the HUMINT specialist when the collection environment, source
value and security consciousness of the subject is in the appropriate position.
Interrogation
When the process of interrogation is compared to debriefing, it is observed that the process does not require
cooperation during the extraction of information by the organization members. The subject is held in
custody and under legal rules and regulations it is possible that the uncooperative subject would leave.
The POWs is an example of the subjects who may be interrogated along with a thief who may be arrested by
the civilian police or the individual detained by the patrol for not being part of the area. Having rapport with
the subject is essential during interrogation as it is a skilled technique. Subject matter experts or linguists
may help with the interrogation process but it is required that the interrogator contains all necessary trained
qualities. An initiative must be set even if the interview is voluntary or involuntary. Harsh activities may be
followed to maintain and bring forward this initiative. Keeping the subjects; cultural aspects in mind, the
interrogators are required to be formally polite in order to be successful. If the respondents’ society
maintains a strong host-guest tradition, the interrogator would play the role of a host who carries out a polite
conversation.
The entire process of information collection is the HUMINT collection technique and not considered as an
analysis. After the interview has been conducted, the interrogator would analyze the data, cross check the
statements against the name indices and then form social network wiring diagrams. The information seen,
heard or assumed by the sources must be compared by the interrogator with his own notes to make sure
there is consistency.
Planning Initial Interview
A basic plan must be developed for the interview even though there would be a change of attitude of the
subject or needs in the service of the interviewer when the actual technique takes place. The documents
associated with the subject and the basic plan for the interview must be placed together in a folder. It could
also be sent out to the HUMINT database for other cultural and language specialists, interrogators and
analysts to review.
With the help of reviews it is possible to enhance the present review along with present new ideas for
interrogators to carry out other interviews.
Elements which must be collected are the following
1. HUMINT collection requirements which are urgent
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
2. The EPW/detainee serial number who is to be analyzed
3. The questioning time and location
4. The alternate and primary approaches
5. Topics to be a part of the questioning plan and the planned sequence of these identified topics
6. Unfamiliar and highly technical topics to be considered and questions to be prepared
7. Support of the linguist if required
8. Technical or general interrogators included if required
9. The recording and reporting method must be attained.
Intelligence is not extracted from the preliminary interview. It is only conducted so that the interrogator
gains insight upon the type and character of the individual being assessed. Strong judgment needs to be
carried out upon the dominance symbol and psychological pressures being used. The interviewing
techniques must be such that they do not threaten or make the subject uncomfortable. For instance, two
interrogators are seated on another table far across the room and when the subject enters he would be at a
distance from these individuals. He would walk across the room and take his seat during which the device
would observe his manner and poise. However, this activity could unsettle the subject. This technique is
considered pressure oriented and the interrogators are found to sit with their back towards the light so it
could obscure their faces, hide their expressions and make the prisoner uncomfortable. An uncomfortable
chair, with wobbly legs or shortened from legs so he slides off, for the prisoner could also further strain the
environment.
At times, using an opposite technique could also prove to be beneficial. The prisoner may drop his guards
after he is made comfortable and given a hearty beer. This would actually occur due to drowsiness.
A psychological effect would be created upon the source due to the location of the questioning during a
military source operation. The HUMINT collector must decide upon his planned techniques, activities and
the impression he needs to project and the questioning location should correspond to this decision. For
instance, meeting in a restaurant where the atmosphere is relaxed may ease the source as well.
It is formal in nature to meet in an office space but informal to meet in an apartment. A psychological
advantage is provided to the source when the meeting is held at his home. The HUMINT collector is given
the edge when the meeting is at the work area of this individual. The level and status of the source, security,
workspace availability, lighting availability, furnishings, heating or cooling of the room must all be
considered by the HUMINT.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Characteristics of Interrogator(s)
Interrogators before conducting the interaction activity must consider their own strengths, weaknesses and
style. They must first assess themselves then move on to understanding the attitude of the subject. He must
understand if there is requirement of a specialist, cultural advisors or linguists.
The physical conditions of the source as well as himself must be considered by the HUMINT collector. A
certain limit is present for the HUMINT collector or the source to concentrate upon a subject which is why
this limit must be understood after the extended operation is conducted.
Support Needs
Incentives may play a vital role in the extraction of information. If it is believed that they would help with
the situation, the interrogator must analyze what the incentives must be and how they could be attained. The
incentives promised earlier must be delivered. If the delivery is not carried out it is required that the issue
must be covered and make sure it does not interfere with the rest of the interrogations.
Additional support in terms of interpreters, technicians and analytics may be required by the HUMINT
collector. Varying levels of trust are present for the intelligence services in the polygraph device. It is
considered as controversial but at times the HUMINT collector may need its help. It is possible that the fear
of the unknown would help elicit the responses much easily than by the measurement of the device. The
interrogators may have anecdotal accounts where they collect and put together random equipment pieces and
tell the respondent that it is a lie detector. This would help break the resistance. Also, trained individuals
from the Behavioural Science Consultant (BSC) could also be appointed. They would be able to conduct a
psychological assessment of the character, personality, social interaction and behaviours of respondents and
eventually advise the HUMINT collectors on how to further carry out the process.
Attitudes of Subject
The approach of the interview will be based upon the attitude of the subject. The tentative technique must be
selected keeping in mind 4 primary factors.
1. The physical or mental state of the source should be observed if he is crying, angry, arrogant,
frightened or cocky.
2. The background of the source should be considered which includes the age, military level, civil
experience, religious, ethnic or cultural factors.
3. The HUMINT collection objective which includes the amount of value the information of the
source holds and if it is beneficial to convince the source to provide the information.
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4. The Attributes of the HUMINT collector which include his skills, abilities and experiences. The
weaknesses must also be considered which could hinder with the information collection. Any social
or ethnic barriers present or the personality adoption to adapt to the personality of the source should
be taken into account.
Cooperative and Friendly
A source that is cooperative and friendly would show less or no resistance towards the interrogation being
conducted. He would participate in all topics being discussed apart from the ones that would personally
degrade or incriminate him.
From these cooperative and friendly sources, information can be extracted to the maximum level by
enhancing the interrogation environment and making it peaceful and friendly. The private affairs of the
subject must not be mentioned by the interrogator. However, over friendliness and loss of control of the
interrogation must also be avoided [10]. The customs and traditions of the sources culture should be
understood through expert advice by the interrogator. Inquiring about the individuals’ family, health etc may
be considered polite in some cultures but this activity is not carried out by the Americans during their
interrogation. The cooperative subject may turn into a silent one if his cultural norms and traditions are not
observed.
Neutral and Nonpartisan
To a limited extent, cooperation is observed from a nonpartisan and neutral source. He may not volunteer
information but would answer questions that have been asked directly. At times, he may be afraid of reprisal
by the enemy which is why he may not answer. Such an aspect is observed in low-intensity conflict (LIC) as
people are afraid of the insurgent reprisals. To obtain information from a neutral and nonpartisan source, the
interrogator is required to ask various questions.
Hostile and Antagonistic
Interrogation is most difficult with subjects who are arrogant and hostile. A real challenge is presented to the
interrogator as he refuses to talk. Patience, self control and tact is extremely necessary on the part of the
interrogator when such a subject is present.
Such subjects must be passed on to the senior interrogators when the juniors have already carried out their
limited interview. The senior would be able to use this information and understand why the subject is being
hostile and unsupportive.
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For a reluctant subject, the intelligence interrogation must be broken down like riding a horse. However, it
should not be like smashing a golden egg.
Each interrogation has its own attributes and characteristics. No two interrogations are the same. They must
be tailored to the needs and requirements of the subject. The following 4 parts have been determined as the
standard lines of procedure.
1. Detention and arrest
2. Preliminary interview and questioning
3. Intensive examinations
4. Exploitation.
The combination of the first three steps is called the softening up process where there is no torture present. If
a cover story is being presented, it would be broken down through softening up. If the subjects are referred
to as liars, they would become less determinate and stick to the lie much stronger. In such situations, it is
essential that loopholes are present while asking questions that allow them to correct themselves while
presenting their stories and not enable to state that they were lying. There are several ways in which the
questioning process is carried out. It includes the persuasive manner, the merciless and threatening posture,
friendly, neutral and impersonal approaches. 4 interrogators must be present to have the disturbing effect all
attitudes but there is possibility that 1 interrogator may play two roles.
1. There is one cold individual who shoots out the questions like a machine gun, has a hard and
monotonous voice but does not show compassion towards the subject or threatens him.
2. There is a bullying interrogator who insults, threatens and passes sarcastic remarks to help break
down the subjects guard and exhaust him or make him angry.
3. One of the questioners is extremely naïve and credulous who give the prisoner benefit of doubt and
believe their story. He lets the subject feel smarter than the interrogator, builds false confidence to
extract information.
4. An understanding, friendly, kind and persuasive interrogator is able to carry out a sympathetic
approach which proves to be of great importance during the interrogation climatic phase. This
interrogator is usually used as a siege after first and second types have done their job. He may also be
present when there is sleep trouble after a siege.
Planning Additional Interviews
The exploitation or softening phase are included in this part. When the resistance is broken and as well as
the cover story, the subject is ready to answer which is why there should be well planned questions readily
available to extract information. The activity cannot be conducted through cooperation and mutual
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assistance. The interrogation could be moved to another office and left alone to display that they have trust
in him. The broken subject will benefit emotionally through this feeling of trust. It will also save him from
thinking about committing suicide or introspection.
The subjects’ character will define the right course of action. The way he is broken and his attitude will help
the individuals conducting the process to decide on the technique. Fresh interrogators may at times extract
valuable information. However, at times, proponents may be unwilling to show their broken spirit to others
and would like to talk to the original interrogator. A relationship of trust and confidence may also be built
which should not be destroyed by introducing another individual.
The interrogation steps are the following.
1. Interview to be initiated with a light conversation: The subject character must be determined
beforehand.This would include the musical preferences, family, occupation etc. Determine the
nervousness signs, the prone to bragging, confidence and intelligence in the preliminary
questionnaire.
2. Abrupt switching to the questioning subject: The reaction of the subject can be noticed through
abrupt switching. It is observed that 9 out of 10 cases the first impressions are correct.
3. Do not interrupt the subjects and let them speak their story: Search for all kinds of
inconsistencies and if the subject is too prepared that means he is ready for questioning and has
already made his story up.
4. Confuse the subject by breaking the flow: Build a scenario in which an associate whispers
something in your ear. Then give the subject a short look and leave the room. By this time, the
subject would be worried as to what is happening and what information you retain. Return in 20
minutes and process to asking your questions regarding the inconsistencies in his story.
5. Request for details: Irrelevant and relevant questions must be combined which would help the
suspect believe that you have a plan in mind.
6. Search for signs that indicate the suspect is lying: When searching for signs, cross hands in a
defensive position, sit at the edge of the chair, tilt the head to the right, look up as you’re thinking an
answer or sit on the edge of the chair. The listener’s trust does not appeal to those individuals who
believe in what they say.
7. Additional interviews must be planned: The exploitation or softening up phase must include this
aspect. After breaking the will to resist and finding the cover story, the subject is ready to answer a
specific set of questions. These questions must be prepared carefully to integrate the intelligence
target and exploit his information through mutual agreements and cooperation.
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Reid has offered 9 steps of interrogation defined below.
Step 1– Confrontation to be carried out in a direct manner where the suspect believes that it is evidence
which is present with the police that points to him. This suspect must be given a chance to explain why the
offence occurred in the first place.
Step 2–At the time of the crime, there would be other individuals present as well and it would be beneficial
to shift the blame on to the other party and make the suspect comfortable. Themes are to be developed to
justify the situation. Themes may also be presented to state that the accused is at fault.
Step 3–The suspect must be discouraged to deny the guilt.
Step 4–By this point of time, it is expected that the accused will admit if the crime was committed. Push for
a confession.
Step 5–Sincerity must be reinforced to make sure the suspect is being receptive.
Step 6–At this stage the suspect decides to become quiet and only listens. Infer guilt if the suspect cries but
give alternatives to the theme discussion if not.
Step 7–The alternatives or two choices must be presented regarding to what actually occurred. One should
be more socially acceptable than the other. Guilt is admitted to whatever option is chosen but the suspect
will choose the easier one. This third option is also present which would state that he did not commit the
crime.
Step 8–To validate the confession, the information presented by the suspect must be in front of witnesses
and it should be corroborated.
Step 9–The confession must be documented and the confession should be recorded in written, video or
audio form.
Principles of Questioning
The HUMINT specialist must thoroughly understand the source and adopt a role which is appropriate. The
verbal and non-verbal cues which are productive should be included. Time must be spent upon
understanding the subject making sure all real life constraints are managed effectively. The constraints
include time availability, knowledge from other sources and information value from other sources.
Walton, (2003), presents 10 rules of game which covers the interrogator or proponent and the interrogator or
respondent.
1. The respondent must not unintentionally present statements or infer facts which he is trying to
conceal.
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2. By allowed means, the proponent must threaten or sanction the respondent to present information.
3. Questions must be created for the proponent that are loaded, deceptive and leading.
4. It is possible for the respondent to serve his end if the answers are ambiguous, vague or misleading.
5. The respondents reply must be critically assessed to extract vital information.
6. The replies by the respondent must be consistent to make sure his commitment remains intact.
7. If inconsistencies are present in the commitment of the respondent, there should be a critical
examination and all information that is inconsistent must be removed.
8. The goal is achieved once the information required is extracted. This is specifically if the dialogue is
in favour of the proponent.
9. It would be in the respondents favour if the dialogue ends without information collection for the
proponent.
10. To achieve their own ends, the two parties could carry out arguments which are fallacious or
irrelevant.
Based on the understanding of the source, the role of the HUMINT must be defined. However, changes must
be made in the verbal and non-verbal characteristics according to requirement. The more time spent in
source assessment would yield better results but the real world situations are likely to change at all times.
The information possessed by the source in terms of quantity and value, the availability of other sources, the
time available and several other factors need to be included.
A formal initial context must be present giving regard to the culture. The situation would become relaxing if
the source appears to be cooperative. The role would have to change and the interviewer would need to
confront if the source is being hostile.
Motivations of the source vary like for personal gain, emotion or logic, when he is observed to cooperate.
The following subjects must be remembered by the HUINT collector from a psychological view.
1. When trying takes place, kindness and understanding must be displayed and if they are under stress,
they need to talk. For instance, when soldiers are captured they are suffering from severe stress.
Usually people like to talk about these things. If the EPW has been separated and silence, the
HUMINT collector would be the one he first speaks to. This would help him to collect vital
information as there will be a desire to talk in the refugees, local civilians and DPs.
2. When a superior authority is confronted, deference must be showed. All over the world, people are
used to replying to government and quasi-government officials yet it is culturally dependent.
3. Personal and culturally derived values must participate in the framework. If the core values are the
same, people respond positively and if not then they show negative attitudes.
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4. Emotional and physical self interest must be responded to. It is like material reward responding and
provides extra support to rationalize the guilt.
5. In a disorganized or strange situation, it is required that they apply and remember the lessons taught.
6. The HUMINT collector consists of experience and knowledge and they should be willing to discuss
the same topics with the respondents.
7. Exoneration and flattery from guilt must be appreciated.
8. If the HUMINT collector routinely manages a topic, give less importance.
9. Someone or something which they respect must not be criticized specifically by those who they do
not like.
Building Rapport
When a rapport is developed, based on confidence and respect, between the collector and the source, vital
information is extracted [20]. It is usually managed by the HUMINT collector through his efforts and
facilities provided. This relationship could be based on fear, mutual gain or friendship and he may be the
inferior, equal or superior.
During the planning and preparation phase, the position and rank of the collector would be decided before
hand which would be used if he introduces himself. This rank must be decided on the age, appearance and
experience of the HUMINT collector. The rapport may be formed using the incidents of war and he may
pose as an individual who is not a military interrogator.
However, he is not allowed to pose as the following.
1. A medical personnel like a medic or doctor.
2. An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or its affiliates member
3. A journalist
4. Civilian government member, like the Member of Parliament [23].
The interrogator attitude is required to be polite, correct as well as sympathetic depending on the kind of
situation. The tempers must be kept low at all times to extract as much information as possible. Based on the
case circumstance, the prisoner should be given a false or true reason for his arrest or then he should be left
entirely in doubt. The interrogators are not allowed to display through their actions if they believe or
disbelieve the source but they need to assess thoroughly if the story being presented is innocent or an act. A
poker face and non committal expression must remain at all times so that the prisoner does not observe how
much information the interrogators have. [8] The interrogators must talk as least as possible but they should
ask those questions which they are most anxious about. The prisoner must be asked to explain his story
through his own words, state the arrest circumstances, details of his occupation or then the period of history
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of his life. The basic aim of the conversation is to make him talk and prompt hum into speaking as much as
possible in order to assess his personality and extract vital information.
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
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PROBLEM: The Intelligence Collection Management System comprises of a Collection Management
Officer and CI/HUMINT specialists and the CI/HUMINT collectors.The CMO takes charge of the collection
plan and tasks his specialists with constantly keeping an eye on current intelligence requirements as well as
intelligence requirements that surface as tactical situations changes rapidly during combat due to the highly
fluid nature of the latter.This tracking of all intelligence requirements is extremely important as collection
operations are driven by intelligence requirements—the correct IRs.Hence the CMO ensures that the
collectors are properly focusing on the prioritized intelligence requirements.That also includes the passive
HUMINT collectors like Civil Affairs,Military Police,Medical units,Psychological ops and Information ops.
During combat operations,tactical intelligence systems develop problems.ISR Ops during combat MUST be
synchronized.But as tactical situations change during combat rapidly forcing development of more different
intelligence requirements the ISR assets need to be retasked and synchronized again and that too in pace
with the changing scenario and that proves to be very difficult.
Intelligence exploitation operations too suffer.During operations pulling intelligence from higher
headquarters or feeding intelligence inputs as per requests from subordinate units again proves
difficult.Proper dissemination to the maneuver division Commander and subordinate
brigades,battalions,units suffers due to inadequate communication systems and database
management/processing capability.
The commander,the staff, and the higher and lower headquarters across the depth and width of the battlefield
must coordinate with the CM section while formulating plans for future operations and to support ongoing
missions.Variations in enemy actions or changes in perception of the enemy’s movements give rise to new
sets of intelligence requirements and the CM section should take this into account.The battlefield is an area
of high fluidity and hence changes must be expected and Requirements Management must be flexible
enough to incorporate these changes.
The two most critical steps in collection management is identifying and prioritizing the intelligence
requirements.To this end 6 areas of interest must be considered and they are force protection,situation
development,targeting,battle damage assessment BDA,indications and warning and IPB.The intelligence
requirements stems from these areas and all of the competing requirements needs to be
consolidated,.Thereafter the collection plan is created and the scarce IEW resources are tasked more
efficiently.
Requirements Management,Mission Management and Asset Management constitute the Collection
Management process.They are treated separately but together constitute integrated operations as a
whole.
The six steps in the CM process are:
Develop Requirements,
Develop a Collection Plan,
Task/Request Collection,
Disseminate,
Evaluate Reporting,
Update Collection Planning.
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The various activities inherent in these steps need to be synchronized and placed under constant review.
While devising the Collection plan,the intelligence officer in charge of designing the plan (henceforth
known as Collection Manager CM) takes into account the following:
Commanders Priority Intelligence Requirements
Low Priority Intelligence Requirements
Requests from subordinate units,
Taskings from higher HQ’s
Intelligence requirements for targeting purposes
Now,he prioritizes these keeping in mind the Commands intelligence needs and the commanders priority
intelligence needs.
When BICCE study was initially conducted with the development of possible enemy COAs , the intelligence
analyst attempts to develop all indicators of these COAs.(Indicators are those details of enemy
action/inaction that may suggest an enemy COA.
COLLECTION FORMAT
There are two collection plans.One designed for conventional battlefield operations whereas the other caters
to a LIC environment.LIC battlefield operations tend to be dispersed.The PIR and IR’s are highly diverse
and collection becomes a tough task.
In the latter case the following steps are followed:
List the PIRs and IRs,priotize them and enumerate them using control numbers and alphabets.This
helps in prioritization.
Now ascertain the indicators
Determine potential indicators-prioritize those that will answer the PIR and IR.
Delete all indicators that do not answer the intelligence requirements.
Develop specific intelligence requirements.These are the requirements as stated by the commander,
prioritized and general,broken down into manageable specific requirements.A PIR may have several
specific intelligence requirements.
Analyse these SIRs and the target characteristics keeping all the indicators in perspective.
Finally prioritize the SIRs and determine the suitable collection discipline/platform/agency keeping
its capabilities,limitations,backlog of collection taskings allotted to it and whether adjacent
units,lower units are also using it.
Prepare the tasking list by creating a prioritized SIR list and deploy the collectors.
Indicator analysis is the basis for recommendations to the commander for a specific COA.
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CM’S need a thorough knowledge of the threat,the characteristics of the AO and the general capabilities of
collection assets before they can translate the commander’s PIR and IR into indicators.
This includes a detailed knowledge of the—
Threat organization, equipment, and doctrine.
Biographical data on major personalities.
Present and past performance of units and
organizations.
Terrain and weather constraints.
Patterns of current operations.
Degree of popular support.
AGENCIES AND AGENCY
COLLECTION PRIORITY.
The collection manager decides on the agency/agencies/assets to be tasked with the collection.To this he
must judge the capabilities , availability and constraints of the assets with regard to the collection
priorities(the intelligence requirements,PIR,IR,SIRs). These include factors such
as—
Frequency ranges for intercept radios.
Aircraft mission durations.
Number of flights.
Mobility.
Linguistic capabilities.
The assets may be organic or external
The collection manager then compares all the agencies or assets who can answer a particular SIR and
chooses the best one depending on the 3 factors.Then he selects the next best one and so on thus creating a
prioritized assets/agencies listing. Next, he determines which agency
or asset can best answer the SIR and prioritizes them.(EX: CI Team=1,CA Team=2,HUMINT Team =3 in
answering SIR-4 which is ‘’Report strangers movement in NAI-alpha)
Mission success depends on the right COAs and while designing the COA the commander needs the exact
confirmation or denial of all the intelligence requirements,prioritized and general so that he may get the best
visualization of the area of operations—the battlespace; that is to say intelligence collection heightens his
situational understanding.To this effect indicator analysis is of prime importance.An indicator is any activity
that may project the enemys intent,his capability,dispositions,movement,vulnerability or other factors
associated with threat.The indicator as gauged by the HUMINT collector for example may or may not
satisfy the intelligence gap(requirement).After looking at all possible indicators,deleting the ones that do
not answer requirements (VERY IMPORTANT STEP) a final draft is prepared which are again tallied
with the intelligence requirements and characteristics of the threat ,finally performing a draft with the
listing of indicators that do answer the priority and other intelligence requirements and also possible
locations where to find them as well as the methods to be employed to find them , SIRs are developed
keeping all this in perspective , prioritized and the final prioritized SIRs are fed into the collectors in the
carefully chosen collection platform as specific collection tasks which the former execute.
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THE TASKING LIST
The CMO prioritizes the SIR and tasks appropriate
sources to answer them. The list of taskings for each
source also should be prioritized.
SIRs 1 to 10 are prioritized as follows:
1=3
2=6
3=1
4=7
5=5
6=2
7=4
8=10
9=9
10=8
Team (Support ops team)is tasked with SIR 3,5,8,10.
We see the prioritized tasking becomes: SIR3,SIR5,SIR10,SIR8
The team will report about SIR3 first,then SIR5,then SIR10 and finally SIR8.
Example:
This means the CMO must provide
the SOT-A (1) with a prioritized tasking list as follows:
1 — Report time, frequency, and location of
insurgent radio traffic or EW activity (SIR 28).
2 — Report the number, size, equipment,
composition, route, and time of suspected insurgent
patrols in the area (SIR 6).
3 — Report the location, quantity, and type of
unexplained firings in the area (SIR 1).
Interrogators
Interrogators must know exactly, verbatim,the PIRs so that they can rephrase the SIRs in various ways to
extract information from sources who may or may not be acquainted with the required information.If the
main PIR (which the interrogator knows verbatim)is ‘’Report on the existence of enemy camp in NAI6’’
the source might not know anything at all of insurgent exfiltration or entry to the area,might not have seen
any vehicular traffic etc .
Indicator Examples
Indicators can be broken into three categories:
• Immediate threat indicators.
• Preparatory indicators.
• Secondary indicators.
All three categories appear at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Immediate Threat Indicators. Imminent threat activities or a threat which is already in progress give rise
to indicators known as Immediate threat indicators.We take into consideration all factors possible like
activities,tactics,movemernts,current dispositions,propaganda,and any preparations indicating a dangerous
course of action.The following might be good indicators:
Recovery of huge cache of arms and ammunition in close proximity to any objective
Increased troop movement towards objective
Very aggressive rhetoric by the military leadership of the enemy nation
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Heavily armed reconnaissance
Preparatory indicators: Before the decided course of action/s is/are undertaken there are preparations to be
made.Indicators of such preparations are termed Preparatory threat indicators.We must analyse
multidimensional threat intelligence,planning,training activities and logistics.Examples of such indicators
could be:
Diplomatic support by other countries
Increased media rhetoric
Very aggressive TV discussions
Increase in training tempo
Lightly armed reconnaissance who engage and break contact quickly
Mock
Overt/covert weapons shipments
Regional countries showing support for the enemy government’s policy
UN embargos/sanctions ignored by countries who support the policies of the enemy nation
Increased media support for the enemy country
Secondary indicators: The local population is affected by any threat activity.The population is affected by
tactical preparatory indicators of the enemy and we can thus observe reflections in the economy,
commodities and population to infer the preparations.We might observe that:
A fear psychosis has developed among the population, most schools unattended,and locals avoiding contact
with the authorities and streets deserted before evening
Huge purchases of rations by locals, stockpiling of medicines and emergency stuff at home
Shortages reported in non-lethal material
Very less presence of their community members in festivals,places of entertainment.Cinema theaters
reporting huge losses in revenue as very low attendance.
Now the CM in collaboration with the intelligence analyst attempts to assign a set of specific information
requirements to address each of the indicators -- the overall focus being to answer each prioritized
intelligence requirement. These SIRs go into making the collection plan.The CM unit must constantly keep a
track of the progress,and any incoming information may also part a play in outstanding information
requirements or in any future information requirement tabled for tasking to the collection platforms.The CM
section continuosly evaluates the collection/reporting processes and disseminates the required intelligence to
the Commander.
SIR is a direct function of enemy Order of Battle and the gaps in intelligence.We can have a huge number of
SIRs as each PIR can generate several SIRs /SORs(A division can have upto 12 PIRs for current operations
and envisage an equal number or more for future operations.Note here that we have several intelligence
collection platforms—HUMINT,SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT.Now the collection manager will assign different
SIRs/SORs to each collection platform.Thus overall we have a huge task at hand as now the collection
manager unit may have to handle hundreds of information requirements while combat operations are
underway.
Each PIR may have a number of SIRs. This number would also include the intelligence requirements to
support targeting, lower priority information requirements, requests for information from subordinate units,
or taskings from higher headquarters.Hence proper synchronization with operations and
deconfliction(particularly in case of HUMINT/CI collection processes) is a prime necessity.
Thereafter the step of preparing the collection plan is undertaken by the collection manager.The collection
plan is created using the PIRs,indicators,SIRs,SORs and all the collection assets at his disposal. Regarding
the available assets for collection ,factors such as accuracy,range,platform type and technical capabilities--
these are matched with the target characteristics in question and the most appropriate collection resource/s
is/are allocated.Redundancy is important here and the assets need also to be integrated and if there is an
admixture of assets then that has to be carefully planned
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Mission management is about how the collection task will have to be executed.A collection strategy is
formed keeping in perspective collection taskings to subordinate units,support requests to higher and
adjacent units and exploitation of all intelligence inputs available from other agencies at the corps,theatre
and national levels. The important objective guiding the strategy formation is synchronization of collection
and dissemination schedule with the PIR.
Here again it is critical that operations be synchronized with the collection plan.The taskings must be issued
to the collection platforms as quickly as possible. This also involves specific intelligence exploitation
operations and systems management.
A Sample of the Process
If the commander’s PIR and JR demand to know ifthe enemy will attack, focus on those enemy
activities and preparations which will confirm or deny the enemy’s capabilities and probable COA.
Steps:
Immediately first focus on ‘’immediate threat indicators’’.Thus during prioritizing immediate threat
indicators translated into SIRs must be given high priority.It is important to not waste time and create
and deliver the SIRs quickly to the collection teams.That is don’t delay in tasking out to the teams.At the
same time when immediate threat indicators are being looked into go ahead with deciding on SIRs for
preparatory and secondary indicators.The same SIR may have to be specified differently to different
collection platforms in accordance with the nature of the latter.For example we need information about
insurgent hideout.Now the SIGINT unit may be given this SIR: Report on any radio intercept in named
area beta.The same requirement has to be put forth to the HUMINT team as ‘’Report on any frequent
insurgent movement in to the named area beta’’ or to the IMINT team ‘’Report on any camouflaged
structure , cleared foliage area.foot tracks in named area of interest beta’’.
DISSEMINATION: The dissemination of the collected intelligence to the commander or other end users is
the next step.It is of prime importance that intelligence information reaches the end user in time.Intelligence
is perishable.Actionable intelligence loses its value if not transmitted quickly.Redundancy in
communications must be avoided.The most appropriate communication channel must be used.It is the duty
of the collection manager that the acquired intelligence is transmitted directly from the sensor to the end-
user.
Finally the last step is the evaluation of the collection effort.This is an often neglected but is perhaps the
most important step after the step of planning.A close watch must be maintained to ensure the collection
assets are properly conducting their tasks and in keeping with the PIRs and SIRs.Technical control should be
exercised throughout. It is very important that tactical maneuver is in synchronization with the collection
operations.The intelligence analysis cell, the targeting cell and the tactical operations center all must work in
close coordination with the collection cell, keeping in mind that as operations progress intelligence
requirements may change,collection priorities will also change,instructions need to be thus meted out to
collection assets and data need to be accordingly updated in the database.Thus we see it is entirely a cyclical
process,from planning to evaluation,wherein often circumstances will arise for repeat planning and
directives to assets , on account of the very fluid nature of operations.Also bear in mind intelligence drives
operations and vice versa,thus intelligence requirements change with time.
RSTA AND ISR OPERATIONS
Intelligence drives operations and vice versa. In effect the enemy situation drives operations. For the enemy
situation to drive operations we must have perfect intelligence about the enemy. To this end Reconnaissance
, Surveillance and Target Acquisition should work hand in hand with ISR SO AS TO ACHIEVE PERFECT
SYNCHRONIZATION in the deployment and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation and
dissemination of intelligence.RSTA/ISR should focus on the priority intelligence
requirements.Recconnaisance and Surveillance confirm or deny threat actrivities,plans,courses of action
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which were gauged by the Commander and his staff during planning , war gaming and sessions with the
collection manager and counterintelligence speciaslists.By focusing RSTA/ISR on the commanders needs,
his critical and priority intelligence requirements we can deploy and use RSTA/ISR sensors and assets in the
most optimum fashion , totally integrated and synchronized resulting in timely and accurate information,
combat information and intelligence to be disseminated to the targeting platforms.
Every operation is initiated as per plan and this planning has certain decision points.RSTA/ISR should take
these critical decision points in perspective , primary perspective and focus all collection platforms and
assets on these points and see to it that al information linked to these decision points are gathered , nothing
left out and disseminated in time to the commander. Again for this synchronization is essential. Targeting
requires proper detection of the target and evaluation of its importance. Further there should be sufficient
reason to nominate the target to the attack platforms. To this end synchronized RSTA/ISR operations collect
all possible information about the target and pass it on for evaluation and thereafter if the target satisfies the
criteria for nomination the intelligence on the target is passed on to the targeting platform. After an attack on
the target, kinetic/nonkinetic attack or exploitation operations, RSTA/ISR is required to assess the
effectiveness of the attack.
The planning and operation of the entire multidisciplinary collection system comporising of sensors
,assets,processing,exploitation and dissemination if synchronized and integrated and will yield the best
situational development enabling the commander to shape the battlespace as his priority intelligencve
requirements are hereby answered successfully.This ISR synchronization is predicated by the commanders
need for an a competitive edge ove the enemy in terms of information operations,enabling him to
successfully execute C2 Attack , C2 exploit and C3 protect. Here we achieve perfect integration of
intelligence and operations.
Intelligence officers use ISR synchronization tools with staff input to synchronize the entire collection effort,
including all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and
organizations, and intelligence reach to answer Commanders requirements.
ISR OPERATIONS
Commanders Role
1. You must clearly state your intelligence requirements, prioritized and otherwise, to your intelligence
officer. You should also tell him when you must know the information.
2. Ops must be integrated with intelligence. Hence your ops officer should work closely with your
intelligence officer and every plan, course of action must be coordinated with the intelligence officer.
3. Be fully aware of all the multidisciplinary collection platforms available to you and their capabilities. You
must also be aware of any collection platforms being used by adjacent units and to what extent arte they
available to your unit.
You must take stock of your intelligence requirements along with these limited intelligence collection
resources and pair them in an optimal manner so as to achieve maximum efficiency despite resource
constraints.
4. Involve your entire staff while performing the intelligence assessment of the battlefield, the enemy, the
course of actions open to both, the strength, capabilities, dispositions of the enemy. The intelligence officer
should not be the one conducting these functions. Everyone should be involved with you, the Commander
steering the effort in the right direction.
5. Make sure that the ops officer understands all intelligence platforms available, their capabilities, which
are the ones to be configured for his needs and similarly the intelligence officer must understand the ops
details, tactics etc.
6. Regarding reconnaissance, detailing personnel and allocating them the collection assets and sending them
on a well defined mission after briefing them with well defined, clearly stated priority intelligence
requirements, these are your job as a commander.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
7. Required intelligence information may be several. In other words you may have identified several
intelligence gaps. But at the same time you must be aware that the limited collection assets you have in hand
may not be sufficient to answer all your intelligence requirements. Hence first prioritize your intelligence
requirements. Out of all these prioritized intelligence requirements, properly listed, choose the ones that are
critical to your decision making process , those that are very time sensitive. Handle these first. Be careful to
see that collection efforts stay focused on the prioritized ones and do not get diffused. To this end keep a
close tab on your ops officer and intelligence officer.
8. Synchronize ISR ops with higher HQ and ensure that subordinate units have sync’d their ISR plans with
yours.
Keep the summary given below in mind:
MISSION ANALYSIS -- begins with higher headquarters order analysis to extract ISR tasks with all
constraints implied.
Ist Step- IPB Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.IPB products viz., enemy characteristics,
event/situation development, terrain, demographic and weather characteristics, High Payoff Targets and
High Value Targets (Target folders) and updated intelligence estimates.
The intelligence officer (supported by the ops officer) armed all the above information identifies t
intelligence gaps in the following manner:
Those that can be answered by intelligence reach , requests for information to higher headquarters , existing
running ISR operations
Those that are not yet determined and ISR operations need to be conducted.
The second type of information gaps pave the way for Information Requirements, Critical Information
Requirements and Prioritized Information Requirements as inputs for the next step of ISR planning.
The intelligence officer , in addition to identifying intelligence requirements properly classified needs also to
take into account threat factors , terrain effects , weather effects , civil considerations that may
benefit/constrain/limit ISR assets functioning and capabilities and overall affect the ISR planning.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Asymmetric Warfare
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Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric warfare constitutes of two opponents that
abide by a completely different set of military principles,
views, tactics, and resources. Fundamentally, this results in
weaknesses and strengths that each party can target and
exploit. Militarized and non-militarized strategies are part
of the asymmetric warfare process. Asymmetric warfare
does not engage in traditional force-on-force engagements
but is a type of hit-and-run guerilla attack wherein the
vulnerabilities of the security apparatus are targeted. Asymmetric warfare brings into play TTPs that are
often unanticipated by the security forces. The insurgents mode of attack banks on the concept of tactical
surprise , catching the security forces off-balanced and unprepared. They use their limited military
capabilities and the physical environment in the most optimum fashion so as to negate the security forces
advantage and spring a surprise with the intent to deliver a tactical defeat and then disappear to their
sanctuary in the physical environment. Insurgency is a type of asymmetric warfare.
Firstly, asymmetrical warfare is not a new form of warfare. There have been other terms used to describe
this type of warfare. Conflicts such as guerrilla warfare, people’s war, and low intensity warfare have
traditionally been described as wars in which asymmetrical tactics have been used effectively against hostile
forces.
Asymmetric warfare tactics are available to all forces in a war - good and bad, conventional and non-
conventional. These tactics are known to be used by irregular military forces such as freedom fighters,
mercenaries, military special forces operators and intelligence operators.
However, for the scope of this book, asymmetrical warfare will be used to describe violent elements such as
organized criminal gangs, insurgents and terrorists. These elements usually are incapable to directly engage
the forces of established authority and instead use asymmetrical warfare for leverage.
There are features about asymmetrical warfare that are divergent from conventional warfare when observed
from a counter-insurgency point of view. These are: the practice of insurgents to hide among the general
population; the insurgents’ use of unconventional improvised weapons and the use of civilians as targets for
violent attacks. In an asymmetrical warfare there are no clear battle lines and insurgents do take advantage
by even seeking to spread their subversion from within the society or nation. The advantage of the use of
technology in a conventional warfare is neutralized by the combat environment in an asymmetrical warfare.
Insurgents have their strategic goals and agenda that they pursue in asymmetrical warfare. These goals may
be to increase recruits and train new members, removing opponents to their belief, boosting their morale,
their image and legitimacy and to spread fear. They use tactics such as assassinations, bombings, hijacking
and hostage taking. The targets of their attacks are usually public and vulnerable areas and places, such as
bridges and tunnels, critical infrastructure, high profile corporations, nuclear reactors, oil plants, churches
and water facilities among others.
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Certain Definitions relevant to this chapter :
Irregular Warfare (IW): “A violent struggle among state and non‐state actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may
employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and
will.”
Insurgency: “The organized use of subversion or violence by a group or movement that seeks to
overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”
Asymmetrical warfare: “Leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against the States security
vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining Governments will in order
to achieve the asymmetric actor’s strategic objectives.”
Insurgency: “The organized use of subversion or violence by a group or movement that seeks to
overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”It is a
type of Asymmetric warfare.
Counterinsurgency (COIN): “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency
and to address any core grievances.”.
Counterterrorism (CT): “Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and
render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.”
Intelligence: “The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and
interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or
elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results
in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity.”
Surveillance: “The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or
things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.”
Reconnaissance: “A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”
ISR: “An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and
processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.
This is an integrated intelligence and operations function.”
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
INSURGENCY
“Insurgency”, a word often confused as well as
used with a near synonym “insurgency”.
Although not very clear there exists a thin line
of difference between the two. Often we see
that the basic goals of both insurgents and
insurgents are similar; yet if we examine
insurgency and insurgency, specific differences
emerge. The main base difference is that
insurgency is a movement- an effort with a
very specific aim and course of action. Another
difference is the intent of the component
activities and operations of insurgencies versus
insurgency. Although there are places where
insurgency, guerilla warfare, and criminal
behavior all overlap, groups that are
exclusively insurgent, or subordinate "wings"
of insurgencies formed to specifically employ
terror tactics, demonstrate clear differences in
their objectives and operations.
The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to
politically amputate the working power for
control of all or a portion of a desired territory,
or force political concessions in sharing
political power. Insurgencies greatly require
the active or tacit support of some portion of
the population involved. External support,
recognition or approval from other countries or
political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is
not generally aimed at. Whereas, a terror group
does not require and rarely has the active support
or even the sympathy of a large fraction of the
population. While insurgents will frequently
describe themselves as "insurgents" or "guerillas",
insurgents will not refer to themselves as
"insurgents" but describe them using military or
political terminology as “freedom fighters”,
“soldiers” or “activists”.
What can we guess the reason behind such risky
moves? Obviously, there has to be a trigger factor
for choosing such a path. If we look behind in
world history, the most radical portions of the
population are mostly engaged in such activities.
Why so? Why would they leave the homely
security and live lives of most wanted nomads?
Yes, the answer lays in the brute fact that they
have been denied justice time and again. They
were made to bear injustice that cannot be, has not
been or will not be addressed by the so called
governing power of varied countries. This very
situation has mostly led the minority to take up
arms in order to make the supreme power hear
their pleas. But as times changed, the way and
acuteness of their action changed. Starting from
bow and arrow today they have successfully
managed to outset violence with armed resistance.
The core belief that led to these movements is that
their cause is righteous (whether or not). In this
era the belief has made such a strong foundation
that based upon it they fuel the passions of general
public.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Thus it is very well understood that the
insurgency problems are not the branches of the
terror tree that can be cleaned up by using brute
force but it lies at the grass root level. Then what
should be the way of approach to search and hit
them? The answer lies in the question itself- i.e.
handling the problem right from the base. Here
comes into action the sensitive part of approach-
counterinsurgency campaigns. These
campaigns must be conducted with utmost
discipline and vigor; and must incorporate all
elements of national power into its strategy to
have any hope of success. The methods used
earlier had very little if not null effect in
eradicating the problem.
Although military operations are an essential
component in counterinsurgency operations
previous experiences have proved that political,
economic and informational/diplomatic efforts
ultimately lead to successful quelling an
insurgency. One indispensible component of
counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the
entire spectrum of operations, is the requirement
for actionable intelligence. Keeping in view the
grounds of their action, only way to curb their
encroachment is possession of a good
intelligence, without which there is very little or
no hope to defeat them. The successful
management of counterinsurgency warfare
depends on the well-organized intelligence
architecture that is experienced, managed and
carried upon and an equal emphasis on
counterintelligence , so often ignored. Given
this fact, it is paramount that
counterinsurgency forces gain this
essential intelligence. Counterinsurgency
(COIN) is an intelligence driven endeavor.
Intelligence helps in understanding the
operational environment. Commanders
require accurate intelligence about the
insurgents,their organization and their
sympathizers in the local populace. the
primitive conventions of war,
counterintelligence does and does not at large
depend on the data derivations from technical
means (e.g. signal intelligence-SIGINT, imagery
intelligence-IMINT and measurement
intelligence- MASINT, respectively); but is
dependent on collection of relevant information
from human interface. This intelligence is
harvested from the human intelligence
(HUMINT), investigations and analytic
capabilities of organic military intelligence and
police forces in the area of operations.
Now if we examine the passion leading to
insurgent movements in a deeper ground, we
shall see that unlike conventional warfronts, they
have the freedom of action. It becomes nearly
impossible to predict their upcoming actions.
They can make their own plan of action, at their
own chosen times and places disregarding the
conventional formulae. The upper hand they get
is because of their geographic shelling and also
some political organizations aiding them for
transferring power from central to local control.
Further, they need not wait for permissions to be
granted, rules to be passed, conventions to be
maintained and other restrictions of statehood
which may inhibit their adversary. Most
importantly, their targets are specific, plan of
action with unmatched convention and they have
near-perfect intelligence which helps them to
successfully prove their vulnerability.
This sorry state could have been well avoided
if the reason would be uprooted at the initial
stage. Only if the existing situations would be
resolved one could argue that no word called
insurgency would ever exist. But sadly this
was not done and the seeds have now sprouted
to produce one of the greatest threats to not
only general public, the government, a nation
but the world peace at large.
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There are four important aspects of COIN that are vital,from an intelligence standpoint, in successfully
undertaking a mission. It is imperative to understand the environment in which you operate. As much detail
as possible must be gathered about the operational environment, the level and nature of the threats and the
planned course of action to manage those threats. The other aspects are ISR, counterintelligence against
insurgency and collaboration between intelligent assets and the host nation and its populace.
A proper understanding of the operational environment helps in making the right decision in
deploying proper levels of force, managing the interaction with the people and being sensitive towards the
culture and its impact. Environment knowledge even includes weather analysis as the weather can be a
hindrance and a blessing in operations. Social structure is also a considered part of the environment.
Networks of people and organizations play important roles and have valuable knowledge that could be of
assistance. It would be essential to know the roles and statuses of such persons and organizations within the
operational environment.
The third civil consideration is multi-lingual. There must be the capacity to learn a new language and
achieving a high level of fluency in it. This is a simple and critical requirement.
The fourth consideration is discovering who represents the centre of power and authority. This would
require the engagement of this authority figure by establishing relationships with central and local
governments, bureaux, and other political organizations.
The fifth step in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is evaluating the threat. The limitations,
vulnerabilities of the enemy must be known and investigated to gain an advantage in battle. In other words,
finding out weaknesses about the insurgency and exploiting them. There are four items that are considered
as critical characteristics of the insurgency that must be known: their goals, grievances (of the people) that
the insurgency can exploit, means of support, organization of insurgent forces, and accurate locations of key
insurgent leaders.
The identification of objectives - political motives, support, political activities, and violent activities
are another paramount part of evaluating the insurgency. But focus will be on activities that are considered
as violent activities because they have the most directive relationship to asymmetrical warfare.
Determining the threat courses of action is the final step of IPB. According to FM COIN, there are
basically three types of violent activities that insurgents can choose to utilize: terrorist, guerilla, or
conventional tactics.
Terrorist tactics employ violence primarily against non-combatants, innocent bystanders. Terror
attacks do not require a large number of persons; they are less than the number that makes up guerrilla or
conventional warfare. Terrorist attacks usually have political motivations and with their main objective to
alter government policies or gather popular support.
While all counterinsurgents collect operational reporting as they perform their daily functions—what
is frequently termed “passive” collection—HUMINT requires “active” collectors who are specially
trained to conduct military source operations and interrogations.
Guerilla tactics feature hit and run attacks by a lightly armed group which focus on harassing counter-
insurgents. They seek the public’s attention as the make it known that they are the ones responsible for
particular attacks.These attacks aren’t meant to be military victories or decisive battles, but they can be
simultaneously used with supporting terror tactics.
Lastly, conventional warfare tactics are hardly used by insurgents because they lack the political support to
form sophisticated military formations.
non-military courses of action such as kidnapping, political demonstrations, hostage taking, infiltration and
subversion, propaganda and seizure actions.
After the IPB phase, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations phasing is purposed,
“to develop the intelligence needed to address the issues of driving the insurgency. In the ISR phase of the
intelligence cycle in COIN, there are five core focuses which include: a focus on the local populace,
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
intelligence collection activity, the localized nature of insurgencies, on the ground military forces as
potential collectors, and understanding the insurgent use of complex terrain.
Because of the nature of the conflict, military intelligence and operational activity are unique forces from
within COIN activity. According to FM COIN, “Intelligence and operations have a dynamic relationship…
Intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence,” It is through this
correlation of each driving the other and vice versa that COIN operations continue to be successful. Every
boot on the ground is a potential collector and facilitator of battlefield intelligence.
Though the other types of intelligence collection are important (especially geospatial intelligence due to
complex terrain), the HUMINT aspect is the most vital because it is the most useful in helping
soldiersunderstand the mind-set of the enemy, their operational capabilities, and their relationship with the
populace.
An intelligence officer can gather intelligence from a variety of channels such as patrol debriefings, after
action reports, civil affairs reports, psyops reports, special operation forces reporting, leadership liaisons and
tip hotlines, Another interesting but controversial part HUMINT usage in COIN is the interrogation of
detainees and debriefing of defectors. There is a wealth of information that can be gained from these
individuals as they can provide details about the internal operations of an insurgency. Interrogation
generates some amount of controversy because of the types of techniques that may be used that are
considered abusive of the detainee.
The next subtopic of this book relates to the topic of counterintelligence in COIN. Counterintelligence is a
focused directive implemented to neutralize the insurgent’s intelligence collection efforts. This is
accomplished through counterintelligence investigations, analysis and production, and functional and
technical services. Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, exploit and nullify the
extensive intelligence activities ofcompetitors, opponents and adversaries.
It is extremely important to use counterintelligence capabilities in COIN missions. Insurgents place a very
high emphasis on utilizing informants, double agents, surveillance and other methods that would provide
them with valuable intelligence. It therefore makes sense to be highly cautious when conducting
counterintelligence operations as potential sources may be working for both sides of conflict with
veryminimal, if any, loyalty to either side. It is therefore up to expert counter intelligence officers to
identifyindividuals who may be compromising operational security.
Insurgents also have counter-surveillance capabilities such as hiding among the local population, using off-
the shelf counter SIGNIT/ELINT solutions to counter our high technological edge, or even use couriers to
transfer money, intelligence, and orders to facilitate their operations.
Intelligence operations are greatly enhanced whenthe collection and analysis actions of various units are
cohesive and well managed. By ensuring that all efforts, from the lower to the upper echelon units,
continuously work in tandem, this would aid in reducing any gaps in the intelligence process.
Synchronisation of the intelligence efforts involve various intelligence agencies from the host and allied
nations. Operations are guaranteed greater success with the coordination of these resources. This unity
would also help to maintain a high degree of situational awareness and a more efficient and effective use of
resources.
Through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, intelligence officers are actively
collecting all-source intelligence from the battlefield, which helps both the field and intelligence components
of a COIN operation. Through counterintelligence and counter reconnaissance efforts in COIN, the activities
of insurgent and terrorist organizations are neutralized.
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Observation and investigation can only occur if we have successfully detected the element in
question.Further investigation and adjudication is linked by discovery.To dismantle insurgent networks and
eliminate insurgents both detection and discovery are required.We infer about suspected individuals when
we observe discrepancies/suspicious movements about them as they roam around , mixing with the locals
possibly with the intent to study ,say the security forces location or assess their capabilities/movement
patterns.This is observation.When several suspicious incidents occur there becomes room for investigation.
And as we investigate we discover say individuals with high certainty of insurgent affiliations or certain
movements directly/indirectly related to insurgent logistics.To sum up,with detection , investigation ,
observation and discovery our intent is to discern the dynamics of the insurgency movement.This
detection..the main link..requires intelligence.We need to go out there , with a plan in mind,utilize our
collectors,get as much information as possible,collate it , analyse it,at the same time time conducting
surveillance and investigating observable phenomena which in turn will drive more collection and analysis
with the final outcome of a discovery or a series of discovery about the insurgents.Without the intelligence
cycle we can never hope to zero in on the insurgents successfully—it will be just the usual scatter gun
approach—not concrete actionable intelligence but inferences based on personal judgement and past
experience—‘’the intelligence trap’’ which we should always avoid. When the insurgent comes in the open
to do surveillance detection comes into play , discovery comes when the insurgents get down to planning a
plot and execution of the plot is negated by detection,observation and discovery.But observation and
discovery cannot follow suit if we have not detected the insurgents or their movements etc well.It is a well
known fact that insurgent groups disperse to new areas offering them sanctuary when things become too hot
due to security forces offensive operations.Now these new sanctuaries have no past history of insurgent
activity.In other words in these areas insurgency is at its nascent state.Intelligence becomes all the more
important in this particular case. Every terrorist operation has three phases: research (thwarted by
detection); planning (thwarted by discovery); and execution (thwarted by observation, detection and
discovery). The only true way of knowing when a terrorist operation is being planned is to uncover their
research, which includes all the things that they know, who they know, what they're reading, and so forth.
In many cases, this can be accomplished by traditional criminal justice footwork. In other cases, it requires
some extraordinary surveillance efforts. Relatively low priorities are assigned to covering the early phases of
insurgencies.Lack of activity in an area does not mean we should not be concerned.The problem is ISR
assets are already not sufficient and whatever we have they are allocated to high-insurgency zones rather
than in those places where there is little(but not nil) history of insurgent activity.ISR assets should not only
be dedicated to tactical ops and force protection but also to emergent threats.
In an insurgent network there is ‘’ideology’’ at the top of the hierarchy. Ideology gives birth to
‘’strategic objectives’’ and each of these strategies , after more refinement and evaluation leads to a ‘’plan’’
wherein resources are dedicated , that is put to use in the most optimum fashion to achieve the desired
results. There is a plane between strategy and tactics.Tactics is the collective name for ‘’methods’’ of
engaging , amploying or maneuvering resources in a conflict,in a battle.This plane is known as
‘’doctrine’’.The doctrine , in addition to other variables drives the plan.The doctrine lays out how operations
were conducted by this group in the past,not only ops but all facets connected with the movement,how other
similar groups from our country or other countries performed and a critical study of their success and
failures and how ‘’legitimate’’ are the actions of the insurgents in the eyes of the media and public.At this
point ‘’legitimacy’’..that is the governments views about the movement does not take precedence over that
of media/public.It surely will factor in the long run but for immediate purposes a tactical win,say a
successful attack on the security forces given wide publicity by the media and jeopardizing the prestige of
the government before the public due to its failure..this is more important. In addition to providing a focus
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
for planning it also lays out the tactics.A tactic is a specific/specialized element of a mission but we can have
an array of tactics to achieve a general objective , like repeated tactical operations in order to overwhelm the
media with news of insurgent activity. When tactics are added up the plan leads to the formation of a
‘’plot’’.Tactics form the repository of the group which contains rehearsed/practiced actions making up the
modus operandi.One or more members of the group are specialized in the usage of a specific tactic.These
specific skills can cover expertise in weapons and explosives,map reading,deception,intelligence and
counterintelligence,psychological operations,sabotage,surveillance and countersurveillance,photography and
forgery in document preparation,medicine and first aid,propaganda,target selection and assessment,hand to
hand combat,couriers to name a few. The crux of the matter is we must dedicate all our efforts to detect this
‘’plot’’,prempt the insurgents and hence deny them their desired objectives and destroy our target which can
be the insurgents themselves or any other variable associated with their intended plot.We must also, and this
is more important in counterinsurgency,leave room to exploit the enemy to our advantage using
counterintelligence techniques.From the above it is clear that to detect,deny,exploit and destroy we need
intelligence and counterintelligence and without these two,however much we pitch in our military might we
can never succeed to eradicate the movement.
Insurgent Intelligence
Insurgents place heavy reliance on gathering intelligence. They use all means necessary, i.e. informants,
double agents, surveillance, to further their collection of vital intelligence.
OPSEC is thus very important; government personnel must carefully screen everyone working with them.
Failure to do so can result in infiltration of protected facilities and even deaths of government personnel
.I have included a primer on OPSEC at the end of the book.
Insurgent Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR)
Insurgents diligently weave their own reconnaissance and surveillance networks so as to do their harm
without detection. Their networks include the citizens who act as their early warning system and inform
them of counterinsurgent movements.
Sophisticated counter ISR efforts assist in identifying the techniques and weaknesses of
enemyreconnaissance. Commanders would gain great advantage as they would be able to detect signs of
insurgent preparations and surprise and neutralize them.
Insurgent Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Insurgents may also have a SIGINT capability based on commercially available scanners and radios,
wiretaps, or stolen counterinsurgent equipment. Information that is transmitted through these type of
equipment are vulnerable and can be “tapped” or diverted. Because of these deficiencies it would be ideal if
counterinsurgents did not use commercial radios or phones.
But when joint forces are conducting COIN/AT ops, commercial equipment may be their primary means of
communication. To not have them would severely limit and degrade the counterterrorism effort. In such
instances counterinsurgents must be careful to exercise OPSEC protocols when using such equipment.
All-Source Intelligence
The multidisciplinary (HUMINT, IMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, FISINT, MASINT,OSINT) fusion of
information by intelligence organizations results in the production of all-source intelligence products.
Analysis for COIN operations is very challenging as it involves multiple components to study and
understand. Perceptions and cultures take time to absorb, understand and utilize. The need to track hundreds
or thousands of personalities is made even more difficult as they change over time.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN COIN
PROTECTION
6-15. Protection is the maintaining the effectiveness and survivability of military installations, camps,
personnel, equipment, information/communication systems and other facilities located within the area of
operations in any COIN mission. In case of COIN the protection concept is different than that of a
conventional force protection scenario in that the element of the protection of the local
populace/communities inhabiting the AO is also taken into account. Now if this element is granted due
protection, is secured from the insurgents psychological ops and transactional overtures(seeking safe houses,
staging areas in the local area, taking psuedonames or as family members to deceive the forces against a
false or ideologically goaded sense of protection for the community members or any other assumed social
benefit not accorded by the government) then in turn the security forces gain allies who will feed
intelligence about the enemy and information pertaining to military security thus enhancing the security of
the tactical units and installations itself.
TECHNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS DURING COUNTERINSURGENCIES
Insurgents resort to lethal and nonlethal attacks against groups of soldiers, unit commanders and civilians.
Lethal attacks include killing and IED whereas non-lethal attacks are kidnapping and ransom, subversion or
psychological/intimidation/threats. To thwart such attacks and deter the enemy the following basic site-
protection operations may be included as foundation steps in the overall unit protection program.
Observation Post: An OP is inadequately capable of protecting any vital asset of the unit using combat
power but it can observe any enemy visual action and alert combat support immediately. It should be
capable of defending itself and must have a communications backup/night vision devices and long range
binoculars.
Stationary posts and static bases: Each post/base must take into consideration following factors before being
assembled:
Critical asset dimensions
Threat severity
Nearest reserve troops in terms of the time to inform them and the distance.
Keeping these into consideration a detachment/s occupies the post/base, full time and equipped with night
vision devices and surveillance equipment. Its a very good idea to include mobile surveillance teams to keep
an eye in the area in close proximity of the base perimeter.
Patrols:
a) Foot patrols: Both critical and low priority assets may be covered by foot patrols but usually low
priority assets are allocated for protection. Foot patrols are susceptible to ambush and hence patrol
timings must be random. This also helps in maintaining the element of surprise. Patrols must be well
armed to defend themselves and have the necessary communication facility toi call for support if the
need arises. The support team should be locally positioned and not far away.
b) Vehicle patrols: All the above apply equally to vehicle patrols.
c) Aerial patrols: Inaccessible areas can be kept under routine patrolling surveillance. Here they
supplement foot and vehicle patrols in that they offer an extension in the coverage area. It can so
happen that critical assets are positioned long distances away in terrain unsuitable for foot/vehicular
patrolling.
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RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES
It is very likely that the enemy keeps our forces and installation under surveillance. Their priority is to
discern the overall security plan. Hence to throw them off track we must introduce a random element
whenever possible. This also helps us to spring a surprise on the enemy. The main criterion here is to alter
the security posture from time to time thus defeating the enemy’s surveillance attempts. The enemy through
surveillance attempts to know our possible actions,intent,order of battle,dispositions,etc.True surveillance is
not strictly an intelligence activity on the part of the enemy but it is an enabler of intelligence. Hence we
should tackle enemy surveillance on a equal footing with our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.
Just like we use deception in counterintelligence based defensive and offensive activities.
Similarly we must use randomness to thwart enemy surveillance efforts.
• Vehicular barriers to route traffic around base.
• Random security patrols
• Floodlights should operate at random times.
• Guard duty shifts must be practiced at random times.
• Changing access time for entry points.
• Access procedures/passwords must be changed at random.
• Searching personnel must be randomized—the method that is.
• Maintaining random observation of surrounding areas utilizing unmanned systems if available/remote
systems.
Armor Protection
We can increase the quantum of protection considerably by vehicle and personnel armor. But it must be kept
in mind armor weight reduces the mobility of both the vehicle and soldier—in the case of the latter his
maneuverability and endurance gets affected adversely..In addition heavy armor wears engine parts of the
vehicles. But it is true that insurgent attacks become very much ineffective on armor shielded vehicles and
personnel.
Hardening
Hardening is intended to defeat or negate /deter an attack.
Hardening makes it very difficult for insurgents to carry out attacks.
Study the terrain carefully and see to it that natural obstacles can be emplaced to deter the movements of the
insurgents. Naturally available materials can be used to protect personnel, equipment and facilities. Physical
protection can be effected using sandbags, walls, shields, concrete barriers. Proper selection should be made
in keeping with nature of attacks: Blast, indirect/direct fires, heat, and radiation. Electronic warfare demands
a different set of materials/systems.
COUNTERINSURGENCY BASES
COIN forces must have a base from which to operate and also project. Bases are secure areas from which
the COIN objective is to isolate the insurgents from the support facilities and protect the local
populace/communities. The base must be carefully selected, reinforced and rendered fully defendable.
Command relationships should be clearly defined. Bases can be of 3 types: Forward operating bases,
Combat outposts, and Patrol bases. The nature of the mission and size of the unit (Company etc) determines
the size and location of the base.
FORWARD OPERATING BASES
Sometimes the nature of operations, the terrain, the size of the AO as well as the size of the units necessitate
a separate forward placed operating base for the Battalion which itself commands controls, communicates
and supports deployed units. It provides intelligence support, sustainment, replenishment and personnel
support as well as functions also as staging area. Each area of operation may have one forward base. A
forward operating base acts as a secure location for the planners and command staff so as to plan operations,
provides security to the local populace and acts as a deterrent for the insurgents nearby by hampering their
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
mobility and subjecting them to an increased threat. We can have both Brigade FOBs and Battalion Fobs. In
the case of Bde FOBs they act as rear areas for Bn Companies which are forwardly deployed. FOBs should
maintain either secured road/water or air sustainment capability.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
Observation posts are reinforced with fire power and combat teams and hence take the shape of a combat
outpost. They are positioned at strategic points inside insurgent-0dominated areas , are company or platoon
sized, possess the ability to conduct combat operations on a limited scale and are in contact with base
headquarters as well as horizontally with other combat outposts , in effect networking both horizontally and
vertically soi as to:
Cut of insurgent logistical lines
Provide security to the local populace in the immediate neighborhood of the COP
Maintain direct contact with the local populace and hence keep an eye on the activities / strangers
These are not possible from remote bases operating from outside insurgent dominated areas. The negative
factors in this type of arrangement are increased risk to the soldiers and limited area of operations ,
nevertheless proper networking among the combat outposts helps greatly in keeping a grip on the
insurgency and the kill ratio as well as protecting the populace. It is very important to plan the position of
the outpost, the emplacement, complete with secure logistical lines, communication systems and
reinforcement capability. Each COP is assigned a sector of the AO.
Outposts may be employed—
• To secure key lines of communication or infrastructure.
• To secure and co-opt the local populace.
• To gather intelligence.
• To assist the government in restoring essential services.
• To force insurgents to operate elsewhere.
Priorities of Work
Certain factors need to be considered while establishing combat outposts.
The selected area must be free of noncombatants , civilians and the like.
To hinder the enemy’s movement , obstacles to his entry to streets , underground passages,marked
areas in rough/jungle terrain should be emplaced.
Carefully choose positions to set up weapons to cover likely avenues of approach.
Clearing fields of fire
Cover and camnouflage.
Obstacles/barriers may be integrated with weapons so as to be auto-triggered.
There should be easy access between positions and the routes must not hinder speed.
PATROL BASES
Patrol bases are secured areas which serve as long period halting points for patrols. They may be permanent
or temporary.
1. Sometimes it is important for patrols to remain hidden or halt all operations as information is
received that they are liable to be detected.
2. Again detailed study of an area requires long periods of reconnaissance so they need a place to
hide,and then later launch recce ops.
3. After long periods of recce operations,the troops get exhausted and hence retire to a patrol base for
food,sleep or rest,weapons/equipment maintenance
4. After detailed reconnaissance the patrol commander needs to sit down with his senior NCOs and
devise future course of action.
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5. In cases when the patrol is in enemy area after infiltrating the area,in small groups , they set up
temporary patrol bases where they can later meet and regroup and make further plans.
6. Finally a patrol base is a good launching pad for consecutive or concurrent operations such as
7. raids,reconnaissance,surveillance and ambush.
TERRAIN
Key terrain factors to consider include the following:
The terrains may add to defense by virtue of its natural characteristics.Hence conduct a thorough
study of the terrain.To enhance its natural defensive characteristics more utilize artificial
obstacles/barriers.
The patrol bases must have all access routes to it , by road or waterways , under control.The same
applies for all lines of supply and communication and civilian access.
The best technique for base defense is the perimeter defense.
RSTA AND ISR OPERATIONS
Intelligence drives operations and vice versa. In effect the enemy situation drives operations. For the enemy
situation to drive operations we must have perfect intelligence about the enemy. To this end Reconnaissance
, Surveillance and Target Acquisition should work hand in hand with ISR SO AS TO ACHIEVE PERFECT
SYNCHRONIZATION in the deployment and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation and
dissemination of intelligence.RSTA/ISR should focus on the priority intelligence
requirements.Recconnaisance and Surveillance confirm or deny threat actrivities,plans,courses of action
which were gauged by the Commander and his staff during planning , war gaming and sessions with the
collection manager and counterintelligence speciaslists.By focusing RSTA/ISR on the commanders needs,
his critical and priority intelligence requirements we can deploy and use RSTA/ISR sensors and assets in the
most optimum fashion , totally integrated and synchronized resulting in timely and accurate information,
combat information and intelligence to be disseminated to the targeting platforms.
Every operation is initiated as per plan and this planning has certain decision points.RSTA/ISR should take
these critical decision points in perspective , primary perspective and focus all collection platforms and
assets on these points and see to it that al information linked to these decision points are gathered , nothing
left out and disseminated in time to the commander. Again for this synchronization is essential. Targeting
requires proper detection of the target and evaluation of its importance. Further there should be sufficient
reason to nominate the target to the attack platforms. To this end synchronized RSTA/ISR operations collect
all possible information about the target and pass it on for evaluation and thereafter if the target satisfies the
criteria for nomination the intelligence on the target is passed on to the targeting platform. After an attack on
the target, kinetic/nonkinetic attack or exploitation operations, RSTA/ISR is required to assess the
effectiveness of the attack.
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UNIT PROTECTION:
We will define unit not be size or specific function but by any military group capable of offensive, defensive
or stability operations.
Unit protection is the process through which combatant and noncombatant personnel, physical assets and
information are protected from adversarial threats including adversarial multidisciplinary intelligence
threats.Multi layered, active/passive, lethal/non-lethal offensive and defensive measures are adopted for this
purpose. Protection is composed of a variety of active and passive measures (for example, weapons, pre-
emption, and warning) in the air, land, sea, and space domains. The goal of unit protection is preventing
attacks on the three unit resources , manpower, physical assets and information so that the capability of the
unit to maintain its fighting potential without any degradation by the enemy is constantly maintained.
The Army must:
Detect the threat
Asses the threat capability to degrade the units combat capabilities
Decide on protective measures , whether offensive or defensive
Act to implement these protective measures
Recover in very less time from any damage inflicted by the adversary so that technical
countermeasures and tactical procedures may be employed so as to bring back the unit to full
operational status in the least time possible.
In order for unit protection to be 100% effective we need to ensure that the following are taken into
prioritized consideration by the unit commander:
Persistent surveillance
Actionable intelligence
Precise target recognition
Interrogation
Commanders situational awareness
Accurate identification of unit security related intelligence gaps
In addition unit Command and Control must be properly defined as C2 aids the Commander to take proper
decisions in the light of what needs to be done exactly to protect the unit and ensure that this is carried out
efficiently.
Protection: Protection is a function which should be given a holistic treatment.Protection should not
separately focus on weapons deployment , pre-emption and warning.All three must be integrated.No one is a
separate entity.Protection must be proactive.In fact unit protection should never always be pasisive but must
also include active measures.Intellighence , counterintelligence and an admixture of military and cross
government capabilities should be employed to the full.Installation/camp protection should look beyond the
perimeters.Just employing passive measures(check posts,access control,perimeter security , guard functions ,
lighting) and OPSEC isn’t sufficient.Surveillance teams , counterintelligence operatives should foray outside
into adjoining areas , even areas of interest located far from the unit , and the communities in these areas soi
as to gain information/intelligence and counter enemy reconnaissance/HUMINT/subversive
/sabotage/terrorist activities.Counterintelligence should be employed to screen contract workers and
suppliers.A counterintelligence review should be conducted periodically on unit personnel.Red teaming
should be taken up by the commander and his staff to ascertain unit vulnerabilities and critical areas.
Add to Detect , Assess and Decide the functions Act and Recover and we have the foundation for a
complete protection system on which toi base our decisions regarding collection of intelligence , fortifying
and strengthening/hardening our bases,decide on the optimum courses of actionsd , employ forces optimally
to act on these decisions and in case of an attack which could not be prevented , recover in the shortest
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possible time without the base collapsing totally during/after the attack using redundancy measures/backups
and thorough protection of critical assets.We should also remember protection has yet another
dimension.The enemy might know the porotective measures we have employed using intelligence and might
attempt to block /prevent/deter our post-attack or pre-emptive actions , hence protection must take these into
account also.
Protection means ‘’time-critical tacrtical operatiuons’’ ..not just tactical operations.Protection should be a
360 degrees hemispherical capabilkity , meaning protection from land , air and sea based attacks.
Foir protection intelligence is critical as everything needs to be known about the enemy , envirobnment and
self.The last factor is determined by counterintelligence vreviews , technical experts and red teaming.DAD
abilities must be thoroughlky integrated to handle attacks fro m land , air,information ,
electronic,CBRNE,and intelligence domains of the enemy.This integrated approach heightens the
commanders situational awareness consuiiderably , thus acting as a forc e and decision-superiority enbabler
thus leading to optimum effective course odf acrtion/s by the Commander with a decisive finish.
Thus it is clear from the above that protection must be proactive , intelligence-led and an integrated
approach.
Objectives of unit protection are:
Install a warning system
Intelligence preparation of all areas adjoining the base ,camp , the route along which the troops movement
takes place –in fact it must be made mandatory for units intelligence section to keep an updated file on the
intelligence preparation of the entire area surrounding the base/troop movement route whether or not there is
a perception of threat.IPB should include , among other things:
Protection must be proactive , lethal and nonlethal both.
Intelligence is the primary tool in protection
Increase active/passive protection measures
Rapid seizure of initiatives
Rapid transition to decisive operations
Rapid decision making capacity as tactical operations in unit protection are ‘’time-critical’’.Damage
to our forces in combat on the battlefdield or in case of an assymetrical combat , in hilly/urban/jungle
terrain but away from base is different than that of an attack on an unsuspecting troop movement or
installation/base itself where an attack means catching us off guard , unprepared and things move so
fast due to the element of surprise our forces do not have enough time to recover , regroup and
counterattack in time to thwart the enemy.The enemy may have critical assets in mind when they
attack the installation/camp/base.Thus tactical operations are ‘’time-critical’’.Hence to successfully
thwart an attack ,should our defences fail …we must be prepared to execute time critical axctions
without falling prey to the shock due to the surprise element.This is more so say in the case of an
attack on an unsuspecting convoy or troop column.
Reducing vulnerability to minimum
Identifying critical assets , protecting them priority of all unit protection systems
Understanding that most operations will be in a non-linear unconventional operational environment
and hence all intelligence , counterintelligence , surveillance , reconnaissance , target determination
and nomination, combat oiperations,passive and active protection measures , red teaming , and
recovery options should be seen from this perspective.
Should understand that a complete 360 degree hemispherical protection system must be installed
which must be a thoroughly integrated intelligence and operations function keeping the factors DAD
in perspective and the factors which come next , viz..Act , Finish and Recover
The following types of threats should be expected in any future conflict-
Attacks –air based/heliborne—on logistical systems.
Critical assets will be targeted with precision munitions.
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Staging areas , critical choke points may be targeted using missiles with medium-range to ballistic
capabilities.
Random attacks so as to be unpredictable, IED attacks, terrorist and insurgent attacks and special
forces attacks may be conducted with twin objectives or any of them...viz...Effect
destruction/undermine our fighting capability and to force the commander to waste resources,
ammunition, and unneceesarily divert forces to protect facilities and personnel which in fact are not
threatened.
We must remember we are now facing a fourth generation enemy , who will attempt to put in use every
means including confusion and deception to overcome the asymmetry/mismatch by increasing uncertainty
and making us more susceptible to the element of surprise.The enemy will resort to continuous , random,and
non-decisive engagements.The enemy will randomly and continuously threaten and interdict lines of
operations and communications.They will use camouflage and deception to to reduce weapon engagement
rangers and degrade our forces advantages in ‘’stand-off’’ engagements.There are two objectives herein—
first to confuse us so much that we cannot execute the targeting process correctly , target
determnination.identification.nomination becomes very difficult against an elusive enemy employing
random attack methods , and secondly frequent loss of contact with this elusive enemy has more negative
consequences than that which would have occurred with a conventional more predictable echeloned enemy.
HUMINT and CI are two disciplines which help in detecting enemy capabilities, intent and
countering enemy intelligence collection activities. In a typical Army Intelligence structure, the
intelligence assets are located at Div and Bde levels , with the Bde having a HQ company and
Intelligence Bn , each Bn catering to a specific collection/counterint discipline. For example
there can be a Ops Bn , a reconnaissance Bn , a tactical exploitation Bn,a forward collection Bn
,or a strategic SIGINT Bn.There is also a Div MI Bn and a theater intelligence Bde.
Military intelligence brigades coordinate, manage, and direct intelligence and surveillance;
they conduct collection management, all-source intelligence analysis, production; and they
disseminate information in support of national, joint, interagency, multi-national, regional
combatant command, and Army service component requirements.
HUMINT and CI are indispensable to thwart enemy intelligence activities, to conduct force
protection in a optimum manner, to keep our forces combat-ready to deliver precision strikes and
to always keep the decision advantage in our favor with the element of surprise by the enemy
being put at the minimum. Both disciplines are time intensive and inter-human interactions over
prolonged periods have turned the tradecraft into a very specialized skill involving human
perception, behavior, psychology and other traits. Unlike other disciplines like
SIGINT,IMINT,MASINT,GEOINT HUMINT and CI have in common human sources , the
human element and hence is susceptible to error , deception by the enemy , fraught with risks and
psychological stress including human vices predicated by money and other factors which are
usually the byproduct of information-transactions (quid-pro-quo).But it is exactly these problems
which prompts intelligence professionals to come up with newer tactics so as to minimize these
negative factors and the resulting exploration and research in the field of HUMINT and CI leads
to refined methodologies , TTPs which have been found to be effective in many cases.
. Unit protection must integrate the protective attributes of different Army Corps. The capabilities in brief of
the Corps are as follows:
The Air Defense artillery provides protection by acting as a warning system , intercepting threats
directed from air in the form of missiles and aerial attacks (heliborne..etc) and also provide locational
grid information for otrher supporting forces to target.
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Military Police provides security by executing proactive intelligence led policing.
Engineer Corps protect our force by contributing to its mobility and countermobility thus
heightening its survivability.provides the capabilities of survivability, mobility, and countermobility
to the force.
Military intelligence provides security to our force by adequate synchronized utilization/deployment
of ISR assets and counterintelligence capability
Signals protects our command and control nodes directing/controlling
communiucation,computers,and intelligence operations. Siugnals intelligence directly supports
HUMINT operations to validate information,increase the situational understanding oif the
Commander.
Field Artillery provides security to the force by contributing to the direct/indirect
firepower,predicting impact points.
Ordnance Corp contributes to recovery by deploying its ordnance disposal systems.
Unit Protection Functions
It’s very true that conventional military threats exist and are given priority in intelligence activities but the
existence and threat capabilities of asymmetric , nonconventional threats cannot be undermined. Add to
these new emerging threats of this category. At the tactical level it is very important to address this type of
threat by determining its identity, leadership, capabilities, tracking its location and gauging its intent.
We need to detect the enemy’s entire range of hostile activity including intelligence collection and
counterintelligence activities,use this information to assess its capabilities,intent to arrive at the common
operation picture COP which brings to light the relationship between the terrain,enemy,mission,troops,time
and the civil environment thus enabling the commander to enter the enemy’s decision cycle,gauge its
intent,deliver warning to force s in the area and develop suitable courses of action.After the asses step is
over the commander moves on to the decide function wherein an action is decided upon or any existing
action is altered or monitiored.Therafter the act function takes over where the course of action decided upon
is implemented by tasking the tactical fighting unit to deliver kinetic.nonkinetic attack on nominated targets
or passive protection measures..all with the intent to protect the force.Protecting the force should not entirely
be passive in nature,the soldiers need to go out and attack nominated targets so as to deter attacks or fail
plans to attack our installations.
CI/HUMINT Functions:
Recommending countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of
actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.
Threat intent
Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
Identify threat C2 nodes
Identify threat logistic routes
Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts
Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises
Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control
Identify political/administrative figures that support threat ideology
Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
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Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.
Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of attack.
Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
Gauge IED detonation methods/means
Gauge IED timings
Possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Staging areas
Safe houses
Weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
Find out what supplementary operations threat may resort to
Recommending countermeasures to threat IED
Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW
Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
WARNING
(a) Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a
timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the
existence ofd a threat and subsequent dissemination.
(b) Warning is of two types:
Defensive warn
Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the
installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be
digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as
interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy
action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the
enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a
method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy
in its tracks...
It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific,. In addition
to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated; meaning the level of warning may
assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate
that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet
operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and
cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The warning system must have the following features:
1. It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.
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2. It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets,
command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.
3. It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our
installation , its C2 and critical assets.
4. Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.
5. Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes
6. Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
7. Provide warning of threat logistic routes.
8. Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,
9. Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs
10. Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat
11. Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
12. Provide warning of threats history
13. Provide warning of threat movements
14. Provide warning of threat leadership
15. Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
16. Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
17. Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.
18. Provide warning of the expected time of attack.
19. Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
20. Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
21. Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
22. Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means
23. Provide warning of IED timings
24. Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration
25. Provide warning of Staging areas
26. Provide warning of Safe houses
27. Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations
28. Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
29. Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to
30. Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-
We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active measures
to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area
Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2
mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated
with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlled lethal/non-lethal
measures.
As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles
movement inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within
buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be effectively protected by
employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures
should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected
military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical
barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence
we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up
specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2
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system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success
depends on a great deal on intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the
remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to
apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian
contractors. Or we can effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up
a mapping of probable anti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could
attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the
criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our
vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if
damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment
coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give
adequate unit protection.
Future Modular Force leaders must be trained to aggressively manage information and instill trust in the
output of decision support tools that automated systems provide. Other major implications include adoption
of a lifetime of education paradigm and the creation of knowledge centers configured to support professional
leader education. Leader development questions include, but are not limited to-
(1) How do we develop leaders ready to deal with the complexity of the contemporary operating
environment, threats, and interagency implications?
(2) How can we develop more adaptive leaders, versatile in UP operations?
(3) How do we provide collaborative, distributed training problem solving and decision aids that
empower battle command to support commanders, as well as staffs to advising commanders during planning,
preparation, rehearsal, and execution of UP exercises and operations?
(4) How are leaders enabled to know the terrain and weather and appreciate their tactical
implications for tactical concealment, employment of weapons, mobility, and seeking positions of advantage?
(5) How are leaders empowered to understand the operational environment as well as, or better than,
the threat in order to execute UP detect, assess, and decide functions?
(6) How will units enable leaders to know the enemy, friendly unit locations, and their capabilities?
(7) How will units adapt to emerging UP situations more quickly than an adversary?
Note: UP is not force protection, although the application of protection capabilities will positively
affect force protection. By integrating the protection capabilities outlined in this CCP, a commander,
and consequently, the force will be offered superior protection abilities.
ISR assets require the flexibility to detect a wide range of emerging threats. While the ability to
detect conventional military threats remains important, the ability to address the asymmetric, non-
conventional threat gains importance. Tracking the location and activity and predicting the intent of
individual threats is a new challenge at the tactical echelon. The following are future enhanced capabilities
to address the future environment and will aid in the execution of the UP detect function.
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HUMINT AND CI KNOWLEDGE STRUCTRURES, LIBRARIES AND DATABASES:
There should exist knowledge centers pertaining to all HUMINT and CI acquired intelligence information at
the theater, departmental and strategic levels. Data stored in this system will range from historical to near-
imminent hostilities data. Included will be a separate future prediction (whether linear progression or
nonlinear) section delivering warning data. Commanders, intelligence staff, operations staff and those with
access permission to compartmentalized and classified information and a need-to-know clearance can access
the data in these systems to satisfy their information requirements. Systems must be able to perform source
and initial information analysis and have the communications capabilities to receive and pass data including
digital imagery to analysts, consumers, and other HUMINT collectors in real-time and on the move.
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Intelligence-Operations Dynamic.
Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.
—Carl von Clausewitz
Clausewitz’s reflections on the simplicity of the tasks in war, yet, the difficulty in
accomplishing these tasks is especially applicable in the integration of operations and
intelligence. History is riddled with examples of tragic results when armies engage in battle
with poor or incomplete intelligence. We can also see examples of numerically inferior
forces completely overwhelming their enemy due to the synergistic effects caused by the
correct application of forces at the right place and right time based on a key piece of
intelligence in the correct hands.
IPB, all-source, and single-source analysis are used to template adversarial OB. HUMINT elements analyze
operational taskings to determine the best collection methods to employ in satisfying CCIRs (PIRs and
FFIRs) and IRs.Intelligence operators must understand military operations well.
It is generally assumed by the members of the Intel and Ops community that intelligence and operations are
separate functions and occur independently.This is a major error on the part of the two communities.,in fact
intelligence drives operations and vice versa.Intelligence and operations should not be seen as separate and
distinct but as parts of a whole..the objective should be to ‘’integrate’’ them..in other words synchronize
intelligence with operations.
In the military world , or for that matter in all our defence and offensive effort we bank heavily on
intelligence and that must be priority.We cannot affort to lack unity of effort between intelligence and
operations if we have the objective to win a battle or any tactical operation.Synchronizing intel with ops lead
to team spirit , an unity in effort.With this as the predicate a common goal is thus established.
Just as intelligence drives operations similarly operations should feed into intelligence.The operator should
understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence.Operations planning should involve intelligence
faculties..the concept of ‘’give me this information..thats it’’..or in other words ‘’need to know’’ concept
should not be the mainstay in ops planning.Intelligence is frequently used to ‘’fill the gaps’’..well this leads
to the concept that it is separate..outside the operations cycle..a supportive entity..NO—THE
INTELLIGENCE CYCLE SHOULD RESIDE WITHIN THE OPS CYCLE FOR TARGETING TO
SUPPORT STRIKE AND RESTRIKE OPS . Intelligence collection,production and dissemination should fit
inside the ops cycle..in other words the intelligence cycle needs to be compressed.
In order to make an operation successful we need timely,accurate and usable intelligence.Accuracy of
intelligence is the prime principle.If intelligence is accurate then we have real solid factual information on
which to base our strategic/operational or tactical decisions.But one should take note that accuracy is a
relative term considering the current scenario on the battlefield.Say for example a fighter pilot is being
assailed by a SAM system.For him intelligence about the location is highly time sensitive..he cant afford to
take chances with the gunner for any extended period of time.Here the time factor is most important for
him.Now take the case of an enemy radar which has been located by a reconnaissance patrol.They convey
the information to the operational planner whose task is to assist in the targeting of the radar by passing on
intelligence to a strike aircraft.It does not matter how soon he receives information from the patrol about the
radar..here priority is accurate co-ordinates of the radar..the patrol team must not only locate the radar but
also pass on the locational co-ordinates accurately.Then only can the operator task the aircraft to strike the
target.So here accuracy is more important than the time dimension.
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As in any joint operation, intelligence and operations have a cyclical relationship. This dynamic relationship
is particularly important in COIN—intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate
additional intelligence. The reverse is also true. COIN efforts conducted without accurate intelligence may
alienate the population, which results in their offering less information. Because intelligence and operations
are so closely related, it is important for collectors to be linked directly to the analysts and operators they
support. Similarly, analysts must remain responsive to their supported units’ intelligence requirements.
Collectors should not passively wait for operators to submit requirements; rather, they should closely
monitor the OE and recommend requirements based on their understanding of operators’ needs.
In general, collection focuses on the populace, insurgents, and HN. Several factors are particularly
important for ISR operations in COIN environments, including: a focus on the local population, collection
occurring at all echelons, localized nature of insurgencies, all counterinsurgents prepared to function as
potential collectors, and insurgent use of complex terrain. Given the potential challenges faced by
intelligence assets in collecting information against insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must effectively
employ all available intelligence collection capabilities.
Due to the various methods that may or may not be known about the opponent, asymmetric warfare requires
actionable intelligence available to the warfighter in a timely manner for operational execution of a mission.
Intelligence effectiveness for Army operations is measured by its timeliness, relevance, accuracy, and
predictability. Effective intelligence in asymmetric warfare allows for commanders and Soldiers to target
and narrow the scope of actionable intelligence (in contrast to other adversarial requirements). There are
variety of techniques used to collect actionable intelligence which are best suited at particular scenarios and
time frames. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of the intelligence gathering methods that is most
diverse, flexible, and cost effective which also makes it the most universal method. HUMINT can use every
Soldier as a sensor (ES2) and intelligence officer, thus training and education should be more widely
available for Soldiers to be more effective during warfare.
What we find is that operations planning utilizes intelligence on a ‘’need –to-know’’ basis.In other words
‘’just tell me what I need to know’’.The tendency is to fill in the missing gaps.Treating intelligence as
separate.This should not be the case.Intelligence must be fully integrated in operations.Intelligence should
reside within the operations cyclical.As intelligence drives operations,the fluid uncertain nature of evolving
operations leads to further intelligence requirements.An intelligence feed of an arms cache leading to a
tactical raid operation might yield more information about hideouts from captured enemy personnel.Now
humint or other sensors may work on this information to gather intelligence leading again to a fresh tactical
operation.
It is imperative operators understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence personnel,their
operations and again the intelligence community must be well versed in operations matters.This way on
determining the intelligence requirements the operators can request intelligence assets most suited to their
task and on the other hand knowing the nature of operations the intelligence collection manager can properly
and optimally allocate the resources most suitable for that particular type of operation. Hence intelligence
personnel must be included in every aspect of operations planning and execution. Only if this is achieved
there will be complete synchronization between intelligence and operations. It should be clearly understood
that each is the enabler of the other.
Education and training of both operations and intelligence personnel must be configured with the need to
integrate ops and intel in mind.Peacetime training can be carried forward if a crisis erupts.That is to say
battle-condition intelligence operations/functions are practiced in peace time.This will enable the
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commander and his staff to plan in wartime much efficiently.Not only this the commander and his staff will
be able to study wartime intelligence operations and assess more satisfactorily,given this peacetime training.
The unit commander can also create small intel-ops cells manned by one operational personnel and two
intelligence personnel.The team can now study the unit plans,missions,tactics and devise all possible enemy
reactions,attack modes based on this information.The 3-man team is rotated among all the soldiers in the
unit which renders full training for the entire unit members.Thus the soldiers get an ‘’insiders-view’’ of their
unit from the perspective of the enemy.Now in the event of real operations and where time is very limited
both intel and ops personnel can sit down together and derive good solutions to prob in hand as now they
understand each other’s domain more better.Moreover the unit soldiers now are trained to predict enemy
COAs corresponding to various scenarios.Apart from these , the unit also gets the ability to study its own
plans,tactics and thus discover vulnerabilities and other weaknesses which may then be rectified.
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Actionable Intelligence
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Actionable Intelligence
Information superiority is a force multiplier. We should strive to
have information superiority and prevent the same for the
adversary. Intelligence officers and personnel conduct collection
operations to gather information which ultimately is intelligence
on the adversary. This intelligence aids in identifying and
destroying high payoff targets. But insurgency is unlike a
conventional war. Conventional intelligence platforms and
processes have not really lived up to expectations in the war
against insurgency forcing us to rethink—to transform the
intelligence and here is where Actionable Intelligence comes in.
Yes HUMINT is the preferred mode of intelligence collection but it should never replace the other forms of
intelligence. We can cue other intelligence disciplines while preparing an intelligence summary or
assessment using HUMINT.HUMINT is more preferable as face-face communication yields more robust
results. For example interrogation, tactical questioning, debriefing –all these help us to gain a first-hand
insight in the problem at hand..we are able to collect first hand intelligence. This direct interaction concept
has time and again proved that HUMINT is indispensable in collecting intelligence, more importantly
actionable intelligence. Take the scenario of a unit coming under fire from an enemy inside the perimeters of
a village. A cordon and search operation leads to the apprehending of a local who may or may not be co-
operative. In the latter case tactical questioning may yield the location of a house in the village which
contains the enemy. Thus with first hand actionable intelligence the enemy can be liquidated. Now on
further questioning and apprehension of a couple more villagers with irregular behavior the unit HUMINT
officer discerns they have information of counterintelligence value , so he hands them over to the custody of
the tactical HUMINT cell for further interrogation , which could possibly lead to the revelation of more
enemy members identification and finally the network can be busted.
In the process of dissemination of actionable intelligence TIME is of essence. The war fighter must be
supplied the exact intelligence at the right time to clear a kill-zone. Editing, Vetting and quality control can
be kept for a later stage and limited processes of the two must exist at the grass root level. Form is less
important than the speed and accuracy with which actionable intelligence is delivered to the warfighter.Fine;
you have to write an intelligence summary. But as the decision cycle is very compressed in this information
age the analyst cannot afford to waste time over grammatical errors, punctuation, form. More important the
intelligence summary/assessment should not be routinely reactive but proactive. Consider that the analyst is
writing out a summary of the developments in his area of operations AO in the past 24 hours. He details to
other units what type of attack it was, the magnitude of the attack, the casualties etc.,This is essentially a
reactive report. Had he , besides all these , included in the report his own perception of the attack based on
former attacks and the characteristic war fighting traits of the enemy he could have postulated
trends/patterns and what could happen in the next 24-48 hours , the other units would have been better
informed and prepared in advance and also it is possible they create their own actionable intelligence reports
by resorting to more intelligence databases/history and assessments coming from higher ups of the enemy’s
TTPs.
Tunnel vision of intelligence officers is another problem that needs to be addressed immediately. The flow
of communication from the grass roots level to the higher ups and vice versa in the MI community is
frequently a timing breakdown. With the result that the intelligence officers concern themselves with only
the happenings in their own specific piece of the area of ops AO.Say the intelligence unit in one area of
operation receives an intelligence report rather late as it has already been auctioned upon by another unit. An
all source analysis system was dedicated mostly at the division and corps level. That is to say at the battalion
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level very few analyst are there who can rarely take out time to make a detailed assessment of the actionable
intelligence which arrives from higher ups , even if on time. With the result the report gets lost in yet another
stack of reports to be analyzed.
A multilayered HUMINT system to effectively tackle insurgency can be created. It will consist of local
villagers, turned former insurgents, paid informers, double agents, intelligence officers and torture
interrogation methods. Thus it will be possible to supply immediate actionable intelligence to Indian strike
forces. Using the locals against the insurgents is demoralizing for the latter. These locals can act as guides,
informers and secret agents. Target folders can be created, the key insurgent leader, logistics and safe houses
identified and couple this with information by cueing other intelligence disciplines and conducting an all-
source intelligence assessment—we can then zero in to destroy the insurgent networks. The locals can
further spread the word around in keeping with the psychological ops of the intelligence deptt.Isolating the
insurgents from the local villagers is the key.
We should not compare the efficacy of one intelligence discipline or skill set over another in obtaining
actionable intelligence.HUMINT SIGINT CI MASINT IMINT..all contribute to the process. One
intelligence discipline starts the process and the others validate or refute the information gathered. For
example to validate a HUMINT piece of information we might require SIGINT to confirm it and we might
require IMINT to further assess it by imagery reports. Thereafter we might have to conduct an all-source
analysis/combination to prepare the final actionable intelligence report for dissemination to the ground strike
units. Thus what we need is an optimum synchronization of all intelligence disciplines and the process
should be evolving continuously. There should be a provision of feedback so as to alter the collection plan if
necessary. We should never defeat the process of all-source intelligence analysis or else we can never gain
actionable intelligence in time. In the MI domain deconfliction is very necessary and the tendency to
consider one intelligence discipline as superior to others thus leading to compartmentation and lack of
information exchange should be avoided. One intelligence discipline, regardless of type of conflict, be it
conventional warfare or asymmetric, must be coordinated with other intelligent disciplines to be truly
effective in order to gain actionable intelligence.
Every Soldier as a Sensor (ES2)
A technique that puts the Soldier at the center of gathering actionable
intelligence will lead to success on the battlefield and improve battle space
intelligence capabilities. This technique will fundamentally change the
intelligence culture of one that focuses on certain intelligence personnel to
one that focuses on Soldiers and commanders at every level to gain and
maintain greater situational understanding of the battle space.
Current counterinsurgency tactics that outflows from digital collectors to
Soldiers collecting information is the key to transforming the military
intelligence community. Soldiers are on the ground in the neighborhoods of
Iraq engaging the local communities; these individuals are the most important
sensors of all.
To increase mission effectiveness, network centric environments can be used by Soldiers to record and
report actionable intelligence to commanders who can use national assets to analyze and support their
targeting process in the battle space. This allows for diverse, flexible, and actionable information
management. Network centric environments provide a battle command framework to pioneer effective
gathering and exploitation of actionable intelligence by Soldiers on the battlefield.
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The collection , analysis , protection and sharing of information on the position and movements of the
enemy and on the weather and area where the operation is being conducted—all these go into the production
of actionable intelligence.Intelligence actions , be it tactical or strategic exist at all levels and most of the
individuals tasked with collecting intelligence are at Bn level or above.A transformation is required right
here.The individual soldier on the ground should be the prime sensor.Every soldier should be a sensor.That
is to say not only the Military intelligence community but every soldier should be indoctrinated in the art of
collecting intelligence.Actionable intelligence is extremely important for mission success.Information which
is not accurate and which is not on time can cause mission failure and cost lives.Hence it is the duty of every
soldier to contribute to the actionable intelligence collection process.They should act as the
collectors.Synchronized interrogation(wherein the interrogator and the interrogated reach a level of
understanding without the use of coercive methods) , the support of the local people and the individual
soldier as the sensor—all these portray the near perfect combination for actionable intelligence
collection.What we are dealing with here is Human-Centric Operations. Yes , it will be quite a challenge to
train every soldier in the methods of intelligence but it is not necessary to train them in all aspects of military
intelligence.When they come into contact with the local people , they should be at least skilled enough to
elicit information instead of posing as a threat , using words efficiently coupled with respect of local
traditions.They should be alert enough to make a quick scan of the surroundings and see if anything is out of
the ordinary.They can build up a rapport with few or one of the families or even the village head.What we
require is training every soldier in basic HUMINT.If needed and when information is accurate and of
counterintelligence value they can be accompanied by tactical HUMINT teams…a 2 member team. With
time this new entrant in the field of military intelligence will get more accustomed to intelligence habits ,
will develop the acumen and then use all the intelligence resources to work more efficiently.What we now
have is a soldier who not only fights with weapons but also knowledge
Human intelligence-centric operations are part of the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) discipline. There is an
overall lack of military intelligence personnel, so training leaders, organizing intelligence cells, and training
Soldiers adequately so they may accurately obtain actionable intelligence, while still engaged in combat
operations is a challenge. Using HUMINT as a platform in intelligence collection methods requires that
training and education become readily available for Soldiers and commanders to be able to assess, analyze,
support, and target when engaged in combat operations.
India has used a multitude of intelligence extraction methods that have proven to be the greatest obstacle for
Soldiers and commanders obtaining actionable intelligence. Captured enemy prisoners of war and local
civilian populations have been used to coercively extract actionable intelligence. These methods have been a
detriment to strategic success as shown by the Philippine conflict in the Spanish-American war and the Iraq
conflict during the ongoing Global War on Terror. However, the technique that has been the most successful
today is Soldiers collecting actionable intelligence on the battlefield.
HUMINT is the most preferred method for many Soldiers at the brigade and below. Human Intelligence is
preferred because the information is immediate and your source can lead you directly to a target. When you
have a source that has been vetted, the source understands that he or she must accompany you to the location.
If he is unable to accompany, he will be detained in the unit area until the mission is complete. This ensures
that accurate information is portrayed and obtained correctly by the source. One challenge of this system is
the fact that many sources fear for his or her life.They are afraid of the consequences if their peers
discovered they were giving actionable intelligence to the United States soldiers. This obstacle has been
overcome by protecting the source’s identity or by providing compensation to the source for the information.
Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) are coupled with units to accompany them on many of these missions.
THTs are a reliable source of information, intelligence, and are a great asset to the commander.
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In relating actual intelligence to actionable intelligence we have to consider several variables. Time,
accuracy, legitimacy, and bureaucracy are the areas we will discuss here. Because situations change rapidly
time is very important for any intelligence to be used as actionable intelligence by the Soldiers on the ground
at the brigade and below. For instance if intelligence comes in that there is a high value target in a house in a
near-by village, most times a unit will have less than 24 hours to search that house and detain the target.
That may seem like a long time, but you have to consider that the unit has to put together a patrol, get more
information on the village as a whole, plan the operation, rehearse actions on the objective, etc. In the same
instance we would have to make sure the intelligence is accurate. The unit planning the mission must have
the correct house to go to and information on and description of the target. If that unit goes into the wrong
house they can potentially upset the local people, or worse yet allow the target to get away. Legitimacy is
probably the biggest draw-back to some methods of human intelligence. For instance a patrol goes out and a
local civilian tells someone on that patrol that he knows there is a “bad guy” in a particular house. Many of
the local civilians will give information because they know the U.S. will give them money for information,
or they will provide false information on a person because they are mad at them for something. Validating
information is critical because of situations like this. For the Soldier on the ground one of the most, if not the
most, frustrating things is getting authorization to act on intelligence. The bureaucracy is crippling in many
cases. Although the levels of authorization for acting on intelligence are necessary to ensure units are doing
all the correct preparation, analysis, and to ensure validity of intelligence there have been many
opportunities lost due to the time it takes to get approval of a plan or authorization to conduct a mission.
(Please refer to my book Company level intelligence capability for the concept of bottom-up
intelligence flow, right from boot level)
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
HUMINT RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Commanders and their staffs need to disavow themselves of the thought process that one intelligence
discipline is necessarily better than another. They should base their decisions on the timeliness, relevance,
accuracy, and predictability of the intelligence provided to them with a revised estimate each time they
receive new information. Soldiers need to realize that every one of us is an intelligence sensor, a possible
HUMINT source. Every Soldier needs to view the Every Soldier is a Sensor Simulator Before the current
global war on insurgency, combat commanders preferred the use of HUMINT, especially from subordinate
unit sources, for developing actionable intelligence against asymmetric warfare targets. This preference was
due to the level of control over tasking intelligence collection assets and receiving processed intelligence.
However, great strides have been made during the current conflict to give combatant commanders at the
lowest level conduits to SIGINT resources at the national level to provide accurate and timely intelligence
support unforeseen to date. This change in attitude and access has leveled the preference for SIGINT and
HUMINT against asymmetric targets. Both are now seen as equally viable sources for actionable
intelligence. Warfighters continue to prefer to be supported with IMINT, UAVs, when executing operations
based on SIGINT and HUMINT to provide the commander on the ground with live sources they can use
themselves to aid in their operations. All the intelligence disciplines need to work more closely together in
the future to be truly effective against asymmetric warfare targets. This is one of the reasons the Directorate
for National Intelligence was created following 9/11. As civilian and military intelligence organizations
continue to improve their intercommunication capabilities, more tipping between disciplines will occur
leading to better all source products for commanders to act upon in the future. The continued effort to
provide combatant commanders with access to the highest levels of support against asymmetric targets will
improve actionable intelligence opportunities throughout the foreseeable future.
From the HUMINT definition, HUMINT inputs are information collected and provided by human
sources. The outputs desired are information regarding capabilitiesvulnerabilities, disposition, plans
and intentions. The general opinion is that HUMINT is a tool to confirm the existence of what has been
identified or located.We have our PIRs and IRs HANDED DOWN BY THE Commander , and we go out
collecting the information to cover these intelligence gaps.But the real value (primary value)of HUMINT
lies in the fact that it has the potential to gauge enemy intent.It can act as a very effective early warning tool.
This is what decision-makers will need for future operations.The secondary value of HUMINT is its
capability to confirm SIGINT and IMINT.
Till so far counterintelligence was having as its attribute to determine enemy intent.Well counterintelligence
uses the same techniques as HUMINT mostly.Thus whereas the defensive attribute of HUMINT is inherent
in its capabilities to visualize the enemy in blue-teaming mode , its offensive capabilities lie withing
counterintelligence practices.Counterintelligence takes this offensive mode further by penetrating/infiltrating
the enemy intelligence organization.
HUMINT or more specifically C-HUMINT has the capability to mould the adversarys perception about our
capabilities,intentions,plans,dispositions,strength the way we want it by employing methods of
deception,feeding misleading information….in other words CHUMINT specialists can either neutralize the
opponent (say,arrest him) or exploit him(either by "turning" an arrested enemy agent into a double agent, or
by feeding him a deception).
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C.Objectives
Intelligence covers both questions about what is where, and why and what for. HUMINT is generally
considered passive reporting whereas C-HUMINT agents engage in active countermeasures such as
investigation, raid and arrest. At this juncture it should be pointed out C-HUMINT and CI use nearly the
same techniques as HUMINT,the former two go few steps further by engaging in deception, infiltration and
penetration operations. But the baseline is HUMINT.Hence we can say HUMINT embraces both the
offensive and defensive aspects of military intelligence.
It is an established fact that there is an increasing trend in terrorist organizations turning to other criminal
enterprises to achieve their ends and vice versa. This very important observation is often gone unheeded.
Law enforcement intelligence should focus on terrorism issues and military intelligence should liaise with
law enforcement to access data/information about criminal enterprises which are suspected by the law
enforcement agencies to be in collusion with terrorist groups. Now here is where the earlier statement can be
rephrased as HUMINT embraces both the offensive and defensive aspects of military intelligence and law
enforcement. But contained in this statement is the problem that as both use nearly the same methods and
B.DEFICIENCIES
There is usually a good time lag between HUMINT reporting and final targeting.The individual time lags
between collection,processing and dissemination need to be reduced as much as possible without compromising
the quality of intelligence product.One case has ben cited earlier—bringing the analyst to boot level, teaming up
with the collectors for on the spot assessment which may be referred to higher-up analysts.The second factor is
the protection of the intelligence cycle itself and the system integrity as humans are involved and humans are not
infallible,they may be suspectible to deception,subversion or the sources may be enemy plants.Here is where we
need a robust CI element supporting HUMINT BY MONITORING STRONGLY ALL
OPERATIONS,PROCESSES ,SEQUENCES.Strict technical control,proper collection management preceded by
a clear definition of objectives and assembling an optimum quality-specific systemized architecture with
feedback loops and guided by doctrinal principles can only guarantee good results.
In HUMINT there is often information overload leading to susceptibility to deception. Stressful conditions may
force the HUMINTeer to overlook facts or to be led away due to the inherent lack of human capacity to rapidly
integrate and reference large amounts of information and here is where technological methods are resorted to but
they may or may not help in answering priority intelligence requirements. We can solve this by granting him
access to mobile communication architecture enabling him to execute data fusion, link analysis, cross referencing
and dissemination—software’s and mobile units are being used by American forces with success – the soldier (of
HUMINT specialty) on the ground reports, analyses and disseminates all intelligence with high
efficiency.HUMINT is very time intensive, particularly source operations. Development of HUMINT capability
requires top echelon approval and commitment. Command must appreciate this and the time requirement and
must be prepared to progress in this direction with patience and not solely depending on technological versions of
multidimensional intelligence for fast intelligence collection. The importance of HUMINT, sheer importance
cannot be overstated. Time is required to maintain records and databases of operations, source registries,
operation venues related to peace keeping, stability and low intensity conflict. This time factor, realization by top
command and governmental echelons and maintaining accurate,reliable,responsive and relational database –not
to mention deconfliction and synchronization…these are some of the challenges facing HMINT capability
development.
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techniques/sources there can be a conflict between agencies that use similar information and sources for
different purposes. We can take a hypothetical case here. Say a terrorist group has planned to raid a navy
installation and to this end they are on the lookout to procure naval servicemen uniforms and to this end they
break into a defense store and steal the required uniforms. Now this is a security intelligence problem if we
view it from an internal security perspective, objective being to prevent a terrorist attack. Again if viewed
from the police angle (law and order) it is a law enforcement problem—here the terrorists are ‘’criminals’’
to be booked and duly prosecuted in a court of law. Hence, answers have to be found about the
reconciliation of the competing information management requirements so that they do not come into conflict,
but complement each other.
Intelligence gathered via HUMINT techniques can have tactical,operational or strategic implications.No
information should be constrained to any one domain just because the intelligence requirement was
constrained to that domain.The efficiency of HUMINT depends on the efficient passage of the intelligence
information through the cycle,HUMINT control cells,higher headquarters,allies and if warranted with
adjacent headquarters (there may be requests for information from subordinate units).Hence data sharing
should be complete inter-operable without any constraints,whatever it may be and free from political or
administrative influence and ofcourse the commanders intelligence-trap syndrome,if any.
The finished intelligence should reach only the intended users. Herein access-control is of prime importance
as well as data security. In case of data-banks with users having direct access , the access should be
restricted to ‘’read-only’’ so that intelligence information is not maliciously altered.COMSEC is of prime
importance. Restricted number of administrators will have access to the data-storage units and there should
be a complete listing of each and every intended user and administrator. Source reliability and information
credibility should be continually assessed with source registrys,rosters and profile-banks integrated with the
system and continually updated. These information should be forwarded to CI specialists for continual
monitoring. of the sources.
D.HUMINT operations depend on successful transmission of gathered intelligence.This is extremely
important to understand.The HUMINT cell must easily share data with adjacent units,allies and higher
headquarters.Interoperability with other military ujnits , national agencies and allied HUMINT organizations
is of paramount importance.The communications between the HUMINT cell and all the others must be
secure and controls imposed to deny malicious intrusion in intelligence databases or extraction of
information.It is important to install software which will restrict and monitor a limited number of
administrators of the databases so as to contro the integrity of the system and all other users be granted only
the ‘read-only’ access.Such a HUMINT CIS design can limit enemy counterintelligence activities.The
analyst should also be adept in detecting deception,gauging source reliability and information credibility.
Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-
1. Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and
these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for
information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable
intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually
lacking.
2. Single-source collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception.Muliple sources need to be
deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms should be employed.
3. Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of
communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or DF’d)thus affecting
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adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence collection effort
gets degraded by the enemy.
4. Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and
aviation collection and jamming systems.
5. Inability of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of mutually
supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous support.
6. Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.
Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency successfully by
gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing first hand combat intelligence. This tactical
environment needs our fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an
asymmetric enemy.
When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at battalion level we usually
see that the battalion itself rarely executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves into sub-divisions which
take up strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are set up in these strategic
areas and these posts /sections create and maintain unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence
collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard
intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes.locational economics,
topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the political forces operating in the community
together with any other criminal enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.
E.Be Prepared to Dynamically Identify Opportunities and Exploit Success
HUMINT is generally considered ‘’passive’’—assets and platforms in the form of HUMINT operatives and
governmental/commercial (or official cover/unofficial cover) bases.This is an approach with a fallacy---
HUMINT should be proactive , sometimes defensive and not always reactive.A patrol debrief tells us there
is a sudden troop movement in named area of interest alpha and so we begin intelligence activity.Thats
reactive.Had we deployed HUMINT agents well in advance to look beyond the forward areas by
intermingling with the local population on a daily basis,eliciting information,keeping continuous contacts
with the sources/informers,liasing with local police,keeping a tab on political developments and opensource
intelligence like publications,newspapers,media,rallies,public meetings,information gleaned from the
internet about enemy govt policies,their arms purchases,their foreign policies with respect to our nation—all
these will definitely give the HUMINT agent a feel of the pulse in the area of operations and if there is any
‘’imminent’’ change in it (mind you,I didn’t say any ‘’change’’ in it like the reported deployment) he is
bound to catch the new pulse.Before deployment to an area of operations HUMINT and CI personnel should
move in first to secure the ‘’human terrain’’ as well as the physical terrain from the intelligence
perspective.This is what we can term –‘’intelligence and force projection capability’’ for an area of
operations which is unknown to us in all terms.This is frequently the condition when the tactical
commander successfully wraps up an operation in a defined AO and then is suddenly ordered to move into a
new area much forward and totally unknown and occupied by enemy provocateurs and agents.Had he
projected his force and available intelligence assets(after deploying his main assets for current operation
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and earmarking those available for projection taskings , like HUMIT,CI..) in the new AO while he was
conducting his ops in the present AO , he could have been well prepared when the order came in.Here
intelligence preparation of the battlefield will focus on both the local populace and the physical
environment.The intent is to act as a forewarning system for the to-be deployed troops.This is also a force-
protection intiative.Similarly when operations are being conducted in one Area of operations during a larger
campaign commanders pitch in all platforms of intelligence collection systems to accomplish a tactical
victory.That is fine and is the standard procedure in the event of a conflict.What the commander doesn’t
think is to extend his view beyond the Area of operations far away in hostile territory which is yet to see
our troops in action and which is in control of the enemy.We need to project a part of our intelligence
collection assets into that area/territory. Dynamic intelligence is the name of the game. able to focus
ahead to be able to detect and exploit opportunity.
Intelligence professionals need to think beyond the current mission to have resources in place to
confirm or deny the most likely and most dangerous second and third order effects of the
ongoing operation. We had, and still have, a tendency to devote collection and analytical assets to the current
operations. We saturate the target with assets and continue to stare at it until the mission is complete, and then
move assets and attention to the next mission. Doing business this way means giving the enemy a chance to
regroup and recover. It takes time to position assets, for them to collect, for the “take” to be processed, analyzed
and disseminated. Moving collection assets off the objective while the outcome is not yet in-hand, means having
to accept risk in coverage of the current op when moving the focus ahead. It is easy to say, tougher to do.
F. INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Before we delve into the problem of intelligence education for our soldiers we must first state a clear
mission statement on intelligence.
A mission statement describes the purpose and vision of an organization. It helps keep the organization
focused on its goals by providing a roadmap for the employees.In a similar fashion a clear concise mission
statement is needed for intelligence.We must not forget that intelligence is both a product and an
organization.If we define the mission statement optimally , clearly and without any ambiguity we can
determine the current deficiencies as the goal , the objectives will be clear to us and we will be able to
discern where there are divergences.
The what , when , who and how components of the mission statement will highlight the inherent probs in
our intelligence education and also the possible solutions.
Six fundamental intelligence deficiencies were identified These fundamental intelligence deficiencies were
identified as six distinct problems that need to be addressed. They are:
1. Inadequate doctrinal foundation
2. Lack of a "Professional" Occupational Field
3. Insufficient Tactical Intelligence Support
4. Insufficient Joint Manning,(21)
5. Inadequate Imagery Capability
6. Insufficient Language Capability
Concepts and Actions based on mission.
1. We need to have a focused operations domain to utilize intelligence effectively. Or for that
matter to execute intelligence operations correctly in the first place. To this end we must
understand that our troops are mostly fighting battles, not wars. The target is tactical
intelligence. Whether be it an antiterrorist operation in Kashmir, an anti-insurgency operation
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in Assam or a tactical assault mission in Kargil—the focus of intelligence is tactical, not broad
based, not spread over the entire spectrum of tactical, operational or strategic intelligence.
Intelligence training and education can take on three forms. At the national level what is
required is training for strategic intelligence. Whereas the Joint Intelligence Committee ius
concerned with training for operational and region-specific intelligence. But if we see closely
the operations-pattern currently being conducted in parts of the country, we find our soldiers
are fighting tactical battles.Hence those forces who generally handle tactical operations need to
be educated and trained in tactical intelligence.
2. The focus of support must be downward.
3. Intelligence must drive operations.
4. All intelligence disciplines must be used coherently so as to lend credence or refute obtained
intelligence. Each should complement the other. A situation may warrant exclusion of certain
disciplines, such as a thick canopy will hinder UAV photography or imagery and render HUMINT as
the only resource for the moment but disciplines like SIGINT can be brought into play to confirm or
deny the intelligence obtained using HUMINT.
5. The unit intelligence officer should be educated and trained in all forms of intelligence disciplines so
that he may better manage, coordinate and exercise good technical control over various intelligence
collection operations.
6. Intelligence is the product of the intelligence organization. The intelligence staff officers are the ones
who use this product in planning and executing operations.
7. The last step in the intelligence cycle is utilization, not dissemination.
8. HUMINT is indispensable , and at times the only collection resource available.HUMINT
capability must be pushed down to the boot level. It must be enhanced significantly.
9. Proper Delineation of intelligence tasks specific to a particular discipline is very important.Increased
use of CI agents to carry out HUMINT functions (as both contain similar tactics and techniques , the
tendency is to use CI) result in CI being defined in terms of HUMINT and seen from this perspective.
This is a major fallacy as other attributes of CI which are not in the HUMINT repository tend to be
overlooked with the result that CI , a very powerful counterintelligence tool , gets relegated to the
back seat.This also leads to the fact that we need to define intelligence and counterintelligence
carefully.
10. To achieve Force protection most optimally , a multidisciplinary intelligence effort must be ion place.
11. SIGINT must focus primarily on tactical intelligence.
OUR SCHOOLS MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
Intelligence is as important as other battlefield functions like fire and maneuver .
Familiarize with our intelligence system.
Thoroughly understand how the Commander utilizes intelligence , or in other words how is
intelligence important for the commander and how does it support the Commander in planning and
executing operations.
Review our intelligence system.
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Thoroughly understand how all are responsible to the intelligence system.
Thoroughly understand what is expected of us by the intelligence system.This will highlight the
necessity of defining and prioritizing intelligence requirements by Commander and lower units
intelligence officers,the collection managers capability of managing assets optimally ,the capacity of
the intelligence manager to synchronize reconnaissance and surveillance with the intelligence
parameters,and all other capabilities/faculties of intelligence officers and personnel which should be
developed to the full.
Keeping the above in perspective , familiarize with the procedures resorted to by the
intelligence/operations staff to meet the intelligence systems expectations in order to make it run at
its peak performance.
Thoroughly understand the prime need of intelligence in planning and demonstrate this fact.
Intelligence needs to be thoroughly integrated with operations.It drives Ops.
Professional Military Education for Commanders
Must study our present intelligence system , understand his role in the system , and how the current
system fulfills his expectations and what is expected of him from the intelligence system.
What is expected from his staff , Intelligence , Operations meet those expectations and how.
Must understand how others are responsible to the intelligence system.
Must understand how to utilize intelligence in Planning
Must understand the concept of Intel-Ops dynamic thoroughly. To this end he should familiarize
himself how he may assist the Staff (Intel and Ops,) or the Unit intelligence officer to integrate
operations with intelligence in order to increase performance.
Commanders must thoroughly understand the following:
1. Our intelligence systems structure, its limitations , its capabilities.
2. Commanders must understand that intelligence operations need direction , focus and that can be
achieved if requirements are clearly defined and prioritized.
3. Commanders must always utilize intelligence while planning. Any military decision making process
needs intelligence inputs on a continual updated basis.The importance of intelligence during military
planning just cannot be overemphasized.An operations/missions success is predicated by sound
intelligence.Timely , specific and accurate.
4. Intelligence not only drives operations , intelligence is not separately involved but rather it resides
inside the operations cycle .Intelligence and operations ned to be integrated.Commander must clearly
know how to utilize intelligence to drive operations and how operations can lead to more intelligence
that can be further exploited.This intelligence-operations dynamic is what in essence the benchmark
for success in a military operation.
5. The last part of intelligence cycle is not dissemination but utilization.What matters more is how the
disseminated intelligence products are utilized by the end users like the Commander or policy
makers.
6. Clearly defining intelligence requirements should be the starting point in planning.Prioritizing these
requirements can only help in focusing intelligence on operations.Poorly defined and prioritized
intelligence requirements can cause wastage in intelligence resources , as well as time and effort.
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7. Intelligence is as important as other battlefield functions like fire and maneuver and needs to be
thoroughlky synchoronized with operations.
8. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield or area of operations. This is extremely important before
any planning activity.
9. How to integrate intelligence in battlefield function training exercises.
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EXAMPLE CASE STUDY
HUMINT CENTRIC APPROACH
The disappointing COIN experience based on conventional intelligence collection , their dependency on and
their failure to understand the negative perceptions their actions were generating among the community has
led to a blunt realization: If we did not change our methods, and change them quickly, we are not going to
be successful in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment in which we find themselves. As a result of
that realization, two decisions should be made. First, we must reform the way we conduct intelligence
operations, and second, make information operations (IO) a pillar of our daily operational framework.
Background
Lets assume a hypothetical 23 INFBN deployed in an insurgent-affected area.
With the exception of a counterintelligence warrant officer and a few other officers who had some previous
exposure to HUMINT operations, the Int team of the Bn neither understood nor anticipated the inadequacy
of their conventionally designed intelligence collection and analysis system. More importantly, a speciality
no one understood the dominant role that HUMINT operations would play in developing actionable
intelligence on a burgeoning insurgency.
The intelligence system they brought to the insurgent zone was designed to identify conventional enemy
formations, and their intelligence personnel were trained to conduct predictive analysis about an enemy
based upon their knowledge of his equipment and doctrine. Exactly none of these conditions existed here.
Instead, they found themselves in the midst of an insurgency, confronted by an elusive enemy force that
wore no uniform and blended seamlessly into the local population. Conventional intelligence collection
systems just don’t work in this type of environment; their imagery operations, electronic reconnaissance, and
standard combat patrols and surveillance operations were simply ineffective. After faithfully applying these
conventional ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) methods and assets to their combat
operations, they netted no actionable intelligence.
Challenges
Realizing that they were fighting a growing insurgency and that the current conventional organization and
training of their battalion and brigade intelligence sections were inadequate to address their needs, it was
decided to transition their conventional INFBN intelligence system into a HUMINT-centric system.
Not unexpectedly, a change of this magnitude for a unit engaged in combat against a growing insurgency
presented many challenges. After considering the circumstances they faced in their AO and their
leadership’s lack of experience and familiarity with COIN operations, it was found that their challenges
could be grouped into three general categories: leadership, organization, and training.
Leadership
When people are confronted with substantive change that runs counter to their doctrine and training, it’s
natural for them to be uncomfortable and therefore hesitant to embrace that change. It was assumed this
would be the case from the beginning; thus, mechanisms were implemented to ensure that compliance with
their intelligence changes was rapid and “as directed.” From the beginning, it was felt necessary to convince
the commanders and staffs that transitioning to a HUMINT-based approach to intelligence was of absolute
highest priority.
As a commander, you must set the conditions to ensure that their subordinates make HUMINT operations a
priority and that they synchronize such operations with their headquarters. You must start out by providing a
sound concept their subordinates can understand and follow: visualize the plan, describe it to their people,
and then direct them in execution. After close consultation with the staff and other individuals with COIN
experience, a vision and draft organization were presented for how the units in the INFBN should conduct
intelligence operations. Central to their new intelligence system was the development of an extensive
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network of the insurgent zone informants. It was felt it was absolutely key to identify and develop
indigenous sources that had the ability to infiltrate the insurgent society and blend in. Such human sources of
intelligence represent a critical capability that no ISR technology, no matter how sophisticated or advanced,
can match.
Once they had decided to rely primarily upon informants for their intelligence collection, they modified their
analysis process to bring it more in line with police procedures. This meant a heavy reliance on evidentiary-
based link diagrams to associate individuals with enemy cells and networks, and some conventional pattern
analysis when appropriate. Units were also directed to modify the organizational structures of their
intelligence sections to accommodate new functional requirements such as intelligence exploitation cells,
more robust current operations and plans cells, and additional subject matter experts who could support
analysis and exploitation activities.
After they developed a concept and described it to the INFBN’s leaders, the final (and speciality leader-
intensive) part of their transition was getting those leaders to buy in. It was fully expected that many of the
subordinate commanders would be very uncomfortable changing their intelligence organizations, collection
assets, and analysis processes, particularly in the middle of ongoing operations. Throughout their careers,
they and their Soldiers had experienced only conventional military intelligence operations. Forcing them to
abandon a system they were comfortable with and that they thought adequate required commanders at all
levels, starting at brigade, to stay personally involved in all aspects of the transformation.
HUMINT Battle Rhythm
Anticipating that there would likely be some resistance from within the organization, mechanisms were
implemented that would allow the promotion of compliance, conformity, understanding, and confidence in
their new approach to intelligence collection and analysis. Two particularly useful venues that allowed
personal involvement and oversight in intelligence operations with subordinate leaders were weekly
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) back-briefs and INFBN after-action reviews (AARs).
The weekly intelligence battle rhythm consisted of a brigade intelligence targeting meeting on Sunday, and
then the R&S meeting on Thursday. The latter was personally chaired by BGS INT with his intelligence
officer (S2) and all the INFBN’s battalion operations officers S3 in attendance.
R&S meeting.The R&S meeting was particularly useful for several reasons. First, it allowed BGS INT to
confirm that the decisions, priorities, and guidance he had provided during his weekly targeting board had
been accurately disseminated and interpreted by his subordinate commands. Second, it allowed him to
monitor their weekly recruitment and development of informants, who were absolutely central to their
HUMINT-based intelligence program. Third, it gave him the opportunity to directly provide or clarify guid-
ance from the weekly brigade intelligence brief to all of the INFBN S3s. Fourth; it improved his situational
awareness of each of his battalion AOs. Finally, taking the time to personally chair this meeting
demonstrated his commitment to making HUMINT-centric operations a top priority in the INFBN.
During these meetings, the battalion S3s were required to brief him on a number of mandated topics: the
priority of their collection actions, the status of informant recruitment and training, the allocation of
intelligence collection assets, and any additional R&S support they required from brigade level or higher.
Each battalion used a brigade-standardized matrix to cross-walk their priority intelligence requirements
(PIR) with the asset or assets they planned to dedicate against their PIR. Any informant a battalion was
using was listed on this matrix along with their organic collection assets.
The gathering of battalion S3s was one of their specially important and productive intelligence meetings. It
allowed him to assess the development and use of HUMINT assets, to ensure that the battalions’ intelligence
and collection requirements were nested with the brigade’s, and to see how the battalions were progressing
in the development and use of informants. It also provided a venue for the battalions to share lessons learned
about intelligence targeting and collection.
Weekly INFBN AAR. Another meeting that facilitated professional and informative dialog and gave him an
opportunity to provide guidance to his commanders on intelligence issues was their weekly INFBN AAR. It
was held on Saturday, with every battalion commander and S2 attending. Each AAR began with the brigade
S2 providing a detailed intelligence update of the entire INFBN AO, followed by a discussion to ensure that
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they all shared a common enemy picture. This forum also allowed for the dissemination of intelligence
lessons learned and best practices, and it gave him an opportunity to identify challenges and seek solutions
from fellow commanders. Once their intelligence portion of the AAR was complete, the battalion S2s
departed with the INFBNS2 to synchronize INFBN intelligence issues. Commanders stayed and they
continued their AAR of information and maneuver operations.
Net gain. These two weekly venues, the R&S meeting and the AAR, were essential to reforming their
intelligence system and improving their individual and unit performance. They—
● Allowed BGS INT and the INFBN S2 to routinely emphasize or reinforce key components of their
intelligence system.
● Promoted a learning environment within a chaotic and fast-paced operational environment.
● Allowed the immediate sharing of lessons (good and bad) among key battalion leaders.
● Provided BGS INT with immediate feedback on how well they were adapting to their new system.
● Fostered a better understanding of, and leader buy-in to, their new method of intelligence operations.
Eventually, once leaders at all levels understood the new system of intelligence collection and analysis
better, had gained experience with it, and had bought into it, BGS INT was able to back off and be less
directive. His subordinate leaders were then free to adapt and modify their intelligence operations to best fit
the needs of their AOs.
Organization and Team Building
It was relatively easy to visualize, describe, and modify the organizational structure and the processes that
they adopted to transform their intelligence operations. The greater challenge was manning their new model
and training their Soldiers and leaders to conduct HUMINT operations.
That said, manning is one of the challenges units encounter when they try to adapt their intelligence sections
to HUMINT operations. HUMINT-centric operations are very manpower intensive—the amount of
information that must be collected, analyzed, and synthesized to produce actionable intelligence can be
overwhelming. Personnel needed for activities such as document and technical exploitation, interrogations,
informant meetings, and plans and current operations present additional manpower challenges. As a result,
commanders will find themselves undermanned when they have to staff their transformed intelligence
activities according to the typical authorization for a conventional intelligence section. To develop an
effective brigade intelligence team, you will have to find additional personnel to man it.
One way to address this shortcoming is to screen and select non-intelligence-speciality soldiers from their
INFBN who have the required skills: intellectual capacity, technical expertise, and a natural proclivity to
contribute to their intelligence effort. They never hesitated to take Soldiers out of other sections or units to
resource their intelligence sections. They had more than enough combat power in their organizations to
overmatch the enemy; what they didn’t have was the depth and knowledge in their intelligence sections to
find the enemy in the first place. To fix that, they integrated infantry and armor Soldiers, cooks,
communications specialists, and mechanics into their brigade and battalion intelligence sections.
Commanders might also look closely at any Reserve units attached to them during deployment. Many of the
Soldiers in these units already have unique skill sets (e.g., law enforcement, finance, computers and
telecommunications) that make them excellent choices to serve as intelligence augmentees.
Having to build and train their intelligence team during combat was hardly ideal. Fortunately, units today
have the opportunity to reorganize and train their intelligence sections and systems at home station prior to
deployment. When they’re deployed to their home station, they endured the typical personnel chaos
(Soldiers changing station and leaving the service) that occurs in the wake of a long deployment. After the
majority of their personnel turnover was over, they immediately set about building and training their
intelligence sections in anticipation of the brigade’s next deployment.
A HUMINT-centric pre-rotational training program was developed to facilitate the early and
progressive training of their new intelligence teams. What was developed was a detailed enemy situation
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and database that replicated an insurgent-terrorist activity, one that could fully exercise the INFBN’s
intelligence units. The intelligence flow began six months prior to commencement of their maneuver
training exercise, as their intelligence sections at home received a steady stream of notional intelligence
reports, interrogation debriefings, and programmed meetings with HUMINT sources.
With that pre-rotational data and information provided in advance, their intelligence teams were required to
conduct analysis, build link diagrams and target folders, and produce other intelligence products that passed
along the hard lessons learned during their first deployment. They also continued to run their weekly
intelligence battle rhythm just like they had in the insurgent zone. The staff would provide BGS INT with
current intelligence updates, recommend changes or additions to their PIR, conduct current analysis of
insurgent organizations in their AO, and suggest intelligence targeting priorities.
These pre-rotational intelligence activities supported three important goals: first, they allowed them to train
their newly staffed intelligence teams throughout the INFBN based upon lessons they had learned and
processes they had developed in the insurgent zone. Second, they enabled them to maximize their training
experience when they finally deployed for their rotation—instead of spending valuable time learning
undergraduate lessons at an expensive postgraduate training event, they were able to hit the ground running
based upon actionable intelligence their sections had developed over the previous six months. Finally they
developed the confidence of the new Soldiers and leaders in their intelligence sections.
Informants
As stated earlier, leveraging informants as their principal intelligence-collection asset constituted a
significant shift from the earlier way they had ever operated. The theory and logic behind using local sources
to obtain information and intelligence is easy to grasp; however, the practical aspects of developing these
nonstandard collection assets are less obvious.
In general, they had two challenges with informants: finding them and training them. Initially they relied
upon informants who routinely provided unsolicited information to their units. They would track the
accuracy and consistency of the information they gave them and, after they established a credible and
reliable track record, they would begin to reward them for useful information. Later on, as their knowledge
of their AO improved and, more importantly, their understanding of the culture and the nuances of local
demographics increased, they became more savvy and cultivated informants from different ethnic, sectarian,
political, tribal, and other groups within their AO. Eventually, the brigade’s intelligence sections developed
a rapport with three to five informants who consistently provided reliable information they could develop
into actionable intelligence.
Among their informants were members of political parties, local government officials, prostitutes, police
officers, ex-insurgents, prominent businessmen, and expatriates. Of course they recognized that there was
risk associated with using informants. For example, there was the concern that the informants might be
collecting on them, or that the information provided might have been designed to settle personal vendettas.
Consequently, their INFBNS2 and counterintelligence warrant officer developed a vetting program to
minimize such risks. All of their informants were screened to validate the quality of their information and to
check their motivations for providing it. They also implemented careful measures to ensure that informants
were not collecting on Indian forces or providing information that would put their soldiers at risk.
Once they determined that a potential informant was reliable and useful, it became necessary to train and
equip him so that he could provide more accurate and timely information. They typically provided their
informants with Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, digital cameras, and cell phones. The phones not
only improved the timeliness of information, but also allowed informants to keep their distance from them,
thus minimizing the chance they would be personally compromised. Later on, as Internet cafes began to
flourish in the the insurgent zone economy, they helped their informants establish email accounts and used
that medium as another way to communicate with them.
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GPS devices were also important, because informants could not accurately determine or communicate
address information that was sufficient to pinpoint target locations. With some basic training, their
informants could use their GPSs to identify key locations using the military grid reference system. This
increased the accuracy of location marking and measurably enhanced their ability to develop precise,
actionable intelligence. Occasionally it was useful to give informants automobiles, too, to facilitate their
movement and collection activities inside and outside their AO.
They discovered that identifying and training an informant was a complex and time-consuming process.
Finding the right type of individual willing to work with you is both an art and a science. Their counter
intelligence-trained soldiers were instrumental in ensuring that they worked with the reliable, consistently
accurate informants. Training and equipping the informants were key to their effectiveness and paid great
dividends in terms of the volume and accuracy of their information. Because informants were the foundation
of their HUMINT system in the brigade, they resourced them accordingly.
Collecting and Exploiting Evidence
Although developing indigenous sources of intelligence was central to the way they operated, they quickly
discovered that there was another key component to their HUMINT-driven system: the collection and
exploitation of evidence. It is not only frustrating, but also detrimental to their mission success to culminate
an operation with the capture of insurgents or terrorists only to be directed to release them because their
justification for detaining them can’t endure the scrutiny of a military or civilian legal review. They quickly
learned after a couple of very avoidable incidents that their ability to successfully prosecute intelligence
operations was directly linked to the ability of their soldiers to collect, preserve, and exploit evidence related
to the captured suspects. To remedy that, they initiated a training program to give their soldiers and leaders
the skills they needed to manage evidence.
Leveraging the experience and training of their military police, National Guardsmen with law enforcement
skills, they were able to rapidly train their soldiers on the essential requirements for capturing, securing,
associating, safeguarding, and exploiting evidence. Once they were armed with this training and an effective
HUMINT-based intelligence process, their seizure and detention rate for insurgents, terrorists, and other
miscreants soared.
Closely linked to the collection and association of evidence to suspects was the exploitation of that evidence.
Early in their deployment they were frustrated by the inability of organizations above brigade level to
exploit evidence in a timely manner and then provide feedback that they could use.
This was particularly true when it came to captured computer hard drives and cell phones. The standard
policy was that these items had to be expedited to division headquarters within 24 hours of capture. This
made sense because division was the first echelon above brigade that had the knowledge and expertise to
exploit these devices. Unfortunately, for many reasons the turnaround time to receive intelligence from
echelons above brigade was typically too slow, or the resultant product too incomplete, to help them.
What they needed was the ability to exploit these items at the INFBN level for tactical information, in
parallel with the division and corps intelligence shops, which were focused on other priorities. Based upon
their previous working relationship with the IB team in country, they managed to get a copy of a software
program the agency was using to exploit hard drives. The INFBN communications platoon loaded the
software on their computers , received some basic training, and instantly they had the ability to exploit hard
drives. They dedicated a couple of linguists to their communications platoon section, integrated this element
into their cell, and from then on conducted their own tactical-level technical exploitation of computers. They
still had to forward hard drives and cell phones to division within 24 hours of capture, but now they just
copied the hard drive, forwarded the complete captured system to division, and exploited the information
simultaneously with the division.
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This easy technical remedy to their hard-drive exploitation problem consistently provided big payoffs for
them. The new capability was useful for documenting evidence to support the detention of an insurgent and
for developing follow-up targets. They had the same challenge with cell phones. Unfortunately, they
couldn’t acquire the technical capability they needed to exploit them as they had with the hard drives. It was
believed that phone exploitation is yet another trainable skill and capability that they should give the INFBN
communications platoons.
As with cell phones and hard drives, they were challenged to fully exploit their detainees. Specifically, they
had to get them to provide information, and then they had to exploit that information to incarcerate them or
to assist them in developing further intelligence to support future counterinsurgency operations. To address
this challenge, they developed and adapted two useful tools as they gained experience at tactical-level inter-
rogations. One was a detailed line of questioning that their HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs) could use
when questioning detainees; the other was the “cage infiltrator”—an insurgent zone informant who would
pose as a detainee in their holding facility to gather valuable intelligence from actual detainees.
Developed by the HCT team leader and the S2, a detailed line of questioning is extremely important for
prioritizing the avenues of questioning that their trained and authorized interrogators pursue. It is an
especially important tool given the latter’s extraordinary workload and the limited amount of time they can
dedicate to initial and follow-up interrogation sessions.
As a commander, it was found that it was imperative to take a personal interest in the line of questioning
their HCTs pursued. For example, it was important to ensure that their line of questioning meshed exactly
with the INFBN’s PIRs and intelligence targeting priorities. The commander spent a lot of time with his S2
and battalion commanders refining their PIR and specific intelligence requirements (SIR), reviewing and
establishing collection priorities, and synchronizing our collection efforts. This entire effort can be derailed
if the line of questioning the interrogators pursue isn’t nested with the unit’s priorities.
To ensure development of the effective interrogation line of questioning, his S2 required their HCTs to
participate in the following five-step process (weekly or mission-specific):
● HCTs receive updated PIR and associated SIR from the unit S2.
● HCTs receive a current intelligence briefing from the NCO in charge of the unit S2 cell.
● Senior HUMINT warrant officer attends the INFBN commander’s daily intelligence briefings to
facilitate his understanding of the latest changes in intelligence priorities.
● HCTs develop lines of questioning and back-brief the unit S2 and senior HUMINT warrant officer.
● HCTs conduct interrogations.
They found that it was easy for their HCTs to determine the right questions to ask as long as they thoroughly
understood the current PIR and SIR (which they continuously updated and refined).
Because detainees figured out very quickly that they treat prisoners humanely, it was not long before many
of them refused to provide useful information. During interrogations they would typically hear things like
“I’m innocent; I was just sleeping at my cousin’s house when you arrested me”. If they didn’t have
substantive evidence to link these detainees to a crime or insurgent activity, their strategy of denial,
obsequious behavior, or happenstance alibi was difficult to dispute. One day, theS2 came to him with an
idea. At his suggestion, they planted an informant in their holding facility with instructions to listen to the
detainees’ conversations and then report to them what they discussed. This technique, which they dubbed
“cage infiltration,” resulted in immediate intelligence.
Subsequently, they redesigned the individual spaces in their holding facility so that they could place their
infiltrators in individual detention spaces, between suspected insurgent leaders and their possible followers.
The only way these detainees could communicate among themselves was to talk past their infiltrator to their
accomplice or cell member. The interrogation teams would then remove their infiltrator under the guise of a
routine interrogation, debrief him, and then return him to the holding area. Armed with the new information,
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the interrogators could often modify their line of questioning for more effective and productive follow-up
interviews.
In a very short time, this technique became their single effective method for gaining information and
intelligence from their detainee population. An additional benefit to using cage infiltrators was that they
were interactive. Over time, as they became more experienced and adept at what they were doing, they
became quite clever at developing a dialog with their fellow detainees that would draw out additional
information useful in incriminating the suspect or in developing future targetable information.
Another twist to this technique was the use of a taxi-driver informant. Despite their best efforts, there were
times when they couldn’t build a case strong enough to support the long-term detention of a suspect. When
that happened, they would make their apologies for the inconvenience the suspect had endured and offer him
a taxi ride back to his residence. It was not unusual for these suspects to brag to the driver or among
themselves on their way home how they had deceived the “stupid” Americans. They would incriminate
themselves in the process or reveal details that they could use to conduct follow-up COIN operations. Upon
returning to the headquarters, the taxi driver was debriefed on the suspect’s conversation. Based upon the
nature of any new information the informant presented, they decided either to recapture the suspect or to
cease pursuing him.
Ensuring that the line of questioning their HCTs pursued was nested with the INFBN’s intelligence
priorities, coupled with some simple deception techniques such as using cage infiltrators in their holding
facility, considerably improved the quantity and quality of intelligence that they obtained from their
detainees.
Conclusion
Throughout the course of this example case study it was attempted to identify some of the major intelligence
challenges the INFBN faced during their first tour in the insurgent zone. Provided are examples of how they
met these challenges and adapted to best meet their needs at the time. Also shared are some of their more
useful and effective practices in the hope that others may use or modify them to support their needs. The
examples and practices offered do not represent definitive solutions to the countless intelligence challenges
units face in the insurgent zone. The intent, rather, was to demonstrate that by direct and constant leadership
involvement at all levels; conventional units can effectively organize, train for, and execute HUMINT-
centric operations in a COIN environment with great success.
One Final Thought
Although HUMINT-centric operations and IO may appear distinctly different in terms of their aims, they are
closely linked; in fact, they are mutually supportive. HUMINT-centric operations target the insurgent and
the terrorist, but in doing so they produce precise and timely information that allows the soldiers to locate
and attack insurgent forces with surgical precision, minimum violence, and minor collateral damage. A
corollary benefit is that their actions result in minimal harm and inconvenience to the local population,
helping to convince the local population that there is the intent and capacity to improve their security and
daily lives by eliminating the insurgent threat.
Likewise, IO synergistically supports the intelligence efforts by convincing the local population that it is in
their best interest, personally and nationally, to tolerate and even support the efforts to improve their lives.
Through IO, it is shared with the population the progress that is being achieved politically, economically,
and socially, and ensures that they know about the violence and harm the insurgents are wreaking upon their
fellow citizens and their nation.
Similarly, through IO we are able to let the population know that we can separate and protect them from
insurgent-terrorist threats when they have the confidence to share targetable information with us. The more
adept we become at conducting IO and influencing the population, the more information the population will
provide to enable us to target the insurgents and terrorists. It’s a win-win dynamic.
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CONCLUSION
Given the environment the forces are operating in today and will continue to confront in the future,
HUMINT-centric operations and IO are no longer merely “enablers” or supporting efforts. Quite
simply, they are the decisive components of our strategy. Both of these critical operations must be
embraced; they must become the twin pillars of the framework from which we operate. No longer can
we allow our greater comfort with conventional combat operations to minimize these decisive com-
ponents of a winning COIN strategy.
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CASE STUDIES :
“Insurgency”, a word often confused as well as used
with a near synonym “terrorism”. Although not very
clear there exists a thin line of difference between the
two. Often we see that the basic goals of both terrorists
and insurgents are similar; yet if we examine
insurgency and terrorism, specific differences emerge.
The main base difference is that insurgency is a
movement- an effort with a very specific aim and
course of action. Another difference is the intent of the
component activities and operations of insurgencies versus terrorism. Although there are places where
terrorism, guerilla warfare, and criminal behavior all overlap, groups that are exclusively terrorist, or
subordinate "wings" of insurgencies formed to specifically employ terror tactics, demonstrate clear
differences in their objectives and operations.
The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to politically amputate the working power for control of all or a
portion of a desired territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies greatly
require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition
or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is not generally aimed at.
Whereas, a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support or even the sympathy of a large
fraction of the population. While insurgents will frequently describe themselves as "insurgents" or
"guerillas", terrorists will not refer to themselves as "terrorists" but describe them using military or political
terminology as “freedom fighters”, “soldiers” or “activists”.
What can we guess the reason behind such risky moves? Obviously, there has to be a trigger factor for
choosing such a path. If we look behind in world history, the most radical portions of the population are
mostly engaged in such activities. Why so? Why would they leave the homely security and live lives of most
wanted nomads? Yes, the answer lays in the brute fact that they have been denied justice time and again.
They were made to bear injustice that cannot be, has not been or will not be addressed by the so called
governing power of varied countries. This very situation has mostly led the minority to take up arms in order
to make the supreme power hear their pleas. But as times changed, the way and acuteness of their action
changed. Starting from bow and arrow today they have successfully managed to outset violence with armed
resistance. The core belief that led to these movements is that their cause is righteous (whether or not). In
this era the belief has made such a strong foundation that based upon it they fuel the passions of general
public. This sorry state could have been well avoided if the reason would be uprooted at the initial stage.
Only if the existing situations would be resolved one could argue that no word called insurgency would ever
exist. But sadly this was not done and the seeds have now sprouted to produce one of the greatest threats to
not only general public, the government, a nation but the world peace at large.
Now if we examine the passion leading to insurgent movements in a deeper ground, we shall see that unlike
conventional warfronts, they have the freedom of action. It becomes nearly impossible to predict their
upcoming actions. They can make their own plan of action, at their own chosen times and places
disregarding the conventional formulae. The upper hand they get is because of their geographic shelling and
also some political organizations aiding them for transferring power from central to local control. Further,
they need not wait for permissions to be granted, rules to be passed, conventions to be maintained and other
restrictions of statehood which may inhibit their adversary. Most importantly, their targets are specific, plan
of action with unmatched convention and they have near-perfect intelligence which helps them to
successfully prove their vulnerability.
Thus it is very well understood that the insurgency problems are not the branches of the terror tree that can
be cleaned up by using brute force but it lies at the grass root level. Then what should be the way of
approach to search and hit them? The answer lies in the question itself- i.e. handling the problem right from
the base. Here comes into action the sensitive part of approach- counterinsurgency campaigns. These
campaigns must be conducted with utmost discipline and vigor; and must incorporate all elements of
national power into its strategy to have any hope of success. The methods used earlier had very little if not
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null effect in eradicating the problem. Although military operations are an essential component in
counterinsurgency operations previous experiences have proved that political, economic and
informational/diplomatic efforts ultimately lead to successful quelling an insurgency. One indispensible
component of counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the entire spectrum of operations, is the
requirement for actionable intelligence. Keeping in view the grounds of their action, only way to curb their
encroachment is possession of a good intelligence, without which there is very little or no hope to defeat
them. The successful management of counterinsurgency warfare depends on the well-organized intelligence
architecture that is experienced, managed and carried upon. Given this fact, it is paramount that
counterinsurgency forces gain this essential intelligence. Unlike the primitive conventions of war,
counterintelligence does and does not at large depend on the data derivations from technical means (e.g.
signal intelligence-SIGINT, imagery intelligence-IMINT and measurement intelligence- MASINT,
respectively); but is dependent on collection of relevant information from human interface. This intelligence
is harvested from the human intelligence (HUMINT), investigations and analytic capabilities of organic
military intelligence and police forces in the area of operations.
Now let us have a deeper look at some case histories:
French Indochina: 1945-1954
Algeria: 1954-1962
Malaya: 1948-1960
French Indochina: 1945-1954
Overview: During World War II, “The Pacific War” by the Japanese, Vietnam was occupied by the
Japanese, who took it from the French colonial government already there. After taking over Vietnam, the
Japanese brutally enslaved the populace. This led to the resistance movement against the Japanese aided by
the US on promise that Vietnam would be an independent country. Gradually the Japanese withdrew due to
the A- Bomb; but the US went back on its promise and allowed France to retake its colony. The resistance
movement then was called “Viet Minh” rebelled against French masters and the leader of the rebels Ho Chi
Minh looked for new suppliers and adopted a more communist way of thinking and fought on, while his
forces grew.
Analysis: As mentioned earlier there is always a catalyzing factor to these kinds of movements. Here too,
the catalyst was the brutal torture firstly by the French and later on by the Japanese. But interestingly enough,
both the French and the Japanese were defeated and colonies evacuated in spite of possession of much lesser
freedom of action and development than their masters. Than what brought their success? What could have
been the weakness of French and Japanese that were exploited for gaining freedom? Here lies the answer-
1) The French clearly lacked sufficient intelligence on the basic capabilities and intentions of the Viet
Minh forces.
2) The underestimation of the Viet Minh power to fight back led to easy handling of their operational
plans and troop disposition. Thus their mapping of plans could not be safeguarded from the enemy.
3) The prevailing historical accord of this war is that the French definitely lacked proper intelligence
thereby trying to turn tables based on conventional style in counterinsurgency environment. By doing
so they not only overextended their limited resources in an attempt to become supreme again but also
found themselves chasing the wild goose ultimately gaining absolute nothingness.
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4) Along with their failure to obtain actionable intelligence they also failed to maintain operational
security the French dug their own graves and sealed their fate.
Conclusion: Definitely from the above analysis it becomes quite clear that the enemy possessed what the
French did not. They had an edge in combat intelligence and hardly could the French ever guess what they
were up to. The French had arms and power; Viet Minh forces had vast unbreakable underground
intelligence collection network. For the French it resulted in expending their manpower and material loss
thereby gaining nothing. Arrogance, inability to measure the depth of enemies, inexperience and lack of
operational security and counterintelligence is what French forces possessed mainly. The intelligence web
that Viet Minh forces created, aided them to be aware of even the slightest movement form their enemy side.
Thus every time for a successful movement the speed of movement became necessary rather than its shelling.
The Communist High Command therefore almost knew every little movement of the French troops in any
sector and how many of those troops would be made available for those mobile operations. Thus is becomes
quite clear that the visible lack of intelligence and their inability to safeguard their operational intelligence
caused the downfall of the French in “French Indochina” war.
Algeria: 1954-1962
Overview: The Algerian War was a conflict between the French and Algerian. These were independence
movements from 1954 to 1962 which led to Algeria gaining its independence from France after an important
decolonization war. It was a complex conflict enveloping guerrilla warfare, maquis fighting, terrorism
against civilians, the use of torture on both sides, and counter-terrorism operations by the French. Members
of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on November 1, 1954 initiated this movement, the conflict shook the
brass tacks of the French Fourth Republic (1946–58) and led to its ultimate collapse. The French Army
initiated a battle of "pacification" of what was considered at the time to be a full part of France. The "public-
order operation" rapidly turned to real war. Algerians, who had at first largely favored a peaceful resolution,
turned increasingly toward the goal of independence, supported by Arab countries and, more generally, by
worldwide opinion fueled by anti-colonialist ideas; but because of the volatility in France, the French Fourth
Republic was dissolved. Even today this war has provided an important tactic casing for counter-insurgency
thinkers, while the use of torture by the French Army has provoked a moral and political debate quite never
to be resolved, on the legality and efficacy of such methods.
Analysis: At the initial stages the French were quite unfamiliar as well as unprepared for facing any
insurgency movements. It was out of the box movement for the French and thereby they failed to face the
enemy successfully. Hardly could they estimate the enemy power, path of action and available resources etc
due to the lack of their own intelligence network. Whereas, the FLN intensely developed its intelligence
network by then and the developed web constituted of maximum number of civilians. As a result of which
working right under the noses of the French, they could be successful in slaughtering the enemy. Every
movement made by the French was noticed by the guerilla columns infiltrating the colonized villages and
unknown to the French information steadily flowed down to FLN leaders. Even when the French tried to
develop their network, initially it was a hard nut to crack. They could not manage to collect reliable
intelligence as the insurgents constituted of the rural population who enjoyed local terrain, complete
freedom of action to strike back and withdraw unmolested.
French method of hitting the bull’s eye: Jacques Émile Massu, a French general who fought in World
War II, the First Indochina War, the Algerian War and the Suez crisis introduced an idea that would
successfully stifle the growth and movement of FLN activists. The method constituted of constant patrolling
and searching house to house and checkpoints in order to gather information as well as develop French
intelligence network. Although Massu’s method was worth it but most impressive was Roger Trinquier’s--
a French Army officer during World War II, the First Indochina War and the Algerian War, serving mainly
in airborne and Special forces units and also a Counter-insurgency theorist. He established a gridding system
that divided the entire geographical area of action into symmetric blocks or grids. Then each large grid was
again subdivided into smaller grids going down to the individual buildings and the families of French
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military units were assigned responsibilities for monitoring all the activities within the assigned grid. As a
result of which surveillance became easier and successful to a great extent and information flow hiked up to
a rapid pace. This method of gridding facilitated to build strong foothold within the community and build
stronger relationships and as mentioned earlier the French army initiated the battle of “pacification”; this
method was an important aspect for the effort. At the core level a small unit of Infantry Company who
controlled a few villages developed sustained relationships with the inhabitants, developed trust and
managed to include villagers who would work with the French in choking the rebels. These self defense
units were called “harkas” who greatly helped the French to sort and destroy the rapidly popping heads of
rebellions. Not only villages also the urban areas were included in the grid method where a “chief” was
appointed to keep a close watch in his respective unit. To enhance the monitor identity cards were issued to
each inhabitant. His job was to identify every living individual of the area and monitor the activities of each
of them. Any unexpected, fowl activity was to be taken care of by him; and if he failed to do so he would be
accused of helping the NLF. Although fruitful these methods visibly strangled the basic human rights and
liberties. Yet for the good or bad the French managed to create forbidden zones, deploy Sections
Administrative Specialists (SAS) and cleared some units resulting in nomadization. They organized
effective police forces that shared the burden of the French officials and helped in penetration to hostile
areas. Finally, by September 1957 FLN could be broken in Algiers.
Conclusion: Now if we consider both the cases in Vietnam and Algeria we clearly see that French used a
method in Algeria that they failed to do so in Vietnam resulting in their downfall Without effective
intelligence even in Algeria it would be quite impossible for the French to continue their foothold. As
diamond cuts diamond, here too without trickling down to the insurgency bed it would be impossible to
create a loophole in the web of insurgency. To clear dirt away one has to get into it was the only effective
policy that worked then and works till date. Since insurgents follow no formulae and convention direct
interaction with the insurgents is the only way to know their plans and action. They have a well-knit family
of activists who strongly believe to be fighting for their liberty, against suppression and for the good of their
community; so they hardly betray their group under emotional floods or pressure. Gaining as well as
keeping trust, changing their mindset to make them believe the authority can only help in checking their
advancement. Thus finally quoting Colonel Roger Trinquier’s view in order to enhance the fact discussed
above, “intelligence was one of several crucial enablers for defeating an insurgent. Others include a secure
area to operate from, sources in the general population and government, maintaining the initiative, and
careful management of propaganda”.
Malaya: 1948-1960
Overview: During 1940s the European community was well settled in Malaya. But by February 1948,
communist guerillas attacked European settlers in the Malaya peninsula quite unaware of the British counter
insurgency tactics of search and destroy. The insurgent units were nearly destroyed but the sudden death of
the British High Commissioner again made a way for the communists to reinforce their activities. They
applied every possible means to eradicate British settlement in their country- from convincing to killing the
populace in order to achieve their target. But the British, very tactfully instituted the first helicopter in the
“hearts-and-minds” campaign wherein they used helicopters to aid wounded civilians and military to the
hospitals and provided necessary supplies and transport facilities. This “hearts-and minds” campaign was
magically successful in contrast to the American method of using military power alone in Vietnam. Finally
the Malayan communists fell apart after twelve years of campaign in 1960.
Analysis: Similar to the other two previous cases of Vietnam and Algeria, here too the insurgents
maintained quite a similar base of approach. They kept themselves as isolated as possible from the
government forces and kept creating menace time and again from different places and absurd times which
followed no convention. T.E Lawrence’s prescription “the first principle of guerrilla warfare is one of
detachment from the enemy” was followed to the backbone by the insurgents even this time. Not only
detachment, they also kept up with their second basic necessity of insurgency- “they acquired perfect
intelligence of the enemy’s movement and strength” though the means to acquire was both friendly and
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brutal. Here MPABA’s political wing the Min Yuen developed an extreme network of informants and
gathered relevant information about their enemy all the time. By doing so they always had a steady flow of
information which allowed them to hideously develop their network and achieve success. But interestingly
enough, the tables had turned this time. Insurgents were tackled with counter insurgency campaigns from the
government’s side. Now along with the military the local police forces were involved in handling the
miscreants. Brigg’s successor, General Sir Gerald Templer was the one to follow this method by early 1952
upon his assumption of directorship. It followed that the intelligence structure would be build around the
local police forces mainly rather than the army as it would allow the intelligence net to penetrate deeper into
the populace. As expected, this method enabled a more reliable and steady flow of information unlike the
discrete flow faced earlier. With the development of this technique counter-insurgency began to flourish
rapidly and the British undertook another effective decision of creating a well organized branch that would
extensively deal with counter insurgency. It was a Special Branch of Police that dealt with the insurgents
with a heavier hand than before. This group was responsible for proper collection and accumulation of the
information which resulted in a beginning successful defeat of the insurgents. In order to assure services
they began to mix need with patriotism; informers were being paid and some were even trained to act as
double agents. This led to acute operations on insurgents resulting in capture cells after cells. With the
improvement of this Special Branch even a school was developed which could train informers with the
techniques to handle and derive information from and about the insurgents without leaving any trace of
doubt to them.
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APPENDIX II
HUMINT—COMMUNICATION INFORMATION SYSTEM (CIS)
(My experiment—not accurate, but I tried)
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Summary of Human Intelligence: HUMINT
And
New Framework on Faster Perspective
System Summary:
HUMINT is an intelligence organization, works on information collected and provided by human sources.
It follows decision making architecture to obtain information based on capabilities, vulnerabilities,
disposition, plans and intentions. The information gathered is often caused by a chain of human interactions
and human understanding. It is sometimes affected by cultural and environmental factors that may become
relevant for many reasons, some of which might be real and others which may be part of an adversary
deception operation.
HUMINT has the capability to make a contribution of both the offensive and defensive aspects of
intelligence. thus it can be used as either a shield or as a sword.
Objective:
● Develop adaptable and efficient information sources for situation awareness and decision making.
● Imply in assessing battlefield damage.
● Employ the counterintelligence (CI) specialists to influence adversary intent.
Drawback:
● Time consuming system
● Lack of effective contacts in a particular environment.
● System can be susceptible to deception.
This situation can be fixed somewhat by providing the HUMINT analyst with a good communication
information systems (CIS) architecture that can provide him with powerful data fusion, link analysis,
research and information distribution capabilities.
Future Goal:
● To define new criteria for information collection and information management.
● Accuracy achievements through the DITE (Detection, Identification, Track, Estimate) sequence.
● Accurate, reliable, responsive, relational database management future operations.
Proposed System:
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A new framework is proposed for HUMINT CIS development encompassing the HUMINT operator, the
information and the information environment. The proposed framework would be built to include both
legacy HUMINT analytical processes or systems and future HUMINT systems.
The proposed CIS aims to cope with an ever expanding Military Information Environment (MIE) and
Global Information Environment (GIE), and to ultimately maximize the holistic contribution of HUMINT to
decision making.
Fig-1: Information flow in the HUMINT environment
CIS architecture is defined from three features:
(i) Interface
(ii) Data Structure
(iii) Processing
i. Interface:
● Build to store information in common pattern.
● Provide efficiency to system user what need to saved in database.
● Reflects the data structure in graphical format to end user.
● Link between the physical-system and its users.
● Determine sequence of events.
● Offer an way to search information in internal available database.
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● Dynamic interfaces allow to pass parameter based on selection criteria and display relevant
information from available data structure.
● A robust CIS design increases strengths of C-HUMINT and reducing its weaknesses.
ii. Data Structure:
● Represents common data format for every incident.
● Records past events information with space and time and served as historical purpose.
● Facilitate data processing to filter valuable information from raw data.
● Provide link among data object.
● Increase accuracy by managing information in structured architecture.
iii. Processing:
● Handle data fusion and resources management and facilitate intelligence mechanism within the
system.
● Establish link or relation among information gathered from different sources.
● Improve accuracy by summing partial data or uncertain data.
● Classify available data based on sources and category them under intelligent circumstances.
HUMINT is a Foreign Intelligence Activity focused on the penetration of an adversary’s decision making
architecture. Its components are categorized by directed conventional activity, military intelligence liaison,
and field. It works for military intelligence reconnaissance, screening, debriefing, interrogation, contact
handling, agent handling, convert passive surveillance and specialist technical support. HUMINT is one of
the most versatile and powerful information sources available for situation awareness and decision-making.
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Fig: Penetration of Adversary's decision making architecture
A predefined paper format is used to maintain structured data system. Thus, the interface is designed in a
manner such that it can hold and save pre formatted data in database. But interface can have provision or
field to entry the purpose of capturing key data.
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Fig-2: Proposed CIS system for HUMINT
After then, data fusion process is accomplished on available structured data. This will improve data accuracy
and reduce the redundancy of links (information overload). Repeating the same process leads to the identify
critical point of people network.
HUMINT uses framework to define new criteria for future HUMINT operations regarding intelligence and
counterintelligence. Objectives and accuracy achievements are proposed through the DITE (Detection,
Identification, Track and Estimate of state) sequence of events. Data is structured at each stage and process
(data merging, data fusion, resources management and learning) to find out a keynote. Example of utilizing
DITE in real scenario is given at later section.
While HUMINT techniques can be employed to influence friendly visualization of an adversary, the same
techniques are employed by the counterintelligence (CI) specialists to influence an adversary's visualization
of friendly capabilities and intent by identifying, neutralizing or exploiting hostile HUMINT assets.
To identify key persons, HUMINT can use social network links or information within CIS database. The
later one is used in urban operations. For example,
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Fig-2: Category (a) and instance (b) identification – social network assessment
A man (possibly a criminal) contacting a lady (Natalia). After the decision, Natalia exchanges 50000$ to the
account owner, a man connected with the national military organization. At Fig-2, the two circumstances of
men are recognized. Barbara, is a participant of the regional mafia, deals with armament. Paul, a sergeant of
the infantry, is the dad of Natalia. From this factor, we blink research can be conducted to understand about
a possible web link between Barbara and Paul, maybe exposing details about the provenance of the enemy
team weaponry.
Fig-3: Social network assessment: Person representation level
For urban operation, an individual name is not enough to characterize somebody as unique. Since there are
no findings at social network in such case, suspect can be listed by national, local, government service,
driving license information, professional or trade union, voters Ids, membership card etc. The national
identity number can be effective to identify in such context if nationwide citizen database is available
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Each individual is member of one group and certainly also of many groups. Fig-3 illustrates the overlapping
between individual memberships to social groups. Paul and Natalia are members of the family group.
Natalia can also be a member, with Barbara, of the group criminal organization. Barbara, is also a member
of the group mafia, etc. Figure 3b presents the possible interactions between instances of social groups such
as government, military, civil, religion, police, and family.
This paper presented a possible approach for HUMINT CIS design. Its framework is based on system
objectives and related accuracy requirements, sequence of events. In this case detect, identify, track and
estimate of a future state (DITE). A five-dimension structure is proposed for data modeling and
management: space (x,y,z), time (t) and possible worlds (w). On this foundation, data exploitation and
resource management can be performed with regard to common ontology and analysis. This includes
network inference, data merging and data fusion capabilities. The learning process can enhance the system
by an intelligent component performing optimization.
Example of DITE:
DITE works in following steps:
Detect: Discover or perceive the existence of any crony, keynote and initial statement.
Identify: Quantify suspect features to meet conditions for perfect comprehensive and precision
Track: Monitor the suspect, record movement and notice its tendency.
Estimate future state: Predict the suspect status over time, or more particularly a damage estimate for a
possible engagement
The special operations that raid and killed Bin Laden was done by the CIA and Navy Seal team. The
intelligence that spawned the capture-kill mission which ended bin Laden's reign of terror was obtained
through the CIA's interrogation program
Detection
● Under interrogation, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Faraj Al-
Libi both gave up the name of a trusted bin Laden courier.
● After two years of intelligence gathering, CIA officials were
finally able to find the courier with his brother operated in
Pakistan.
Identification
● Spotting the courier on a street in Pakistan gave them an
important clue. U.S. intelligence drilled down to the home
where the two brothers lived with their families.
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● Finally, CIA agents were able to mark Laden at a compound in
Abbottabad.
Tracking
● CIA officials observed that the compound was massive and
tightly guarded with only two points of access.
● The compound had neither Internet nor telephone access which
was unusual.
● Residents burned their trash rather than leaving it out for
collection, there was no telephone or internet service and the
three-story main structure had few windows facing outside.
Estimation
● In August 2010, Bin Laden courier identified.
● In September, 2010, Bin laden suspicious location identified.
● At February 20111, the intelligence was ordered strong enough
to begin considering action against bin Laden.
● Finally 2 May 2011, they launched the operation and killed Bin
Laden.
EDIT:
Here is my clarification on mentioned topic:
HUMINT CIS provides an approach for sequential analysis of a case, determine its suspect relation from
three dimensional perspective (x,y,z ) then impose time (t)on common ontology (common nature , possible
action )and finally select most relevant (with present case) work space (w ) for suspect.
For example: A criminal can have several identity. He / she may be social worker, has driving licence, has
land property, has political familiarity. HUMINT CIS approaches to justify a criminal from different angle
and more probably through the three dimensional view (x,y,z . Here three dimensions refer all works,
activities and identities are involved for a criminal.
Now, impose time observation on criminal incidents. Compare time of crime and criminal work action time,
discard the weak and non relevant information.
Finally, find and specify a possible relevant work scope (w ) area for criminal for faster tracking the crime
and criminal.
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APPENDIX
TACTICAL QUESTIONING
Collecting Information
Soldiers patrol the same area day after day. Sometimes they go in for deep area patrolling and
reconnaissance. All this is done with the intent to collect combat information.In any operational environment
soldiers should always be primed , alert to collect information.Of particular mention here is te word
‘’change’’.While patrolling the soldiers may discern a ‘’change’’ in normalcy of the surroundings. While
studying the surroundings , like the people,terrain,infrastructure the soldier should recognize any changes in
the environment.Often than not these changes are important indicators cof enemy activity or intent.The
soldier may not be able to find out the reason behind the change , still it’s very important he report it to the
intelligence personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as
• Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.
• Homes and Buildings: What is the condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water,
sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock?
• Infrastructure: The presence of functioning stores, service stations, etc.
• People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees status, visible health,
clothing, daily activities, and leaders.
• Contrast: Has anything changed?
If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the
information requirements. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within
the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the information requirements and
their responsibility to observe and report
While handling detainees and EPWs keep the following in mind:
1. Segragate the detainees and EPWs based on nationality , sex , profession , ethnicity (civilians) and
rank , insignia , and regiment (may be belonging to enemy intelligence unit , thus game for special
interrogation )
2. While searching the person of the detainee or EPW search thotoughly.Keep separate the records of
documents , seized equipments and weapons(capture tags).Describe all documents,equipments and
weapons as completely as possible.This is not DOCEX or Captured equipment exploitation in its
entirety—that will later be done by trained HUMINT personnel and with help of technical
assistants.What is being done here is tactical exploitation , just like tactical questioning—on the spot
intelligence extraction.
3. Intelligence is perishable and combat intelligence is highly perishable , action is required as soon as
possible and for that the intelligence must reach the targeting platform without any delay.But there
are procedures.The prisoners and detainees who are felt will yield more information on further
questioning must be moved as soon as possible to the rear where interrogators are waiting.Bear in
mind that with time the detainee/EPW emboldens , the initial panic which he had on point of capture
wears away , he gets time to think and also harbors escapist thoughts—escape from captivity.We are
here talking about the duties of secondary collectors , the line troops who must move them fast to
rear after ascertaining that they do have information of value.There are mobile interrogation teams to
handle cases right on the spot at forward areas and copmposed of a mix of HUMINT/CI but that is
tactical HUMINT and will be dealt within my book on Counterintelligence.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
4. Kep a tab on the detaines , EPWs and all others so that they do not communicate with each other.
5. Remember the personal safety and protection of all detained for questioning can be a cause for
concern under certain circumstances and hence they must be safeguarded.For example someone from
the line troops may vent his personal anger on the enemy by attempting rough handle the detainees
or prisoners.Sexual harassment is also an issue.Whatever be the case , they must be treated humanely.
Key Considerations for Talking
• You must be aware of the existence, nature and type of threat in your area and the vulnerabilities of the
protection measures taken by your commander which are liable to be tapped. Overall you should
know the force protection measures taken by your unit.
• Be careful about the local culture, traditions, customs.
• Your body language should project a friendlier flavor, not an intimidating one. Point weapons away
from the accosted person.
• Talk to people in normal surroundings.Dont lead them to an isolated area, an alley or any place which
will make them suspicious. Always be polite. Remove sunglasses.
• If you are speaking to a woman know local courtesies.
Questions
Questions should be so structured so as to be simple, straightforward, should open and maintain the
conversation, should start with an interrogative, and should prompt a narrative answer. Interrogatives are
what, why, when, who and where. Questions should not be closes provoking only an ‘’yes’’ or ‘’no’’ as
answer but should be ‘’open’’.Avoid asking questions that are confusing. Characteristics of open questions:
• Act as an invitation to talk.
• Prompts the person to answer comfortably and feel encouraged to continue with the conversation.
• Not too specific but broad in nature.
• Encourage discussion.
• Creates a situation favorable for the soldier to be the listener(and observer) for a major part of the
conversation.
• Does not cause the person to feel intimidated or threatened.
• Invokes curiosity of others and allows them to get involved in the discussion spiritedly.
• Gives the person the opportunity to tell his opinions, his judgment, what he feels is important, what he
feels should be done.
• Should invoke a conversation, not a question-answer scenario.
Be subtle, don’t just jot away on paper the answers –that is not conversation and always be friendly,
cooperative, observing him carefully but not arousing any suspicion, studying his body language and be
courteous and reserved.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Questioning to Fill Out the Capture Tag
You are manning a check post or roadblock..Before being deployed to do so your unit commander has
briefed you about the intelligence requirements as per current mission. The Battalion prioritized intelligence
requirements lead to the generation of intelligence requirements for each company and subunits. These
intelligence requirements as spelled out to you will guide you in framing the questions to be asked of
individuals at the check post/roadblock. Once you, the soldier, have screened and detained a person
categorized either as a detainee or EPW you must now obtain all possible details from him so that on
subsequent questioning/interrogation of the person by the HUMINT or CI agent, the latter is well prepared
initially with the information you have supplied. You must fill out a capture tag which will facilitate further
questioning/interrogation. The capture tag must include:
What is your job? What is your speciality? Are you a combatant? If so what is your rank, number and unit?
Who are in your chain of command? Whom do you report—that is who your immediate superior is? What is
the mission of your unit? Are you a civilian? Then why are you here? Who is your immediate boss and what
is the name of your company? At the time, place and point of capture, detention what was your immediate
mission—that is to say why were you there and what were you doing or what were your plans? Were you
supposed to conduct any mission/job when you were captured/detained? What are your future plans and
what is the future mission of your unit/company? You might note he is carrying documents, maps,
identification papers; photographs.Here is where you might find things out of the ordinary. The map might
be of another place or even this place: Why are you carrying this map? The photo/s might be of someone
else: Who is this person and why are you carrying his photograph? The ID papers may belong to other
persons and hence you ask him why is he carrying other peoples identification papers and why. And where
are these persons as they are in a disturbed area and that too without identification papers. All these
exploitable documents can now be handed over to the MI section together with the detainee/EPW.
Remember your questions should be guided by your unit’s intelligence requirements and as briefed
to you but on no count should the person being questioned get a whiff of these requirements or your
mission. Everything should be done in an atmosphere of normal conversation.
Example Questions
Questions must be framed in such a manner so as not to elicit vague or misleading answers. They should be
direct, pointed but at the same time broad so that the person being questioned does not misinterpret it or has
any room for maneuver. For example the following questions were designed for soldiers manning check
posts/roadblocks. Modify them to accommodate EPWs/detainees, local population as per your mission,
situation and unit requirements.
• What is your name (Match this with any identification document found on his person) Cross-check with CI
White list, Black list and Grey List)
• Where do you live and full address, where were you going and why, how did you arrive here. From here to
your final destination point—what will be the route and why? In what way is it safer or convenient for you?
Who will facilitate your journey? That reminds me, who facilitated your journey till here, financially or
otherwise? (All these must be specifically answered or obtained)
• What is your present occupation, your specialty-if any and your qualifications (see if he has any technical
expertise)?
• What was the type of physical terrain you travelled to get here? During your travel what all obstacles you
faced and how did you manage to overcome/circumvent them. While travelling did you observe anything
out of ordinary in your surroundings? Or any unusual activity?
• What currency are you carrying and how much? What is the money intended for (if found to be a big sum)?
• Can you name anyone whom you know personally who is averse to Indian security measures/ops here in
this area? On being answered immediately follow with ‘’who else’’.Do you know or are you aware of the
nature and type of any anti-Indian security operation/any other activity here or anywhere else and dates or
time of such activities? Can you tell me the reason for our forces to be here? Do you support our activities?
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
DO NOT’s
• Ask questions which might reveal your intent or which might make him aware of your units mission,
intelligence requirements.
• Jot down answers before him.
• Don’t resorts to quid-pro-quo.They are not permanent sources to be given goods/money in exchange for
information and neither are you an intelligence specialist. The same goes for EPWs and detainees.
• Do not resort to coercion. You may be reported to social media. Or the police. Remember we are all
governed by Geneva Conventions.
• If you are handling EPWs and detainees escort them to the interrogation center as soon as possible. You
are only supposed to ask basic questions to civilians in conversational mode. Yes if situation is fluid, like in
battle and yu accost suspicious civilians you may resort to interrogation based tactical questioning, but only
to ascertain if they are of interest to HUMINT/CI personnel and carefully examine any captured documents.
In such cases escort them quickly to detention centers from where the MP will take them to interrogation
centers. • Pay money for information.
• Do not be so cooperative so as to tell them their rights that can be handled later. First the information from
them.
Reporting
For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit intelligence section to factor
in all useful tactical information gained during the small units activities in the overall planning of the
mission (and also update ISR planning):
Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical value.The soldier may resort
to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to arrive at his judgment.•
• Normal reporting
• Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.
• Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.
Document Handling
When there are documents on the person of the detainee efforts should be immediately made to:
Classify them
Seize , Impound or return them
Determine if they contain information which can be exploited further by trained intelligence
personnel (DOCEX).
Remember that any document, even though it may seem irrelevant on first sight , may on close
inspection reveal information of interest , might satisfy intelligence requirements and with other seized
documents give a bigger picture of enemy intent.
Classification:
Documents can be Personal such as letters, diaries, photographs, flyers posted in cities and towns, etc
,Identity such as identity cards , passport, drivers license , ration cards or Official such as documentation
government/military information , for example military books , field manuals, military reports,files,maps etc.
CED (Captured enemy document) is a piece of recorded informnation seized from the captured person
belonging to the enemy forces or any civilian in collusion with the latter.We can also name our own military
documents CED that were in the possession of the enemy.DOCEX of such documents can rev eal what they
know about us , or if anyone was involved on our side in transferring these documents to the enemy then we
are alerted to the fact and going by the nature of the document or its origin we can put our CI agents to track
him down.CEDs can be found on the person of EPWs/detainees , abandoned military areas , on the bosies of
killed enemy personnel , old enemy command posts , destroyed enemy forward tactical headquarters.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs can also be
US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can be found almost anywhere;
some locations include abandoned training sites, old enemy command posts, deceased persons, cafes,
town squares, or in the possession of EPWs/detainees.Written or typed material, drawings, audio, and/or
video recordings, computer disks,etc can constitute the content of a CED.
Once you have critically studied the CED you have to decide on three actions:
Return them to the owner as they are very personal items and do not contain any military or
governmental information
Impound the CED with the intent to return them later as these documents being of personal nature
contain information pertaining to the military but which after examination is found not to have any
bearing on current situation or having any affiliation with the enemy. Still they will be sent for
DOCEX and if the initial assumptions are true , they will be returned.
Confiscate the CED as it contains military or governmental information (all official documents)
Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred for DOCEX.
The capture tag should contain the
1. Unit details who captured the CED
2. Location of capture : Grid coordinates
3. Time and date of Capture
4. Identity of the person from whom it was captured including brief description (Rank , unit etc)
5. Prevailing circumstances under which the capture was made
6. Description of the CED
APPENDIX
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
TACTICAL HUMINT
HUMINT is collected information which we term positive intelligence after processing.HUMINT collectors
access human sources and multimedia to gain information about enemy
intent,composition,disposition,capabilities,table of order and equipment, command control nodes, centers of
gravity,leadership,personnel—this is also called Order of Battle when conducted prior to a combat situation.
The Commander specifies his intelligence requirements explicitly and going by these requirements ,
prioritized , human sources,informants,and other human elements possessing information compatible with
the said requirements are utilized by application of specific techniques like tactical
questioning,debriefing,document exploitation, eliciting and interrogation and reconnaissance and
surveillance. The HUMINT collectors are not intelligence operatives with general intelligence education and
training but specialists.
Counterintelligence is also a collection oriented discipline like HUMINT but not an intelligence discipline in
the strictest sense. It is concerned with enemy intent while HUMINT is concerned with collection part only
so as to satisfy Commanders intelligence requirements in order to answer certain information gaps.CI
attempts to prevent sabotage,assassination,terrorism,subversive and enemy intelligence activities , deny the
enemy access to installations and sensitive information , acts as a protective shield for the Commander by
supporting OPSEC and force protection and acts in an advisory capacity recommending countermeasures to
enemy intelligence activities.CI is a protection component in the Commanders repository of defensive
tactics and techniques and CI also protects the intelligence cycle. Several definitions exclude personnel,
physical, document or communications security programs from CI purview , but on close inspection it will
be seen that CI invariably is resorted to while implementing force protection and denial/deception measures
(information warfare) thus bringing in play the security aspects of personnel , physical,documents.CI
support tio physical security , infrastructure, technology protection, military security,HUMINT –all these
some way or the other involve those elements that are kept out of general definitions.
Definitions can be very confusing, may render doctrine imperfect and lead to redundancy. For example the
Army ten ds to maintain a general perspective on threat—statements like our forces are prepared to deter
/attack/defend against a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from criminal activity in our jurisdiction which
may abet our main enemy, terrorism , subversion to small wars, wars and battles. Now this generalized
concept is fine in that we can have several security programs, each tending to one specific threat type in the
entire spectrum. But the disadvantage in this approach is we cannot focus on the main threat, say terrorism,
and as security concepts like force protection, deception operations, physical security, military security,etc
all have certain elements in common we land up with redundant programs designed to handle these security
concerns. For example antiterrorism and force protection both have in common physical security as a
passive defensive subcomponent where the installation critical points are protected after vulnerability
assessments and red teaming. The same subcomponent is the major component in a physical security
program. Thus there occurs good redundancy if we do not have a focused view of the threat and counter
threat measures become diffused over the broad spectrum.
The same goes with the definition of intelligence and CI. Or rather I should say the general perspectives
held by most Commanders and even intelligence officers.
The main idea is to remove uncertainty and gain a decision advantage. This should be the prime objective of
the Commander.HUMINT and CI are both shaping operations but with a critical difference.HUMINT
shapes the Commanders view of the battle space by providing him accurate intelligence about enemy order
of battle. Plus other information requirements when ops are in progress.CI on the other hand penetrates the
enemy commanders decision cycle and shapes his views ‘’like the way’’ our Commander desires by denying
the enemy commander access to our operations, plans and information systems , and using offensive
methods like penetration , infiltration and also denial/deception operations. Both shaping operations have
one thing in common as goal. To act as force enabler. To heighten the Commanders situational
understanding. In other words to gain that ‘’decisive ‘’ advantage. .To get a ‘’positional’’ advantage.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces'
knowledge of Blue forces.
HUMINT shapes the understanding of the ‘’Blue forces’’ with respect to the ‘’Red forces’’ while CI does
the reverse. True both use several techniques which are in common like interrogation and other low level
source operations but going by what has been discussed CI is not HUMINT and not in the least a subset of
HUMINT. Being a subset would mean CI operations would be counter-HUMINT only. But CI looks beyond
that, by conducting offensive operations, denial and deception operations , exploiting enemy intelligence
activities ,neutralizing them through collection of evidence and subsequent prosecution for national security
crimes, and supporting tactical and theater operations by feeding inputs to the decision cycles. Thus we see
CI goes far beyond Counter-HUMINT operations.
Interrelationship
CI also provides positive intelligence about the enemy as a byproduct of its operations.CI and HUMINT
operations overlap in that very similar techniques are often used. In fact in tactical operations a mix of
HUMINT and CI operators plus a linguist carry out tactical HUMINT operations where the roles of both are
more overlapping and confusion arises when either may operate like the other. We should not always justify
HUMINT source operations..this leads to the mistaken impression that CI only lends support to HUMINT
and has no other function and that HUNMINT and CI are the same thing.NO.Whereas HUMINT focuses on
the enemy’s organization,composition,capabilities and decision making without any focus on the intent of
collection , only collecting all require information laid down in the commanders prioritized intelligence
requirements order , and reporting it through proper channels (and here full stop) CI will go much further ,
exploiting , neutralizing the enemy intelligence activities or doing both…CI is concerned with enemy
‘’INTENT’’.HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s decision making cycle to gain information for the
Commander whereas CI attempts to ‘’INFLUENCE’’ that decision cycle and shape it the way we want it in
order to achieve winning objectives. Thus the HUMINT operative tasking end after detecting and
identifying enemy intelligence activities while the CI agents tasks begin afresh.
From all this discussion we can derive two things:
1. HUMINT and CI are different.CI is not a subset of HUMINT.
2.As HUMINT and CI have many similar lines of operation , if both can be combined to satisfy tactical
requirements ,(during theater or national-level requirements they can revert to individual role-this capability
must be retained) , we will have an intelligence operator who will be more versatile,adaptable.and can
confirm easily to all army requirements at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence formations can execute this
tactical HUMINT asset (the operator) to satisfy commanders requirements. Merging the capabilities of
HUMINT and CI results in a task organization of skills for the Commander—definitely an improvement
over either HUMINT or CI enabled operations. Tactical HUMINT operations are most suitable for
developing and maintaining an excellent informant/source base that provides timely, specific and accurate
information. Tactical HUMINT operations combine both HUMINT and CI techniques and together with
linguist assistance , are more capable of developing and maintaining contacts than only HUMINT or CI
ops.For example , the Tactical HUMINT team comes across few individuals of interest near the forward area
, the HUMINT operators conduct tactical questioning to extract information of intelligence value and then
pass them over to their CI colleagues for further interrogation if they discern any information of interest to
the CI operators. This can be switched to and fro and the application of the combined faculties of both
results in more refined, relevant and timely/accurate information. If the individuals are of the witting type or
have voluntarily offered to deliver information or are community members sympathetic to the forces, then
they can be inducted into the source repository by establishing rapport/giving incentives etc and then later
their assistance taken for more information. Tactical HUMINT teams can act as mobile interrogation teams
at forward areas, quickly disposing off sources after tactical questioning and interrogations, thereafter
detailing escort for those who may render more information or who, it appears are suppressing tactical
information, sending them to detention centers and collocated interrogation areas near forward areas or in
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
the rear. The standard procedure of detaining and escorting to rear interrogation areas is hereby bypassed as
in this procedure , the time taken to assess , detain , segregate , and transport to rear areas can negate the
availability of timely intelligence—intelligence is highly perishable ,. Especially combat intelligence, where
time is of essence.
Hence as the repository of sources grows, the quality and content of available information is enhanced and
for the commander tactical intelligence, most of the time, is at his fingertips. Compare this to the situation
where earlier, HUMINT or CI operations had to be complemented by intelligence from theater or national
agencies, and it so happens they cannot provide real time, ground intelligence always for combatant
commanders.
The soldiers will be given language training, Basic CI training, operational debriefing training so that as and
when required they can shift from tactical to operational briefing to CI functions. The focus of training
should be cultivating the capability to conduct contact and informant operations, recognize
information of CI value, and execute tactical questioning of civilians, and screen EPWs and detainees
with the assistance of an interpreter.
Tactical HUMINT team functions:
1. Tactical tasks with Language training
2. HUMINT Ops=Strategic Debriefing
3. CI
Here it should be stressed that intelligence nowadays is tactical—the focus should be at tactical level as
soldiers fight wars nowadays more than battles. Small-wars in fact. Hence the dire need for actionable
intelligence/tactical intelligence. Here the players are combatant commanders who must move swiftly in
their maneuver and strike decisively. Higher echelons are there for planning, average intelligence support,
but it is for the ground based Tactical HUMINT teams to do most of the work. And they do it—as their
composition is quite what the modern day warfare demands.
CI/HUMINT
Counterintelligence functional services are provided to promote the Commanders situational
understanding.
Define and analyse mission
Execute CI Surveys
Prepasre a brief on CI Awareness
Execute CI Vulnerability Assessment
Execute CI Threat assessment
Execute CI Inspections
Execute CI Reviews
Execute CI Evaluations
Conduct CI support to HUMINT activities
Identify, exploit and counteract foreign intelligence activities across the full spectrum of HUMINT activities.
CI activities include, but are not limited to, identifying friendly and hostile capabilities and vulnerabilities;
providing CI review of HUMINT activities; conducting CIdamage assessments; providing support to
Counter Espionage (CE) investigations; conducting and/or assisting in asset validation by physical and
technical means.
Perform CI/HUMINT operational planning.
1. Supervise the preparation of CI products, as required.
2. Obtain necessary approvals.
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
3. Supervise CI support to HUMINT operation.
4. Supervise asset validation procedures.
5. Conduct post-mission analysis.
6. Disseminate required reports/products.
CI/HUMINT Collection management
The CI/HUMINT officer/JCO will match the requirements with the collection assets in hand , checks
availability , usage by other adjacent units , deployable possibilities etc and then determines the best
collection plan.
Receive prioritized intelligence requirements from higher headquarters or collection manager ,
conduct analysis
Create the collection plan
Study all CI/HUMINTcollection assets available and match them with the requirements
Decide on the course of action to fulfill collection objectives
Docex
The CI/HUMINT officer/Jco must be acquainted with the exploitation setup and the units exploitation SOP
so that he may, after receiving, accounting and sending the captured materials he may be able to follow-up
for results and give future feed inputs to the exploitation cell/agency.
Understand exploitation agency infrastructure
Identify exploitable materials
Categorize them as Biometric Examination or Forensic Examination.
Take possession of exploitable materials
Account for and categorize exploitable materials
Prepare catalogues
Dispatch the materials to exploitation agencys custody
Followup with the agencies for results
Identify orders of battle in given Area of operations
Identify Ground military attack and defense capability, Air-defense and attack capability, naval capability
and all associated military weaponry systems and equipment, such as ground combat systems, antiaircraft
systems, naval vessels, etc.Study the enemy infrastructure and locate/identify the keys areas.
Intelligence support to Targeting.
This includes identifying enemy targets , both high value and high payoff , nominating in order of priority ,
recommending kinetic or non kinetic attacks, and thus assist the Commander to destroy, neutralize or exploit
the target in a manner which is in line with the units mission and in keeping with the Commander and his
staffs requirements.
The Unit intelligence supervisor who controls the target intelligence collection and associated
ops/recommendations to the Commander must be as thorough as possible, evaluating all factors and
intelligence inputs carefully, studying imagery data and compiling and organizing target information
efficiently so that while nominating to the Commander and making recommendations there is absolutely no
ambiguity. Target descriptions including composition, location, importance, imagery, graphics,
construction—all of these are spelled out correctly and particularly for HVTs/HPTs their location,
significance, all associations determined and influence with respect to the leaderships decision cycle/battle
space situation.
Identify:
Targeting Categories
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
HVTs/HPTs
Areas of Target value
Build a list of targets
Locational factors of each target
Associations of each target(COIN)
Social circles of each target (COIN)
Assess target significance/value
Determine whether to employ kinetic or non kinetic attack
Contribute to attack guidance
Assess effect of removal of targets on battle space
Create and maintain target folders
Decide on target intelligence requirements
Create target nomination list
Combat assessment
Update target folder based on combat assessments.
Contribute to IO
decide on restrike options
Evaluate the Threat
Determine threat intent, capabilities, vulnerabilities, possible courses of action and the most dangerous
course of action.
It is of prime importance to study enemy activity and indicators to assess his capability to attack, defend,
withdraw, reinforce. Focus on the intelligence gaps and this focus can determine the direction of collection
of intelligence. Enemy activity patterns should be studied.
Factors influencing the intelligence product are the time available for collection, assets available, unit size,
the intelligence requirements, AO features and the mission. The enemy, terrain, weather, local populace are
taken into consideration. Identify:
Enemy Intent
Enemy Capability
HVT
HPT
C.G.
Critical areas: Capabilities,Requirements
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
Keshav Mazumdar DipCriminology,CPO,CRC,ASC,CMAS,ATO is engaged in intelligence/security
activities and research and engaged at present in anti-terrorism research involving social network analysis,
and exposure to intelligence-led policing, terrorist profiling, TACHUMINT,terrorist threat assessments and
counterintelligence related security fields. He has his Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) credential from S2
Institute of Safety & Intelligence, USA.He is at present the Sr Vice President ATAB,USA, Advisor
(RIEAS) , Greece and also of European Intelligence Academy (EIA).He has been nominated to the Board
of Geo Strategic Forecasting Corporation , USA.He holds a Diploma in Criminology from Stonebridge
Associated College UK and in Criminal Profiling(INDIA).He is certified as a Master Antiterrorism
Specialist by ATAB , Anti Sabotage Certified (ASC) by the College of Forensics Examiners International
(ACFEI-USA),Certified Protection Officer by IFPO-USA and is a Certified Crisis Response Coordinator
(CRC).In July 2012 he has been inducted as Fellow of New West minister College , British
Columbia,Canada.He is a member in good standing of several professional Security
organizations/Associations including the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security
Professionals , Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, International Association of Bomb Technicians &
Investigators, IAHN & the International Counterterrorism Officers Association. He is a registered member
of the Int Association for the Study of Organized Crime. His has completed several NATO/Partnership for
Peace courses, UNITAR Courses, and is specialized in threat and vulnerability analysis/assessment. He is a
certified Human Resource Professional thus enabling him to effectively manage peoples and assignments.
He has authored books on Intelligence, COIN, Warning Intelligence, Terrorist Interrogation and
Antiterrorism. His expertise in unarmed combat is noteworthy--he is a regd. kungfu practitioner.
Along with Admiral Peter Kikareas (NATO, presently retired) he is the administrator of two on line courses
in Intelligence and Counterintelligence. This is an ATAB Endeavour to impart quality intelligence training
to both Intelligence officers’ as well as responders , a part of the course so designed so as to acquaint the
latter with Terrorist indicators , pre-attack terrorist surveillance(dry runs),terrorist profiling and CARVER.
The counterintelligence course also covers the TACHUMINT concept. The very important concept of I&W
is dealt with thoroughly.
MEMBER OF:
International Assn of Counterterrorism & Security Professionals IACSP
INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICERS ASSN ICTOA
International Assn of Hostage Negotiators IAHN
International Assn of Bomb Technicians
Antiterrorism Accreditation Board ATAB
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ACFE
International Foundation of Protection Officers IFPO
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS
HONORS/AWARDS/CREDENTIALS:
Anti terrorism Officer Credential ATO
Certified Master Anti-terrorism Specialist CMAS
Anti sabotage Certified ASC
Certified Protection Officer CPO
Crisis Response Coordinator CRC
Certified Human Resources Professional CHRP
Fellow of New Westminster College, British Coulmbia, Canada
He comes from a very respectable Indian family , his late father being a soldier and gentleman of highest
integrity, war decorated Captain D.N.Mazumdar.He has strictly adhered to his fathers principles. His mother
and two sisters, both Professors have nurtured in him a high sense of respect for every living being, big or
small, human or of the animal world. His belief in THE SUPREME is predicated by his feelings for
mankind, for those in distress and poverty. But he is stoic enough to imbibe the true qualities of an
antiterrorist, not flinching when meting out punishment to criminals/terrorists.
Performance Review Excerpts
‘’He is more than qualified to conduct training of security forces in a vast number of Intelligence, Crisis
and Terrorism Recognition and Response, intelligence led policing and counterintelligence in anti-
terrorism & COIN operations.
Keshav has retired Admirals and Generals chairing training committees under him in ATAB who have
expressed their appreciation for his abundance of knowledge and his motivation to the furtherance of setting
the world standards in terrorism response’’. (Keith Flannigan , Certification Chairman , Anti Terrorism
Accreditation Board , USA +1-703-310-7482))
Seconded by : Admital Peter Kikareas (NATO)..Retd.
‘’I highly recommend him to be nominated as Fellow of New WestMinster College,Canada.His excellent
knowledge of current intelligence/counterintelligence practices in combating terrorism/insurgency renders
him ideal for imparting training to security forces.His latest book on counterintelligence and ES2 is rich in
‘’the need of the hour’’ actionable intelligence and counterintelligence TTP.’’
Prof John M Nomikos Dir RIEAS European Intelligence Academy Athens +302109911214
HUMINT/CI Revisited by Keshav Mazumdar ATO CMAS