“Why COIST Matters”
by Victor R. Morris
Victor R. Morris
Introduction
“Do you even COIST,
bro?” was the question a young command post
non-commissioned officer (NCO) asked one of his Soldiers. The question arose
during situational exercise lane training (STX) involving platoon level patrols
in the company sector. The young soldier asked his leader how he knew about the
enemy’s employment of IEDs and the “hot spot”
locations, which are essential to countering asymmetric threats, maintaining
situational awareness and contributing to bottom-up refinement. There have been
numerous debates regarding the applicability of Company Intelligence Support
Teams or COISTs and the “way ahead” in future
conflicts. Opinions such as “COIST is for COIN”, “COIST is not doctrine”, and
“Intel is for analysts” have been widespread. In contrast, there have been
positive reviews from Specialist through Brigadier General about the efficacy
of COISTs in training and combat.
One of the current challenges involving COISTs stems from an overall military shift. This shift
involves the reduction of counterinsurgency operations world-wide, increase of
Decisive Action Training Environment rotations (DATE) and global employment
utilizing Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). The DATE rotations support
conducting Unified Land Operations in a Hybrid Threat Environment. There is a
perception that COISTs are only relevant in an
irregular warfare model during counterinsurgency and stability operations.
Other challenges to COIST future applicability involve a lack of doctrine and
ineffective task organization. The current company COIST model is not conducive
to effectively engaging diverse combinations of regular and irregular forces
simultaneously. Future security challenges will include multi-faceted,
uncertain, complex and chaotic environments, and will require more support to
information and intelligence requirements at all echelons. The initial, sustainment and pre-deployment training must be a command
priority and must for formalized for future management during Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) cycles. Finally, teams must become better integrated into
company command posts during training and be better supported through more
emphasis on overall mission command. COISTs must not
only be maintained for future conflicts, but adapted to be better integrated
and transitional within company mission command systems during Unified Land
Operations involving a hybrid threat.
Background
The complexity of
irregular warfare necessitated the need to have more enhanced intelligence
capability at the small unit level. In conventional operations, intelligence is
disseminated from higher to lower headquarters based on the presence of
intelligence gathering resources. In counterinsurgency or other decentralized
operations, information flows in the opposite direction, where small units
gather raw information based on their operational environment. Recent
counterinsurgency operations assessed that company formations needed the
ability to produce intelligence to drive their operations and support higher
echelon common operational picture (COP) development. This assessment was
refined and given the designation “COIST” with the following mission: serve
as the primary source of information and intelligence that the company
commander needs to make timely accurate decisions(CALL COIST
Handbook). Post-deployment after action reviews (AARs)
and training assessments dictated the employment of COISTs
and greatly enhanced the company’s ability to analyze, produce and disseminate
accurate information and intelligence in a counterinsurgency environment. They
also facilitated better situational awareness and more effective lethal and
non-lethal targeting in support of the commander’s intent and overall mission.
The Shift: Unified
Land Operations
In response to the
current and future changes, the combat training centers and TRADOC collaborated
on the development of a training model called the Decisive Action Training
Environment (DATE). The current model is designated as DATE 2.1 and differs
from past training rotations and pre-deployment Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs) utilized to prepare units for Iraq and Afghanistan.
The model was designed to prepare tactical organizations to execute a wide
range of operations as part of Unified Land Operations. The DATE model presents
a complex training environment that is designed to train operationally
adaptable units. The ground operations provide the ability for the unit to
build competency with mission essential tasks, while re-fining standard
operating procedures from the last fourteen years of combat. Next, the model
drew on aspects of the contemporary operational environment, while
incorporating aspects of emerging threats and security challenges. The threat
to the brigade’s mission involves an emerging category of threats and
activities that do not fit into the traditional understanding of conventional
and unconventional war. Lastly, the DATE includes Joint,
Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners and a multifaceted
host nation security force that presents the brigade with integration
challenges and opportunities. This paradigm shift to encompass Decisive Action,
Army Core Competencies and Mission Command has created debate about the
applicability of COISTs during Unified Land
Operations.
The Doctrine Dilemma
There have been improvements during the last
eight years involving the development and implementation of COIST doctrine, but
the concept is still not formalized in many company formations. It is
imperative that doctrinal references be used as the basis for COIST training, AARs and standard operating procedure (SOP) development. A
current doctrine review and its support to COIST operations are below:
·
25 November 2008: Field manual 2-19.4,
1-24, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence Operations. This section briefly
mentions the need to form COISTs based on capability
requirements and access to perishable information. It also highlights the fact
that these teams are ad hoc and optional.
·
23 March 2010: Field Manual 2-0
Intelligence fails to address COIST operations in detail.
·
9 November 2010: Training Circular
2-19.63 Company Intelligence Support Team. Aside from various CALL handbooks
published May 2013, this is a very detailed doctrinal publication involving COISTs. Although it was published in 2010, it acts as the
doctrinal foundation for our COIST, Attack the Network, Counterinsurgency and
staff training courses.
·
15 April 2014: The revision to FM
2-0 Intelligence highlights COISTs in BCT
intelligence operations (Chapter 2). Paragraphs 2-7 through 2-10 provide an
overview of COIST and their contribution to intelligence sharing, enemy
assessment, troop leading procedures, and mission execution. The manual also
states that the MI Company may augment selected maneuver companies with MI
Soldiers to form the nucleus of the COIST.
·
10 February 2015: ATP 2-19.4, 1-24, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence
Operations. This document has been updated from the previous 2008 version and
clearly frames the CoIST’s role &
responsibilities.
Evaluating the Threat
Hybrid threats are not
new and there are myriad examples throughout history of how adversaries
organize into conventional and irregular forces. A
hybrid threat (HT) is defined as the diverse and dynamic combination of regular
forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve
mutually benefitting effects (TC 7-100).
The term “hybrid” has recently been used to illustrate the increased complexity
of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between
traditional categories of conflict. Contemporary hybrid warfare involves a
multiplicity of actors employing a combination of hybrid instruments
facilitated by 21st century technologies and combinations of conventional and
irregular forces. Hybrid threats are characterized by the combination of
forces, which can further be defined as conventional military, insurgent
(cellular networks) or criminal organizations. To be a hybrid, these forces
cooperate in the context of pursuing their own internal objectives, which
further complicate the unit’s mission and need for increased situational
awareness and understanding. A recent example of this threat can be seen in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. On August 10, 2014, Troops of Apolo
Task Force, Third Army Division, discovered a complex illegal structure which
operated in La Esperanza village, Buenos Aires municipality, Cauca. On site, troops fought against a group of guerrillas
and when they retreated, troops searched the area and located a 200 m2
structure which had been adapted to manufacture explosives and process coca
paste. This facility was reported to be the property of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC). This event is evidence of the close relation between
drug trafficking and FARC, and the way this criminal structure intends to
strengthen its capabilities by using explosive devices. Below are some of the
goals associated with hybrid threats:
·
Removal of forces from their area of operations.
·
Degrade and exhaust forces rather than cause a direct military
defeat.
·
Use of a dynamic variety of conventional and unconventional
methods to create multiple dilemmas.
·
Prevent opponents from segregating the conflict into easily
assailable parts. In many cases military action is the least important of the
hybrid threat’s activities.
·
Rapidly form, transform, adapt and abolish cells based on
requirements, environment and opponents.
·
Simultaneously inject themselves into all of the operational
variables in the OE (PMESII-PT).
·
Adhere to ensuring security, accomplishing the task, maintaining
adaptability, and remaining connected to the people.
·
Preserve bases to train, self-sustain, prepare for future missions
and evolve organizational capability.
·
Initiate strategic consequences of denying an enemy a secure area,
or making it politically untenable to remain.
·
Create a dilemma where an army is vulnerable to conventional
attack when it disperses to combat irregular forces within the population, and
cede control of the operational environment and population if they remain
concentrated.
Training to Counter
the Threat
COISTs must possess core
competencies associated with engaging actors in a hybrid environment. The below
tasks are associated with offensive, defensive and stability operations in a
static or mobile command post during operations. The core competencies can also
be aligned with a COIST framework consisting of the following spheres: Mission,
Purpose and Function, Task Organization, Core Tasks, Situational Development
and Understanding, Support to Targeting and Assessment. The framework is nested
in the Mission Command and Intelligence Warfighting
Functions for complimentary effects. The below list is not all inclusive and is
subject to change based on the mission and commander’s discretion.
Traditional or
Conventional Threat: Regular Military Forces as a threat the regulated armed
forces of a state or alliance of states with the specified function of
military offensive and defensive capabilities. These forces may have matching
capabilities across all war-fighting functions.
COIST Core
Competencies: Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) involving detailed terrain analysis,
various intelligence disciplines to included TECHINT, OSINT, SIGINT, GEOINT and
HUMINT, template and company graphic management (analog and BFT), PIR, SIR,
CCIR management, ISR program management, proper enabler utilization
(task/purpose), information assurance management (cyber defense),
airspace/ground integration, planning on the move contribution and direct
support to the orders process, which is condensed during high-tempo operations.
Irregular or
Unconventional Threat: Irregular forces as armed individuals or groups who are
not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security
forces (JP 3-24). These forces include: paramilitary, insurgent, guerilla,
terrorist and criminal elements. At the tactical level, they can apply tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) common to regular
forces but do so with asymmetric applications. The definition of irregular
warfare highlights population centric engagement and intention to damage an
opponent’s influence over that population.
COIST Core
Competencies: IPB with an emphasis
on understanding trends, patterns, human networks (to include criminal),
culture and perceptions of the community within the environments, various
intelligence disciplines, Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI), OSINT with a
social media emphasis, SIGINT, GEOINT and HUMINT. All
of the above competencies support situational awareness and support to
targeting.
Lessons Learned
James K. Greer’s
article from the Small Wars Journal entitled “The Network vs. the BCT:
Organizational Overmatch in Hybrid Strategies” analyzes the concept of more modular
approaches at the tactical level specifically involving “cellular companies.”
In summary, he suggests that we must become a cellular network in order to
respond to future threats. This is accomplished through a deviation from the
current relatively fixed company identity to a “cellular company” that operates
off of rule sets enabled by a robust information and intelligence cell. This
cell is an augmentation of the information mission command system. He also
states that the company should be able to gain or lose modules many times in a
day without losing the coherence of operations, as tasks and engagements are
conducted simultaneously and sequentially.
As an Infantry Company Commander during OIF
09-10, we conducted operations in a similar model. For example, we had one
platoon conducting route security patrols (C-IED), one platoon conducting host
nation security force EOD training, one platoon conducting indirect fire
disruption patrols in a targeted area of interest, and one platoon designated
as a company or battalion quick reaction force. Based on the situation and
operations tempo, these patrols could be happening sequentially or
simultaneously. Additionally, each module has its own set of enablers, which
had to be planned and managed properly. The “dynamic re-tasking” occurred when
host nation security forces required tactical support from U.S. forces.
Typically, Commanders were given six to eight hours to dynamically re-task the
company to support host nation battalion level operations. This re-tasking
meant consolidating and re-organizing the platoons or “cells” back at the
operating base and finalizing the troop leading procedures. The majority of the
time the mission was to conduct a company level clearance of an urban area. In
other offensive terms, we conducted company movements to contact whilst
partnered with host nation forces. The threat was asymmetrical at the time, but
this can easily be applied to a more conventional or hybrid threat. The OPORD
was completed and briefed within three to four hours of the company WARNO. The
company essentially went from conducting de-centralized stability operations to
centralized offensive operations in six hours with direct support from the
headquarters section. COIST employment begins with the company command team and
the commander’s mission command philosophy and system management.
Mission Command
Systems: COIST 2020 Initiatives
The solution to effective and adaptable
companies lies within mission command. ADP 6-0 defines Mission Command as the
exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to
enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile
and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. Additionally,
mission command system consists of five components: personnel, networks,
information systems, processes and procedures, facilities and equipment. All of
these components are contained in the company command post module. That module
is contained in the headquarters section with the commander as the backbone of
mission command.
Due to the nature of the future operational
environment, the current state of company command posts and COIST cells are not
effective due to a lack of effective integration. They should not only be
combined, but augmented through experience and capability—not personnel. The
efficacy of this technique comes from a synchronization of the five components
of mission command in one module with intelligence as a centralized function.
The module or node is the command post, the cells are the headquarters
section/platoons, and the network is the company. One of the primary arguments
with COIST training and employment involves creating cells “out of hide” and
taking soldier from line platoons. All the mission-command capabilities are
already present in the headquarters section of a maneuver
company/troop/battery, which includes the 35 series MOS intelligence soldier,
Armored, Infantry, and Stryker formations. Mission command capabilities can
also be modified or augmented in non-maneuver companies as seen in Chapter 9 of
the CALL COIST Handbook No. 13-09, May 2013. This is not to say that a soldier
from the line cannot be transferred to or from the section, but the
capabilities are already there and are adaptable. If you are conducting
combined arms maneuver through high-tempo operations, the commander is fighting
mounted through a multi-vehicle TAC or in a dismounted configuration. There is
no “COIST vehicle” and those skill sets are executed via the personnel and
systems present on the various TAC vehicles. If you transition to wide area
security, the entire module along with the systems transitions to a tent or
hard stand building. Company intelligence must be synchronized with current
operations and reporting, based on all of the preparation and assessments
conducted prior to the mission. The emphasis comes from a previous planning
knowledge involving friendly maneuver, enemy courses of action, information
requirements and enabler integration. Accurate reporting is decisive in high-tempo
operations and must be concise for proper common operational picture
development. Doesn’t it make sense for the soldiers collecting and analyzing
the information before the mission, to report it during and after the mission?
All modular configurations of the command post
must be able to receive, distribute and analyze information. They must also be
able to recommend courses of action and integrate resources. All of this is
accomplished through one mission command module that includes the company
intelligence aspect. Intelligence is innate at the company level based on
recent combat operations. There is no longer a need to differentiate Command
Posts from COISTs because their missions are
synonymous. We need to train with increased capability in mind, in lieu of
increased personnel or equipment. Strong companies with strong leaders have the
ability to “do more with less”.
Conclusion
In conclusion, companies have evolved from
recent combat operations and must continue to evolve and adapt based on the
future threats involving security. Time-honored concepts of conventional and
unconventional war involving traditional methods have no meaning to a hybrid
threat beyond their ability to be used against its opponents. The skill sets required
to combat this threat must be standardized and maintained at the company level.
Operations at the tactical level directly correlate to the success or failure
of a campaign, where success is gained through enhancing the situational
awareness in tactical units at the company/troop/battery level. All of the
principles contained in this article are applicable to maneuver and
non-maneuver companies alike. Whether you are utilizing Company Intelligence
Support Team (COIST), Company-Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC), Company
Intelligence Cell (CIC), or Intelligence Support Team (IST), you must be
cellular and adaptive in order to support higher echelon requirements and the
mission in a highly dynamic operational environment.
References
1.
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 13-09: Company
Intelligence Support Team Update May 2013.
2.
Field manual 2-19.4, 1-24, Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Intelligence
Operations 25 November 2008.
3.
Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence 23 March 2010 and 15 April 2014.
4.
Training Circular 2-19.63 Company Intelligence Support Team 9
November 2010.
5.
ATP 3-90.37 Combined Arms Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Operations.
6.
ATP 3-21.11, SBCT Rifle Company 3rd QTR FY 15 (pending).
7.
Training Circular 7-10 Hybrid Threat November 2010.
8.
Super-cities threaten to swallow humanity The Independent August 2014.
9.
The Network vs. the BCT: Organizational Overmatch in
Hybrid Strategies, James K. Greer Small
Wars Journal November 2013.
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About the Author
_files/image001.jpg)
Victor R. Morris is a civilian contractor at
the U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of JMRC, United States Army Europe, United
States European Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,
the United States Government or Booz Allen Hamilton.
Comments
by SGM97B | May 21, 2015 - 2:19pm
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I am the guy that
started CoIST (it was originally called Company Level
Intel Cell or CLIC for short) in the Army as the S2 SGM of the Asymmetric
Warfare Group. Others were dabbling with the idea at the same time. I also
worked closely with the USMC who went one step further and created Ops/Intel
fusion cells at the company level.
Where did the idea
come from? I was embedded with a separate MP company that had no effective
Intel support. They were going outside the wire completely blind to the threat.
I trained two promotable Staff Sergeants to conduct
basic collection, analysis, and production during a couple long nights when
things were fairly quiet. I published a White Paper called, "Roll your
Own", which explained the capability gap and the potential solution. A
team from AWG expanded on my ideas and then we pitched it to a brigade at Fort
Lewis. The commander liked the concept so we quickly put together a five-day
and a seven-day training program. The extra two days was if the unit wanted
additional training on software solutions (CIDNE, WebTas,
Falconview, and Crystal Reports). Of course it is
bigger and more complex now then it was in the beginning.
The original
concept, and I stand by the wisdom of it, was for the CoIST
to be organic assets from the unit. Nobody knows what Intel an Infantryman
needs except another Infantryman. It is far easier to teach (not train) an Infantry,
MP, engineer, or whatever, Soldier to do basic analysis than it is to teach an
Intel Soldier every other MOS that exists. These CoIST
Soldiers would continue to go outside the wire with their platoon on a routine
basis to stay fresh and in the fight. Another poster is completely right when
he says that a CoIST can become detached from the
line platoon. That is why I fought to prevent the MI Corps from making CoIST positions CMF 35 Soldiers across the board. The
reason the original CoIST elements were so effective
is that they were looking at the threat from a completely different perspective
from the professional MI Soldier that is trained to do things one way. The
original concept called for the organic CoIST element
to be the link between the company and the battalion S2, not to be a part of
it.
I completely oppose
pulling the CoIST up under a MICO. CoIST is the company commander and platoon leaders' asset
and they MUST be organic troops from the line unit; not just in support of it.
There is a huge difference.
I trained five
brigades and then we embedded with those five and many more after I passed off
that mission. Our observations were that Soldiers organic to the unit had far
more credibility with the commander, had the trust of the Soldiers in the line
platoons, and had a better "feel" for what was going on in the AO
that they patrolled then non-organic MI Soldiers pushed down from the brigade
or battalion did.
by Vicrasta | May 26,
2015 - 2:30pm
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SGM thank you for
your response and for your innovation which has become a significant combat
multiplier and catalyst for the evolution of company level operations in the
21st century. I started with COIST as a PL in 2007 during the surge (4/2ID
JBLM, WA) and continue to teach it now as an enduring capability for our NATO
and PfP partners. I have also been very impressed
with the USMC's ability to evolve and adapt rapidly with regard to doctrine
development and implementation.
First, I agree with
your points about COIST being an organic asset from the unit. I re-iterated
that point in my previous comment with regard to the analysts not being the
single point of success or failure for the unit. COISTs
"aren't going away" due to MICO task organization shifts and lack of
command influence. I also agree that Infantrymen (and other MOSs)
can be taught basic analytical skill sets and would argue they are ready for
more advanced training based on combat experience, enduring CTC training and
threat evolution. They HAVE to be.
Secondly, my
argument with regard to the "detachment" discussion is contained in
the main article which fuses intelligence support to operations into the
company mission command system. They cannot be detached if they are an organic
component of the CP module (HQ soldiers who are closest to the CDR and 1SG
anyway). During ULO, COIST is in the fight and carries the same BTL Rhythm as
the rest of the platoons, albeit with different priorities of work.
Additionally, I'm
glad to see that we share the same thoughts with regard to COIST being a
Commander's and PL's asset. They are crutial in
providing SA/SU and CDRs intent for disciplined
initiative during extremely decentralized operations. Conversely, they are the
central mission command node that supports the commander's fire and maneuver
planning and execution during centralized operations. They are the hinge for
effective ULO transition.
Finally, my charge
to you involves providing accurate and realistic intelligence support to
company operations for our Eastern European partners conducting real world
operations. As much as I would like to say that flutter kicks and low crawls
make a difference, what they desperately need is a method to better share information
and intelligence from the front line to support their superior leader's decisionmaking. They also need to share that information
adjacently to their sister elements in adjacent sectors. How do we apply an
effective COIST model to the nonlinear battlefield where overmatching
conventional military means are resulting in loss of life, and are coupled with
nonmilitary means achieving other detrimental effects above the tactical level?
An additional obstacle involves top down, compartmentalized Soviet era
intelligence models not conducive to bottom-up intelligence refinement. I'd
like some help with this and here or offline is fine.
Thank you again for
your continued contributions to effective company level operations.
by Gruse | May 11,
2015 - 11:22pm
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Mr. Morris,
A very well thought
out technical proposal, though I feel there is one danger in COISTs that deserves highlighting: the more capable they
become, the more platoon and company level leadership tend to lean on the COIST
as a intelligence staff function, and begin to abdicate their own
responsibilities to intelligence because "COIST does that."
It is, of course,
very human. After a hundred plus patrols in the first quarter of a deployment,
even the best junior leaders are looking for a way to lighten their load. The
time pressures of a dynamic action/high intensity environment will always see
leaders looking for ways to save time without compromising what they see as
their duty. Unfortunately, the COIST in these situations can rapidly become a
crutch, with hotspots and network diagrams replacing the bone-deep human
knowledge you want in your squad and platoon leaders in COIN, or the truly
critical thought on just how the enemy is going to go about killing you in high
intensity, and the intra-company sharing of intelligence and trends gets boiled
down to a lifeless staff product.
In short, the COIST
quite accidentally becomes a beast to be fed more than a supporting function,
and this only increases as it grows larger and its
personnel grow further detached from the line. A "permanent" COIST of
HQ platoon and the FSO, plus a 35 if the BN provides, is already so far away
from the average rifle squad or vehicle crew that they demonstrably do not use
it and tend to think of it's members as rear area
soldiers with more reporting requirements. The platoon leaders tend to see it
as a box-check, not the commander's direct tool for intelligence.
As a
counter-proposal, I would say draw the COIST entirely from line personnel - and
leave them with their patrolling and fighting elements to continue to witness
the AO. COISTing becomes a duty, not a position. At
most, one analyst and a UAV operator from the HQ platoon, but everyone else
needs a combat job - though I imagine a lot of FSOs
will end up being COIST-Os. It keeps the COIST honest, interested, and aware
and keeps the line in the mindset that the COIST is, in fact, a way to process
information and share ideas on the AO, not just a staff function interfering at
the company level and forwarding the S2's power-points.
by Vicrasta | May 26,
2015 - 2:31pm
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Gruse,
A very detailed
response to the COIST assessment which I believe addresses a myriad of accurate
concerns. The "prisoners to products" mentality is certainly a pitfall
and can consume the COIST in what we would consider Staff type work. It's the CDRs prerogative most likely as a former Staff Officer to
say "this is what I want and how I want it". There is no time for
slides during a condensed offensive BTL Rhythm where the CDR can rely on the
COIST to provide an enemy COA sketch on the skirt of a tank or stryker in chalk before enabler status checks and SP. This
is the intra-company sharing that you mention and is crutial.
F2F brief before the company crosses the LD in support of the Commander's OPORD
review, CONOP or FRAGO.
I disagree with the
point saying a HQ COIST is so far away from a rifle squad or vehicle crew.
Maybe in the days of superfobs, but not the case in
an AA, defensive position or early stage outpost. I also disagree that PLs see it as a box check. In our modern Army, the
Lieutenants are the hungriest (not excluding company level NCOs) and see COIST
as a way to feed their knowledge and planning efficacy. They also have a peer
in the COIST through the FSO or XO..who
acts as a sounding board in addition to their PSG. It is there, they can
clarify guidance about the CDRs intent, higher
echelon reporting requirements and their favorite topics "ISR, CAS and
Fires".
Lastly, your final
point makes a great deal of sense and is echoed in the article points about
evolution and company intelligence being innate. The every soldier as a sensor
still applies and all individual nodes are plugged into the modules, which are
plug into the company network. HQ soldiers do have a combat job which involves
various jobs within the company TAC which hopefully don't involve .ppts
by Scott Kinner | April 2,
2015 - 11:23am
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Well, if it is any
help, the Marine Corps has already written CLICs into
doctrine and have changed the infantry company manning documents to place
permanent intelligence analysts within the company HQ (reference MCWP 3-11.1 Inf Co Ops).
The current debate in
the infantry and intelligence communities within the Marine Corps is how best
to double down on this - probably by adding more intelligence trained personnel
of greater experience and rank while increasing reachback
capabilities as the Marine Corps moves further towards making the infantry
company the basic unit of employment (reference Expeditionary Force 21).
There is debate on
how best to train and maintain proficiency for intelligence personnel
permanently assigned to infantry companies - but not whether they should be
there.
by Vicrasta | March 25,
2015 - 1:17pm
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Scott,
Thank you for the
feedback and I agree that the core competencies need to be clarified in their
current context. The awareness (where to access them on-line) and
"fusion" of the various "INT" reports into analysis is what
I was trying to capture, which you did concisely. I should also differentiate
TECHINT from site exploitation and DOMEX which is a critical skill and SOP for
company and below operations. COIST and key leaders should be closely
integrated with HCTs, LEPs,
WITs, EOD and analysts so they need to be aware of
the basic intelligence capabilities and disciplines to complement those assets.
I agree that the cyber aspect and AGI is well above the scope, so an awareness
of cyber-enabled intelligence and reporting requirements is probably sufficient
for COISTs. If COISTs/CPs are the same module, then they may be required to coordinate
aviation assets (AWT/SWT) before or during an operation, which is what I think
you clarify in your last statement.
In my experience
the relationship between the COIST and 35 series representative was not an
issue. We did not have a permanent analyst at the company level, but had a
dedicated rep/liaison at the BN level. The COIST and analyst had a deliberate
relationship that included face to face BTL Rhythm working groups (Company and
BN CPs), but was often times limited to email, phone,
internet relay chat or O&I net based on OPTEMPO, competing echelon
requirements and transitioning between CAM and WAS. As long as that nexus is
created, standardized and maintained the company can operate without robust
intelligence analyst presence in the company.The
analysts are an invlauable asset, but not a single
point of success or failure for tactical intelligence support to operations.
by Greywolf | March 25,
2015 - 10:55am
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Mr. Morris,
Good rundown on the
importance of maintaining COIST elements in all types of conflicts.
One change that the
Army has proposed is to move all COIST personnel to the MICO, where they would
establish a COIST platoon (21 pax) comprised entirely
of 35F intel analysts. This
should work well to ensure the COIST members receive the training and
professional development they need, but means they will have less synergy with
the company that they will ultimately support in combat. Additionally, 21
personnel will not be enough to staff all 3 infantry BNs,
Cav Sqdn, and other units
that may be employed as a maneuver company; meaning other augmentation from
non-intel MOS personnel will likely be needed.
Regrading the Core Competencies that you
list above, I think you are being a little too ambitious. COIST
are not qualified to collect or conduct single source analysis of
TECHINT, SIGINT, GEOINT and HUMINT. What they can do is receive those reports
from higher and fuse them into their analysis. They also are not qualified nor authorized
to conduct cyber defense or airspace/ground integration. These things are not
even done by a battalion S2 section; they are far beyond the scope of COIST.
COIST that are
proficient in IPB, ISR planning, and Intelligence current operations to include
tracking the battle and managing the current ISR fight would go a long way in
assisting the company commander with mission accomplishment. Mastering the
basics would be a major improvement over the current state of competency.
Sincerely,
Scott