General Dr V.K.Singh
(Retd)
Minister of State
Ministry of
External Affairs
South Block
New Delhi.
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS – URI/NAGROTA TERRORIST ATTACKS
SIR
With your permission I present our shortcomings from an int
perspective..there is an urgent need to implement the solutions..we are
losing men by the day..
We can make certain observations after studying force protection
failures during the recent attacks at Raj Rif unit , URI,Nagrota :
HUMINT was not given priority in force protection
efforts , neither the HUMINT support was precise, effective and tailored to the
Commanders needs. Instead standard operating procedures detailing standard and
routine defensive methods and access control were implemented capability in
predicting on how , where and when a terrorist attack might take place was
ignored.HUMINT can predict the specific target ,time and nature of attacks.
Lack of organic intelligence capability at
tactical level.. “They did not have a dedicated, organic, and focused [force
protection] intelligence analytical capability.”Plus there is a weakness in
both collection and analysis of force e protection intelligence. If intelligence
capability can be pushed down to company/platoon level with the soldiers being
augmented with 2-3 HUMINT and 1-2 CI operatives (or the soldiers(infantry --not
of intelligence military occupational specialty) themselves being trained in
the basics like tactical questioning and interrogation) then instead of sending
request for information to higher headquarters the tactical capability to
investigate , gather information and analyze it would have been achieved. The
‘’always top-down’’’ intelligence flow could have been avoided and a four way
flow implemented with interaction between the tactical units and higher
headquarters, adjacent company headquarters and intelligence elements.Hence
there is a desperate need
for military units operating in high-threat environments to possess organic
intelligence collection, analysis, and investigative capabilities.
Military intelligence lacked the necessary
impetus to devote time, effort and resources for long-term and mid-term
terrorist threat intelligence collection and analysis – such as trends,
intentions and capabilities of terrorists. National intelligence agencies were
larger in operational and administrative size and were given priority rather
than the MI (Bde Level and lower) in collecting intelligence but national level
agencies cater to a wide range of requests for information apart from terrorist
threat to forces whereas MI can exclusively set up collection taskings for
force protection intelligence given adequate weight age , administrative and
financial aid and clearance by the Government. This was absent.
The installations/camps in question fell prey
to terrorist attacks because the intelligence arrangement at Command level in
higher headquarters or at the installation headquarters itself was focused on
outward attacks like tactical missions, or defensive postures dictated by air
threat and totally ignored the need for HUMINT/CI based intelligence collection
for ground defense of the installation, personnel, information and
communication facilities.
Also had there been organic int capability
earlier,there would have been updated int summaries,CI estimates,vulnerability
analysis reports,threat assessment reports..these int products would have made
the incoming battalion int officer aware of the current situation ,and URI
incident could have been avoided ( a sort of battle-handoff int transfer).
Kindly click here to see how a
non-int MOS unit--CMP--can be converted into an int-savvy unit,and the policing
is now a proactive intelligence-led policing , not the usual
''investigation'' based MP functions.
Similarly training line soldiers in tactical
questioning will act as an enabler for the limited intelligence personnel
available , as they (secondary collectors) can collect on the spot intelligence
on the border areas (even in war at forward line of own troops instead of
escorting detainees to the CI cage at rear) from locals while
patrolling,suspects,detainees,infiltrators,refugees..thus freeing the Humint
personnel for more important tasks.
_________________________________________
And the NEED for Force Protection.
We badly need
a separate doctrine on FP.The doctrine should detail the role of CI
in force protection,take into account criminal investigations and
establish its relation to CI with respect to force protection and also
clarify the differences between CI applied to force protection and CI
as offensive measures when dealing with enemy
multidimensional intelligence collection efforts.Thus the doctrine will greatly
enhance the understanding of CI with respect t to for ce protection among the
soldiers and officers,thus acquainting them with the limitations and
capabilities of CI when they apply it to support force protection
efforts of the deployed tactical force.
To execute a CI
operation successfully liaison is needed with other
civil agencies and with the intelligence agencies of the 3
services.To effectively build up a liaison time is required,it cannot be achieved
overnight.In case of COIN operations (for that matter any asymmetric
threat/hybrid threat) liaison is much needed with the local administrations
intelligence branch and with the police as they are the ones who know the local
area,population,criminal elements and insurgency profile in terms of
attack history,police records of personalities and elements who
have been apprehended and surrendered..the latter can be put to use
by the counter insurgents as pseudo-insurgents to penetrate
the adversary's setup.Liaison relationships are an investment in the
future, and the return on this investment is directly proportional to the time
and effort expended on developing and maintaining the relationship.
We can transfer say 2-3%
personnel from the MI toi the CI unit as CI units are generally understaffed
compared to the standard HUMINT units , and the liaison units.Even transferring
3% personnel can significantly raise the strength of all the units overall.Thus
with this transfer the Commands HUMINT assets get a boost and now coupled with
CI augmentation the HUMINT teams can handle all
three types of threats , Basic , Levels 1&2.
Simply transferring will
not suffice,proper training in counterintelligence need to be
given.But this wont be a problem as the MI soldier already has
basic intelligence training and acumen.Yes they need to be granted
clearance to access compartmentalized intelligence information and hence
prior to transfer the soldiers need to undergo a counterintelligence
investigation process as to their suitability.
The CI effort focuses on
the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and
subversive threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the
geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of
the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence, sabotage,
terrorist, and subversive organizations. We need CI as much as we need HUMINT.
I want to open a pilot project in the Bihar Regt
camp here at SALT LAKE..its ideal..Ill set up an organic int unit with 5 men,
classes for Tactical questioning,exams,and a full practice area (simulated
tactical questioning environment , complete with
patrols,detainees,suspects..MODEL BORDER TOWN ALPHA-this being followed by an
after action review where the unit int officer , the CO and int staff officer
or any officer from ECCIU can participate.)
The
full report is there in my earlier mail with the HQ and CI HEAD OFFICE links.
Obediently
Keshav
Mazumdar
Antiterrorism
Officer.
c.c. GOC-in-C Lt General Parveen Bakshi , G-O-C –in-C Eastern
Command
Station-
Kolkata-21
Dated;
29-11-2016