Coy level intelligence cell.

To increase the tactical and situational awareness picture of the Int staff at Higher HQ and the Coy Cdr and identify target packs using organic intelligence capability.

KESHAV MAZUMDAR

Combat intelligence derived from combat reconnaissance patrols debrief is no longer the mainstay  when planning for COIN operations. We are now fighting battles, not wars. It’s now precision warfare evolved into a sort of discriminatory warfare. It’s no more the sole domain of maneuver warefare.Right now we are more occupied with targeting an enemy which is highly asymmetric , can blend into the local community and attack from within thus forcing us to discriminate and selectively target the insurgent/terrorist from within aggrieved locals, coerced fighters, criminals , drug mafia and others who are either in some way benefitting from the insurgents or are of use to the insurgents. These other groups also merit kinetic action but to a markedly less degree; in fact the civil agencies and police can very well deal with them. My point is , we can no longer dwell on solely kinetic attacks , killing is no more the solution. Precision selective targeting of course is the answer when we are completely sure about the identity of the enemy and when killing him/them will not create second or third order effects—ripples amongst the local community; the very essence of COIN is to alienate the insurgents from the locals wherein lies their center of gravity , not in C2 nodes or other conventional tactical physical structures/communication systems. In COIN both parties , the insurgents and the counterinsurgents attempt to win over the local communities as the insurgents have to maintain their credibility before them in order to survive ( cover and concealments amongst the villagers , ration and arms/ammo supply using locals ,couriers, informers) and the counterinsurgents must see to it that all psychological ops conducted by the insurgents do not affect the locals , nullify the effects of coercion by the insurgents not by kinetic means but by non-kinetic psychological methods, make arrangements for community/social development so as to settle their boots more firmly in the area of operations as such initiatives will raise their credibility in the eyes of the populace and so on.

 
Current COIN operations which the Army is conducting at NE or Kashmir  are local in nature, tackling village by village , valley by valley with the platoons and companies doing most of the work,. Each platoon/company has their own AO , locally fight the insurgents while conducting independent patrols and missions. Most often than not they are operating far from their bases amongst the local population. Now due to this reason , company level tactical units have to do their own intelligence gathering. They do not have access to sophisticate overhead sensors or support from intelligence units at higher headquarters. It is important to note that these are combat soldiers , not intelligence military occupational specialty personnel who have to do on their own the collection , analysis , target nomination and development. This is where the need of an organic small intelligence cell arises. This cell will be staffed by these very same non-int soldiers who are given training in tactical questioning, elicitation , on the spot interrogation, observation and surveillance skills—these are not difficult to learn and do not require detailed knowledge of standard intelligence TTPs……capability/knack against Int Corps affiliation/rank being the primary requirement. We need intelligence-savvy personnel to staff these small organic cells , not intelligence corps personnel. And these soldiers we induct from the very same company to which they belong.

In a wide area of operations , involving a Brigade , companies enabled with their own organic intelligence cells renders the collection capacity as a whole far greater than that what is possible with the limited intelligence detachments/units spread across the North East for example. We now have a much greater quantity of trained personnel , and if as per my earlier paper on NE INT NET where I have suggested creating tactical operations centers TOCs , each catering to a group of Companies/Bn wherein all information is channelized to respective Desk NCOs and then through a LAN/WAN network to a centralized intelligence database covering the whole of NE,then we have a complete intelligence architecture with information flowing bottom-up from these organic cells of the Companies. In essence the conventional intelligence pyramid is now inverted. The “top-down” intelligence no longer drives today’s operations. Instead, current operations produce numerous lower-level information and intelligence reports that higher  headquarters must gather, analyze, and synthesize. The sheer volume of these reports and the depth and breadth of information they provide often exceed the capacity of the intelligence organizations at the various headquarters echelons.

For non-linear distributed battle space as against a conventional one , where we are dealing with an highly asymmetric enemy , the intelligence architecture needs to be modified. And the individual soldier  is the key and he can be of any military occupational speciality , basically the infantryman. He is our primary sensor.

 
Of all the intelligence disciplines which are employed to derive all-source intelligence after fusion of information from sensors characteristic to each discipline, it is HUMINT that offers most of the information. The conventional approach to warfare by the Division no longer works in a COIN environment. Here there is a much more need of HUMINT personnel than technical sensors. It is very important to recognize the fact that the Division has to increase its HUMINT strength. If possible include a HUMINT platoon to support 3-4 companies , or create organic HUMINT platoon for Battalion/Coy support intelligence team. Or at the minimum , a 4-5 man cell  created out of the Coy infantrymen , the CLIC.

Often combat operations at tactical level yield intelligence which has strategic implications. This should be recognized by higher HQ intelligence staff (at strategic levels)and every effort should be made to understand and appreciate the existing situations at district/village levels and not only focus on the national level.

In a nonlinear distributed battle space we have numerous tactical operations going on , with independent platoons/companies engaged in their own way. Here the mass of information gathered cannot be effectively pushed up to higher HQ , there is little sharing of intelligence information among the units engaged (horizontally—sharing can help a lot….).Point is here intelligence is generated at boot level  and the flow is upward—the intelligence pyramid characteristic of conventional battles becomes inverted. This is where the need for TOCs……is.

Information collected at tactical levels by ground soldiers has assumed yet another significance which affects more advanced technical intelligence collecting platforms in a very positive way. We have GEOINT platforms which conduct the very important task of locating the place where a particular event occurred and the time associated with it. We get access to maps and up-to-date imagery both at higher HQ and tactical levels , made possible by  computer technology and no longer soldiers and platoon/company commanders have to huddle around making maps before deployment. But here something is missing-or was missing. What about specificity , context  and meaning about these maps , imagery? Some of the content is of course provided by these specialized imagery software after data is collected by GEOINT platforms. Say the focus is on an inhabited area with buildings so we have imagery consisting of colored images of the locality and buildings within it. But then what about the occupants who stay inside those buildings, their affiliations, ethnicity , how long they have been staying there,occupation,antecedents etc? A sort of census data , and now this is practically unfeasible by strategic level intelligence platforms..for this we need the tactical units , and they collect this information while on patrols,cordon and search ops,checkpoints and roadblocks , tactical questioning and interrogation of detained persons/suspects .elicitation from village people/panchayat leaders and observation/surveillance.

The era is now hence of discriminatory warfare with precision warfare  coupled with kinetic and non-kinetic modes of attack—a proper mix of these two is what should be the main goal of the rifle Coy. To this end , we must recognize that combat reconnaissance patrols cannot get all the intelligence  that a simple 4 man cell (made up from among the rifle Coy , the best and brightest NCOs) can glean from everyday routine overt patrolling in the village and outskirts, tactical questioning sessions involving suspects/detainees/outsiders. Higher HQ does not assign full priority to subunits that are operating in isolated areas  and austere locations; Coy commanders should recognize this fact. You cannot expect the intelligence resources at higher HQ to be deployed for your unit , be it HUMINT/Tech , if you are far off and away from Base. You have to be creative , on your own and that means you start collecting your own intelligence , shape your ‘’own’’ battle space armed with this information , and convert this information into actionable intelligence. At higher HQ a well directed effort is needed to translate information acquired through sensors at various intelligence platforms corresponding to various intelligence disciplines, and it must be noted the intelligence cycle theoretically gives the intelligence analysts at that level only a logical framework to proceed; actually the interrelationships between the parts of the cycle and concurrency leads to complication while inferring and analyzing information—couple this with the fact that backlog of information , requests for information by other units and headquarters, process and protocol and requirement of reliable corroboration , contextual awareness and specificity, protection of sources and capabilities, all these go into making the intelligence 90% accurate but not on time. In other words we can say a 70% solution is far better than a 90% one , if the solution is delivered on time , and that is what we can say is the essence of actionable intelligence. Hence depending on higher HQ to deliver is always not practicable; the Coy needs to have that 70% solution done on its own. A determined enemy cannot be defeated with late or ephemeral 90% accurate intelligence , a 70% accurate one can turn the odds in the commanders favour.Self-help that is , initiative of the Coy commander to create a more focused rubric at the tactical level and that is possible if he creates the Coy level intelligence cell. Trained manpower is usually not available , as I mentioned about higher HQ priorities; this manpower needs to be generated internally, from among the rifle Coy. Am not asking for the creation of talented HUMINT personnel like those from the intelligence Corps; what we are making is  basically a cell , organic cell which will be manned by infantrymen trained in basic skills of observation , surveillance , tactical questioning, document exploitation , and when opportunities arise , say in friendly encounters/environment with locals , elicitation. Tactical questioning is a framework wherein spot open-ended, not close-ended questions (which evoke at the maximum a yes/no) force the detainee/suspect to answer with thruthfulness,even if partially.TQ can be learnt very easily.

 The best actionable intelligence cannot be got even from higher HQ always (even if the team is operating not far off , imagery needs to be corroborated by other intelligence disciplines , takes time ,similarly geoint products arte okay in terms of overall profiles of area/buildings but not specific as to the inhabitants inside those buildings/their affiliations/no of people etc.., processes and protocol further delay the deliverance of intelligence at the right time to the squad on the ground; again overhead sensors are of no point over canopies in a jungle or in a built up area in urban terrain where line of sight matters) but  can be acquired in a far better fashion by rifle Coy soldiers during their routine overt patrols and the relationships they build with the local communities , police , other security agencies , NGOs , panchayat members etc during the course of their duties. This intelligence resource pool can be exploited in a much better fashion if the rifle Coy has its own organic intelligence cell , tailorable with the mission. When required they go for full combat , when  patrolling or while engaged in a cordon/search operation  questioning a newcomer to the village/detainee (they resort to tactical questioning, two of them questioning and observing him while he answers , one jots down in his report to be tabled later to the Coy OpsOfficer while the other keeps guard as well as keeps a tab on the external environment(security)) or when interrogating a suspect/confirmed enemy personnel. Or all four can assume very friendly outlook when conversing in a friendly atmosphere with locals , carefully using basic elicitation techniques … Thus we are not now dealing with Dets (far less in number than that what is required to support all units in a wide area of operations) but with self-forming , decentralized and localized Coy/platoon intelligence cells , far greater in number than the int Dets , and in much direct contact with the enemy and the population together.(Later I will show that deploying tactical ops control centers , LAN , WAN ..We can create complete intelligence architecture to give a centralized command and control at top echelons, with this decentralized intelligence setup at the boot level.).In essence we are handling a non-linear , distributed , disaggregated battle space in a much more uniform way by installing Coy intelligence cells at the tactical level and networking all the companies through their own tactical ops centers with the higher echelons through a LAN/WAN grid; thus what we achieve here is that fleeting moments of opportunity (‘’intelligence-opportunity’’) from disparate tactical battles , intelligence that would otherwise have been lost due to the wide area of operations and isolation of the sub-unit engaged in battle or any nonkinetic mode of attack and which could have had strategic implications or even translated into actionable intelligence for some other Coy/unit another part of the AO or even in another AO –this ‘’intelligence-opportunity’’ is well exploited by intelligence analysts and policy makers art higher HQ and other echelons. Again lateral intelligence exchange is also made p[possible ,among Coy commanders , courtesy the TOCs. We talk of enhancing situational awareness of the commander .

Situation development by satisfying his priority intelligence requirements by deploying intelligence assets under a careful requirements and collection management program. This is fine. But how about enhancing the situational awareness of the basic infantryman , not usually intelligence-savvy but smart and bright enough to spot irregularities and suspicious behavior in the people he meets every day? What if his situational awareness propels him to learn a few techniques in tactical questioning, observation and surveillance , elicitation and on-the-spot interrogation and also how to exploit seized documents? This situational awareness and curiosity to learn can be brought about by the Coy havildar major or the Sr JCO,after he is explained the benefits of having the Coy’s own organic intelligence cell which not only will translate that situational awareness into actionable intelligence , delivering a good kill ratio/non-kinetic success but also security to the Coy personnel through intelligence gathered from the force protection perspective—such intelligence usually comes as a by-product from the civilians/locals who give information about possible suspects. We must remember the asymmetric enemy is clever enough to create conditions where if we proceed with a target pack successfully , collateral damage also results as a by-product of the kinetic attack. This collateral damage  will alienate the locals from us , alienating from us means getting closer to the insurgents , thus shifting our center of gravity towards them. Center of gravity in COIN is the local population , the community. Hence we need to understand the atmospherics , the locals , the total area of operations , the other parties involved in the villages/valleys , and the second and third order effects any kinetic/non kinetic action may result. Sounds a long sentence with many variables , but given the consideration that COIN is a long drawn out game and the time rifle Coy men get to spend with the local environment (given the opportunity by rotating them frequently between observation posts , patrol duty , social meetings ,liaison with police/security agencies),they already have a grip on the situation prevailing in their area of operations; now what if this same thing is seen from the perspective of the small Coy intelligence cell which is trained in the basics of TQ , interrogation , DOCEX , elicitation , observation and surveillance? Much enhanced situational awareness for the commander. Means good leads for actionable intelligencde.And this is possible because you need to be closer to the ground to understand a COIN environment in order to extract actionable intelligence , and this is not always possible for overhead sensors , other technical intelligence collection platforms like geoint or even signals intelligence.HUMINT is the answer , if trained manpower cannot be deployed as support by higher HQ then we need to create from within the Coy. And hence , the need of the hour is CLIC.      

The rifle Coy may have certain combat assets like snipers who can deliver first hand intelligence as they can provide some of the best observation and reporting skills to the unit. Hence snipers are int-enablers.We need to change the way we do things, we can achieve the same result—what is required the comprehension of the fact that not always can we depend/get intelligence support from higher HQ;we need to work on our own, particularly in a high threat environment where timely actionable intelligence is the prime mover of operations. Thus we can see from the sniper example that one of the best kinetic capabilities of the combat team can deliver very good non-kinetic effects , like surveillance, search , reassure.

The main point is we need to translate the situational understanding of the Coy soldiers into serviceable target packs and with the creation of the organic Coy intelligence cell and Coy commanders guidance (if possible, apart from the Coy second in command , if we set up the Sr JCO as ops officer ,then a good degree of synchronization between ops/intel can be achieved with the ops officer and Coy Int Sr NCO working hand in hand) as the driving force.