The need for ground level analysis
APPLIED TO COIN

Strategic Intelligence in military terms means the intelligence which goes into formulation of military policy and strategies. Operational intelligence on the other hand focuses on support to planning operations at the theater or regional level while Tactical intelligence is at the local level—intelligence that goes into driving operations locally.

Traditional intelligence doctrine does not take into account the asymmetric enemy which does not have an Order of Battle from the conventional enemy point of view—rather is dispersed, of loose cellular structure with all command identities unknown to cell members and is transnational..all in all near invisible with no military uniform that can identify him as in conventional battle , which does not resort to standard TTPs and other combat techniques, whose logistical, supplies and other support services are totally unlike the support arms of the conventional enemy and out of view, nearly invisible, hidden among sympathizers and communities resources. Thus if we consider COIN operations in a region, whether urban or jungle or hilly, the operational intelligence doctrine must be adaptive to include these factors. Further the intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms applied to conventional wartime and peacetime situations may not be as effective in situations involving, say COIN in an urban environment.

Hence we cannot just stay limited to traditional approaches to operational intelligence. We can adapt by say endeavoring to create new indigenous HUMINT sources, capturing indigenous insurgent technology conducting source operations by using sources from the local community by bridging the gap between them and us soldiers (developing close relationships, respecting their customs and abiding by it, being more of a civilian than a soldier by wearing civil attire and sharing tea/coffee with them, respect for their religion, etc all contributing to a conducive environment suitable for elicitation and oblique tactical prodding without raising any doubts ) and conducting security reviews with such as the modern day IED in perspective..Information from all these being aligned with the intelligence requirements of the commander thus increasing the depth of his situational awareness.

The main goal of collection is to acquire data about the enemy’s environment, resources, and activities. This is summarized as follows:

We need to know the current activity of the enemy, its objectives/goals, whether these goals are directed against us—the intent, whether it has the capabilities to achieve these goals and taken for granted it succeeds in its attempts—that is it succeeds in achieving its intent , then what will be the consequences for us—the damage.

Intelligence here is crucial. We must determine the intent of the enemy. But like we are always striving to secure our installations, all related information systems and movements from enemy prying eyes so does the enemy who takes pain to cloak its behavioral indicators which might give out its intent. Now if there are no behavioral indicators, however we may suspect the enemy of possessing intent to cause harm, we are nowhere when it comes to determining it accurately. We need to go for deep intelligence collection and access a myriad of sources so that slowly the behavioral characteristics are discerned.

Here let’s touch on Indicators and Warning concept. So vital to security. This is also known as Early Warning. If the enemy has intent it will decide on a course of action/actions—COA/s. We have to design a thorough collection system so that we can target the indicators (on a continual basis so as to confirm the enemy’s COAs or negate our assessments of its COAs until finally we confirm accurately) and hence get an idea about the intent. And then lay down the potential COAs in parallel (parallel mind you) and after matching with the capabilities (yes, that too needs to be determined first) we choose the most probable COA of the enemy. The Early Warning system is more of a proactive-intelligenceapproach rather than a reactive-intelligence one.

For each intent they can take a course of action (or we zero down to a course of actions from a list of probable course of actions corresponding to the intent by considering more factors such as information gleaned from open sources, attack mode types or weapon types/delivery mode as per prevailing security hardening of target/security environment around/proximity of target etc) which we determine as most probable by considering factors like capability, behavior or other indicators. We can have a Most Likely Course of Action or in the extreme the Most Dangerous Course of Action. It all depends how successfully we ascertain their intent, capabilities, behavior and how far accurately we can infer their other characteristics and past criminal/terrorist/military offensive activity from past records/databasepast threat assessments, past activity records, personality profiles, weapons/combatcapability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports. For example a military unit, while assessing the threat can pull intelligence (of course on request and need to know basis) from higher headquarters, from adjacent units, from its own sources and from whatever ISR tools they have. Adjacent units or other units who share the same communication network or who is accessible by the unit can supply intelligence on the threats past behavior—say an engagement with the other unit. From that the unit can , within a good confidence level ,determine the enemy’s tactics, techniques and procedures. Inputs like this can help in determining the probable course of actions. We can list out possible consequences for each course of action.

First the Intents, then ascertaining the Capabilities—not exactly ‘’then’’...the collectors tasked by the CMO generally busy themselves with sourcing information on both and by pulling on information from R&S teams.Therafter the Commander brainstorms with his staff the possible COAs by backwards iteration to the Intent/s and evaluating the COAs in the light of the Capabilities and also the possible consequences for the enemy/effects as battle damage or simply damage for us. A terrorist attack may more be directed at the Parliament House than a Mall because of the Symbolic andPolitical-Seat flavor).Again it can equally be likely that one enemy COA generates a crippling counterattack by our forces whereas another COA is less obvious and also causes less damage or less repercussion. The enemy too war games and may decide to forego the first COA and go for the second one. Another example could be the enemy’s COA is simply intelligence activities directed against us with a timeframe to determine what they intend to determine, knowing very well that our CI teams will move in and take tentatively that time frame to expose their intent—hence their COA could be go on with the intelligence activities before the deadline—that is before they are exposed. There are several courses of actions, each in context of different scenarios. That is why it is immensely important to gain a perfect or near perfect situational understanding. Thus during this evaluation the Commander and Staff narrow down to the most possible Course of Action or the Most Dangerous Course of action for each Intent. Whatever every COA the enemy takes we must look for observable INDICATORS. This is the task of the Collection teams. Once these indicators are identified we look for patterns. Once we discern them we begin exploitation.

In other words, we need to judge the Intent of the adversary. Our intelligence collection teams should look for indicators, indicators which will tell us what he is doing today. Supported by more information about the capabilities of the adversary, , past threat assessments, past activity records , personality profiles , weapons/combat capability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports).

We make an educated guess of the intent or a list of intents with confidence level/s and then list out the corresponding course of actions with possible consequences for each course of action. Continuing the iteration further we select the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action by studying the consequences along with the capabilities and intents.

The following grossly sums up the steps in the intelligence cycle.

1. Develop intelligence requirements.

2. Collect information to answer intelligence requirements.

3.Triage information for accuracy and consistency, analyze collected information, deconflict inconsistent information (if necessary), and identify other intelligence requirements (re-taskcollection, if necessary).

4.Compile analyzed information (timely, accurate, specific, and predictive!), and produce a finished intelligence product for dissemination and community consumption.

This all goes back to collection. What are the goals of the adversary? What’s he trying to accomplish; what’s his intent? What is the Order of Battle of the enemy? In other words what are the strengths, dispositions and capabilities of the enemy? What is the inventory and type of their equipment/weapons? How will the terrain affect enemy’s movements, possible courses of actions (this applies to us also),what are the possible concealment areas offered by high ground or foliage, how does the terrain afford ambush points and where they can possibly be, how does the current and future weather predictions act as enabler or otherwise for the enemy and us, what is the present enemy situation , if the enemy is an asymmetrical one like the terrorist/insurgent then does it have the capability to attack hard targets, what was the modus operandi in the past of the asymmetrical enemy, target history and who were/are its leaders/sympathizers, what were the safe houses then and possible locations at present, what ideology the terrorist group pursues and what are its aims as demonstrated by its propaganda or by website declarations and so on. This will allow us to identify indicators. We identify indicators, then patterns, and then we exploit them.

Tracking adversary capabilities is a continual process, and should be updated per changing conditions in their strength, disposition, equipment, or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Requirements Determination –The Collectors

To properly collect information during war or any situation involving ground troops and the enemy, be it a tactical operation or stability operation we need individuals who can interrogate or EPWs or detainees in an efficient manner without invoking unnecessary delays .

To this end we need persons with good interrogation skills, ability to conduct tactical questioning and good debriefing skills. Soldiers on the ground need to be trained in HUMINT capabilities, apart from HUMINT specialists, so that when the soldier encounters the EPW right at the front or in areas other than the rear, he can quickly interrogate and extract HUMINT/CI relevant information and then pass on the prisoner to the interrogation facility. If the soldiers manage to extract information this way, it could very well be that the said information can be of immediate tactical use to the unit the soldier belongs. The chances of detaining an individual with no information or intelligence of target value are also lessened considerably. On the other hand involving soldiers this way helps the commander and upper echelons get a first hand good situation assessment.

Besides this we need trained HUMINT specialists to act as enablers for the commander while assessing the situation. They will conduct source operations to throw light on the enemy order of battle, his capabilities, plans and intentions. The collection manager with all the inputs from the HUMINT specialists can then assist the Commander with updating his intelligence requirements and with the capabilities and intent of the enemy in perspective now, he can devise appropriate COAs.

As for the intelligence component CI we need to realize the full import of the latter. Thus we need CI specialists/soldiers with the skill to identify, detect, counter, neutralize or exploit the enemy’s intelligence approaches to gain information about our plans, capabilities and other factors. The CI soldier must be well versed in polygraph and technical countermeasures as there can be cases of treason and subversion and he will have to identify, detect such individuals and also establish their complicity in the crime and report to the executive. Foreign language ability will be an asset.CI soldiers need to exploit documents seized and these may be in a foreign language.CI teams can be augmented with an interpreter in case the soldiers lack the ability to converse in a foreign language.

Finally we need soldiers/specialists trained to coordinate collection activities, deconflict and synchronize all HUMINT/CI activities and interact effectively with higher and lower echelons.

ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED ORGANIC INT UNIT FOR PARAMILITARY BN FIGHTING INSURGENCY

I WILL FIRST OUTLINE INT ARCHITECTURE AT HIGHER HQ THEN LIST A TACTICAL INT CAPABILITY
Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using resources, planning for and employment of forces, and ensuring that forces accomplish assigned missions. Leaders and staffs exercise control to facilitate mission accomplishment.
We can have the following organizational structure:
The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)
HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)
Operations Support Cell
Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
HUMINT Teams
HUMINT TEAM HQ - Analysis & Control Element: An Intelligence mission management and analytical hub at the division, corps, or theater level, where intelligence is gathered from the individual intelligence disciplines and fused together to form a composite intelligence picture. Gaps in intelligence are identified and tasked out to the respective collection assets.

ACT - Analysis Control Team: An intelligence cell which aids tactical combat brigades or battalions in managing assigned or attached intelligence assets and conducting analysis.

OMT - Operational Management Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a Captain the OMT is designed to manage two to three subordinate CI/HUMINT Operational Teams (OT). The OMT is a self-contained operational and technical control and analysis element. The OMT is capable of plugging into an ACT, ACE, Rear Area Operations Center(RAOC) or any element which has a CI/HUMINT requirement.

HOT – HUMINT Operational Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a JCO, the OT performs CI/HUMINT operations, investigations, and collection functions.
TET - Tactical Exploitation Team: The TET is subordinate to the Corps MI Brigade and contains the Corps CI, IPW, and LRS assets.
The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)
HUMINT reports and other operational feeds need to be worked upon, processed, and derivations made. Cross cueing with reports from other sensors sometimes becomes necessary.HUMINT validates IMINT, SIGINT.What we need is a cell where all these feeds are fused together, processed and timely actionable intelligence derived. Extrapolation is also done to impact operational and strategic considerations with the available intelligence products plugging into the overall intelligence system. The HUMINT analysis cell also indicates gaps in reporting.
The HAC:
Produces HUMINT reports and feeds for intelligence summaries. Conducts dissemination.
Maintains database of all HUMINT activities in the AO and this database is directly accessible to all HUMINT teams and lends very good support to their collection operations.
HAC plugs in ACE so as to use analysis tools for immediate and long term analysis and collection plans. It analyses the trends and patterns discerned after collection or during collection. Analyses source reliability and credibility by various comparative tools and assists the collector to know his sources better and assign tasks accordingly or stop all source-handler operations with sources of negative attributes.
HAC helps in compiling target folders. Now future collection efforts can be affected based on the information in these target folders. The target folders are updated time to time and a repository maintained.
HAC supports CI entities by supplying information of CI interest and provides feeds to CICA
ØProvides collection requirements input to the HOC.
ØSupports RM through the development of HUMINT SIRs based on command PIRs.
ØAnswers HUMINT-related RFIs.
HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)
Coordination and synchronization of all HUMINT activities is of utmost importance.Proper technical control and deconfliction among adjacent and higher/lower HUMINT elements is the job of the Operations cell.The HUMINT Operations Cell HOC.The HOC keeps a track of all activities conducted by all HUMINT and operational teams(which are a mix of CI and HUMINT operators) and coordinates them.  
HUMINT TEAM STRUCTURE
Operational Management Team
The OMT is manned by 3-4 persons and provide technical control, operation coverage and guidance, collection and operational advice and focus to 2-4 HUMINT teams who are engaged in the actual collection and other HUMINT activities. The OMT can have an analysis element (to help in quick dissemination of actionable intelligence) to assist in boot-level analysis and mission analysis. It reports teams equipment status and other variables which may affect the HUMINT teams capability to the HOC and unit headquarters. It works in close tandem with the ACT to develop current threat assessments and answer the commander’s intelligence requirements· Provide the collection and operational focus for HUMINT teams.
Integrates the HUMINT teams directly into the commander's ISR planning. Keeps the commander abreast of all activities, capabilities and limitations of the deployed HUMINT teams.
HUMINT Team
The HUMINT team consists of 4-5 persons who carry out the actual HUMINT functions and are trained in the entire spectrum of the latter, and they may be deployed to execute mission- focused activities of interrogation, debriefing, contact operations, tactical questioning or DOCEX.
The HUMINT-CI mix (Tactical HUMINT team) functions:
CI/HUMINT Preparation of Battlefield:
CI/HUMINT team will study all environmental factors and the effect they will have on both the enemy and our forces.
Attention areas:
Threat profile including Intent,OB,Dispositions,Strength,TOE, Demographics,population,politics,culture,language,ethnicity,history,religion,military,terrorism,in surgency,information structures, communication lines, centers of gravity and other criminal groups who support enemy/sympathizers from local community intentions/attitudes.
Enemy's Composition, Disposition, Strength (often mnemonic zed with):

SALUTE: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment

Exercise:
I as the Commander have a Goal. To determine the Threat capability of the enemy. To this end I define the mission as explicitly as possible. Thereafter I set down the PIRs. At the same time the HUMINT resources I can spare are allocated tasks to collect information after my planning team in concert with the collection manager sets up cells each catering to certain IRs broken further into several Sirs. The teams of HUMINT and TACHUMINT are guided, controlled and overseen by the OMT, HAC….
Goals: We need to determine the intent of the enemy (threat) ,as formulated by the command (top hierarchy whose identity we need to determine),its strength, disposition and capabilities and all the possible courses of action, the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action.
PIRs: What are the intentions of the enemy and is it capable of carrying out the threat?
TASK: Each team derived from each cell will consider all factors and generate the intelligence requirements. They will then task themselves with identifying all indicators that support or deny these intelligence requirements
Identify the threat's likely objectives/desired end state.
Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.
Develop each COA.
Evaluate each COA.
Prioritize each COA.
Identify threats to aviation operations for each COA (Aviation-specific).
Identify initial collection requirements.
Identify initial production requirements.
Identify initial dissemination requirements.
A.We can create a basic intelligence team structure with the GOALS:
1.To identify the enemy top-tier officials
2.The enemy intent (current tactical goals and strategic goals)
3.The strength, disposition, capabilities assets, and organization structure of the enemy.
4.Organizations TO&E
5.The most likely COA and the most dangerous COA.
B.From the above we identify our primary intelligence requirement/s:
The immediate threat posed by the enemy. What are the goals of the adversary? What’s he trying to accomplish; what’s his intent? Answer what he’s doing today in order to answer what he’s going to do tomorrow and beyond.
C. Next we create teams, say 2-3 manned teams, each team assigned a separate task of collection. The team leader should exhort his members that given the intelligence requirement by HQ they should strive to generate further IR based on the information available and during collection as new information may require further probing and exploration. Members and team leader should be proactive. Intelligence too is both reactive and proactive. An indicator associated with an IR propels the agent to look for corroborating information--that’s reactive. Sometimes we are totally unaware of the unknown. Well the intelligence agent can have an informant/source network in place which constantly looks for say enemy movements or any
change in enemy positions—which on first sight can be a normal movement/displacement but on further probing reveals an offensive intent. To this end the intelligence agent needs to have a proactive mindset, always curious, probing and exploratory.
We also set up covert or overt civilian collection units whose members are either having access to physical addresses frequented or inhabited by the enemy or are geo-located in close proximity to the latter.
Our teams are exhorted to resort to open intelligence frequently OSINT such as any news/enemy propaganda/private and government discussion boards, analyses/TV panel discussions on current situations with reference to the disturbing elements posted on the web, in dailies, or aired on radio / TV programmes.It should be borne in mind that globally 90% useful intelligence is collected from OSINT sources and the remaining from ISR platforms.
Our teams can be based on the following factors – ATTENTION AREAS:
ØOrganization,Composition,Disposition,Strength (the command structure and organisation of headquarters and subunits, geographical locations of unit headquarters and subunits, Strength expressed in units and weight of fire delivered by its weapon systems)
ØLeadership
ØIntent
ØWeaponry and Equipments
ØCapabilities / Combat effectiveness
§TTPs—historical in the concerned area of operations and area of interest.( Tactics used by the enemy unit and Miscellaneous data related to specific task, mission or operations…this will help in determining enemys most likely course of action. Unit history used to judge expected performance based on its past performance)
ØThreat ranking-by violence or activity
ØEnemy propaganda
ØRecent incidents of violence irrespective of sporadic or concerted nature
ØLocal community and political support
ØOther friendly groups / criminal gangs sympathetic to enemy causes or having same ideology/political goals
ØLogistics
Keeping the above factors in perspective we can create cells comprising of HUMINT collectors (and also admixture of HUMINT/CI , TACHUMINT—when information of CI Interest is emerges when the HUMINT collector is conducting questioning , he will transfer the source to the CI team).These cells may be:
vLeadership Cell
vEnemy units cell
vStrategic Cell
vThreat Cell
vTO&E Cell
Each team cell will generate its intelligence requirements. These requirements are all predicated by the Commanders PIRs.SIRs or sets of SIRs corresponding to each IR are developed, keeping in view the indicators.Therafter tasking begins.
The current teams are C2, Strategic, Lower HQs and Units, TO&E AND THREATS.
C2 Cell – The enemy organization leadership formulates the strategy and hence the individual leadership personalities, their affiliations, intent, movements, social contacts etc should be gauged accurately by identifying the indicators so as to defeat their ongoing or future deliberate operations. The hierarchy should be determined which will give us an idea of the functions and span of control of each level. Thus the C2 cell will focus on the command and control of the organization.
Strategic Cell: Decides on the overall strategy. Is composed of the Command staff, planning, logistics, operations and intelligence/CI advisors.
Lower HQs and Units cell – The organizations middle and lower level management is composed of lower HQs/Section HQs and units. The capabilities of these should be determined and it should be assessed properly as to which deptt or unit has a significant part in the current operations against our forces and thus we can assign a priority ranking. This ranking can be based on the threat potential or activity predicated by the overall intent of the organization which has prompted it to conduct current operations. That is to say those HQs and units should be prioritized as per their threat capabilities and activities which have a direct bearing in the offensive operations.. Triage all these HQs and units and feed the report to the TO&E cell.
TO&E cell – The TO&E cell will evaluate the report submitted by the Chapter cell. It will evaluate the strength, assets and activities and draft a table of organization and equipment.
Threat cell: The task of this cell is to identify all the possible courses of action to be undertaken by the enemy and distill them to infer the most likely and most dangerous course/s of actions. The threat cell will consider all the inputs from the other cells. In addition it will undertake an intelligence preparation of the battledfield.It will study the past violent behavior of the enemy,take cognizance of its intent/s, capabilities, dispositions, strengths, affiliations with other support elements such as criminal enterprises, terrorists and create intelligence requirements, prioritized which will lead to tasking of its operatives to identify the indicators supporting or denying these threat activities.
COLLECTION SUMMARY
Assessment of threat capabilities, operations and, current and expected threat actions across the battle space to provide the commander with an assessment for the development and execution of countermeasures.
Recommending countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.
Threat intent
Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
Identify threat C2 nodes
Identify threat logistic routes
Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts
Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises
Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control
Identify political/administrative figures that support threat ideology
Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.
Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of attack.
Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
Gauge IED detonation methods/means
Gauge IED timings
Possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Staging areas
Safe houses
Weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
Find out what supplementary operations threat may resort to
Recommending countermeasures to threat IED
Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW
Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire



WARNING
(a) Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminating.
Warning is of two types:
Defensive warn
Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks.
It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific. In addition to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated; meaning the level 
of warning may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The warning system must have the following features:
It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.
It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets, and command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.
It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation, its C2 and critical assets.
Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.
Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes
Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
Provide warning of threat logistic routes.
Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,
Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs
Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat
Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
Provide warning of threats history
Provide warning of threat movements
Provide warning of threat leadership
Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Provide warning of the expected time of attack.
Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means
Provide warning of IED timings
Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Provide warning of Staging areas
Provide warning of Safe houses
Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives. Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to
Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire 
(b)Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-
We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area
Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlledlethal/non-lethal measures.
As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on 
intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probableanti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit protection.
METHODOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION:

The commander, the staff, and the higher and lower headquarters across the depth and width of the battlefield must coordinate with the CM section while formulating plans for future operations and to support ongoing missions. Variations in enemy actions or changes in perception of the enemy’s movements give rise to new sets of intelligence requirements and the CM section should take this into account. The battlefield is an area of high fluidity and hence changes must be expected and Requirements Management must be flexible enough to incorporate these changes.

The two most critical steps in collection management is identifying and prioritizing the intelligence requirements. To this end 6 areas of interest must be considered and they are force protection, situation development,targeting,battle damage assessment BDA,indications and warning and IPB.The intelligence requirements stems from these areas and all of the competing requirements needs to be consolidated,. Thereafter the collection plan is created and the scarce IEW resources are tasked more efficiently.

Requirements Management, Mission Management and Asset Management constitute the Collection Management process. They are treated separately but together constitute integrated operations as a whole.
The six steps in the CM process are:
ØDevelop Requirements,
ØDevelop a Collection Plan,
ØTask/Request Collection,
ØDisseminate,
ØEvaluate Reporting,
ØUpdate Collection Planning.
The various activities inherent in these steps need to be synchronized and placed under constant review.
While devising the Collection plan, the intelligence officer in charge of designing the plan (henceforth known as Collection Manager CM) takes into account the following:
ØCommanders Priority Intelligence Requirements
ØLow Priority Intelligence Requirements
ØRequests from subordinate units,
ØTaskings from higher HQ’s
ØIntelligence requirements for targeting purposes
Now, he prioritizes these keeping in mind the Commands intelligence needs and the commanders priority intelligence needs.
When BICCE study was initially conducted with the development of possible enemy COAs, the intelligence analyst attempts to develop all indicators of these COAs.(Indicators are those details of enemy action/inaction that may suggest an enemy COA
COLLECTION FORMAT
There are two collection plans. One designed for conventional battlefield operations whereas the other caters to a LIC environment.LIC battlefield operations tend to be dispersed. The PIR and IR’s are highly diverse and collection becomes a tough task.
In the latter case the following steps are followed:
ØList the PIRs and IRs, prioritize them and enumerate them using control numbers and alphabets. This helps in prioritization.
ØNow ascertain the indicators
ØDetermine potential indicators-prioritize those that will answer the PIR and IR.
ØDelete all indicators that do not answer the intelligence requirements.
ØDevelop specific intelligence requirements. These are the requirements as stated by the commander, prioritized and general, broken down into manageable specific requirements. A PIR may have several specific intelligence requirements.
ØAnalyze these SIRs and the target characteristics keeping all the indicators in perspective.

ØFinally prioritize the SIRs and determine the suitable collection discipline/platform/agency keeping its capabilities, limitations, backlog of collection tasking allotted to it and whether adjacent units, lower units are also using it.

ØPrepare the tasking list by creating a prioritized SIR list and deploy the collectors.

Indicator analysis is the basis for recommendations to the commander for a specific COA.
Note:

1. Intelligence should be timely, accurate, predictive and specific. The last term is very important especially in the case when actionable intelligence is needed. The HUMINT agent reports:

Observed movement of Bodo insurgents in NAI 6.

Observed that they are moving south towards the rice fields near the Tarmung village Now these two reports are timely as they are happening right now, predictive as we know they

are moving south towards the rice fields near an identified village. But what about specificity. What is the strength of the insurgents in terms of manpower? How many of them? Any idea how heavily are they armed and what weapons are they carrying? Do they possess mortars, bazookas, rocket launchers (shoulder mounted)? Where are they exactly in named area of interest 6? Whenever you report keeping the factors Size, Activity, Location and Time in perspective, you need to be as specific as possible. That way we can not only gauge their exact intentions and courses of actions but also formulate our course of action, as we can now pin-point them.

Enemy Capabilities and Limitations can be mnemonic zed with DRAW-D, Defense, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw and Delay. The Order of Battle and Table of Organization and Equipment (ORBAT and TO&E) are two areas intelligence must dwell upon throroughly.The ORBAT refers to the enemy organizations disposition, capabilities assets and composition whereas TO&E refers to its organization table of units and associated equipment. Thus the Commander is made aware with this strength, disposition, organizational and capabilities brief of the enemy.

Tasking is meted out considering:

Type of collection platform to be used. Here it’s HUMINT

Availability of HUMINT resources. It could well be resources are very limited. Maybe time is of essence. It could well be that actionable intelligence is required fast and there is no room to send the collected information up the chain for collation, processing and dissemination to targeting platforms by the end-users—here the Commander. This time constraint may mean we have the analytical element right at boot-level, who will be a part of the collection team. This will cut down on the time involved in the intelligence cycle from collection to dissemination. Moreover
availability of HUMINT resources also means the Commander has other priorities with other tactical missions or maybe a part of the HUMINT resources are away accompanying patrols to get intelligence from neighborhoods, civilians etc.So availability of resources is a criteria to be taken into account.

NOTE: A MUCH SIMPLER CONFIGURATION CAN BE SET UP INITIALLY MANNING THE ORGANIC Coy INT CELL

WITH 4-5 ENLISTED INF RIFLEMEN , A SR NCO/JCO.TECHNIQUES OF TACTICAL QUESTIONING , ELICITATION

OBSERVATION/SURVEILLANCE,DOCEX,AND ROUTINE INTERROGATION CAN BE TAUGHT EASILY TO THE HANDPICKED

MEN.THE SET UP IS BEING ENVISIONED FOR AN INF REGT AT KOLKATA.