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I had a couple really good questions this past weekend about looking for indicators signaling a SHTF situation. How can we tell an emergency event is going to happen before it happens?  What can we look for?  Those are very good questions but they’re not easily answered.  We’ll work on breaking it down here.  I want each of you to have a way forward to start developing your own Early Warning Indicators (EWI) for whatever threats you may be expecting.

To best describe EWIs, I’ll start with an analogy.  Intelligence analysts identifying EWIs are a lot like insider trading.  Inside traders who buy or sell a company’s stock do so because they learn sensitive information signaling a shift in the real or perceived value of that company.  Inside traders sell off a company’s stock before news comes out that the company didn’t meet analysts’ earnings expectations.  Alternatively, they buy a company’s stocks because they learn that a company will exceed earnings expectations, and then they stand to profit once that news is published and the stock price increases shortly after.

Another fitting analogy is a warning from a fire alarm or tornado siren.  The ‘intelligence analyst’ in this case smells or sees smoke and then pulls the fire alarm (or the smoke sensor goes off automatically).  Meteorologists or eye-witnesses confirm that a tornado or tornadic activity is in the area, and then the sirens go off, alerting nearby residents of the need to get to cover.

Governments around the world encourage (pay) intelligence analysts to identify EWIs in order to predict future ‘moves in the market’ of conflict and geopolitics.  But identification of EWIs is only one part of the equation.  Without the ability to ‘see’ the battlespace, intelligence analysts aren’t effective.  We need the brain (the analyst) in order to identify EWIs, and we need the eyes and ears (the collector) to inform the brain about the environment.  Developing eyes and ears is a critical step but we won’t talk about that now (go to the Collection category of this blog to read all the intelligence gathering articles).

So once intelligence analysts have all this information coming in, we start to get a good picture of the full spectrum of threats in the battlespace.  Now there are four types of threats: Conventional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and Disruptive.

Conventional Threat.

The conventional threat is the standing, uniformed army; the police state; the occupation, the tyrant, the powers that be.  The conventional threat has doctrine and authority.  They don’t need to hide because their strength is partly in their visibility and presence.  The US patrol in Muqdadiyah, the FOB in Musa Qaleh District, the police outpost in Ghazni City.  It’s the force that carries out the application of law, and the force that defends the interests of the political power.

 Irregular Threat.

The irregular threat is the near-opposite of the conventional.  The irregular threat is marked by blurred lines.  Those blurred lines form along soldier/civilian, political/military, organized/disorganized, centralized/decentralized, among others.  The irregular threat are gangs, insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists.  The irregular threat’s power is typicallyde facto; they’re here, therefore they wield power and influence.  The irregular threat typically doesn’t hold de jurepolitical authority, and if they do, it’s manifest in shadow governance.  The irregular threat is marked by civilian clothes and military weaponry; and most typically favor opportunistic targeting and remaining hidden over long-term, open maneuver operations and shows of presence.

Catastrophic Threat.

The catastrophic threat is existential: natural and man-made disasters.  Threats like tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes; nuclear meltdowns, weapons of mass destruction, and national/financial/monetary collapses.  Unlike conventional and irregular threats, you can’t defeat catastrophic threats.  Once conflict beings, conventional and irregular threats can be stopped.  You can’t stop a tornado, you can’t stop a nuclear explosion once it’s begun, and there’s nothing you can do to stop a nation or society in collapse.

Disruptive Threats.

Disruptive threats aren’t necessarily direct threats like the previous three.  If you are a target or in the way of a conventional, irregular or catastrophic threat, then you are facing an existential threat.  A disruptive threat disrupts (spoiler alert); it can be considered a ‘strategic shock’.  Technology developed at the NSA or Google that assaults privacy and the Fourth Amendment is an example of a disruptive threat.  Biometrics and collection of biometrics is a disruptive threat.  A computer virus is a disruptive threat.  Identity thieves are disruptive threats.  Electric cars manufactured by Tesla and others are disruptive to large combustion engine vehicle manufacturers (if not today, then certainly in the years to come).  The Chinese ability to target US aircraft carriers (the so-called “carrier killer” missile) is a disruptive threat; it changes the balance of geopolitical or military power.  It may never be put to use but the mere ability is disruptive.  Disruptive threats won’t necessarily kill you, but they will ‘disrupt’ your life, organization, or mission.

Identifying EWIs.

So in order to identify potential EWIs, we first need to look at the specific threat.  One of the threats pointed out previously was martial law.  One of the most helpful exercises we, as intelligence analysts, can do is to start from the end state and backwards plan out all the possibilities.  (If you’re interested in these and other advanced structured analytic techniques, sign up for one my Intelligence Analysis courses.  Email me and let’s set up a course in your area.  It’s one of the most practical weekends you’ll spend as a prepper or patriot.)

An easy example: a burned grilled cheese sandwich is our SHTF event (First World Problems).  What could have gone wrong?  Off the top of my head, (A) the chef could have left the bread on the skillet for too long, or (B) the skillet could have been too hot.  Here we start a tree.  Why would the chef have left the bread on the skillet too long?  (A1) He was distracted.  (A2) He’s poorly trained.  (A3) He died.  Why was the skillet too hot?  (B1) The chef is poorly trained.  (B2) The stove eye malfunctioned. (B3) The knob is fitted incorrectly.  We continue so on and so forth until we exhaust all possible options, regardless of likelihood.  We’re brainstorming here; attempting to find the widest range of options.  Remember that without knowing the circumstances or context of a situation, even outliers are possible explanations.  The low likelihood of an event doesn’t mean that the event didn’t or won’t happen.  In 1904, the Japanese launched a preemptive, surprise attack against a Russian fleet during the Battle of Port Arthur.  Knowing the context of this battle should lead a good intelligence analyst to make a similar assessment about the possibility of a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor nearly forty years later.  Of course hindsight is 20/20, however, seemingly unimportant information paid due diligence could have made all the difference.

Moving forward, we wake up tomorrow with news reports of martial law in the metropolitan area closest to us.  That’s our starting point.  We ask ourselves, “What caused martial law?”  We identify all the potential causes, all highly dependent on many factors such as region, year, political leaders, and others.  We create as long a list of causes as possible and then we start looking for our indicators.

An indicator is an observable or potentially observable piece of evidence that leads to a logical conclusion.  A stack of newspapers piling up in a driveway and a lack of lights on inside the home at dusk when every other home on the street has its lights on has a logical conclusion: no one’s home, and no one’s been home for a few days.  The stack of newspapers and the lack of lights are our two indicators.  Tom and Laura loading up the minivan on Friday morning with the kids, beach chairs, floats, and a couple suitcases is an indicator that they’re going on vacation to the beach.

If I was to ask you – the intelligence analyst – when Tom and Laura were going on vacation, then ‘packing up’ should definitely be an indicator we look for in determining when they’re leaving.  In this case, you’d report back to me that Tom and Laura have been observed packing and that their vacation is imminent.  That’s not much of an early warning, but when talking SHTF scenarios, three seconds, three minutes or three hours could make all the difference.  (If this was a real life scenario, we’d be employing all the techniques I teach in the Human Intelligence Collectors Course.  If you’d like to collect intelligence information from human sources, then sign up for a future course.)

Back to martial law, identify all the potential contributing causes.  Ask yourself, “What would I expect to precipitate martial law in X city?”  My list would start with riots, civil unrest, terrorist attack, and monetary collapse.  If any of those things become observable, then I’m going to be on alert for martial law.  Taking it one step further, I’m going to start looking for indicators of those contributing causes.  A white police officer shooting a black man could start a riot.  A humanitarian crisis or extreme political event could cause civil unrest.  “Increased chatter” or the publication of a credible threat could indicate a terrorist threat is expected.  Large swings in the market, a failed Treasury bond auction, or a public announcement of dumping the dollar from a large country or a confederation of large countries could precipitate a monetary collapse.

In business we use Y3 or Y5 analysis – Why?, Why?, Why?  It’s our way of investigating the underlying cause of symptoms in order to find the root cause (also called Root Cause Analysis).  Event A occurred because of Cause B, Cause B happened Cause C failed, and Cause C failed because Event D happened.

A real world example:

Millions of illegal immigrants are pouring over the border.

Why?  Because the Obama Administration’s border policy is not to stop illegal immigration.

Why? Because the administration wants illegal immigrants so the illegal immigrants can be amnestied and granted citizenship.

Why? Because the newly naturalized citizens are more likely to vote for the Democrat Party in places like Texas and Arizona.

Why? Because the Democrat Party wants to turn Texas and Arizona blue from top to bottom so a Republican presidential candidate is unlikely to ever win another election.

Why? Because the progressive, Marxist wing of the Democrat Party wants to “fundamentally transform” the United States of America into the United Socialist States of America.

We could go on for a few more steps until we finally arrive at a global coalition of Marxist nations, one world government, depopulation, whatever theory to which you subscribe.  The point is that we’re attributing an individual action to a strategic objective.  (Kind of getting off course here, but hopefully you see the value of Root Cause Analysis.)

In the same way, we’re looking at individual components of an end state.  Martial law is a culmination of a series of events, and the better job we do at identifying those events and their causes, the better EWIs we form.  As long as we’ve developed the ability to observe those EWIs, the better we can do at anticipating future events.  Text book stuff.

If you have any questions or want to delve deeper into a specific issue and form some practical EWIs, just email me or post a comment below.

http://guerrillamerica.com/2014/07/identifying-shtf-indicators/

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I finished re-reading Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnamover the weekend. (It’s a MUST READ; non-negotiable for preppers and Patriots.) After talking with a few friends, it dawned on me that formulating a defense plan for post-SHTF preppers is a lot like planning for the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Preppers need not become experts on counterinsurgency, but I recommend learning the tenets and learning from others’ experiences.  There are (at least) three reasons why preppers should learn about counterinsurgency: re-establishing local governance, taming the criminal/irregular threat, prioritizing missions with competing resources.

(Re-) Establishing Local Governance.

Unlike the other forms of warfare, counterinsurgency (COIN) is population-centric.  As the populace goes, so goes the conflict.  COIN is a battle for legitimacy: in a vacuum, who has the rightful authority?  That boils down to perception, which is why its critically important (can’t stress that enough) to be able to influence the populace and win them to your side.  We do that, in part, by providing for them. We provide security firstly.  One thing I’ve learned in dealing with Iraqis and Afghans, and I can extrapolate from there to include the entire population of the world, is that most human beings want security; they want to see their children grow up and be successful.  They don’t want to live in a war zone; they don’t want to live in fear of being blown up by an artillery round or an IED.  They want peace and security because peace and security mean prosperity.  Therefore, the populace is much more willing to support whichever side is able to provide that peace and security, as a general rule of thumb.  In other words, they will support the faction that seeks justice, upholds the rule of law, and prosecutes those who break the law.  If you’re not scoping out your local and county law enforcement and learning about their abilities to provide peace and security for the populace (and where they plan to provide it; it won’t be everywhere), then you have an enormous intelligence gap to fill.  Work on filling that soon; start this week.  (It’s as simple as a conversation and asking some questions.  It’s really no more complicated than that.)

Infamous Chinese communist guerrilla leader Mao Tse Tung referred to the populace as the water in which the fish (guerrillas) swim.  That is, the guerrillas use the populace for mobility and support.  Fish get from Point A to Point B by swimming in the water, and that water completely sustains them.  They get everything they need from the water.  Depending on the situation, you may be battling guerrillas in the form of criminals and gangs, or you may be a guerrilla fighting off tyranny.  Today we’re focusing on the former scenario: grid-down, looting, survival.

If there is a lack of governance, perceived or physical, then tribalism will be a likely result.  The people in Area A are going to build a community government, the people in Area B will live under the ‘government’ chosen for them by local gangs, and anyone not in one of those two categories may just live far enough out that life goes on, regardless of government.  (Now before we start a philosophical argument about the need for government, I’m defining government as the mechanism that enforces the rule of Constitutional law and generally protects the citizens from each other.)  So when you look at your area, consider under which category you’ll fall.

Part of the great battle in areas of Iraq and Afghanistan was supporting a local government that was corrupt, incompetent, or both.  (Often times, it seemed that incompetence bred corruption, and corruption led to further incompetence.  Which came first, the chicken or the egg?)  Because of standing up good governance was so problematic, the Army introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).  The PRTs were groups of military leaders, political scientists, social scientists, engineers, agricultural specialists, and other professions with the mission of advising provincial and local government to better enable governance.

One of things I’ve brought up before is just what happens after survival.  Whether you think it’s an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), or fiscal collapse, or government collapse, whatever; Event X happens and then it’s time to rebuild.  (Or maybe there is no specific Event X, and we just continue a decline while we see dramatic increases in lawlessness and an inability to provide security.)  Are you going to lead the charge in rebuilding or aiding a lawful government, or are you going to have government, lawful or not, be built around you?  Preppers may find themselves in situations where they essentially have to act as part of a PRT in aiding local law enforcement or local government (or county law enforcement/government).  We absolutely cannot forgo planning for rebuilding, or supporting established, lawful government in the wake of an emergency.  It’s for this reason that we ought to learn as much as we can about maintaining good governance during a conflict/counterinsurgency.

Defense Against Irregular Threats.

A large part of the reason why I compare likely post-SHTF environments with a counterinsurgency is because of the tribalism and likely insurgencies that will occur in those vacuums.  There are what we call “irregular threats”.  Those are the criminals, gangs, tribes, whatever, who have an agenda.  It may be survival in the case of the common criminal looting out of a need to survive, or it may be establishing a fiefdom in order to implement a gang or tribe’s ideal government (which may be very un-idealistic for you).

Going back to COIN operations, we’re talking about a population-centric approach.  Did killing everyone really work in Iraq and Afghanistan?  Nope.  Yet that seems to be the post-SHTF strategy for so many.  And that’s a really intellectually lazy (not to mention immoral) way to conduct post-SHTF business.  Instead of being in prolonged conflict, our goal should be instead to influence the populace capable of being influenced.  Violent criminals and gangs will always exist but I don’t accept a foregone conclusion that they have to exist where I live.  Earlier this year, I wrote about the Four D’s: Defend, Diminish, Deny, and Defeat.  That should be the basis for all our mission and security planning.  We absolutely must stop thinking about defense in linear terms; that is, we can’t keep thinking that the only way to deal with threats is to kill them.  Instead, we ought to be asking ourselves why they are threats in the first place.  What makes them my enemy; for what reasons are they seeking to do me harm?  If it’s something as simple as because they want to survive, and for no other reason, then that’s great news!  If I help them become more self-sufficient and survive, then I may have just removed an adversary from my area of operations (AO).  (I get that it may be a little idealistic, however, we can’t assume that everyone who has nothing is a mortal enemy.)  A lot of prepper groups aren’t that concerned with Leroy Jenkins, but are very concerned about their unprepared neighbors who might be, by one-sies and two-sies, driven to violence in order to help their families survive.  If you can find alternative means – maybe food for intelligence information (the M in MICE) or improving their survivability – then not only are we reducing the threat but we’re also increasing our intelligence networks.

Now, for all the threats who can’t be persuaded – the ideological socialists or communists, the progressives, the racists, the adversaries who want to abolish the Bill of Rights, the warlords, the gangs, etc. – then we have to start invoking the Four D’s so we can achieve our rightful and lawful will.  Use that Four D’s article as a refresher about how to defeat this set of threats.  Remember: our fight against them is population-centric.  If we can turn the populace – our neighbors – against these threats, then our security will improve.  If the threats are able to turn the populace against us, then we face an existential threat.  As the populace goes, so goes the conflict.

Competition for Finite Resources.

Finally, resources are finite.  We have limits on manpower, limits on time, and limits on supplies.  We must prioritize our missions to reflect that reality and conserve our resources.  From the introduction to the Chicago Press version of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual:

Thinly stretched occupying forces were particularly brutal.  Atrocity was their economy of force… Moreover, they were less concerned with with attaining legitimacy than obedience.

‘Economy of force’ is a military concept describing accomplishing the mission with the least amount of resources necessary.  We don’t put a battalion at an observation post because that’s far too many resources dedicated to a mission that can be accomplished by a squad.  We didn’t send an entire corps of soldiers into Grenada because it would only take roughly a division.  When faced with finite resources, we absolutely must incorporate ‘economy of force’ into our planning.

Back to the quote: atrocities win battles but lose wars, especially in this day and age.  We earn the populace by “attaining legitimacy” and not by behavior modification through fear, intimidation and coercion.  Fearful populations are resentful populations.  Resentful populations might not openly oppose you, but they’re willing to cooperate with a viable alternative.  Therefore, we must seek to be a viable alternative when faced with oppression.  In my mind, that’s the largest component the Liberty movement is missing — a viable alternative.  We have plenty of alternatives but most realize that those alternatives are just the lesser of two evils.  Don’t become the lesser of two evils; don’t kill the Constitution in the process of saving it.  As a friend of mine said to me last weekend, “You don’t get morality from immorality.  You don’t get good government from bad government.”  (His name is John Ainsworth, hands down one of the smartest men I’ve ever met.  His website is America’s Remedy and his introductory video will challenge your beliefs that your participation in politics is worthwhile, if not convince you otherwise altogether.)

Back to mission planning, we start with our objectives.  Our objectives should be immediate security first, then (re-) establishment of good governance at the local level.  Then we ask ourselves, “What are the paths that lead to our objectives?”  The annihilation of imminent threats comes to mind; then security patrolling.  Then comes community outreach, building or repairing critical infrastructure, and tracking down the remaining threats in order maintain peace and security.  I can’t prioritize these things for you, however, these few items should be on the lists of most Patriots and preppers.  You very well may not have the resources to accomplish all these goals.  Accomplish what you can, or find a place now where you’ll be able to accomplish these objectives.

If you’re interested in implementing COIN into the rebuilding process, an action highly beneficial, then Chapters Four and Five of Counterinsurgency Field Manual discuss planning and implementation in great detail.

If there’s enough interest, then I’ll start going through some of the COIN books and manuals and writing out the “Cliff’s Notes” versions.  Otherwise, I will probably get to work describing intelligence support to COIN operations.  Please post your questions and comments below!