TRAINING MANUAL
ARMY STUDY GUIDE

EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR
PUSHING DOWN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY TO BOOT LEVEL- THE RIFLE COMPANYS OWN ORGANIC INT PLATOONS
MANNED BY ITS OWN RIFLEMEN

FIRST INDIAN ARMY UNIT BASED ON AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE
KESHAV MAZUMDAR
PROJECT ARMY XXII

TRAINING CLASSES -- GO HERE

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

TOPICS TO BE COVERED DURING TRAINING

NON-INT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY

(BATALLION/COMPANY LEVEL SOLDIERS)

TO ENABLE THE CREATION OF UNIT1 (HUMINT+CI),THUS PUSHING INT CAPABILITY TO TACTICAL LEVELS

UNDER THE ARMY INTXII PROJECT - PROPOSED LOCATION : BIHAR REGT SALT LAKE , KOLKATA , WEST BENGAL

TAKEN UP BY KESHAV MAZUMDAR

( Font sizes vary..to express relative importance of topics )

Current Conflict Environment:

Conventional War (Battle Operating Systems)

Maneuver

Assymetric Era:

Distributed Nonlinear Warfare

Adaptable Asymetric Enemy

Writing Enemy Doctrine

NE INT NET

Intelligence Estimate

Counterintelligence Estimate

IPB COIN

IPB Conventional Warfare

Kinetic/Nonkinetic Fires in COIN

Center of Gravity in COIN as opposed to Conventional Warfare

Importance of HUMINT

CI should not be relegated to back bench

CI must support HUMINT

HUMINT NO MORE PASSIVE-MUST BE AGGRESIVE

CI Support to Force Protection

CI Investigations

CI Review of Installation

Tactical HUMINT

Mobile Interrogation Teams -FLOT

CI Enabled R&STABDA Teams:Fighting for information;not passive R&S

Tailorable HUMINT-CI teams (Mix as per Mission needs)

Concept of Operations

Common Operating Picture COP

DOCEX

Push/pull defn

Bn Level Int Capability:Pushing intelligence capability to tactical levels

Every Soldier a Sensor

CLIC

COIN Company/Bn level Int Diagram

Deception

Psychological Warfare

Defining doctrine

Defining policy

Defining tactics

Defining techniques

Defining procedures

Terrorism and humint

COIN and humint

Indications and warning

Tactical/operational/strategic intelligence

Intelligence-def

Counterint def

The int disciplines

The int cycle

Planning/direction/requirements

Prioritizing Requirements

Int drives ops & Vice versa:Int resides within Ops

Shortening int cycle***

humint collection

source management***

source ops***

source reliability

mice

humint techniques

docex , interview, interrogation , screening , cordon&search ops, etc

separate chapter on interrogation

tactical questioning

secondary collectors: case study-MP Intelligence Function (click)

COIN:

Unit Protection

Force Protection

Humint system

Humint architecture printed file***

1.situation development*

2.targeting

3.collection

4.EW

5.COAs

__________________________________________________________________

Subversion

Terrorism

FIS

Threats we r facing

Humint as remedy***

Applications of humint

TOC & BATTLE STAFF NCOs

Intelligence Projection as against Force Projection

Misssion-Capabilities-Needs Analysis

Commanders Professional Military Intelligence Education.

INTELLIGENCE/CI COURSE

CLASSES

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION PLAN

TO DETERMINE THREAT DOCTRINE. ( ASYMMETRIC ADVERSARY/HYBRID ENEMY)

TO DETERMINE THREAT INTENT FROM THREAT DOCTRINE.

THE NEED TO KNOW ENEMY DOCTRINE.

We must have all historical and current information about the threat stored in a database. The database should have doctrinal templates about the threat. For example we have conducted a HUMINT/SIGINT study about the threat recently. We can now overlay the HUMINT situation over the extracted threat doctrinal template from the database and compare to find any similarities between current and doctrinal activities, tactics, methods of collection (CI),deployments etc. In this manner we compare against as many doctrinal templates we can extract from the database and select that one that bears close resemblance to the current HUMINT overlay. That is to say that resembles the current situation as assessed by HUMINT/SIGINT Assets.

Hence its very important to know threat doctrine. Even the irregular asymmetric unconventional enemy has an unwritten doctrine which should be compiled and stored by our intelligence analysts. What we can do is conduct a thorough study of past and current threat tactics,techniques,distinctive signatures like preferred methods of intelligence collection , methods of attack, weapons/explosives used. There is more than this to collect and store in the database. Remember open source intelligence accounts for more than 90% of all intelligence collected about the adversary. So thoroughly glean open source and extract as much information as possible about the threat. For example from the internet , media , etc we can get information about threat activities in other areas/states/nations which can be documented , analyzed to extract threat intelligence collection methods , tactics and techniques of attack , targeting methods , dry runs, weapons used , explosives used, population centric center of gravity locations, how they operate in an urban-semi-0urban battlespace,how they operate in a jungle environment, who are their abettors from among the local criminal enterprises , how they communicate and the extent of communication systems/mobiles/couriers usage and the preferred method of communication so as not to be easily intercepted , threat deception tactics and threat maneuver tactics and so on—in short the battle field operating system specific to an unconventional asymmetric threat and tactics , techniques and procedures together with C2 and combat service support (here it will be from abetting nations, criminal enterprises and even the local population).Whether or not a doctrine exists or is accessible , we must attempt fully to put down their doctrine on paper , properly format it and document it and then store it in a database and what with the scores of patterns analyzing/other extraction software easily available from the internet including link diagramming/association matrix or time event charting , we can extract all doctrinally preferred tactics , techniques and procedures from the database thus getting to know the enemy much more better in advance. We can extract different doctrinal templates and stack them in the database for immediate comparison with our HUMINT situation overlays when required , instantly without wasting time by simply querying the database with proper query syntax.

Remember even the most elusive , cunning threat group will always have a history of activities which he can’t erase as its embedded in the time, we only have to get the maximum possible information about him to make a satisfactory assessment of his war doctrine. Yes we must be prepared to adjust our doctrine to his doctrine, if we stick to our conventional doctrinal methods then surely we cannot expect to gain information superiority and that competitive edge. We must ADAPT to the enemy’s doctrine.

Determine threat intent:

Questions the CI operative should ask himself:

Which area will the adversary target?

Why has he selected that particular area?

Has there been past instances of targeting that area?

Are there any particular / distinctive threat signatures?

Any estimate when the targeting can take place?

How will the adversary collect intelligence about the target area?

Are there any particular instances of adversary collection attempts on the target area in the past? Have they been documented?

Does the adversary have a doctrine which can be accessed and if so does the doctrine suggest possible threat actions?

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CAPABILITY-MISSION ANALYSIS

TO YIELD THE INT PRODUCT

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

''COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE''

--not the same as Intelligence Estimate--

We have to conduct a counter intelligence study of the area of operations, so as to ascertain details about the enemy ,the existing situation , the military geography, weather, characteristics of the local population from the perspective of the enemy- that is to say who are the sympathizers, corroborators of the enemy, where and how the enemy intelligence operates, how it conducts sabotage - terrorist- subversive and counter intelligence and counter reconnaissance activities. We must estimate the effects of Enemy counter intelligence and intelligence activities on our mission, operations ,capabilities and all steps that are undertaken to attain mission success. Details about the enemy must include[ in counterintelligence context] location and disposition, composition, strength which should include local abettors and sympathizers, replacements and to what extent they are available, how much efficient are the enemy organizations that conduct intelligence, sabotage, subversive and terrorist activities. We must take into account all what the enemy counter intelligence services know about our intelligence and counter intelligence efforts. Historical, recent and present intelligence, sabotage, terrorist and subversive activities of the enemy should be maintained in database form which can be queried whenever required especially during mission formulation and counterintelligence planning. Those activities which are highly significant must be highlighted and all movements of the enemy during the conduct of such operations must also be recorded. We must know in detail the peculiarities and weaknesses of the enemy counter intelligence service and we must be fully aware of the operational tactical and Technical capabilities of the enemy as well as the type of equipment used by the enemy. All other factors must be recorded in fact sheets which must be attached to the estimate or recorded as annex.

After determination of the above we must now analyze the intelligence , counterintelligence ,sabotage , subversive and terrorist capabilities of the enemy.

1.. Maintain separate enemy capability data sheets, capabilities ranging from intelligence , subversive sabotage, terrorist and those that adversely affect our assigned missions and operations.

2. Every enemy capability datasheet must contain information about what the enemy can do with that capability, how, where, when, in what strength the enemy can carry out its operation. The data sheet should contain information about the time the enemy can devote given the constraints due to our/friendly military security , force protection and intelligence/ counter intelligence operations.. The time when the enemy intends to start its activities should also be entered in the datasheet.

3. This counter intelligence estimate is made by thinking like the enemy and hence we consider all courses of action that can be undertaken by the enemy. Keeping these courses of action in perspective we analyze each capability of the enemy. During this analysis we consider all the factors in para 1, that is all the intelligence we gathered about the enemy counter Intelligence service, existing situation, all the estimated effects on the enemy counter intelligence service and Intelligence Service by the weather and the terrain and also the effect on our intelligence and counter intelligence operations and capabilities/measures, its strength, disposition ,table of organization and equipment ,local affiliations..

4. With all the above information we now attempt to forecast the probable time of the most probable course of action of the enemy. In other words we try to determine the estimate of the probability of occurrence of the most likely enemy counterintelligence activity.

5. Every capability must be seen in the light of factors that will act as enablers or that will go against its adoption.

6. A capability must be seen in the light of its associated strength and vulnerabilities.

7. There should be a detailed discussion in the capability data sheet about all indicators that point towards adoption of that capability by the enemy.

8. The data sheet should contain information exactly how that capability will affect our mission accomplishment—how that capability will be put to use, its role in the course of action of the enemy.

The capabilities of the enemy should be categorized as intelligence capabilities , subversion capabilities , terrorist capabilities and sabotage capabilities. All known and estimated methods of operation should be recorded. Regarding sabotage capability all three that is military , political and economic sabotage should be taken into consideration. Both agent and guerilla types of sabotage should be considered. Subversion capabilities should include propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection and terrorist activities should also include information on enemy cooperation that will help in the evasion or escape of hostile locals. Regarding terrorist capability we must have all data about the terrorist organization capabilities in the area of operations and also the capabilities of the main personalities of the organization.

We must utilize all our intelligence and counter intelligence resources to get information of all the centre of gravity of Enemy counter intelligence services, command and control , table of organization and equipment, areas of vulnerability and criticality of the enemy counterintelligence apparatus and whether or not this vulnerability can be exploited and to what extent or do we have to neutralize them. We must create a list in which from the beginning till the end we put down the enemy courses of action from the most likely to the least likely corresponding to each capability, and the most dangerous course of action singled out after considering all the possible courses of action. Finally we must put down all information that will indicate in an estimated from the effects that this course of action will have on our assigned mission or in other words we can say the estimated effects of the capability that the enemy will put to use to execute that most likely course of action to defeat our mission.

The final part of the counter intelligence estimate will now dwell on an analysis of our counter intelligence measures to be adopted against these estimated enemy courses of action and whether there is any need of additional requirements or emphasis.

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTORS:

FIGHTING FOR INFORMATION

Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of [the users] and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained, and analyzed respond to the needs of [users]. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.
--Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy

(from Special Warfare Bulletin, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg.)

In today's irregular battlespaces, lethal and nonlethal operations alike require a rapid, socially sensitive awareness that is derived from intelligence operations. That requirement applies equally to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and counterdrug activities. Whether their goal is to find, isolate, disrupt, deter, deny, influence or neutralize enemy activities, operations need to avoid inflicting inadvertent consequences, either as unintended casualties or global political fallout.

In order to leverage human intelligence, or HUMINT, today's complex operational environments require a comprehensive understanding of the human social and psychological dimensions, advanced intelligence capabilities for information-collection, and military source operations, or MSO, which involve the collection from, by or through humans of foreign, military and military-related intelligence. Success in these environments also requires a heightened battlespace analysis that provides the capability to rapidly gather, interpret and act on time-sensitive information.

Unfortunately, traditional techniques of information-collection and reconnaissance can be difficult in the irregular battlespace because of various human-terrain factors that deny or compromise observation. More advanced intelligence operations can be conducted to circumvent such challenges, but only if the intelligence analysis that supports mission planning is attuned to the particular battlespace.

Special-operations forces, or SOF, remain one of the most important elements for executing improved information-collection operations and intelligence assessments. SOF commanders can improve cultural and social awareness by adjusting the way they task their intel personnel to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence.

When available intelligence lacks the information necessary for planning SOF operations, it is critical that the SOF commander obtain the necessary intelligence and perform a supplementary analysis. The 18F Special Forces intelligence sergeant can be a great asset by helping the commander adjust the way he requests intelligence, integrates intelligence personnel within teams and plans supplemental intelligence missions to ensure the maximum knowledge of the human terrain.

Operationalizing intel

As they execute their mission-essential tasks, SOF commanders have an imperative to acquire a situational awareness that will also provide the basis for efficient planning that minimizes risk. SOF planning, performed within the theater of operations, often requires critical information that, for a variety of reasons, may be unavailable or not operationalized, that is, not available in a format relevant to SOF operations.

In SOF operations, the commander focuses on an environment that includes the area of influence, all adjacent areas, and areas extending into enemy territory that contain the objectives of current and planned operations. With such a broad scope to consider, the commander requires intelligence that addresses both tactical requirements and the big-picture strategy. In order to provide an appropriate operational analysis and understanding, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, and other planning mechanisms must therefore be tied to SOF operations in order to ensure that planners will have access to the best available and most usable intelligence.

Successful planning is not based solely on how well the intelligence user defines the intelligence requirements, or IRs. The intelligence product also requires skilled analysts who can discern, discriminate, filter, correlate and disseminate intelligence. Such intelligence may have to compete with contradictory information that often lacks the methodical evaluation and contextual application that SOF warfighters need.

When intelligence is operationalized, risks and options become more apparent. The resulting comprehensive awareness enhances insight, improves mission planning and heightens tactical performance by allowing quick and sure responses to rapidly shifting conditions.

Operational intelligence has two main foundations:

1) Assessments - "Intel drives ops." Customized operational intelligence, synthesized with analytical rigor, either enables planning for a specific operational environment or highlights additional requirements for intelligence collection.

2) Missions - "Intel-driven ops." Intelligence operations conducted primarily to collect information related to priority intelligence requirements, PIRs, or to develop military sources, as opposed to being a secondary objective of other missions.

Assessments

Intelligence can provide a competitive advantage only if its various pieces are matched with operational experience and intuition, reasoning and analytical skills honed for the specific situation. In special operations, intelligence planning is usually tasked to the staff of the S2, G2, C2 or J2. These staffs are responsible for intelligence procurement and interpretation. If the intelligence personnel are unskilled, their typical response is to disseminate a "data-dump" of raw intelligence or to perform increased, unfocused collection activities, rather than to perform an enhanced analysis and distill PIRs or to manageable levels.

Most failures of battlefield intelligence are due not to insufficient data or intelligence-collection efforts but instead to intelligence products that were either ignored or analytically weak. The products are often weak because the analyst is unskilled or uses an intuition-based, or "gut-based," approach instead of a systematic process, or because rigid analytical processes and templated frameworks do not provide the responses that missions demand. Another problem in intelligence is mirror-imaging, in which the analyst bases his findings on the assumption that foreigners will think about matters in the same way as Americans do.

For example, a commander may be preparing for a foreign internal defense, or FID, deployment to North Africa that could involve working with indigenous Tuareg tribes in the Sahara. Based only on observations and some internal examination, the S2 may have concluded that Tuaregs are lazy, which the commander and his team may interpret as a signal to push the Tuaregs harder in training or to expect less cooperation from them. However, that analysis is weak: The truth may be that untrained observations have concentrated on an isolated group of individuals performing their social-cultural roles within the Tuareg caste system. In reality, an approach that would motivate or engage the Tuaregs would need to be based upon an understanding of their cultural conditions and their view of society. Approaches that might motivate U.S. troops could in fact offend the Tuaregs and create a resistance to cooperation. The result would be a negative relationship with a group that could assist SOF in counterterrorism initiatives or in intelligence support.

In the Tuareg illustration, a better, operationalized approach would take a broader look at the indigenous people, focusing on insights garnered from their social history and culture, and apply the findings to the execution of a particular operation and to the team's understanding of the people. In addition, the success of the mission should be evaluated in terms of short- and long-term goals, relationships formed with the Tuaregs and regional interests. A commander may ask himself: Does the analyst understand our FID intelligence-support requirements' Is the analyst a subject-matter expert who understands the indigenous society and culture' Are the IRs and PIRs specific enough to yield useful operational information, or will they reflect the analyst's narrow opinion and his need to simply check a box on an IPB template' Perhaps the commander could advise the intelligence staff of a target-analysis tool that Special Forces Soldiers use during their mission assessment: CARVER/DSHARPP (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability/demography, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population and proximity).

Improving assessments

Our analysis of the battlespace must also be improved in the area of predictive analysis. It is not enough simply to have a list of forecasted assumptions about the area or the adversary. Intelligence needs to include validated information about the building blocks required for a particular scenario or flashpoint to materialize and clues that would indicate their presence.
The requirements for a predictive analysis of enemy activity include the intentions, will, capabilities and vulnerabilities of enemy groups and individuals. Analysis can be biased and may simply seek information that reinforces the way the analyst views the theater's inhabitants. To ensure that the intelligence assessment will not be based solely on the biases of one person or group, it should also include competing theories.

When commanders are concerned about time constraints, they frequently may not task their collectors and analysts for additional intelligence on the human terrain. They rely instead on their teams to augment the available information as they conduct their missions. Ideally, when information is not available, more interaction between the commander and the intelligence analyst would allow the analyst to describe what is known about a particular scenario indicator and what key intelligence questions still need to be answered. The commander would in turn express his mission tasking and available options for refining and refocusing intelligence collection and analysis.

At times, the information the S2 needs to arrive at a conclusion may be too difficult to obtain, so team databases or intelligence products may simply be stuffed with nuggets of information, in hopes that the user will find appropriately insightful items. Planning for SOF operations can no longer tolerate inadequacies in the analysis of human terrain and battlefield atmospherics simply because it is difficult to collect the necessary intelligence.

To date, attempts to make operational sense of massive amounts of unorganized data collected for missions often focus on obscure, technical, computer-based collection structures and complex mathematical algorithms rather than on realistic improvements to the analysis of relationships and human intelligence. Further, most analysis of these collections of information will be isolated from the operational environment in which the data originated, and the analysts will therefore be unable to apply the appropriate perspective to the intelligence assessment and correlate data to operational activities. The analysis will therefore offer little insight or contextual understanding of the way a particular piece of intelligence should be considered or whether its use may have unintended effects.

Missions

Another enhancement to operational intelligence would be the conduct of more counterthreat and counteraction activities to collect intelligence clandestinely or to gain intelligence insights for missions. Insurgencies and guerrilla movements facilitated through illicit border-crossing activities from Iran, Syria and Pakistan into Iraq and Afghanistan rely on mobility, elusiveness and availability of a safe-haven. The trade and transport of drugs, arms and humans rely on the same factors. All these illicit acts require significant active and passive civilian material support, which is deeply rooted in the human sociological framework.

Focusing on the human terrain could give the commander more mission options and provide targeting for information operations. Human factors are the motivating forces behind mobilization, opportunity, resistance or support. Countering illicit acts can be challenging when they are intermingled with ordinary, lawful activities that are central to an inhabited area. Targeting often resorts to direct-action operations, because low-level targets are the most identifiable and available for engagement. Targeting the social network for intelligence collection through MSO is a better method. The best way to break up complex, social-network-driven activities is to ensure that the network's linchpins are identified and removed or discredited with minimal disruption of the ancillary social terrain.

These linchpins and their higher-level activities for "hostile" insurgency acts and drug-transport purposes are typically masked by day-to-day socially networked routines. That makes it virtually impossible for outsiders who are not part of the local structure to identify anything in particular as being illicit. In this complex operational environment, special-operations personnel should maintain a persistent presence mingling with the locals and their commerce, cultivating trust and goodwill, thereby increasing opportunities for developing potential sources for intelligence operations, counterinsurgency activities and stability initiatives.

Successful synergies of local-intelligence collection and MSO can be traced back to the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS developed underground associates; organized guerrilla groups and supplied them with funds or materiel; and performed local work, such as farming and tending livestock, to better observe enemy movements.

Operational intelligence activities must be similarly dedicated to, teamed with and supported by operationalized intelligence analysis to ensure mission success and the proper identification of appropriate intelligence targets. Refining analysis through real-time observations at the operator level must become a primary function, because the majority of available, prefabricated intelligence will be either dated or of too high a level for the commander to use.

An example will support that point: In Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability to remain in place clandestinely over extended periods of time can be compromised by the area's high density of children, animals and families, who may alert the target under observation. Furthermore, intelligence support to SOF units lacks the local nuances required for them to work effectively within small areas. The result is that recon teams in these areas have become less oriented on physical terrain and more oriented on people for intelligence and insights.

Special Forces use a host of collection assets in trying to satisfy the ever-shifting PIRs of operational commanders and their subordinate elements. At its base camp, the team can rely on its internal organization to accomplish its mission, with enhancement by force-multiplying indigenous camp residents and proximate locals. Advanced collection operations against broadly networked, decentralized threats require additional human sources and informants, electro-optics ground sensors, small measurement and signatures intelligence devices, unmanned aerial sensors, ground and fixed-wing signals intelligence and enhanced human-intelligence MSO.

These collection capabilities enable effective target examination for identifying enemies, tracking illicit activities and assessing risk factors, which are based on a range of motivational, ideological and social factors that can't be observed when intelligence collection is a cursory activity of a mission. By enhancing the role of intelligence operations, SOF personnel can find subtle, ambiguous or fleeting observables that indicate seemingly hidden enemy activities or behaviors. Operators must not only collect this information but also quickly record and report mission results, which will prompt additional analysis and result in a better understanding of the situational atmospherics.

SOF field collectors are able to immerse themselves within an area and have daily contact with numerous sources. With their analytical skills, they develop a capacity for judgment, and they may be in the best position to comprehend indicators or warnings that likely would not set off the same alarms within the larger intel apparatus. Under many circumstances, their comprehension is beyond the scope of a distant analyst, who may frequently discard what he deems as irrelevant information. In short, the local collectors can become their own camp-based intelligence community.

Best practices

Improvements to the operational intelligence domain do not require a complex overhaul of the doctrine for special operations or intelligence. From the moment they contemplate operations, commanders and intelligence specialists can launch a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the estimate of any situation. Within that process, the commander's operational requirements must be the principal determinants of the intelligence-system components, staff organization, intel services and products. Simultaneously, intelligence personnel must act as expert advisers.

The process of operationalizing intelligence, driven by the commander and supported by an advisory intelligence expert, will bring greater specificity to mission planning and execution. By customizing insights and findings, it ensures that everyone is working with the same data and situational awareness to create a plan for specific contingencies. When correctly managed, the intelligence will be more proactive and pre-emptive and less a reactive, "off the shelf" product that has not been framed for the situation.

Once intelligence has been operationalized, its content can correlate to the desired operational effects, adding flexibility and agility to planning and execution. Such refinement enables the intelligence tradecraft, collection architecture and deeper social-cultural observation required for gathering the actionable insights needed for engaging complex enemy centers of gravity.

Under the intelligence-operations framework, SOF commanders can enhance their mission success with timely insights that minimize the risk of direct-action civil infringements and unintended opportunities for insurgent propaganda. Without proper intelligence guidance, capture-and-kill solutions can have significant countereffects: alienating and angering the inhabitants of a region, as well as people in bordering regions. The perceived social infractions create more discontent within communities and increase the resistance to participation that SOF are trying to deter.

Conclusion

To conclude, when implemented as doctrine, an effective framework for building ideal intelligence and decision-making dynamics corresponds to the current procedures of Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations. Best practices of turning information into intelligence can immediately improve the quality of interaction, insights and mission success by six factors:

1) Inclusion. Until the completion of the operation, the intelligence staff should participate in virtually all decision-making and planning that is based on an active intelligence estimate. Integration of the intelligence personnel embedded with the SF teams, whether they are formally assigned or temporarily dedicated, should be encouraged by the SOF commander. The operationally focused individual will learn more about intelligence and intelligence-collection capabilities, while the intelligence personnel will learn the mission types and associated tasks to which SOF groups and battalions respond, as well as how to inject intelligence-based assets and capabilities into the operational concept. The interactive process will soon transform the intelligence specialist into the commanding officer's adviser instead of a low-level support arm.

2) Focus. Effective support to the commander requires synchronized, detailed intelligence framed in the context and the requirements of operations. This focus helps all parties determine their priorities and should be used to determine whether additional collection operations can fill information gaps. Intelligence-driven targeting is especially effective when the intelligence personnel are well-schooled in the operational arts of SOF missions. From the onset, the intel staff should establish a set of lines-of-operation collection tasks, and the commander should support it. From these collection tasks, analysts can create a subset of questions for each task. These questions become the IRs that can be assigned to a collector. When the refinement and updates are ready for the commander, another process of distillation and evaluation can turn information gaps into PIRs.

3) Missions. Operational forces must be tasked to collect information, employ locals as intelligence sources and report all discoveries. The information from MSO, reconnaissance and surveillance must be integrated with intelligence from other sources to ensure primacy for future operations. Examination and cross-referencing of multiple sources of intelligence also enhance the quality of analysis by reducing the possibility that information anomalies may be assessed as a "big picture" finding.

4) Framework. Establish an operations-intelligence architecture (task force or fusion cell) for greater coordination and situational awareness, with specific emphasis on fusion analysis, collection management, targeting and theater human-terrain expertise. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center model, facilitating the tactical overwatch program, is a similar concept. An intelligence infrastructure must be created to ensure a unity of effort for complete, accurate and current intelligence that will develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation and reduce unnecessary duplication. Members of the intelligence staff and mission-planners cannot operate in a vacuum; therefore, the integration, consolidation and expanded access to intelligence and operations in a "war room" or "battle pit" can foster better harmony of efforts to ensure that the commander's priorities are being met. Consolidation also minimizes the withholding of information, because there are no walls or stovepipes to act as barriers.

5) Flexibility. Intelligence structures, methodologies, databases, products and personnel must be flexible enough to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities and opportunities, and they must apply to all possible strategies and tactics. Intelligence-related technology and processes must be less complicated and constraining than the operations they are facilitating. Often intelligence products are incorrectly prioritized to look doctrinally correct, as opposed to ensuring that they are effective for mission targeting and assisting the commander to meet his objectives. Technological analytical tools can be helpful, but they must be user-friendly, or they may cause confusion and frustration for the analyst.

6) Backup. Augment national- and theater-level intelligence support with a "virtual" reach-back and reach-forward capability of subject-matter experts to enhance the ability to turn available information into actionable insights. At times, national and theater intelligence organizations may not be able to produce specific operational insight because of constraints in access, capability, capacity or expertise. During those times, commanders benefit from supplemental experts who may come from the private sector, academia or other parts of the public sector that have knowledge or connections pertaining to intelligence needs dealing with areas, peoples, operational concepts, etc.

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

ALWAYS DEFINE MISSION STATEMENT PRECISELY.

MISSION STATEMENT: TO IDENTIFY THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE THREAT OPERATING IN AO ALPHA547.

(Why definition of mission statement is most important)

1.ESTIMATE THREAT INTELLIGENCE CHARACTERISTICS FROM KNOWN DATA AND ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE :
At this stage the CI operative is engaged in studying the current threat intelligence profile characteristics and looks for windows of opportunity to explore questions which normally arise during the course of obtaining information about the adversary intelligence service.Mind you , these are NOT the information gaps the commander needs to find out.Proper determination of these intelligence gaps , prioritizing them will come next..At this stage he is more concerned
with the threat profiles known characteristics,whether the threat intelligence collection system operating in our AO is part of a larger system,what are its capabilities,who are the personnel involved,how is the adversary intelligence doctrine put to use,in what manner does the enemy intelligence service collects information,what are its collection assets operating in our AO,what are the locations of these collection systems(in case of enemy SIGINT the location of the emitters, ).
The CI opperative may have to resort to requests for information from other lateral units or higher HQ intelligence Branch.It may be that certain characteristics of the adversary collection systems he could deternmine but not all are available from local sources.As an example he might be able to pinpoint the enemy HUMINT agent but he discovers the latter uses certain equipments whose technical characteristics are unknown to him.My concept of networking all the TOCs , with each TOC desk NCO handling a specific intelligence discipline operatives feeds,enables one of the lateral TOCs to supply the CI opeative with the information he is not able to collect from sources available to him.It could well happen that from another TOC desk NCO this TOC desk NCO gets information about this particular RFI as perhaps the intelligence teams in that group of companies faling under the purview of the TOC have had exactly the same experience as our CI operative and in their case have acquired the missing information and forwarded it to the TOC Desk NCO.Hence it is very important that all distributed tactical ops going on in a wide AO be networked through TOCs;thus a centralized command /control and push-pull of intelligence is achieved on an erstwhile non-linear , distributed , decentralized tactical battles profile where without these TOCs the lowest rung , i.e. the platoons and companies cant effectively push information up the echelons or share amongst themselves.

2.PREPARE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS :
From the first task above , while conducting a study of the adversary intelligene service , the CI operative comes across information shortfalls , as noted above.He then request information from adjacent units,higher echelons and national level assets.Each level assists by supplying the information or deploying their organic intelligence assets to help him.If any echelon cannot handle the RFI wih its limited organic assets , the RFI is sent up the chain to the next higher echelon with a new RFI.

***** It is here that the TOC plays a very important role.Be it a HUMINT agent/CI agent or the company rifleman turned intelligence operative (ES2 CONCEPT--MY PROJECT),in a very wide AO where the heat of battle makes conditions very fluid as in a conventional operation or like the asymmetric battle environment predominant today where the companies are spread far out in far flung AO and hance cant effectively push/pull intelligence,the operative finds it much easier to send in the information to the local TOC Desk NCO catering to his intelligence discipline speciality, of the particular sector of the AO where his company and other few companies are engaged.

3.ANALYSE THREAT INDICATORS AND DATA :

All the collected information (see above) are examined for key components.The key components are further reviewed,organized and processed by evaluating them,comparing them with information in the database , are operated upon to discern patterns , trends of the enemy threat.These patters/trends will throw light on the enemy intelligence capabilities , methods of operation , and most importantly intentions(CI ESTIMATE).
A single component may yield information what intelligence-specific COA the enemy might resort to as an initiative collection-attack or as a counter to our counterintelligence-attack. (Here the term ''attack'' is not the usual kinetic attack by tactical combat teams , but i invented the intelligence-specific-attack term to highlight the fact that counterintelligence should be on a totally aggressive footing , offensive , hard hitting (collection , deception wise , not fires),continuous and no-holds-barred (use of any type of deception , psychological,exploitation of suspects/detainees/sources--both own and turned etc,DOCEX tactics , techniques) non-fire combat system.I want to view counterintelligence as a non-fires combat system , both for offensive and defensive purposes.If we inculcate in ourselves this fighting-mentality then we can pitch all our collection assets and tactics/techniques and procedures with full force and destroy the enemy intelligence service totally,like what happens when a combat team embarks in a fire-fight.
Apart from CI ESTIMATE these components , key components that is , can also help in identifying the enemy intelligence operating in our AO and help us to assess its capabilities and intentions , whether they can be successfully deployed and the intent carried out.To this end red-teaming and int-COA/int-wargaming is carried out , with other staff elements , particularly the ops staff element helping in the process.
Here target development and target nomination options open to the threat intelligence service are considered in red-teaming mode.

To summarize , the analyse step consists of :

Compile and organize all collected information
Conduct a critical and thorough review--intent here is to accurately ascertain the enemy intelligence systems capabilities and the ensuing ability
to successfully collect information about a target or group of targets which is in the enemys prioritized target listing.
DETERMINE ADVERSARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES INTENT.To this end the CI operative must create attention areas:What/who is the most likely target of the threat intelligence system?When will the intelligence-attack take place?Why has the threat intelligence system chosen this particular target,what can be the pay-offs for the system and what can be our losses and how severe can they be?What methods can the threat sytstem employ to gain information about the target given the fact that we have an idea about the target identity and its immediate environment , access routes to it , security protocols if any to access it,how hard is the defense around it,who are aware of its importance or what can happen to us adversely if it is compromised/liquidated and all other possible constraints , controls,etc (all these points may not apply to the target,I have only listed variables which may be associated with the target depending on its nature,the list is not exhaustive , different targets will have diff controlling/influencing variables-- the point is if we know all the variables , we are in a position to know it as the target is our own asset,then we can determine after a critical red teaming review coupled with advice from all personnel who are directly or indirectly connected with the target that what collectionmethods can be applied to gain info about the target--PRESUMING WE ARE THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE AGENT.).
Gather from historical data about attacks on other targets which point to this particular threat system being the initiator.If such data is found,analyse to find out what methods were employed in using the threat vehicle and how they were implemented.
It is important to know whether the threat intelligence service keeps a doctrine and if so it must be studied to get all information about this particular arm/discipline of the threat intelligence service or if its a multidisciplinary attack then the corresponding attributes.Sometimes there is no written doctrine available,our intelligence service must always attempt to study enemy intelligence actions and attempt to write a doctrine ourselves which will be a portrayal of enemy tactics , techniques and procedures.This point is terribly important and is 99% of the time not even thought of.
All enemy intelligence actions will invariably have a signature....
(to be continued..)

###@@@ NOTE: WE CAN CREATE DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES CORRESPONDING TO VARIOUS TARGETS/SITUATIONS CALLING FOR SPECIFIC KINETIC/NONKINETIC INTELLIGENCE-ATTACK TACTICS , TECHNIQUES OR COMBINATIONS IN LINE WITH ENEMY INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE.THIS IS POSSIBLE.TO CREATE A DOCTRINAL DATABASE.NOW WE CAN MATCH CURRENT ESTIMATED SITUATION WITH THE TEMPLATES AND CHOOSE THE ONE THAT HAS THE GREATEST SIMILARITY WITH A DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE.

BUT HERE SOMETHING ELSE NEEDS TO BE POINTED OUT.WHAT IF ITS NOT THE CONVENTIONAL ENEMY WHICH GOES BY STANDARD TTPs?WHAT IF ITS AN ASYMMETRIC ENEMY OR AN HYBRID ENEMY?ASYMMETRIC ENEMY DOESNT HAVE A SET PRACTICE OF USING STANDARD TTPs , THE STRENGTH OF THE ASYMMETRIC ADVERSARY IS ITS CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO OUR ACTIONS , CHANGING ITS TACTICS/TECHNIQUES , EVOLVING NEWER ONES THUS HEIGHTENING THE ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY.WE CANNOT HAVE THE USUAL DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES AS WE CAN HAVE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL REGULAR FOE.THIS I WILL ADDRESS LATER.

4.ESTIMATE PROBABLE THREAT:
Here the attention areas are the geographic AO and Areas of Interest , the discerned capabilities and intentions of the adversary int system.
LOCATION OF COLLECTORS/ID OF COLLECTORS:Every target can be surveilled and depending on the mobile status of the target (immobile,fixed or moving) , it is susceptible to avenues of approach , observation channels( directions and angles) which ,though may be more than a few , can be ascertained in advance and countersurveillance/.counterreconnaisance mounted.Apart from surveillance the CI operative can also determine how the particular target is suspectible to which means of information collection by the enemy agent.Every target possesses a predictable surveillance/observation and collection of information profile.Thus it is possible to locate the collectors.
ANALYZE TERRAIN/WEATHER EFFECTS:Terrrain and weather affect enemy collection of information.Aerial surveillance for example is hindered by canopy,dense foliage , building density as a clear straight line of sight for the sensors is hampered.Similarly a a direction finding system must have a clear line of sight to the target which is emitting radio signals.Weather conditions or terrain profile that block this line of sight affects information collection.For every possible target study the associated terrain and weather characteristics to determine how susceptible it is to enemy intelligence-attack.Say out of a list of 5 possible targets it is found that weather/terrain cause great difficulty for enemy observation/collection platforms,including enemy CI-HUMINT agents (here force proitection measures , physical/perimiter security/OPSEC/access contro,systems also play an important part in preventing human agents access/observation/reconnaissance) in case of 3 targets , then we have reduced the attention areas w.r.t targets to 2.We can now plan suitable countermeasures for these 2 tpossible targets leveraging our resources more optimally and in a focussed direction.

5.CONFIRM THE THREAT.
Confirm existing collected data.
Here the CI agent should study current intelligence reports/assessments stored/updated in the database (this he gets after he files a request for information), compare them with what he has collected (after all the steps above) and should make a careful note from earlier /current assessments and what he has collected and estimated if there is any change in capabilities and intentions.If there is, it indicates that the enemy intelligence service has either acquired new capabilities or is employing hitherto not used capabilities (to collect information on the possible targets).A change in enemy intent also reflects he has acquired/used for first time already existing capabilities IF the target/s present more difficulty for enemy agents forcing them to change capabilities.Mind you determining enemy intent does not solely translate to mean enemy intent w.r.t targets only , it also reflects enemy intent to change its own capabilities/TTPs so as to effect better targeting.
Hence if more information on enemy capabilities are required , the CI agent sends more RFI to organic/support intelligence units of parent Bn or those spread laterally or up the command chain to higher HQs.
If he thus access new information on enemy capabilities/intentions , he carefully places them against the estimated situation , that is his assessment and thus updates the entire operating picture.
(If again in future intentions/capabilities are discerned to be changing/changed ,the cycle is repeated.).

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CAPABILITY-MISSION ANALYSIS

TO YIELD THE INT PRODUCT

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

''COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE''

--not the same as Intelligence Estimate--

After determination of the above we must now analyze the intelligence , counterintelligence ,sabotage , subversive and terrorist capabilities of the enemy.

1.. Maintain separate enemy capability data sheets, capabilities ranging from intelligence , subversive sabotage, terrorist and those that adversely affect our assigned missions and operations.

5. Every capability must be seen in the light of factors that will act as enablers or that will go against its adoption.

6. A capability must be seen in the light of its associated strength and vulnerabilities.

7. There should be a detailed discussion in the capability data sheet about all indicators that point towards adoption of that capability by the enemy.

Keshav Mazumdar

Antiterrorism Officer

CLASS AR/CI/UNIT-

TACTICAL HUMINT

Tachumint

HUMINT is collected information which we term positive intelligence after processing.HUMINT collectors access human sources and multimedia to gain information about enemy intent,composition,disposition,capabilities,table of order and equipment, command control nodes, centers of gravity,leadership,personnel—this is also called Order of Battle when conducted prior to a combat situation. The Commander specifies his intelligence requirements explicitly and going by these requirements , prioritized , human sources,informants,and other human elements possessing information compatible with the said requirements are utilized by application of specific techniques like tactical questioning,debriefing,document exploitation, eliciting and interrogation and reconnaissance and surveillance. The HUMINT collectors are not intelligence operatives with general intelligence education and training but specialists.

Counterintelligence is also a collection oriented discipline like HUMINT but not an intelligence discipline in the strictest sense. It is concerned with enemy intent while HUMINT is concerned with collection part only so as to satisfy Commanders intelligence requirements in order to answer certain information gaps.CI attempts to prevent sabotage,assassination,terrorism,subversive and enemy intelligence activities , deny the enemy access to installations and sensitive information , acts as a protective shield for the Commander by supporting OPSEC and force protection and acts in an advisory capacity recommending countermeasures to enemy intelligence activities.CI is a protection component in the Commanders repository of defensive tactics and techniques and CI also protects the intelligence cycle. Several definitions exclude personnel, physical, document or communications security programs from CI purview , but on close inspection it will be seen that CI invariably is resorted to while implementing force protection and denial/deception measures (information warfare) thus bringing in play the security aspects of personnel , physical,documents.CI support tio physical security , infrastructure, technology protection, military security,HUMINT –all these some way or the other involve those elements that are kept out of general definitions.

Definitions can be very confusing, may render doctrine imperfect and lead to redundancy. For example the Army ten ds to maintain a general perspective on threat—statements like our forces are prepared to deter /attack/defend against a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from criminal activity in our jurisdiction which may abet our main enemy, terrorism , subversion to small wars, wars and battles. Now this generalized concept is fine in that we can have several security programs, each tending to one specific threat type in the entire spectrum. But the disadvantage in this approach is we cannot focus on the main threat, say terrorism, and as security concepts like force protection, deception operations, physical security, military security,etc all have certain elements in common we land up with redundant programs designed to handle these security concerns. For example antiterrorism and force protection both have in common physical security as a passive defensive subcomponent where the installation critical points are protected after vulnerability assessments and red teaming. The same subcomponent is the major component in a physical security program. Thus there occurs good redundancy if we do not have a focused view of the threat and counter threat measures become diffused over the broad spectrum.

The same goes with the definition of intelligence and CI. Or rather I should say the general perspectives held by most Commanders and even intelligence officers.

The main idea is to remove uncertainty and gain a decision advantage. This should be the prime objective of the Commander.HUMINT and CI are both shaping operations but with a critical difference.HUMINT shapes the Commanders view of the battle space by providing him accurate intelligence about enemy order of battle. Plus other information requirements when ops are in progress.CI on the other hand penetrates the enemy commanders decision cycle and shapes his views ‘’like the way’’ our Commander desires by denying the enemy commander access to our operations, plans and information systems , and using offensive methods like penetration , infiltration and also denial/deception operations. Both shaping operations have one thing in common as goal. To act as force enabler. To heighten the Commanders situational understanding. In other words to gain that ‘’decisive ‘’ advantage. .To get a ‘’positional’’ advantage. HUMINT shapes the "Blue" forces' understanding of the "Red" forces while CI affects the Red forces' knowledge of Blue forces.

HUMINT shapes the understanding of the ‘’Blue forces’’ with respect to the ‘’Red forces’’ while CI does the reverse. True both use several techniques which are in common like interrogation and other low level source operations but going by what has been discussed CI is not HUMINT and not in the least a subset of HUMINT. Being a subset would mean CI operations would be counter-HUMINT only. But CI looks beyond that, by conducting offensive operations, denial and deception operations , exploiting enemy intelligence activities ,neutralizing them through collection of evidence and subsequent prosecution for national security crimes, and supporting tactical and theater operations by feeding inputs to the decision cycles. Thus we see CI goes far beyond Counter-HUMINT operations.

Interrelationship

CI also provides positive intelligence about the enemy as a byproduct of its operations.CI and HUMINT operations overlap in that very similar techniques are often used. In fact in tactical operations a mix of HUMINT and CI operators plus a linguist carry out tactical HUMINT operations where the roles of both are more overlapping and confusion arises when either may operate like the other. We should not always justify HUMINT source operations..this leads to the mistaken impression that CI only lends support to HUMINT and has no other function and that HUNMINT and CI are the same thing.NO.Whereas HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s organization,composition,capabilities and decision making without any focus on the intent of collection , only collecting all require information laid down in the commanders prioritized intelligence requirements order , and reporting it through proper channels (and here full stop) CI will go much further , exploiting , neutralizing the enemy intelligence activities or doing both…CI is concerned with enemy ‘’INTENT’’.HUMINT focuses on the enemy’s decision making cycle to gain information for the Commander whereas CI attempts to ‘’INFLUENCE’’ that decision cycle and shape it the way we want it in order to achieve winning objectives. Thus the HUMINT operative tasking end after detecting and identifying enemy intelligence activities while the CI agents tasks begin afresh.

From all this discussion we can derive two things.

· HUMINT and CI are different.CI is not a subset of HUMINT.

2.As HUMINT and CI have many similar lines of operation , if both can be combined to satisfy tactical requirements ,(during theater or national-level requirements they can revert to individual role-this capability must be retained) , we will have an intelligence operator who will be more versatile,adaptable.and can confirm easily to all army requirements at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence formations can execute this tactical HUMINT asset (the operator) to satisfy commanders requirements. Merging the capabilities of HUMINT and CI results in a task organization of skills for the Commander—definitely an improvement over either HUMINT or CI enabled operations. Tactical HUMINT operations are most suitable for developing and maintaining an excellent informant/source base that provides timely, specific and accurate information. Tactical HUMINT operations combine both HUMINT and CI techniques and together with linguist assistance , are more capable of developing and maintaining contacts than only HUMINT or CI ops.For example , the Tactical HUMINT team comes across few individuals of interest near the forward area , the HUMINT operators conduct tactical questioning to extract information of intelligence value and then pass them over to their CI colleagues for further interrogation if they discern any information of interest to the CI operators. This can be switched to and fro and the application of the combined faculties of both results in more refined, relevant and timely/accurate information. If the individuals are of the witting type or have voluntarily offered to deliver information or are community members sympathetic to the forces, then they can be inducted into the source repository by establishing rapport/giving incentives etc and then later their assistance taken for more information. Tactical HUMINT teams can act as mobile interrogation teams at forward areas, quickly disposing off sources after tactical questioning and interrogations, thereafter detailing escort for those who may render more information or who, it appears are suppressing tactical information, sending them to detention centers and collocated interrogation areas near forward areas or in the rear. The standard procedure of detaining and escorting to rear interrogation areas is hereby bypassed as in this procedure , the time taken to assess , detain , segregate , and transport to rear areas can negate the availability of timely intelligence—intelligence is highly perishable ,. Especially combat intelligence, where time is of essence.

Hence as the repository of sources grows, the quality and content of available information is enhanced and for the commander tactical intelligence, most of the time, is at his fingertips. Compare this to the situation where earlier, HUMINT or CI operations had to be complemented by intelligence from theater or national agencies, and it so happens they cannot provide real time, ground intelligence always for combatant commanders.

The soldiers will be given language training, Basic CI training, operational debriefing training so that as and when required they can shift from tactical to operational briefing to CI functions. The focus of training should be cultivating the capability to conduct contact and informant operations, recognize information of CI value, and execute tactical questioning of civilians, and screen EPWs and detainees with the assistance of an interpreter.

Tactical HUMINT team functions:

· Tactical tasks with Language training

· HUMINT Ops=Strategic Debriefing

· CI

Here it should be stressed that intelligence nowadays is tactical—the focus should be at tactical level as soldiers fight wars nowadays more than battles. Small-wars in fact. Hence the dire need for actionable intelligence/tactical intelligence. Here the players are combatant commanders who must move swiftly in their maneuver and strike decisively. Higher echelons are there for planning, average intelligence support, but it is for the ground based Tactical HUMINT teams to do most of the work. And they do it—as their composition is quite what the modern day warfare demands.

CI/HUMINT

Counterintelligence functional services are provided to promote the Commanders situational understanding.

· Define and analyse mission

· Execute CI Surveys

· Prepasre a brief on CI Awareness

· Execute CI Vulnerability Assessment

· Execute CI Threat assessment

· Execute CI Inspections

· Execute CI Reviews

· Execute CI Evaluations

Conduct CI support to HUMINT activities

Identify, exploit and counteract foreign intelligence activities across the full spectrum of HUMINT activities. CI activities include, but are not limited to, identifying friendly and hostile capabilities and vulnerabilities; providing CI review of HUMINT activities; conducting CIdamage assessments; providing support to Counter Espionage (CE) investigations; conducting and/or assisting in asset validation by physical and technical means.

Perform CI/HUMINT operational planning.

· Supervise the preparation of CI products, as required.

· Obtain necessary approvals.

· Supervise CI support to HUMINT operation.

· Supervise asset validation procedures.

· Conduct post-mission analysis.

· Disseminate required reports/products.

CI/HUMINT Collection management

The CI/HUMINT officer/JCO will match the requirements with the collection assets in hand , checks availability , usage by other adjacent units , deployable possibilities etc and then determines the best collection plan.

· Receive prioritized intelligence requirements from higher headquarters or collection manager , conduct analysis

· Create the collection plan

· Study all CI/HUMINTcollection assets available and match them with the requirements

· Decide on the course of action to fulfill collection objectives

Docex

The CI/HUMINT officer/Jco must be acquainted with the exploitation setup and the units exploitation SOP so that he may, after receiving, accounting and sending the captured materials he may be able to follow-up for results and give future feed inputs to the exploitation cell/agency.

· Understand exploitation agency infrastructure

· Identify exploitable materials

· Categorize them as Biometric Examination or Forensic Examination.

· Take possession of exploitable materials

· Account for and categorize exploitable materials

· Prepare catalogues

· Dispatch the materials to exploitation agencys custody

· Followup with the agencies for results

Identify orders of battle in given Area of operations

Identify Ground military attack and defense capability, Air-defense and attack capability, naval capability and all associated military weaponry systems and equipment, such as ground combat systems, antiaircraft systems, naval vessels, etc.Study the enemy infrastructure and locate/identify the keys areas.

Intelligence support to Targeting.

This includes identifying enemy targets , both high value and high payoff , nominating in order of priority , recommending kinetic or non kinetic attacks, and thus assist the Commander to destroy, neutralize or exploit the target in a manner which is in line with the units mission and in keeping with the Commander and his staffs requirements.

The Unit intelligence supervisor who controls the target intelligence collection and associated ops/recommendations to the Commander must be as thorough as possible, evaluating all factors and intelligence inputs carefully, studying imagery data and compiling and organizing target information efficiently so that while nominating to the Commander and making recommendations there is absolutely no ambiguity. Target descriptions including composition, location, importance, imagery, graphics, construction—all of these are spelled out correctly and particularly for HVTs/HPTs their location, significance, all associations determined and influence with respect to the leaderships decision cycle/battle space situation.

Identify:

· Targeting Categories

· HVTs/HPTs

· Areas of Target value

· Build a list of targets

· Locational factors of each target

· Associations of each target(COIN)

· Social circles of each target (COIN)

· Assess target significance/value

· Determine whether to employ kinetic or non kinetic attack

· Contribute to attack guidance

· Assess effect of removal of targets on battle space

· Create and maintain target folders

· Decide on target intelligence requirements

· Create target nomination list

· Combat assessment

· Update target folder based on combat assessments.

· Contribute to IO

· decide on restrike options

Evaluate the Threat

Determine threat intent, capabilities, vulnerabilities, possible courses of action and the most dangerous course of action.

It is of prime importance to study enemy activity and indicators to assess his capability to attack, defend, withdraw, reinforce. Focus on the intelligence gaps and this focus can determine the direction of collection of intelligence. Enemy activity patterns should be studied.

Factors influencing the intelligence product are the time available for collection, assets available, unit size, the intelligence requirements, AO features and the mission. The enemy, terrain, weather, local populace are taken into consideration. Identify:

· Enemy Intent

· Enemy Capability

· HVT

· HPT

· G.

· Critical areas: Capabilities,Requirements

BASIC STRUCTURE OF COIN SPECIFIC MILITARY INTELL;IGENCE UNIT

(KESHAV MAZUMDAR Antiterrorism Officer)

(Close operations are operations that are within the commander's area of operation (AO) in his battle space . Most operations that are projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive actions. It requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and exploit success. Dominated by fire support, the combined elements of the ground and air elements conduct maneuver warfare to enhance the effects of their fires and their ability to maneuver. As they maneuver to gain positions of advantage over the enemy, combined arms forces deliver fires to disrupt the enemy’s ability to interfere with that maneuver.)

SECTION B is the CLIC.Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.)

Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

Company Level Intelligence Cells

Coming to the CLIC level we have an organic capability to acquire combat intelligence directloy at the ground level. Actionable intelligence is needed desperately by our fighting forces but the time delay from sensor to shooter(sensors on receipt of request for information collect the data matching given coordinates, pass it on to the intelligence section for interpretation who in turn sends it to his higher up for evaluation and dissemination to the ground unit; in case of map/imagery obtained by aerial surveillance the time delay is much more) is often so much that despite accurate target nomination the operation slips out of hand. With the CLIC at his disposal the commander now can obtain, analyse and act on readily available combat intelligence without having to wait for intelligence feeds.C2, intelligence and operations are hereby synchronized and integration achieved successfully. That too at the lowest level. The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis and production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are assigned to the company combat ops center.
Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander,assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture),managing and supervising CLIC ops,interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow.
If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.
After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.
LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They arc not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions.

PROJECTING COMBAT POWER WITH ORGANIC ISR CAPABILITY
Reason for creation of interim team:
Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.
The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINTcollectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into the brigade's collection plan.

C2:
The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier. Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability. We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

HUMINT OR MI BN IDEA
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO PROJECT FORWARD OF AO
Operations Battalion
Collection Management Section
Production Section ASPD & OB Teams
BDA & TGT Team

CI Team

Single Source Teams.

MASINT Team

SIGINT Team

HUMINT Team

IMINT Team

Corps Military Intelligence Support Element

Intelligence Support Elements

HUMINT Collection Operations

vCombating terrorism support

vRear operations support

vCivil-military operations supportv OPSEC support

vInformation operations support

vCivil disturbance support

vLocal operational data collection

vDebriefing and interrogation

vHUMINT threat assessment

Reconnaissance HUMINT Missions

vElicit information from the local populace.

vInterrogate EPWs and Detainees.

vDebrief Allies and U.S. personnel.

vDocument exploitation.

vThreat vulnerability assessments.

vSource screening operations.

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

[ This page is written in such a manner so that in plain english without too much int jargon a presentatable format is placed before the Commander of an infantry unit so as to heighten his perceptual awareness about the value of an organic int unit to his unit , how his soldiers can be easily trained to act as secondary collectors , with procurement of actionable intelligence being reduced to basic observation , surveillance,tactical questioning,DOCEX skills coupled with elicitation keeping the human terrain in perspective and understanding fully that an asymmetric enemys center of gravity is in this human terrain which needs to be exploited.The requirement to seek int assistance from higher HQ no longer will be an inhibiting factor , particularly for units far flung in the AO away from command HQ..EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR--THATS THE IDIOM OF THE FIELD.PERIOD]

The Counterintelligence Doctrine that exists today in our Army is composed of manuals , training pamphlets , SOPs in written form , training provided to special agents and from individual to individual. In addition to this , personal experience of the middle and upper officer ranks in the CI Officer Corps takes precedence over a comprehensive written doctrine.

Had a complete doctrine existed with clearly defined mission , fundamentals , concept of Warning , difference between HUMINT , Clandestine HUMINT and CI highlighted with stress on the need to integrate CI with HUMINT and not relegate it to the backbench,CI functions and tactics , techniques and procedures,CI operations , both offensive and defensive, the need and steps of CI planning , training standards and the concept of introducing the professional element in CI education and training , especially for Commanders as what we need is a professional CI force which can adapt to any changes/deception tactics of the enemy and be professionally managed in terms of operations by CI “Managers “/Commanders , the very important but often ignored concept of Force protection with CI as an enabler , CI Investigations and tactical questioning , the integration of CI with HUMINT teams for mobile screening/interrogation at forward areas and all across the battlefield , not just keeping CI for rear areas , the need to project CI beyond the areas of operations and interest, integrating CI with ops totally, establishing a CI-Det network throughout the area of ops rather than focusing only on the rear, a smooth battle handoff between forward and rear CI elements so that the rear party gets up-to-date intelligence and do not have to keep valuable time aside for fresh intelligence operations—in war continuity in operations must flow smoothly and rapidly,CI and multidisciplinary intelligence cueing, broadening defensive CI to include infrastructure protection , Technology and R&D protection, insider threats , OPSEC Integration, Denial and Deception and its extreme importance in ops and during planning,………and more other factors , then we would have been better prepared with the Commanders visualization of the battlefield/Concept of operations COP/Situational development more complete and thorough.

________________________________________________________

EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

“No echelon has all the organic intelligence capabilities it needs to fully support The commander. Commanders and Military Intelligence leaders at higher Echelons should anticipate the intelligence needs of the lower echelons and “Push” tailored intelligence support down to them.”

Tactical units engage in combat with intelligence inputs coming from the MI dep’t from higher echelons. In today’s asymmetric war scenario the Company-level units should also have its own organic intelligence structures with very few personnel and assets deployed. They can act on available intelligence from the ground themselves without having to wait for collected, collated, analyzed information from Brigade Int section or other agencies which takes time—add to it the dissemination delays. In addition to conducting mission specific analysis and kinetic or non kinetic attack, theCompany-level unit can also disseminate the intelligence acquired to subordinate units, parallel units or higher headquarters as these intelligence inputs may be useful to these parties as often intelligence about the enemy in one area of operations can help units in other operational areas, the enemy may be adopting similar tactics or other behavioral factors.

It is very important to recognize the lack of an intelligence structure at Company-level levels. TheCompany-level unit should have collection and analytical capabilities. There have been instances of lethal attacks on camps and bases itself-a force protection problem. We just cannot depend entirely on civil police and other intelligence agencies to supply us intelligence about the threat which usually is biased, and influenced by political and regional faction influences. The soldier on the ground who is a part of say the Infantry battalion engaging the insurgents , is face to face with the reality—the enemy , the local population and other parties of interest. Say during a reconnaissance patrol his team may come across a valuable source. After rapidly dismounting and ensuring he has no weapons, the teams intelligence component can start source cops like

Company-level or platoon level questioning, debriefing, etc and if a counterintelligence agent is also present the more the better for HUMINT collection.

Let us assume a Command (set up for COIN ops, or Antiterrorist ops in a State) which has everything in order such as Command chain, combat machinery, defined communication channels, civil administration support and police, civil intelligence agencies support lacks only an organic intelligence unit and depends on Higher HQ such as Battalion intelligence section and civil agencies for intelligence information.

It should be noted here that the necessary information is requisitioned first in the form of Request of Information document, which will go through various processing nodes as characterized by administrative channels, then finally landing in the collection manager’s hands from the requested agencies higher authority to whom the request was directed. Now the collection manager will access already present records database and national databases to explore if the needed information is alreadyavailable—if so he further initiates request for information, gets the information and passes it on to the commander of the unit. If not available he prioritizes the requested information as per the supported commands requirements, evaluates availability of suitable assets, allocates the assets tasking as per their capabilities, capacity and speciality,the assets are deployed, information collected, again sent up channels for evaluation of information quality , credibility (if source-submitted),analyzed, transformed into intelligence product and then finally disseminated to the supported commands commander.

All the above processes takes time, sometimes very long time, rendering the information useless as intelligence can at times be highly perishable, especially combat intelligence. The commander needs actionable intelligence fast and to enable this it would be far better if he himself has an organic modular intelligence unit, ready to take up assignments, if needed be integrated with the strike platoons itself for much faster information gathering and analysis and immediate action by the platoon commander. Company level/Platoon level intelligence capability can tremendously increase the competitive edge of the commander over the enemy, increase his situational awareness and be a force enabler.

Doctrine, Personnel, Training and Education, Leadership, Materiel Development, Organization, and Soldier Systems needs to be reviewed if intelligence assets need to be pushed down to the lowest level. There are dozens of units deployed in Company-level operations on the battlefield. If they are intelligence capable the Commander will get the best up-to-date and regularly updated(in the fluid war scenario of rapidly changing ground situations) intelligence inputs thus heightening his situational understanding immensely and thus giving him that decisive competitive edge over the enemy.

The need for projected intelligence capability is all the more important if the commander has to deploy to an unfamiliar area ,inhabited by an asymmetric threat which unlike a conventional enemy has no defined order of battle,organization,discernible patterns ,does not employ standard military tactics and where ops may be simultaneous , non-linear and distributed. In such a situation the commander needs to project his force by sending in interim combat enabled (for self defense) reconnaissance teams who have intelligence gathering ability as well as

counterintelligence asset , not the usual reconnaissance and surveillance patrols who are composed only of scouts and which do not answer the ‘’why’’ of things observed.

Today we are facing an enemy which is very unlike conventional adversaries who can be identified using intelligence as to their leadership,TOE,order of battle,strength,dispositions or anything which is determined by set doctrinal military tactics, techniques and procedures.Todays enemy in low intensity warfare is asymmetric in nature, taking refuge among the urban or rural community who act as enablers of the insurgent movement wither wholly or partially depending on the degree of acceptance of insurgent ideology and insurgent leaderships always try to influence the local communities to the maximum as they are well aware of the benefits of sanctuary among the latter. The enemy recruits, rests and reinforces/resupply itself from amongst the population. Here intelligence directly focused on the enemy is difficult in practice; the enemy is elusive, deceptive and resorts to unconventional attack modes and very adaptable but the enemy’s source of sustenance and very survival depends a great deal on the local populations support. The company and platoon sized units need immediate on scene intelligence support to deal with such a population enabled asymmetric enemy. As such even the smallest fighting unit must be capable of intense collection and analysis of information to get actionable intelligence instead of waiting for intelligence from higher headquarters which may entail time thus letting go of opportunities in combat. It is always not realistic to depend on higher echelon staff for intelligence. We must have an inbuilt intelligence capability in the smallest unit on the ground. The main criteria here is to shorten considerably the time between deciding on intelligence priorities ,detecting the enemy’s OB,Strength,disposition,capabilities and T&OE ,delivering the attack sequence and assessing the Battle damage and re-strike options.

COIN targeting necessitates overwhelming intelligence from ‘’bottom-up’ for successfulkinetic/non-kinetic operations. Hence ground level units need to be trained and tasked with intelligence collection. It is near impossible to dedicate the very few specialized intelligence assets to all the operating forces in the area of operations. Here are the key challenges of bottom- up collections:

(1)Determining what is important information. Leaders need to determine PIRs for each mission.

(2)Determining where to start – in terms of information or geography. Based upon key terrain (human and/or geographic).

Conventional operations and COIN/Antiterrorist operations (This can be termed operations

against networked criminal enterprises) are different in that the intelligence preparation of the battle space takes into consideration not only threat elements but also the human terrain—that is the local population. Unlike kinetic attack priority in conventional operations (kill/capture) in COIN operationsnon-kinetic attack modes are often the desired outcome – non-kinetic attacks taking into account civilian community heads, population psychological operations, insurgent targets social network, targeting his social contacts to judge his resultant movements and tracking him to finally locate his cell members or leadership, exploitation of targets other community traits—in effect besides personality targeting we are also concerned with the fact (non-kinetic fires) that units must project the second and third order of effects after they mount

any operation. Operations on a population, with which the targeted individual interacts, may have second and third order effects on that targeted individual (e.g. – he may increase communications or flee the area—in the former case SIGINT intercepts can yield a lot of information about his immediate network , if his communications are verbal and physical meet ups surveillance will be the preferred tool whereas in the latter case if he flees the area he can be tracked to know his sanctuary—he is bound to contact his team members , move in their hideouts.).All in all kinetic attack fires can yield much more intelligence than just by acquiring battle order intelligence. Only resorting to kinetic fires of kill/capture can never solve an insurgency problem., As the soldiers on the ground are those who are frequently in direct contact with community members (and hence those of them who are affiliates/sympathizers/facilitators of the insurgents) they have the best opportunity to gain intelligence information by conducting tactical questioning (patrols, checkpoints, choke points) or by casual elicitation methods in normal scenarios.

Later it will be shown that setting up a company level intelligence cell and enabling tactical teams with intelligence assets gives a major thrust in intelligence collection and also counterintelligence activities.

There needs to be a change in focus of effort between command levels.

1)Stress should be given to the fact that tactical company and platoon level units conduct operations with a high degree of success and hence higher levels of command must push intelligence staff and information down to lowest points of collection (initial points) , that is the company/battalion levels.

2)At the same time low density high demand ISR assets need to be stretched and spread across the area of operations to gain a better situational understanding.

With these two initiatives the Command Headquarters will not lose control over its intelligence assets and will neither lose the privilege of gaining situational understanding exclusively. On the contrary it will be able to gain more accurate intelligence inputs. Till so far the intelligence needs of individual ground units or any feedback from them was generally ignored what with the Battalion intelligence officer forwarding the intelligence summary report to higher headquarters with the overall intelligence picture of the area of operations falling under the Battalions jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AT UNIT/PLATOON LEVEL:

It is near impossible to allocate specialized intelligence assets to every operating force in the Area of Ops as such assets are few in number and the fact that majority of the information required for targeting flows ‘’bottom-up’ (that is the lowest level troops) necessitates the creation of intelligence collection units at troop level either organic to the tactical combat ground unit or as a modular unit capable of plugging into any company or unit as per requirements. This fact should be taken seriously into Staff consideration for targeting, particularly in asymmetric type

warfare where the network must be targeted and where delivery of fire-power is dependent on very specific intelligence.

Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) drive the military intelligence collection process.

While military intelligence officers help in developing intelligence requirements, it is the commander who is responsible for designating an intelligence requirement as a priority. The intelligence staff regularly updates the commander on its progress toward answering each PIR.speaking, that a military intelligence officer (STAFF INT OFFICER) and his staff are tasked with answering.

Additional intelligence requirements aimed at filling gaps in commanders’ understanding of the operating environment and requests for information may come from higher echelons, lower echelons, and lateral organizations, or from the intelligence staff itself, but it is the PIRs that an STAFF INT OFFICER has been tasked with that are most important.

While emphasis shifts in various doctrinal publications, PIRs are generally supposed to2:

1.Ask a single question.

2.Be ranked in importance.

3.Be specific: Focus on a specific event, fact or activity.

4.Be tied to a single decision or planning task the commander has to make.

5.Provide a last time by which information is of value (LTIOV).

6.Be answerable using available assets and capabilities.

Usually, a commander only designates three to five intelligence requirements as PIRs at any one time.

The PIR model makes use of intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing models that gained traction in combating crime in the United States after 11 September 2001 by refining them for practical use within the military dynamic. The recce unit along with the embedded HUMINT /CI element conducts area reconnaissance and community operations involving atmospherics, thus establishing a PIR framework before resorting to tactical questioning, elicitation and interrogation by using the PIRs to force conversations, gain community perspective and prepare

engagement summaries for analysis...The engagement summaries are analyzed, community feedbacks are compiled thus highlighting the causes that aid insurgency, enabling the unit in turn to recommend the targets that are the driving causes of the insurgency.

We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:

The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6 infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the Bde.The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies and Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sorces , contacts and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of sources between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can have contacts like community leaders of influence , local politicians and councilors , surface and witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich intelligence value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations.

Just like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at the Divn Bn level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is better aware of all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which requirements are tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and vertically, laterally to adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies and even to the line platoon base camps. The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate units.

To further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies level and platoon level , we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to take over as intelligence representative andco-located at the platoon level. During patrolling , reconnaissance by the Company soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected information will be filtered , categorized and forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also requisition intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.

Secondary Collectors:

HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never reported) by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil affairs personnel.

Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the soldier feels could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the source in focus by detaining him or questioning him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source finishes his narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the source and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets the Bn Int section officer and fills him up with all the information he has gatrhered.Therafter one and only one soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the HUMINT operative with the contact details of the source.

In a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache , which he recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly. In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and ears open, can create a good surface contacts base , thus reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues like prioritized intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of the line soldiers or other secondary collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus creating a secondary source base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and secondary collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the chain of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical or influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary source may have links with the individual dealing with the secondary collector or any other link and this can be of value to the primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be personal contact and liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.

Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not intelligence personnel, but come across information on tactical questioning—secondary collectors)

Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:

Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements who can be subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the involved personnel in tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and preparation/execution of the said activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to the unit intelligence officer

Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without delay.

During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.

All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the Commander or HUMINT officers.

Platoon Leader:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full debriefing.

Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this regard.

Company/Troop/Battery Commander:

Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.

All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.

Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by higher headquarters intelligence staff.

Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY of critical value.

Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:

Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them through the Staff headquarters.

Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be able to frame tactical questions better.

See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.

Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons therein come into regular contact with the local communities, local administration, village heads and panchayats, and the enemy itself. The battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it does the section is very understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other agencies. These inputs come as a result for requests for information from the ground and the process of requesting, tasking the request to brigade intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection platforms and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national agencies and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time resulting in untimely intelligence feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the human and enemy terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low level of situational understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever

intelligence they gather is based on standard TTPs and intelligence sharing with other agencies. Yes certain cases involve infiltration by HUMINT/CI assets but as this is fraught with dangers and requires highly talented agents adept in deception and which is lacking in our intelligence headquarters intelligence acquisition using infiltration is scarce e are now left with the human terrain, the local populace and higher headquarters intelligence personnel will not commit to regular interaction with them like the soldiers on the ground do during patrols or securing an area after an operation or mopping up operations or during a cordon/search operation. Higher commands are not fully meeting their intelligence requirements of the companies and platoons in a timely manner; nor at the level of detail necessary for company commanders to successfully operate in the asymmetric defined battlespace.The company and platoon commanders must be able to portray the threat and disposition accurately nominate targets-both for kinetic and non- kinetic attacks and conduct successfully battle damage assessments so that the option of restrike does not get overlooked for example. For this is required a company level intelligence cell and pushing down further an intelligence enabled platoon. The infantry company requires and organic capability to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence to increase their operational effectiveness in full spectrum conflict. Infantry units require company level intelligence cells (CLIC) specifically organized, trained, and equipped to address this capability gap.

Each company (and in many cases several platoons) are assigned their own Area of Ops where the company level intelligence team or platoon level intelligence cell conduct intelligence collection activities and proper synchronization of ISR and integrating with the targeting process is invariably attained as all round collection involving the soldiers who are now the sensors leads to a far better situational understanding.

Primary tasks: Threat situation and disposition, Target nomination, BDA,Combat/security operations, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.

The troops fighting on the ground are fed intelligence from Brigade level intelligence HQ.There are certain limitations which must be taken cognizant as well as the offered solutions ( points 1,6 , highlight the need for company level intelligence structure)

Your intelligence system has some limitations you must understand. These include-

1.Dissemination of information is highly dependent on communications systems and architecture and these are usually limited and under constraints in different fighting environments. Often requests for information from ground units are not disseminated in time. Accurate, timely and specific actionable intelligence is necessary to drive operations with that distinctive competitive edge and this is usually lacking.

2.Single-source collection is susceptible to adversary control and deception.Muliple sources need to be deployed and multidisciplinary intelligence collection platforms should be employed.

3.Counterinsurgency operations may be affected if the enemy resorts to non-usage of communications/no communications equipment (to avoid getting intercepted or DF’d) thus affecting adversely COMINT and ELINT based intelligence collection. Thus our intelligence collection effort gets degraded by the enemy.

4.Weather degradation of traffic ability and the negative effects of high winds on antenna arrays and aviation collection and jamming systems.

5.Inability of ground-based systems to operate on the move. Positioning and integration of mutually supporting ground and airborne systems is critical to continuous support.

Lack of sufficient organic intelligence assets to satisfy all your intelligence requirements.

Current asymmetric intelligence collection is the primary means to combat insurgency successfully by gaining a thorough situational understanding and developing first hand combat intelligence. This tactical environment needs our fighting troops to be trained in tactical intelligence collection to deal with an asymmetric enemy.

When a battalion is deployed, and usually stability and support operations are at battalion level we usually see that the battalion itself rarely executes its operation as a single unit. It devolves intosub-divisions which take up strategic areas in the overall area of operations. Detached posts/stations are set up in these strategic areas and these posts /sections create and maintain unit intelligence cells engaged in tactical intelligence collection on the enemy. Each garrison unit engages in low level source operations using standard intelligence collection methods, and getting a feel of communication routes.locational economics, topography and geography, human terrain intelligence and the political forces operating in the community together with any other criminal enterprises working hand in hand with the insurgent elements.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING I PLAN TO TRAIN NON-INT MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SOLDIERS
LIKE INF BN SOLDIERS

TACTICAL QUESTIONING

Framed to ask local civilians on detention , suspected insurgent informers/agents and insurgents. Questions can be phrased in simple language and ground soldiers like Cobra troops need no extensive special training.This is not interrogation but tactical questioning-to gain information of possible intelligence value on the spot.

Collecting Information

Soldiers patrol the same area day after day. Sometimes they go in for deep area patrolling and reconnaissance. All this is done with the intent to collect combat information.In any operational environment soldiers should always be primed , alert to collect information.Of particular mention here is te word ‘’change’’.While patrolling the soldiers may discern a ‘’change’’ in normalcy of the surroundings. While studying the surroundings , like the people,terrain,infrastructure the soldier should recognize any changes in the environment.Often than not these changes are important indicators cof enemy activity or intent.The soldier may not be able to find out the reason behind the change , still it’s very important he report it to the intelligence personnel. Soldiers should train themselves to become constantly aware of conditions such as

• Armed Elements: Location of factional forces, minefields, and potential threats.

• Homes and Buildings: What is the condition of the roofs, doors, windows, lights, power lines, water, sanitation, roads, bridges, crops, and livestock?

• Infrastructure: The presence of functioning stores, service stations, etc.

• People: Numbers, sex, age, residence or displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees status, visible health, clothing, daily activities, and leaders.

• Contrast: Has anything changed?

If everyone is involved in the collection of combat information, then everyone must be aware of the information requirements. All soldiers who have contact with the local population, routinely travel within the area, or frequently attend meetings with local organizations must know the information requirements and their responsibility to observe and report

While handling detainees and EPWs keep the following in mind:

1. Segragate the detainees and EPWs based on nationality , sex , profession , ethnicity (civilians) and rank , insignia , and regiment (may be belonging to enemy intelligence unit , thus game for special interrogation )

2. While searching the person of the detainee or EPW search thotoughly.Keep separate the records of documents , seized equipments and weapons(capture tags).Describe all documents,equipments and weapons as completely as possible.This is not DOCEX or Captured equipment exploitation in its entirety—that will later be done by trained HUMINT personnel and with help of technical assistants.What is being done here is tactical exploitation , just like tactical questioning—on the spot intelligence extraction.

3. Intelligence is perishable and combat intelligence is highly perishable , action is required as soon as possible and for that the intelligence must reach the targeting platform without any delay.But there are procedures.The prisoners and detainees who are felt will yield more information on further questioning must be moved as soon as possible to the rear where interrogators are waiting.Bear in mind that with time the detainee/EPW emboldens , the initial panic which he had on point of capture wears away , he gets time to think and also harbors escapist thoughts—escape from captivity.We are here talking about the duties of secondary collectors , the line troops who must move them fast to rear after ascertaining that they do have information of value.There are mobile interrogation teams to handle cases right on the spot at forward areas and copmposed of a mix of HUMINT/CI but that is tactical HUMINT and will be dealt within my book on Counterintelligence.

4. Kep a tab on the detaines , EPWs and all others so that they do not communicate with each other.

5. Remember the personal safety and protection of all detained for questioning can be a cause for concern under certain circumstances and hence they must be safeguarded.For example someone from the line troops may vent his personal anger on the enemy by attempting rough handle the detainees or prisoners.Sexual harassment is also an issue.Whatever be the case , they must be treated humanely.

Key Considerations for Talking

• You must be aware of the existence, nature and type of threat in your area and the vulnerabilities of the protection measures taken by your commander which are liable to be tapped. Overall you should know the force protection measures taken by your unit.

• Be careful about the local culture, traditions, customs.

• Your body language should project a friendlier flavor, not an intimidating one. Point weapons away from the accosted person.

• Talk to people in normal surroundings.Dont lead them to an isolated area, an alley or any place which will make them suspicious. Always be polite. Remove sunglasses.

• If you are speaking to a woman know local courtesies.

Questions

Questions should be so structured so as to be simple, straightforward, should open and maintain the conversation, should start with an interrogative, and should prompt a narrative answer. Interrogatives are what, why, when, who and where. Questions should not be closes provoking only an ‘’yes’’ or ‘’no’’ as answer but should be ‘’open’’.Avoid asking questions that are confusing. Characteristics of open questions:

• Act as an invitation to talk.

• Prompts the person to answer comfortably and feel encouraged to continue with the conversation.

• Not too specific but broad in nature.

• Encourage discussion.

• Creates a situation favorable for the soldier to be the listener(and observer) for a major part of the conversation.

• Does not cause the person to feel intimidated or threatened.

• Invokes curiosity of others and allows them to get involved in the discussion spiritedly.

• Gives the person the opportunity to tell his opinions, his judgment, what he feels is important, what he feels should be done.

• Should invoke a conversation, not a question-answer scenario.

Be subtle, don’t just jot away on paper the answers –that is not conversation and always be friendly, cooperative, observing him carefully but not arousing any suspicion, studying his body language and be courteous and reserved.

Questioning to Fill Out the Capture Tag

You are manning a check post or roadblock..Before being deployed to do so your unit commander has briefed you about the intelligence requirements as per current mission. The Battalion prioritized intelligence requirements lead to the generation of intelligence requirements for each company and subunits. These intelligence requirements as spelled out to you will guide you in framing the questions to be asked of individuals at the check post/roadblock. Once you, the soldier, have screened and detained a person categorized either as a detainee or EPW you must now obtain all possible details from him so that on subsequent questioning/interrogation of the person by the HUMINT or CI agent, the latter is well prepared initially with the information you have supplied. You must fill out a capture tag which will facilitate further questioning/interrogation. The capture tag must include:

What is your job? What is your speciality? Are you a combatant? If so what is your rank, number and unit? Who are in your chain of command? Whom do you report—that is who your immediate superior is? What is the mission of your unit? Are you a civilian? Then why are you here? Who is your immediate boss and what is the name of your company? At the time, place and point of capture, detention what was your immediate mission—that is to say why were you there and what were you doing or what were your plans? Were you supposed to conduct any mission/job when you were captured/detained? What are your future plans and what is the future mission of your unit/company? You might note he is carrying documents, maps, identification papers; photographs.Here is where you might find things out of the ordinary. The map might be of another place or even this place: Why are you carrying this map? The photo/s might be of someone else: Who is this person and why are you carrying his photograph? The ID papers may belong to other persons and hence you ask him why is he carrying other peoples identification papers and why. And where are these persons as they are in a disturbed area and that too without identification papers. All these exploitable documents can now be handed over to the MI section together with the detainee/EPW.

Remember your questions should be guided by your unit’s intelligence requirements and as briefed to you but on no count should the person being questioned get a whiff of these requirements or your mission. Everything should be done in an atmosphere of normal conversation.

Example Questions

Questions must be framed in such a manner so as not to elicit vague or misleading answers. They should be direct, pointed but at the same time broad so that the person being questioned does not misinterpret it or has any room for maneuver. For example the following questions were designed for soldiers manning check posts/roadblocks. Modify them to accommodate EPWs/detainees, local population as per your mission, situation and unit requirements.

• What is your name (Match this with any identification document found on his person) Cross-check with CI White list, Black list and Grey List)

• Where do you live and full address, where were you going and why, how did you arrive here. From here to your final destination point—what will be the route and why? In what way is it safer or convenient for you? Who will facilitate your journey? That reminds me, who facilitated your journey till here, financially or otherwise? (All these must be specifically answered or obtained)

• What is your present occupation, your specialty-if any and your qualifications (see if he has any technical expertise)?

• What was the type of physical terrain you travelled to get here? During your travel what all obstacles you faced and how did you manage to overcome/circumvent them. While travelling did you observe anything out of ordinary in your surroundings? Or any unusual activity?

• What currency are you carrying and how much? What is the money intended for (if found to be a big sum)?

• Can you name anyone whom you know personally who is averse to Indian security measures/ops here in this area? On being answered immediately follow with ‘’who else’’.Do you know or are you aware of the nature and type of any anti-Indian security operation/any other activity here or anywhere else and dates or time of such activities? Can you tell me the reason for our forces to be here? Do you support our activities?

DO NOT’s

• Ask questions which might reveal your intent or which might make him aware of your units mission, intelligence requirements.

• Jot down answers before him.

• Don’t resorts to quid-pro-quo.They are not permanent sources to be given goods/money in exchange for information and neither are you an intelligence specialist. The same goes for EPWs and detainees.

• Do not resort to coercion. You may be reported to social media. Or the police. Remember we are all governed by Geneva Conventions.

• If you are handling EPWs and detainees escort them to the interrogation center as soon as possible. You are only supposed to ask basic questions to civilians in conversational mode. Yes if situation is fluid, like in battle and yu accost suspicious civilians you may resort to interrogation based tactical questioning, but only to ascertain if they are of interest to HUMINT/CI personnel and carefully examine any captured documents. In such cases escort them quickly to detention centers from where the MP will take them to interrogation centers. • Pay money for information.

• Do not be so cooperative so as to tell them their rights that can be handled later. First the information from them.

Reporting

For tactical operations, there are four levels of reporting which assists the Unit intelligence section to factor in all useful tactical information gained during the small units activities in the overall planning of the mission (and also update ISR planning):

Reporting immediately any information the soldier considers of critical tactical value.The soldier may resort to his commonsense/experience or any predetermined criteria to arrive at his judgment.•

• Normal reporting

• Information during normal debriefing sessions by the intelligence officer.

• Follow-up reporting, after debriefing by the intelligence officer is over.

Document Handling

When there are documents on the person of the detainee efforts should be immediately made to:

· Classify them

· Seize , Impound or return them

· Determine if they contain information which can be exploited further by trained intelligence personnel (DOCEX).

Remember that any document, even though it may seem irrelevant on first sight , may on close inspection reveal information of interest , might satisfy intelligence requirements and with other seized documents give a bigger picture of enemy intent.

Classification:

Documents can be Personal such as letters, diaries, photographs, flyers posted in cities and towns, etc ,Identity such as identity cards , passport, drivers license , ration cards or Official such as documentation government/military information , for example military books , field manuals, military reports,files,maps etc.

CED (Captured enemy document) is a piece of recorded informnation seized from the captured person belonging to the enemy forces or any civilian in collusion with the latter.We can also name our own military documents CED that were in the possession of the enemy.DOCEX of such documents can rev eal what they know about us , or if anyone was involved on our side in transferring these documents to the enemy then we are alerted to the fact and going by the nature of the document or its origin we can put our CI agents to track him down.CEDs can be found on the person of EPWs/detainees , abandoned military areas , on the bosies of killed enemy personnel , old enemy command posts , destroyed enemy forward tactical headquarters.

A CED is defined as any piece of recorded information obtained from the threat. CEDs can also be US or allied documents that were once in the hands of the enemy. CEDs can be found almost anywhere; some locations include abandoned training sites, old enemy command posts, deceased persons, cafes, town squares, or in the possession of EPWs/detainees.Written or typed material, drawings, audio, and/or video recordings, computer disks,etc can constitute the content of a CED.

Once you have critically studied the CED you have to decide on three actions:

· Return them to the owner as they are very personal items and do not contain any military or governmental information

· Impound the CED with the intent to return them later as these documents being of personal nature contain information pertaining to the military but which after examination is found not to have any bearing on current situation or having any affiliation with the enemy. Still they will be sent for DOCEX and if the initial assumptions are true , they will be returned.

· Confiscate the CED as it contains military or governmental information (all official documents)

Every confiscated or impounded CED must be tagged and logged before being transferred for DOCEX.

The capture tag should contain the

1. Unit details who captured the CED

2. Location of capture : Grid coordinates

3. Time and date of Capture

4. Identity of the person from whom it was captured including brief description (Rank , unit etc)

5. Prevailing circumstances under which the capture was made

6. Description of the CED

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

Int Architecture --For Indian Army
K.MAZUMDAR
ANTITERRORISM OFFICER

1.BLIP/CLIC.

Batallion Level Int Platoon:Colocated with the Company. (One intelligence analyst and five enlisted infantrymen.).One platoon.

Each company of the Bn should select and train at least 6 personnel.

2.Company Level Int Capability : CLIC PLATOONS.
CLIC--> 2 SECTIONS
COLLECTION SECTION
ANALYSIS & PRODUCTION SECTION

TOC Coy -------------- 2 CLIC PLATOONS
|
JCO
|
_______________________________________
| |
IWatch (Collection Section) I/Watch (A&P Section)

The CLIC is supervised by the company commander. The two sections of CLIC , collection and analysis & production are looked after by the officer in charge , usually a JCO and there will be two soldiers , one from each section to function as intelligence watch and are
assigned to the company combat ops center(TOC).

Functions/responsibilities:
CLIC O-I-C: Reports to Company Comander,assists the watch officer in operations situation development (common tactical ops picture),managing and supervising CLIC ops,interacting with adjacent units , lower units and higher echelons and utilizing the intelligence flow.
If required, the CLICs now have the capacity to surge intelligence trained soldiers to support operations such as cordon and searches and raids.

The formation of this platoon will facilitate initial and sustainment training by ensuring consistency throughout the battalion and eliminating additional training requirements for the companies. It will also ensure standardization in processes and reporting formats, and further promote lateral communication among the CLICs. Armed with the BLIP the Commander now has his own organic intelligence unit which will provide him additional support apart from the intelligence feeds as a result of his request for information from higher ups.Moreover and more important the BLIPs of all the companies in the Bnb conduct lateral communication , exchanging combat intelligence and other information, thus keeping abreast of latest developments and enemy tactics which the other company is confronting and the tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the company with an element of success. With the passage of time the initial training given to say the enlisted soldiers or the intelligence specialist helps in sustainment training ,the training a byproduct of the operations the soldier is involved with without resorting to tutored training. Soon the BLIP transforms itself into a robust intelligence unit of the Bn,

3.Reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability.Fighting for information CAPABILITY.
INTERIM COMBAT TEAM --(FI-FO-INFO CAPABLE)-- WITH ORGANIC INT AND R&S CAPABILITY – TO

PROJECT FORWARD OF AO

C2:
|
_________________________________________
| |
RS PLATOON HQ HUMINT PLATOON HQ
1 CI NCO 1 CI NCO

RS PATROLS(EACH PATROL=3MAN SQUAD,EACH SQUAD HAVING 1 CI SOLDIER)

RS SQUADS( NORMAL COMPOSITION +1 CI SOLDIER)

The reconnaissance platoon HQ and the HUMINT platoon HQ both should contain one CI NCO.

The reconnaissance squads each should have one CI soldier.
We can optimally have in the recce patrol 3 six-man squads, each having a CI soldier.

Thus at the lowest tactical level organic CI capability with the deployment of maximum possible CI soldiers is hereby achieved thus increasing significantly the reconnaissance troops HUMINT collection capability.

After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain, community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed, asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of the enemy.

LRS units provide reliable HUMINT against second echelon and follow-on forces and deep targets. LRS units conduct stationary surveillance and very limited reconnaissance. They deploy deep into the enemy area to observe and report enemy dispositions, movement and activities, and battlefield conditions. They arc not equipped or trained to conduct direct-action missions.

The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.AND COMBAT CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF..(Details in HQ PORTAL.)

HUMINT Collection Operations

vCombating terrorism support

vRear operations support

vCivil-military operations supportv OPSEC support

vInformation operations support

vCivil disturbance support

vLocal operational data collection

vDebriefing and interrogation

vHUMINT threat assessment

Reconnaissance HUMINT Missions

vElicit information from the local populace.

vInterrogate EPWs and Detainees.

vDebriefing Ops

vDocument exploitation.

vThreat vulnerability assessments.

vSource screening operations.

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

TACTICAL INT CAPABILITY

INT SUPPORT TO Coy

Keshav Mazumdar ATO

The targeting process is the culmination of another involved process, beginning from sensor

collection activities, sent higher up to the intelligence section where collation, analysis is done,

the finished intelligence product now being routed for dissemination to the targeting platform.

Information flow is from down-up preceded by request for information from the troop level. All

this entails time and intelligence is perishable, in that it is needed to be not only accurate and

specific but also timely. To avoid this time delay or to put it this way: to reduce the time between

sensor collection to targeting, we need to distill the targeting process down to the company or

platoon level. If collation and analysis can be pushed down to that level, a great deal of

enhancement in situational awareness and operational efficiency would result. One of the most

effective of these was the distillation of the targeting process into a Troop/Company-level tool.

We can have a Company intelligence support cell which will help in the creation of Company

and platoon level intelligence teams or grant assistance to units who have no organic intelligence

capability.

The squads or platoons at ground level usually accost the enemy in rapidly changing

environments with the element of surprise against them. In such situations the soldiers have to

adapt real fast and there is no time for sending information requests to Bn Intelligence officer or

higher up and waiting for intelligence...timely specific and accurate intelligence that is. Here

‘’timely intelligence’’ is crucial. Troops on most occasions find themselves operating unilaterally

against insurgents conducting IDF, DF and IED attacks and have to adapt quickly. It is here that

the intermediate level Company intelligence support cell can help by creating a squad targeting

process by supporting the squads with raw operational intelligence by fielding its HUMINT and

CI assets with the squad itself. Later it will be detailed how the HUMINT and CI enabled

platoons are formed with the CLIC in the lead.

In the absence of the CLIC the usual intelligence summary report briefed to the Bn and Bde

commanders omits the ground critical information need of the squad/platoon. The picture usually

presented takes into account the operational success/failures as a whole and dwells on the

priority intelligence requirements, not the immediate intelligence requirements of the tactical unit

on the ground involved in combat. But if we have the CLIC setup, then the CLIC can increase

the situational awareness at higher levels by sending in intelligence reports through the lens of

the squad firefight.

SIGINT resources required to conduct effective personality-centric targeting are not available at

the Company or Troop level.

All the information collected at the troops level is exploited where proper categorization and

collation is executed. It is at the exploitation stage that the soldiers work is evaluated and decided

who needs further training to collect information properly. Because the correct manner of

collection of information is very important at the troop level. It must be duly ensured that he has

properly conducted tactical exploitation of the area , of the captured materials, and of the human

terrain. It must be seen to it that his knowledge of tactical questioning is thorough. All these

performance indexes are reflected when the platoon intelligence unit or company intelligence

unit submits their intelligence reports. This exploitation phase will require a great deal of

administrative functions to assess the soldier’s capability and also to assist in the collation of all

collected information. Although at this phase nothing strong is produced against the insurgents,

but further operations tend to be driven with the collected intelligence. This is where the Bn

Intelligence officer or the Company intelligence officer decides on the technical control aspects

of the collection being done by line soldiers and ensuring that they adhere to it now and in the

future.

It can very well be that the projecting intelligence capability option is used where it is not

practicable for having own intelligence unit. There can be the Company intelligence support

unit/s, modular and available to all the Companies operating in the area of operations. These

units can for example debrief returning patrols of the company. Returning patrols are a very

important source of intelligence—this fact should be understood clearly. Now just coming and

telling the Platoon section headquarters or the Company headquarters intelligence officer what

information they have will not suffice the purpose. This information needs to be sent to higher

echelons and that too systematically after being entered into the Company’s knowledge

management system, collated and analyzed. It is not that difficult as a computer system can be

set up and today dozens of map tracking or link analysis softwares are available together with

database management system software for small units.

The debriefs of the patrols should include what they have observed about the local population –

any changes from earlier situations perhaps?—pictures taken, any information to satisfy the units

intelligence requirements, any engagements with the enemy and if so where, any information

from any civilian upon being questioned etc etc.

One thing that can and should be incorporated in a COIN environment is the ground level or

company level intelligence units biometric collection and exploitation capability. If the soldiers

can properly take DNA samples from members of the population enrolled in a DNA collection

scheme and then all biometric information recorded in the database, in any future case of

insurgent attacks all biometric evidence can then be cross-referenced with that contained in the

database , thus if there are matches insurgent personalities get i9dentified , driving further

operations , kinetic or arrest and prosecution.

Analyze

In this phase the Company intelligence support teams will study all information submitted by

patrols (HUMINT reports), by special forces who went on raids , by forces returning from

encounters with captured material and spot intelligence from EPWs etc , sort them and then

study how they are reflected in earlier Bde or Bn intelligence summaries , to find out common

information. This step is different than most intelligence analysis steps generally used in INDIAs

COIN operations. We have cases like Dantewada or several cases of ambush. If the company

intelligence support teams find that there exist past reports of ambushes and IED activity similar

to the current patrols debrief and located in or near specific areas of the area of operations then a

pattern emerges , indicating for example insurgent concentration points or say the terrain in

these areas are conducive for ambush or IED placement. Or it can also mean that whenever our

forces are visiting those areas they are being ambushed or IEDed so that they do not reach

certain areas in close proximity which could be the insurgents operational headquarters or

anything important for their operations or maybe containing population who are sympathetic to

their cause, and whose questioning or area search may yield intelligence vital to the success of

the forces and detrimental to the insurgents. Hence from the force protection perspective, finding

reflections in intelligence summaries of higher headquarters is something the company

intelligence unit gives high importance. Reflections will also help the Commander to make an

idea about the effectiveness of patrols as any desirable effect on the insurgents, like capture, or

increased movements or a spike in the behavior of certain elements/groups in the local

population paves the way for further patrolling and enabling the Commander to act more

decisively.

Disseminate

This phase is perhaps the most difficult one and also the most important one in that after the

present company/s toil for a year collecting and maintaining intelligence information, relief

troops need to be filled in with that information properly and it is vitally important that the Bn,

company and lower levels need to be disseminated all pertinent intelligence in time , maintaining

specificity , accuracy and timeliness. Thus dissemination is the most important part of the

targeting process and how that information is utilized. The relief units coming in and being

disseminated properly enables continuity in operations. Any break in this continuity is an

advantage for the insurgents in that they get time to regroup etc while the relief company’s are

consolidating or trying to consolidate their position with little information from the departing

units.

During dissemination the usual recourse is to pinpoint grid locations on a map where caches are

located , or have been found and where encounters have been experienced or probable areas for

encounter. This is not the correct way. Efforts should be made with the help of software or

reasoning that ‘’linkages’’ are established between these points. So that a larger picture of the

area of operations results with interconnecting nodes.Say we have a local village panchayats

house located a few blocks away from a madrasa which information collected shows it to be a

school for insurgents , being indoctrinated at night. Further some patrols have pointed out that in

other areas around the madrasa there have been few arrests at evening times by the local police.

Thus we find layers of intelligence makes the entire area involving the mosque and the adjoining

areas very important from the security point of view. Then one fine day on doubt the panchayat

leader was detained for an hour. Keeping the security importance of the madrasa in

perspective—it as the threat—then we can extrapolate further and associate the panchayat leader

with the madrasa activities and all activities near the madrasa under the scanner (the panchayat

leader is a locally powerful man and happenings in a madrasa near his place of living cannot

happen without his knowledge--#assumption) and the nodes are thus portrayed by connecting all

the dots , here two of them being the leaders house and the madrasa.

CLASS : AR/CI/UNIT-

ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED ORGANIC INT UNIT FOR PARAMILITARY BN FIGHTING INSURGENCY – ASSAM RIFLES SECTOR 21

The need for ground level analysis
APPLIED TO COIN

Strategic Intelligence in military terms means the intelligence which goes into formulation of military policy and strategies. Operational intelligence on the other hand focuses on support to planning operations at the theater or regional level while Tactical intelligence is at the local level—intelligence that goes into driving operations locally.

Traditional intelligence doctrine does not take into account the asymmetric enemy which does not have an Order of Battle from the conventional enemy point of view—rather is dispersed, of loose cellular structure with all command identities unknown to cell members and is transnational..all in all near invisible with no military uniform that can identify him as in conventional battle , which does not resort to standard TTPs and other combat techniques, whose logistical, supplies and other support services are totally unlike the support arms of the conventional enemy and out of view, nearly invisible, hidden among sympathizers and communities resources. Thus if we consider COIN operations in a region, whether urban or jungle or hilly, the operational intelligence doctrine must be adaptive to include these factors. Further the intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms applied to conventional wartime and peacetime situations may not be as effective in situations involving, say COIN in an urban environment.

Hence we cannot just stay limited to traditional approaches to operational intelligence. We can adapt by say endeavoring to create new indigenous HUMINT sources, capturing indigenous insurgent technology conducting source operations by using sources from the local community by bridging the gap between them and us soldiers (developing close relationships, respecting their customs and abiding by it, being more of a civilian than a soldier by wearing civil attire and sharing tea/coffee with them, respect for their religion, etc all contributing to a conducive environment suitable for elicitation and oblique tactical prodding without raising any doubts ) and conducting security reviews with such as the modern day IED in perspective..Information from all these being aligned with the intelligence requirements of the commander thus increasing the depth of his situational awareness.

The main goal of collection is to acquire data about the enemy’s environment, resources, and activities. This is summarized as follows:

We need to know the current activity of the enemy, its objectives/goals, whether these goals are directed against us—the intent, whether it has the capabilities to achieve these goals and taken for granted it succeeds in its attempts—that is it succeeds in achieving its intent , then what will be the consequences for us—the damage.

Intelligence here is crucial. We must determine the intent of the enemy. But like we are always striving to secure our installations, all related information systems and movements from enemy prying eyes so does the enemy who takes pain to cloak its behavioral indicators which might give out its intent. Now if there are no behavioral indicators, however we may suspect the enemy of possessing intent to cause harm, we are nowhere when it comes to determining it accurately. We need to go for deep intelligence collection and access a myriad of sources so that slowly the behavioral characteristics are discerned.

Here let’s touch on Indicators and Warning concept. So vital to security. This is also known as Early Warning. If the enemy has intent it will decide on a course of action/actions—COA/s. We have to design a thorough collection system so that we can target the indicators (on a continual basis so as to confirm the enemy’s COAs or negate our assessments of its COAs until finally we confirm accurately) and hence get an idea about the intent. And then lay down the potential COAs in parallel (parallel mind you) and after matching with the capabilities (yes, that too needs to be determined first) we choose the most probable COA of the enemy. The Early Warning system is more of a proactive-intelligenceapproach rather than a reactive-intelligence one.

For each intent they can take a course of action (or we zero down to a course of actions from a list of probable course of actions corresponding to the intent by considering more factors such as information gleaned from open sources, attack mode types or weapon types/delivery mode as per prevailing security hardening of target/security environment around/proximity of target etc) which we determine as most probable by considering factors like capability, behavior or other indicators. We can have a Most Likely Course of Action or in the extreme the Most Dangerous Course of Action. It all depends how successfully we ascertain their intent, capabilities, behavior and how far accurately we can infer their other characteristics and past criminal/terrorist/military offensive activity from past records/databasepast threat assessments, past activity records, personality profiles, weapons/combatcapability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports. For example a military unit, while assessing the threat can pull intelligence (of course on request and need to know basis) from higher headquarters, from adjacent units, from its own sources and from whatever ISR tools they have. Adjacent units or other units who share the same communication network or who is accessible by the unit can supply intelligence on the threats past behavior—say an engagement with the other unit. From that the unit can , within a good confidence level ,determine the enemy’s tactics, techniques and procedures. Inputs like this can help in determining the probable course of actions. We can list out possible consequences for each course of action.

First the Intents, then ascertaining the Capabilities—not exactly ‘’then’’...the collectors tasked by the CMO generally busy themselves with sourcing information on both and by pulling on information from R&S teams.Therafter the Commander brainstorms with his staff the possible COAs by backwards iteration to the Intent/s and evaluating the COAs in the light of the Capabilities and also the possible consequences for the enemy/effects as battle damage or simply damage for us. A terrorist attack may more be directed at the Parliament House than a Mall because of the Symbolic andPolitical-Seat flavor).Again it can equally be likely that one enemy COA generates a crippling counterattack by our forces whereas another COA is less obvious and also causes less damage or less repercussion. The enemy too war games and may decide to forego the first COA and go for the second one. Another example could be the enemy’s COA is simply intelligence activities directed against us with a timeframe to determine what they intend to determine, knowing very well that our CI teams will move in and take tentatively that time frame to expose their intent—hence their COA could be go on with the intelligence activities before the deadline—that is before they are exposed. There are several courses of actions, each in context of different scenarios. That is why it is immensely important to gain a perfect or near perfect situational understanding. Thus during this evaluation the Commander and Staff narrow down to the most possible Course of Action or the Most Dangerous Course of action for each Intent. Whatever every COA the enemy takes we must look for observable INDICATORS. This is the task of the Collection teams. Once these indicators are identified we look for patterns. Once we discern them we begin exploitation.

In other words, we need to judge the Intent of the adversary. Our intelligence collection teams should look for indicators, indicators which will tell us what he is doing today. Supported by more information about the capabilities of the adversary, , past threat assessments, past activity records , personality profiles , weapons/combat capability-strength, social networks (all these can be ascertained from open source, government records, criminal database, and detailed past activity reports).

We make an educated guess of the intent or a list of intents with confidence level/s and then list out the corresponding course of actions with possible consequences for each course of action. Continuing the iteration further we select the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action by studying the consequences along with the capabilities and intents.

The following grossly sums up the steps in the intelligence cycle.

1. Develop intelligence requirements.

2. Collect information to answer intelligence requirements.

3.Triage information for accuracy and consistency, analyze collected information, deconflict inconsistent information (if necessary), and identify other intelligence requirements (re-taskcollection, if necessary).

4.Compile analyzed information (timely, accurate, specific, and predictive!), and produce a finished intelligence product for dissemination and community consumption.

This all goes back to collection. What are the goals of the adversary? What’s he trying to accomplish; what’s his intent? What is the Order of Battle of the enemy? In other words what are the strengths, dispositions and capabilities of the enemy? What is the inventory and type of their equipment/weapons? How will the terrain affect enemy’s movements, possible courses of actions (this applies to us also),what are the possible concealment areas offered by high ground or foliage, how does the terrain afford ambush points and where they can possibly be, how does the current and future weather predictions act as enabler or otherwise for the enemy and us, what is the present enemy situation , if the enemy is an asymmetrical one like the terrorist/insurgent then does it have the capability to attack hard targets, what was the modus operandi in the past of the asymmetrical enemy, target history and who were/are its leaders/sympathizers, what were the safe houses then and possible locations at present, what ideology the terrorist group pursues and what are its aims as demonstrated by its propaganda or by website declarations and so on. This will allow us to identify indicators. We identify indicators, then patterns, and then we exploit them.

Tracking adversary capabilities is a continual process, and should be updated per changing conditions in their strength, disposition, equipment, or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Requirements Determination –The Collectors

To properly collect information during war or any situation involving ground troops and the enemy, be it a tactical operation or stability operation we need individuals who can interrogate or EPWs or detainees in an efficient manner without invoking unnecessary delays .

To this end we need persons with good interrogation skills, ability to conduct tactical questioning and good debriefing skills. Soldiers on the ground need to be trained in HUMINT capabilities, apart from HUMINT specialists, so that when the soldier encounters the EPW right at the front or in areas other than the rear, he can quickly interrogate and extract HUMINT/CI relevant information and then pass on the prisoner to the interrogation facility. If the soldiers manage to extract information this way, it could very well be that the said information can be of immediate tactical use to the unit the soldier belongs. The chances of detaining an individual with no information or intelligence of target value are also lessened considerably. On the other hand involving soldiers this way helps the commander and upper echelons get a first hand good situation assessment.

Besides this we need trained HUMINT specialists to act as enablers for the commander while assessing the situation. They will conduct source operations to throw light on the enemy order of battle, his capabilities, plans and intentions. The collection manager with all the inputs from the HUMINT specialists can then assist the Commander with updating his intelligence requirements and with the capabilities and intent of the enemy in perspective now, he can devise appropriate COAs.

As for the intelligence component CI we need to realize the full import of the latter. Thus we need CI specialists/soldiers with the skill to identify, detect, counter, neutralize or exploit the enemy’s intelligence approaches to gain information about our plans, capabilities and other factors. The CI soldier must be well versed in polygraph and technical countermeasures as there can be cases of treason and subversion and he will have to identify, detect such individuals and also establish their complicity in the crime and report to the executive. Foreign language ability will be an asset.CI soldiers need to exploit documents seized and these may be in a foreign language.CI teams can be augmented with an interpreter in case the soldiers lack the ability to converse in a foreign language.

Finally we need soldiers/specialists trained to coordinate collection activities, deconflict and synchronize all HUMINT/CI activities and interact effectively with higher and lower echelons.

ORGANIZATION OF PROPOSED ORGANIC INT UNIT FOR PARAMILITARY BN FIGHTING INSURGENCY – ASSAM RIFLES SECTOR 21

I WILL FIRST OUTLINE INT ARCHITECTURE AT HIGHER HQ THEN LIST A TACTICAL INT CAPABILITY

Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using resources, planning for and employment of forces, and ensuring that forces accomplish assigned missions. Leaders and staffs exercise control to facilitate mission accomplishment.
We can have the following organizational structure:
The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)
HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)
Operations Support Cell
Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority
HUMINT Teams

HUMINT TEAM HQ - Analysis & Control Element: An Intelligence mission management and analytical hub at the division, corps, or theater level, where intelligence is gathered from the individual intelligence disciplines and fused together to form a composite intelligence picture. Gaps in intelligence are identified and tasked out to the respective collection assets.

ACT - Analysis Control Team: An intelligence cell which aids tactical combat brigades or battalions in managing assigned or attached intelligence assets and conducting analysis.

OMT - Operational Management Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a Captain the OMT is designed to manage two to three subordinate CI/HUMINT Operational Teams (OT). The OMT is a self-contained operational and technical control and analysis element. The OMT is capable of plugging into an ACT, ACE, Rear Area Operations Center(RAOC) or any element which has a CI/HUMINT requirement.

HOT – HUMINT Operational Team: Manned with a mix of CI/HUMINT soldiers led by a JCO, the OT performs CI/HUMINT operations, investigations, and collection functions.
TET - Tactical Exploitation Team: The TET is subordinate to the Corps MI Brigade and contains the Corps CI, IPW, and LRS assets.

The HUMINT Analysis Cell (HAC)
HUMINT reports and other operational feeds need to be worked upon, processed, and derivations made. Cross cueing with reports from other sensors sometimes becomes necessary.HUMINT validates IMINT, SIGINT.What we need is a cell where all these feeds are fused together, processed and timely actionable intelligence derived. Extrapolation is also done to impact operational and strategic considerations with the available intelligence products plugging into the overall intelligence system. The HUMINT analysis cell also indicates gaps in reporting.
The HAC:
Produces HUMINT reports and feeds for intelligence summaries. Conducts dissemination.
Maintains database of all HUMINT activities in the AO and this database is directly accessible to all HUMINT teams and lends very good support to their collection operations.
HAC plugs in ACE so as to use analysis tools for immediate and long term analysis and collection plans. It analyses the trends and patterns discerned after collection or during collection. Analyses source reliability and credibility by various comparative tools and assists the collector to know his sources better and assign tasks accordingly or stop all source-handler operations with sources of negative attributes.
HAC helps in compiling target folders. Now future collection efforts can be affected based on the information in these target folders. The target folders are updated time to time and a repository maintained.
HAC supports CI entities by supplying information of CI interest and provides feeds to CICA
ØProvides collection requirements input to the HOC.
ØSupports RM through the development of HUMINT SIRs based on command PIRs.
ØAnswers HUMINT-related RFIs.

HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC)
Coordination and synchronization of all HUMINT activities is of utmost importance.Proper technical control and deconfliction among adjacent and higher/lower HUMINT elements is the job of the Operations cell.The HUMINT Operations Cell HOC.The HOC keeps a track of all activities conducted by all HUMINT and operational teams(which are a mix of CI and HUMINT operators) and coordinates them.

HUMINT TEAM STRUCTURE
Operational Management Team
The OMT is manned by 3-4 persons and provide technical control, operation coverage and guidance, collection and operational advice and focus to 2-4 HUMINT teams who are engaged in the actual collection and other HUMINT activities. The OMT can have an analysis element (to help in quick dissemination of actionable intelligence) to assist in boot-level analysis and mission analysis. It reports teams equipment status and other variables which may affect the HUMINT teams capability to the HOC and unit headquarters. It works in close tandem with the ACT to develop current threat assessments and answer the commander’s intelligence requirements· Provide the collection and operational focus for HUMINT teams.
Integrates the HUMINT teams directly into the commander's ISR planning. Keeps the commander abreast of all activities, capabilities and limitations of the deployed HUMINT teams.

HUMINT Team
The HUMINT team consists of 4-5 persons who carry out the actual HUMINT functions and are trained in the entire spectrum of the latter, and they may be deployed to execute mission- focused activities of interrogation, debriefing, contact operations, tactical questioning or DOCEX.
The HUMINT-CI mix (Tactical HUMINT team) functions:
CI/HUMINT Preparation of Battlefield:
CI/HUMINT team will study all environmental factors and the effect they will have on both the enemy and our forces.
Attention areas:
Threat profile including Intent,OB,Dispositions,Strength,TOE, Demographics,population,politics,culture,language,ethnicity,history,religion,military,terrorism,in surgency,information structures, communication lines, centers of gravity and other criminal groups who support enemy/sympathizers from local community intentions/attitudes.
Enemy's Composition, Disposition, Strength (often mnemonic zed with):

SALUTE: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment

Exercise:
I as the Commander have a Goal. To determine the Threat capability of the enemy. To this end I define the mission as explicitly as possible. Thereafter I set down the PIRs. At the same time the HUMINT resources I can spare are allocated tasks to collect information after my planning team in concert with the collection manager sets up cells each catering to certain IRs broken further into several Sirs. The teams of HUMINT and TACHUMINT are guided, controlled and overseen by the OMT, HAC….

Goals: We need to determine the intent of the enemy (threat) ,as formulated by the command (top hierarchy whose identity we need to determine),its strength, disposition and capabilities and all the possible courses of action, the most likely course of action and the most dangerous course of action.

PIRs: What are the intentions of the enemy and is it capable of carrying out the threat?

TASK: Each team derived from each cell will consider all factors and generate the intelligence requirements. They will then task themselves with identifying all indicators that support or deny these intelligence requirements
Identify the threat's likely objectives/desired end state.
Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.
Develop each COA.
Evaluate each COA.
Prioritize each COA.
Identify threats to aviation operations for each COA (Aviation-specific).
Identify initial collection requirements.
Identify initial production requirements.
Identify initial dissemination requirements.

A.We can create a basic intelligence team structure with the GOALS:
1.To identify the enemy top-tier officials
2.The enemy intent (current tactical goals and strategic goals)
3.The strength, disposition, capabilities assets, and organization structure of the enemy.
4.Organizations TO&E
5.The most likely COA and the most dangerous COA.
B.From the above we identify our primary intelligence requirement/s:
The immediate threat posed by the enemy. What are the goals of the adversary? What’s he trying to accomplish; what’s his intent? Answer what he’s doing today in order to answer what he’s going to do tomorrow and beyond.
C. Next we create teams, say 2-3 manned teams, each team assigned a separate task of collection. The team leader should exhort his members that given the intelligence requirement by HQ they should strive to generate further IR based on the information available and during collection as new information may require further probing and exploration. Members and team leader should be proactive. Intelligence too is both reactive and proactive. An indicator associated with an IR propels the agent to look for corroborating information--that’s reactive. Sometimes we are totally unaware of the unknown. Well the intelligence agent can have an informant/source network in place which constantly looks for say enemy movements or any
change in enemy positions—which on first sight can be a normal movement/displacement but on further probing reveals an offensive intent. To this end the intelligence agent needs to have a proactive mindset, always curious, probing and exploratory.

We also set up covert or overt civilian collection units whose members are either having access to physical addresses frequented or inhabited by the enemy or are geo-located in close proximity to the latter.

Our teams are exhorted to resort to open intelligence frequently OSINT such as any news/enemy propaganda/private and government discussion boards, analyses/TV panel discussions on current situations with reference to the disturbing elements posted on the web, in dailies, or aired on radio / TV programmes.It should be borne in mind that globally 90% useful intelligence is collected from OSINT sources and the remaining from ISR platforms.

Our teams can be based on the following factors – ATTENTION AREAS:
ØOrganization,Composition,Disposition,Strength (the command structure and organisation of headquarters and subunits, geographical locations of unit headquarters and subunits, Strength expressed in units and weight of fire delivered by its weapon systems)
ØLeadership
ØIntent
ØWeaponry and Equipments
ØCapabilities / Combat effectiveness
§TTPs—historical in the concerned area of operations and area of interest.( Tactics used by the enemy unit and Miscellaneous data related to specific task, mission or operations…this will help in determining enemys most likely course of action. Unit history used to judge expected performance based on its past performance)
ØThreat ranking-by violence or activity
ØEnemy propaganda
ØRecent incidents of violence irrespective of sporadic or concerted nature
ØLocal community and political support
ØOther friendly groups / criminal gangs sympathetic to enemy causes or having same ideology/political goals
ØLogistics
Keeping the above factors in perspective we can create cells comprising of HUMINT collectors (and also admixture of HUMINT/CI , TACHUMINT—when information of CI Interest is emerges when the HUMINT collector is conducting questioning , he will transfer the source to the CI team).These cells may be:
vLeadership Cell
vEnemy units cell
vStrategic Cell
vThreat Cell
vTO&E Cell
Each team cell will generate its intelligence requirements. These requirements are all predicated by the Commanders PIRs.SIRs or sets of SIRs corresponding to each IR are developed, keeping in view the indicators.Therafter tasking begins.
The current teams are C2, Strategic, Lower HQs and Units, TO&E AND THREATS.

C2 Cell – The enemy organization leadership formulates the strategy and hence the individual leadership personalities, their affiliations, intent, movements, social contacts etc should be gauged accurately by identifying the indicators so as to defeat their ongoing or future deliberate operations. The hierarchy should be determined which will give us an idea of the functions and span of control of each level. Thus the C2 cell will focus on the command and control of the organization.

Strategic Cell: Decides on the overall strategy. Is composed of the Command staff, planning, logistics, operations and intelligence/CI advisors.

Lower HQs and Units cell – The organizations middle and lower level management is composed of lower HQs/Section HQs and units. The capabilities of these should be determined and it should be assessed properly as to which deptt or unit has a significant part in the current operations against our forces and thus we can assign a priority ranking. This ranking can be based on the threat potential or activity predicated by the overall intent of the organization which has prompted it to conduct current operations. That is to say those HQs and units should be prioritized as per their threat capabilities and activities which have a direct bearing in the offensive operations.. Triage all these HQs and units and feed the report to the TO&E cell.

TO&E cell – The TO&E cell will evaluate the report submitted by the Chapter cell. It will evaluate the strength, assets and activities and draft a table of organization and equipment.

Threat cell: The task of this cell is to identify all the possible courses of action to be undertaken by the enemy and distill them to infer the most likely and most dangerous course/s of actions. The threat cell will consider all the inputs from the other cells. In addition it will undertake an intelligence preparation of the battledfield.It will study the past violent behavior of the enemy,take cognizance of its intent/s, capabilities, dispositions, strengths, affiliations with other support elements such as criminal enterprises, terrorists and create intelligence requirements, prioritized which will lead to tasking of its operatives to identify the indicators supporting or denying these threat activities.

COLLECTION SUMMARY
Assessment of threat capabilities, operations and, current and expected threat actions across the battle space to provide the commander with an assessment for the development and execution of countermeasures.
Recommending countermeasures after assessment of threat capabilities, operations, expected courses of actions, most likely COA and most dangerous COA.
Threat intent
Identify Threat leadership. Key commanders. Key lieutenants and area commanders
Identify threat C2 nodes
Identify threat logistic routes
Identify threat social reach, network, and contacts
Identify threat affiliates in other criminal networks, enterprises
Identify threat sympathizers in own area of control
Identify political/administrative figures that support threat ideology
Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Gauge potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Recommend C2 setup to thwart threat attack.
Estimate with reasonable accuracy the expected time of attack.
Possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Determine possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario
Possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement
Gauge IED detonation methods/means
Gauge IED timings
Possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Staging areas
Safe houses
Weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives.
Find out what supplementary operations threat may resort to
Recommending countermeasures to threat IED
Recommending countermeasures to threat ISR/EW
Determining threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire

WARNING
(a) Warning. Once actionable intelligence is obtained warning or predictions is disseminated in a timely,unambiguous,specific and accurate manner.Warning is an acknowledgement of the existence ofd a threat and subsequent disseminating.
Warning is of two types:
Defensive warn
Enemy warn
In defensive warn after receiving actionable intelligence about the adversary’s possible attack the installations security is beefed up by incorporating protective measures. The warning may be digital/aural/physical or virtual.
In enemy warn the enemy is communicated the fact through non-lethal measures such as interrogation or challenging an enemy unit/capability that in case of persistent or continued enemy action our course of action/s can take on an increasingly lethal nature with the intent to prevent the enemy from taking further hostile actions and also inflict heavy damages. Thus enemy warn is a method to deter the enemy from carrying out its intent if it hasn’t done so yet or to stop the enemy in its tracks.
It is very important that warning should be unambiguous, accurate and timely/specific. In addition to this it should be actionable. Warning can be graduated; meaning the level
of warning may assume increasing proportions in keeping with the feedback about the enemy which may indicate that it has ceased its operations/.activities temporarily but is conducting discreet operations/increased intelligence activity masked in the cloak of acceptance of our warning and cessation of open hostilities.
WARNING SYSTEM:
The warning system must have the following features:
It should allow for redundancies in our act capability systems.
It should allow for passive proactive means so as to protect our installations, its critical assets, and command and control nodes, thus overall reducing the vulnerability of the installation/.protected area.
It should provide a system of integrating fires to handle threats and precluding enemy attack on our installation, its C2 and critical assets.
Provide warning of threat intelligence activities.
Provide warning of existing threat C2 nodes
Provide warning of threat capabilities, disposition, strength, order of battle
Provide warning of threat logistic routes.
Provide warning of threat sympathizers.,
Provide warning of threats possible attack COAs
Provide warning of the defense capability of the threat
Provide warning of threats peculiar /preferred TTPs/modus operandi
Provide warning of threats history
Provide warning of threat movements
Provide warning of threat leadership
Provide warning of threat detachments, cells dispersed in and out of the area of operations.
Provide warning of Threat attack /defense operations location parameters.
Provide warning of potential attack/defense methods of threat.
Provide warning of the expected time of attack.
Provide warning of possible locations of Threat listening post/observation posts
Provide warning of possible escape routes of threat forces after an attack or defense scenario Provide warning of possible enemy IED techniques, infiltration routes, emplacement Provide warning of IED detonation methods/means
Provide warning of IED timings
Provide warning of possible routes for IED ex-filtration
Provide warning of Staging areas
Provide warning of Safe houses
Provide warning of weapons and ammunitions storage locations
Provide warning g of the Production facilities for IED and other ammunitions/explosives. Provide warning of supplementary operations threat may resort to
Provide warning of threat indirect fire parameters, key indirect fire
(b)Active measures will provide at stand-off distances, the capabilities to-
We designate a stand-off area outside the installation/protected area and take active measures to deny unidentified vehicular or personnel movement in that area
Just like we have a C2 system with respect to any mission, similarly we need to have a C2 mission with respect to active or passive defensive measures and these need to be integrated with the C2 itself. Such active/passive measures can be remotely controlledlethal/non-lethal measures.
As for passive measure steps should be taken to deny unidentified/suspect personnel/vehicles movement inside a restricted area/protected area .Areas within buildings,facilities,structures,airfields,ammunition depot,etc can be effectively protected by employing unmanned remotely controlled nonlethal systems at standoff distances. Measures should be taken with priority to deter personnel and vehicles from entering a protected military installation again using remotely activated lethal/nonlethal systems. Physical barriers, both active and passive can be employed for this purpose.
There can be instances of enemy fire directed at critical assets of the installation and hence we need to include modular protection packages, automatic or soldier response teams built up specifically for this purpose. The protection system should be integrated again with the C2 system. It is very important to point out here that all the passive/active measures success depends on a great deal on
intelligence/counterintelligence/liaison apart from the remotely/manned protection system deployment. For example we need intelligence to apprehend any infiltrations in our camp in the form of security or non security civilian contractors. Or we can effectively liaise with the civil police/intelligence agencies to build up a mapping of probableanti-installation criminal forces operating in the area who could attempt to launch sporadic fires or explosive attacks, such attacks being in keeping with the criminal group’s affiliation with the enemy. Counterintelligence can help in visualizing our vulnerable areas within the installation and then proceed to identify the critical nodes which if damaged can stop the installation operations altogether. This vulnerability assessment coupled with the threat assessment and supported by sound OPSEC practices can give adequate unit protection.

METHODOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION:

The commander, the staff, and the higher and lower headquarters across the depth and width of the battlefield must coordinate with the CM section while formulating plans for future operations and to support ongoing missions. Variations in enemy actions or changes in perception of the enemy’s movements give rise to new sets of intelligence requirements and the CM section should take this into account. The battlefield is an area of high fluidity and hence changes must be expected and Requirements Management must be flexible enough to incorporate these changes.

The two most critical steps in collection management is identifying and prioritizing the intelligence requirements. To this end 6 areas of interest must be considered and they are force protection, situation development,targeting,battle damage assessment BDA,indications and warning and IPB.The intelligence requirements stems from these areas and all of the competing requirements needs to be consolidated,. Thereafter the collection plan is created and the scarce IEW resources are tasked more efficiently.

Requirements Management, Mission Management and Asset Management constitute the Collection Management process. They are treated separately but together constitute integrated operations as a whole.
The six steps in the CM process are:
ØDevelop Requirements,
ØDevelop a Collection Plan,
ØTask/Request Collection,
ØDisseminate,
ØEvaluate Reporting,
ØUpdate Collection Planning.
The various activities inherent in these steps need to be synchronized and placed under constant review.
While devising the Collection plan, the intelligence officer in charge of designing the plan (henceforth known as Collection Manager CM) takes into account the following:
ØCommanders Priority Intelligence Requirements
ØLow Priority Intelligence Requirements
ØRequests from subordinate units,
ØTaskings from higher HQ’s
ØIntelligence requirements for targeting purposes
Now, he prioritizes these keeping in mind the Commands intelligence needs and the commanders priority intelligence needs.
When BICCE study was initially conducted with the development of possible enemy COAs, the intelligence analyst attempts to develop all indicators of these COAs.(Indicators are those details of enemy action/inaction that may suggest an enemy COA
COLLECTION FORMAT
There are two collection plans. One designed for conventional battlefield operations whereas the other caters to a LIC environment.LIC battlefield operations tend to be dispersed. The PIR and IR’s are highly diverse and collection becomes a tough task.
In the latter case the following steps are followed:
ØList the PIRs and IRs, prioritize them and enumerate them using control numbers and alphabets. This helps in prioritization.
ØNow ascertain the indicators
ØDetermine potential indicators-prioritize those that will answer the PIR and IR.
ØDelete all indicators that do not answer the intelligence requirements.
ØDevelop specific intelligence requirements. These are the requirements as stated by the commander, prioritized and general, broken down into manageable specific requirements. A PIR may have several specific intelligence requirements.
ØAnalyze these SIRs and the target characteristics keeping all the indicators in perspective.

ØFinally prioritize the SIRs and determine the suitable collection discipline/platform/agency keeping its capabilities, limitations, backlog of collection tasking allotted to it and whether adjacent units, lower units are also using it.

ØPrepare the tasking list by creating a prioritized SIR list and deploy the collectors.

Indicator analysis is the basis for recommendations to the commander for a specific COA.
Note:

1. Intelligence should be timely, accurate, predictive and specific. The last term is very important especially in the case when actionable intelligence is needed. The HUMINT agent reports:

Observed movement of Bodo insurgents in NAI 6.

Observed that they are moving south towards the rice fields near the Tarmung village Now these two reports are timely as they are happening right now, predictive as we know they

are moving south towards the rice fields near an identified village. But what about specificity. What is the strength of the insurgents in terms of manpower? How many of them? Any idea how heavily are they armed and what weapons are they carrying? Do they possess mortars, bazookas, rocket launchers (shoulder mounted)? Where are they exactly in named area of interest 6? Whenever you report keeping the factors Size, Activity, Location and Time in perspective, you need to be as specific as possible. That way we can not only gauge their exact intentions and courses of actions but also formulate our course of action, as we can now pin-point them.

Enemy Capabilities and Limitations can be mnemonic zed with DRAW-D, Defense, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw and Delay. The Order of Battle and Table of Organization and Equipment (ORBAT and TO&E) are two areas intelligence must dwell upon throroughly.The ORBAT refers to the enemy organizations disposition, capabilities assets and composition whereas TO&E refers to its organization table of units and associated equipment. Thus the Commander is made aware with this strength, disposition, organizational and capabilities brief of the enemy.

Tasking is meted out considering:

Type of collection platform to be used. Here it’s HUMINT

Availability of HUMINT resources. It could well be resources are very limited. Maybe time is of essence. It could well be that actionable intelligence is required fast and there is no room to send the collected information up the chain for collation, processing and dissemination to targeting platforms by the end-users—here the Commander. This time constraint may mean we have the analytical element right at boot-level, who will be a part of the collection team. This will cut down on the time involved in the intelligence cycle from collection to dissemination. Moreover
availability of HUMINT resources also means the Commander has other priorities with other tactical missions or maybe a part of the HUMINT resources are away accompanying patrols to get intelligence from neighborhoods, civilians etc.So availability of resources is a criteria to be taken into account.

APPENDIX:

NEED FOR TACTICAL OPS CENTERS

COMMANDERS OPERATING PICTURE

The standard COP refers to a single,combined,graphical, visual display of the battle space environment , forces , and actions portrayed in near real time on an operation scale rather than the broader strategic level to aid the situational development and awareness of the Bde command headquarters and down through to the lowest tactical command so that these HQs can ensure that the proper /correct information is presented to the commander ..with every commander at every level viewing the identical graphical display. In this manner collaborative planning and synchronized execution of actions is achieved and the entire system acts as a single unit , coherent unit driven by the situational awareness generated.

So far so good.

We can along these same lines create an intelligence common operational picture ICOP so that every command level can share , synchronize and integrate the intelligence products , intelligence feeds from tactical operation centers supporting multiple companies, force protection intelligence , security products like vulnerability assessment and threat assessment, attack and IED frequency distributions and profiles , special operations forces and R&S debriefs and intelligence reports from the CI element attached to the teams and finally OSINT which actually accounts for more than 90% of our intelligence input though rarely realized.

If we can have a combined tabbed representation of all the above in portal form on the desk of the command intelligence staff at every level , with continuous updating by operators in the command analysis section , in the TOCs and if we can ensure that all company and platoons with organic intelligence capability (pl refer to my project ARMY XXII) are commanded and controlled by the ''created'' Bn Int HQ properly and technically then the 2 intelligence analysts can ''push'' intelligence discipline-specific (HUMINT , SIGINT , Tactical questioning by trained inf soldiers , DOCEX , CEE etc) information efficiently to their TOCs..with all the TOC forming a TOC NET...connected with every command int section through secure communication lines ..all the connected command staff computers forming a LAN at every command level..all these LAN networks being connected to form a WAN network comprising the entire Brigade ..then we can achieve the ICOP , with the result that situational awareness is heightened considerably as accurate , specific and timely intelligence is the foundation of information warfare...if we have to get that competitive edge over our enemy and more importantly avert surprise.

Further this tabbed display will be in near real time. Every command int staff and even the soldier on the ground belonging to the created (My project ARMY XXII) can easily access the display..common at every level , and retrieve information of immediate need--this ''intelligence reach'' is extremely important for tactical missions but hardly do soldiers on the ground can access timely information or combat intelligence. Again this portal can facilitate updating of information through intelligence gathered by soldiers and fed into the system by simply entering the information in a ''contact us'' message form interface.

Please go here for complete details: http://bit.ly/doctrinexxii

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