Introduction

An efficient intelligence service must conduct planning, deployment and management of collection assets and platforms, execute, control and evaluate the operations with the primary mission to retain a decision advantage over the opponent, both in peace time and during War/LIC.Two main approaches must be embodied: Criminalization Strategy and Prevent disrupt and counter the enemy’s multidimensional intelligence threat. In the first approach the apprehended elements are captured and convicted as per court of law whereas in the second strategy we intend to thwart enemy actions using HUMINT/Counterintelligence. Intelligence feeds into both strategies in four modes of deployment: to make strategic assessments, including of the sources, nature and levels of threat, and the need for new resources or security measures; to feed into criminalisation operations in which individuals may ultimately be dealt with through the courts; to feed into control operations such as disruption and surveillance; to feed into control operations which deal with individuals by overt executive measures. These modes are not exclusive to terrorism, save for the final option.

HUMINT is generally considered ‘’passive’’—assets and platforms in the form of HUMINT operatives and governmental/commercial (or official cover/unofficial cover) bases. This is an approach with a fallacy---HUMINT should be proactive, sometimes defensive and not always reactive. A patrol debrief tells us there is a sudden troop movement in named area of interest alpha and so we begin intelligence activity.Thats reactive.Had we depoloyed HUMINT agents well in advance to look beyond the forward areas by intermingling with the local population on a daily basis, eliciting information, keeping continuous contacts with the sources/informers,liasing with local police, keeping a tab on political developments and open source intelligence like publications,newspapers,media,rallies,public meetings, information gleaned from the internet about enemy govt policies, their arms purchases, their foreign policies with respect to our nation—all these will definitely give the HUMINT agent a feel of the pulse in the area of operations and if there is any ‘’imminent’’ change in it (mind you, I didn’t say any ‘’change’’ in it like the reported deployment) he is bound to catch the new pulse. Before deployment to an area of operations HUMINT and CI personnel should move in first to secure the ‘’human terrain’’ as well as the physical terrain from the intelligence perspective. This is what we can term –‘’intelligence and force projection capability’’ for an area of operations which is unknown to us in all terms. This is frequently the condition when the tactical commander successfully wraps up an operation in a defined AO and then is suddenly ordered to move into a new area much forward and totally unknown and occupied by enemy provocateurs and agents. Had he projected his force and available intelligence assets(after deploying his main  assets for current operation and earmarking those available for projection tasking , like HUMIT,CI..) in the new AO while he was conducting his ops in the present AO , he could have been well prepared when the order came in. Here intelligence preparation of the battlefield will focus on both the local populace and the physical environment. The intent is to act as a forewarning system for the to-be deployed troops. This is also a force-protection intiative.Similarly when operations are being conducted in one Area of operations during a larger campaign commander’s pitch in all platforms of intelligence collection systems to accomplish a tactical victory. That is fine and is the standard procedure in the event of a conflict. What the commander doesn’t think is to extend his view beyond the Area of operations far away in hostile territory which is yet to see our troops in action and  which is in control of the enemy. We need to project a part of our intelligence collection assets into that area/territory.

Foremost in the analysis of Intelligence tactics/strategies are the following questions: what was the quality of the intelligence; what were the processes in which the intelligence was used and did they put the intelligence to a suitable test?

An exercise-specific chapter has been included to show how to set up an intelligence collection unit comprised of functional cells (staffed with HUMINT personnel)and defining and setting up the control mechanism comprised of headquarters and technical control/analysis/in-process team management centers-the entire exercise being driven by the intelligence need of the commander as specified in the carefully worded mission which will spell out the needed intelligence requirements in general which will further be broken down into IR and SIRs after observing the indicators by deploying the HUMINT operatives in accordance to a carefully built up collection plan. The exercise is not an extensive one but highlights the need of proper definition of the mission (which implies the commander knows the intelligence gaps) thus enabling the commander to specify the intelligence requirements accurately.(and this is often not the case resulting in wastage of collection resources and platforms by focusing on less priority intelligence needs and overlooking the real requirement—deployment of collection systems in this manner also affects other operations outside the current area of operation as too little or no intelligence collection platforms available for intel collection/analysis in those areas).Secondly the exercise attempts to clearly show how to develop priority intelligence requirements, develop a strategy to answer those requirements(mission, goals) and creating a mechanism for the collection assets to answer those requirements. What is also intended here by the exercise that in any LIC/COIN environment, at the tactical unit level, the commander can create a unit for collecting intelligence and not depending entirely on other agencies supporting the operation—for example in Maoist areas of West Bengal ,India, the CRPF can create its own unit without always resorting to the intelligence departments of the State police,IB.An organic unit sometimes comes very handy. Training personnel in intelligence operations can be done with the assistance of agencies who have HUMINT/CI units like the Armed forces. If the Army can help in training the CRPF for example in jungle warfare and other COIN specific combat, then surely it can also train soldiers in HUMINT  and CI.Apart from intelligence specialists , the soldiers , MP personnel , civil affairs personnel etc are the Secondary collectors who by virtue of their regular contact with the local populace at checkposts,roadblocks,during patrolling or even during battle at forward areas when they encounter and detain civilians , EPWs , come across information –combat information which they can recognize of having intelligence value and quickly forward it to the intelligence specialists. Just training the soldier on the ground in Tactical Questioning without making him go through the rigors of intelligence training will sufficiently empower him to recognize and extract combat information from daily encounters. The concept of Every Soldier is a Sensor can revolutionize the entire intelligence concept of the Army.