Military School

BATALLION MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

We can have an integral organic intelligence capability at the Battalion level:
The Bn Intelligence section will consist of the Bn intelligence officer, a JCO , 2 havildars and 6
infantry soldiers. The Bn Intelligence section will interface between the companies and the
Bde.The companies pass on intelligence information for processing to the Bn Intelligence section
who in turn passes them on to the Bde and also as per ground requirements from the companies
and Bn staff .The Bn intelligence section will develop sources and contacts from among the local
population and liaise with the civil police and intelligence agencies. The question of
deconfliction arises at this stage as the line companies and platoons have their sorces , contacts
and liaisons as well as the civil agencies. It is the responsibility of the Bn intelligence section to
deconflict its sources with all these sources, contacts and liaisons. The Bn intelligence section
will use its HUMINT and other capabilities to detect weapons/explosives caches, collect
incriminating evidentiary information for prosecution by the civil agencies and increase the
overall situational understanding of the Bn and Bde commanders and staff. Delineation of
sources between the Bn , the line companies , the platoons and the HUMINT units is very
important by clearly defining the responsibilities of each with respect to the sources. We can
have contacts like community leaders of influence , local politicians and councilors , surface and
witting contacts as well as those contacts who are very useful , can supply information of rich
intelligence value but need protection which will be the responsibility of the HUMINT units. The
overt contacts like the community leaders etc can be the responsibility of the Bn intelligence
section while the surface contacts and liaison can be given to the line units and platoons. The
same line units and platoons can forward to HUMINT units any source of HUMINT interest
which they come across community operations , patrolling or tactical operations.
Just like the Staff composition at Division level we can create similar structure at the Divn Bn
level. There will be an Ops Staff officer and an Intelligence Staff officer. Compared to the Ops
Staff officer the Int Staff officer, by virtue of his direct contact with the Div Staff Officer is
better aware of all Div intelligence requirements, prioritized or otherwise and which
requirements are tasked to subordinate units. His duties include analyzing collected information
by Bn Int Section and effect the transfer of intelligence laterally and vertically, laterally to
adjacent units , higher headquarters , line companies and even to the line platoon base camps.
The Ops Staff officer will see to the tasking of Div intelligence requirements to all subordinate
units.
To further push down the intelligence capability to the line companies level and platoon level ,
we can assign 2 NCOs at each line company and one soldier to take over as intelligence
representative and co-located at the platoon level. During patrolling , reconnaissance by the
Company soldiers , platoon soldiers , all collected information will be filtered , categorized and
forwarded to the Bn Intelligence section for analysis and dissemination laterally and to higher
headquarters. The intelligence soldiers at Company and Platoon levels can also requisition
intelligence and imagery information from higher headquarters.
Secondary Collectors:
HUMINT collection is not limited only to HUMINT personnel. These can be termed primary
collectors.HUMINT can also be and is collected (sometimes unknowingly and never reported)
by secondary collectors like military police , troops and civil affairs personnel.
Take a scenario. A soldier comes across a man who offers information which the soldier feels
could be of use to the HUMINT people. He does not bring the source in focus by detaining him
or questioning him before others. He stays friendly , eliciting as much as possible after the source
finishes his narration. He does all this discreetly. He manages to record the details of the source
and when he is back from the check post to his camp he discreetly meets the Bn Int section
officer and fills him up with all the information he has gatrhered.Therafter one and only one
soldier in the Bn Int section passes on the information to the HUMINT operative with the contact
details of the source.
In a second scenario the soldier may come across something , say a weapons cache , which he
recognizes , and this exploitable intelligence he again passes on to the Bn Int section discreetly.
In both cases he won’t tell his colleagues or anyone. Thus we find line soldiers and other
secondary collectors, if they keep their eyes and ears open, can create a good surface contacts
base , thus reducing the workload on primary HUMINT collectors by gathering exploitable
intelligence , the primary collectors can now focus on more important issues like prioritized
intelligence requirements of the Commander. If all or many of the line soldiers or other
secondary collectors work in this fashion the surface contacts base grows phenomenally, thus
creating a secondary source base. Thus we achieve synchronization between primary and
secondary collectors. The fact that the soldier does not tell any of his colleagues or even the
chain of command renders the information to be exploited and away from any technical or
influence detractors by limiting the sphere of knowledge. Further it is possible that any primary
source may have links with the individual dealing with the secondary collector or any other link
and this can be of value to the primary HUMINT collectors. Hence the bottom-line should be
personal contact and liaison with the local community for every patrolling member.
Mission Responsibilities of commanders (with regard to soldiers who are not intelligence
personnel, but come across information on tactical questioning—secondary collectors)
Squad/Section/Patrol/TCP/Roadblock/Convoy Leader:
Patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints, convoys—all these come into contact with enemy
personnel (captured), civilians, civil suspects/detainees and criminal elements who can be
subjected to tactical questioning. Hence the mission is to train the involved personnel in
tactical questioning and integrate it in the planning and preparation/execution of the said
activities. Pursuant to this prepare for debriefing after all personnel of patrols etc report to
the unit intelligence officer
Prepare reports , verbally (debriefing) or written on any observations or information
extracted after tactical questioning including being able to recognize any information of
so much importance(combat intelligence) that it must be reported immediately without
delay.
During such activities like patrolling, convoy etc all EPW/Detainee and seized documents
must be subjected to exploitation carefully as these are prime sources of intelligence.
All the above should be predicated by the Unit intelligence officers tasking of prioritized
intelligence requirements but collection outside these should not be ignored if such
information is delivered by the source concerned. They might be of tactical value to the
Commander or HUMINT officers.
Platoon Leader:
Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader
based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
Instruct and see to it that it is followed to the book that all personnel returning from
patrolling, manning checkpoints, convoys etc report everything and get subjected to full
debriefing.
Highlight before them the high importance of submitting information of immediate tactical
value without ANY delay. Make it very clear this is mandatory. To this effect he should
apprise everyone of the procedures laid down by the battalion intelligence staff in this
regard.
Company/Troop/Battery Commander:
Squad/section/patrol/ CP/roadblocks, and convoy leaders are tasked by the platoon leader
based on intelligence requirements as laid down by higher headquarters.
All intelligence inputs by the personnel involved in patrolling and tasked with collection are
reviewed and forwarded to the Bn intelligence staff and Bde staff. While doing this highlight that
information that is linked to the current operations or the AO environment.
Make it mandatory for everyone to be debriefed in keeping with the procedures laid down by
higher headquarters intelligence staff.
Ensure that everyone understands that it is mandatory to report information IMMEDIATELY
of critical value.
Battalion STAFF INT OFFICER and S3 Sections:
Task the company, section, squad commanders on intelligence requirements and guide them
through the Staff headquarters.
Push down intelligence information to these command levels so as to enable them to get a
better situational understanding and know what is expected of them. Thus they will be
able to frame tactical questions better.
See to it that all patrols etc are debriefed and no one is left out.
Establish procedures for immediate reporting of information of critical tactical value.

The fighting forces engaged directly with the enemy, companies and the platoons therein come
into regular contact with the local communities, local administration, village heads and
panchayats, and the enemy itself. The battalion may have its own intelligence section and if it
does the section is very understaffed with one intelligence officer and an aide. The troops depend
wholly on brigade intelligence inputs and intelligence feeds from other agencies. These inputs
come as a result for requests for information from the ground and the process of requesting,
tasking the request to brigade intelligence personnel, gathering the intelligence using collection
platforms and pulling intelligence from adjacent headquarters, units and from national agencies
and finally pushing it down to the combat team all takes time resulting in untimely intelligence
feeds. Add to this the total lack of first hand contact of Brigade level intelligence section with the
human and enemy terrain of the area of operations (human terrain is the local population) which
is enjoyed by the troops on the ground fully. This lack of contact leads to low level of situational
understanding of the higher headquarters and whatever ..NEXT

HOME