INTEGRATION OF INTELLIGENCE INTO PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Before we delve into the problem of intelligence education for our soldiers we must first state a clear mission statement on intelligence.

A mission statement describes the purpose and vision of an organization. It helps keep the organization focused on its goals by providing a roadmap for the employees.In a similar fashion a clear concise mission statement is needed for intelligence.We must not forget that intelligence is both a product and an organization.If we define the mission statement optimally , clearly and without any ambiguity we can determine the current deficiencies as the goal , the objectives will be clear to us and we will be able to discern where there are divergences.

The what , when , who and how components of the mission statement will highlight the inherent probs in our intelligence education and also the possible solutions.

Six fundamental intelligence deficiencies were identified These fundamental intelligence deficiencies were identified as six distinct problems that need to be addressed. They are:

(1) Inadequate doctrinal foundation

(2) Lack of a "Professional" Occupational Field

(3) Insufficient Tactical Intelligence Support

(4) Insufficient Joint Manning,(21)

(5) Inadequate Imagery Capability

(6) Insufficient Language Capability

Concepts and Actions based on mission.

1. We need to have a focused operations domain to utilize intelligence effectively. Or for that matter to execute intelligence operations correctly in the first place. To this end we must understand that our troops are mostly fighting battles, not wars. The target is tactical intelligence. Whether be it an antiterrorist operation in Kashmir, an anti-insurgency operation in Assam or a tactical assault mission in Kargil—the focus of intelligence is tactical, not broad based, not spread over the entire spectrum of tactical, operational or strategic intelligence. Intelligence training and education can take on three forms. At the national level what is required is training for strategic intelligence. Whereas the Joint Intelligence Committee ius concerned with training for operational and region-specific intelligence. But if we see closely the operations-pattern currently being conducted in parts of the country, we find our soldiers are fighting tactical battles.Hence those forces who generally handle tactical operations need to be educated and trained in tactical intelligence.

2. The focus of support must be downward.

3. Intelligence must drive operations.

4. All intelligence disciplines must be used coherently so as to lend credence or refute obtained intelligence. Each should complement the other. A situation may warrant exclusion of certain disciplines, such as a thick canopy will hinder UAV photography or imagery and render HUMINT as the only resource for the moment but disciplines like SIGINT can be brought into play to confirm or deny the intelligence obtained using HUMINT.

5. The unit intelligence officer should be educated and trained in all forms of intelligence disciplines so that he may better manage, coordinate and exercise good technical control over various intelligence collection operations.

6. Intelligence is the product of the intelligence organization. The intelligence staff officers are the ones who use this product in planning and executing operations.

7. The last step in the intelligence cycle is utilization, not dissemination.

8. HUMINT is indispensable , and at times the only collection resource available.HUMINT capability must be pushed down to the boot level. It must be enhanced significantly.

9. Proper Delineation of intelligence tasks specific to a particular discipline is very important.Increased use of CI agents to carry out HUMINT functions (as both contain similar tactics and techniques , the tendency is to use CI) result in CI being defined in terms of HUMINT and seen from this perspective. This is a major fallacy as other attributes of CI which are not in the HUMINT repository tend to be overlooked with the result that CI , a very powerful counterintelligence tool , gets relegated to the back seat.This also leads to the fact that we need to define intelligence and counterintelligence carefully.

10. To achieve Force protection most optimally , a multidisciplinary intelligence effort must be ion place.

11. SIGINT must focus primarily on tactical intelligence.

OUR SCHOOLS MUST MEET THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:

• Intelligence is as important as other battlefield functions like fire and maneuver .

• Familiarize with our intelligence system.

• Thoroughly understand how the Commander utilizes intelligence , or in other words how is intelligence important for the commander and how does it support the Commander in planning and executing operations.

• Review our intelligence system.

• Thoroughly understand how all are responsible to the intelligence system.

• Thoroughly understand what is expected of us by the intelligence system.This will highlight the necessity of defining and prioritizing intelligence requirements by Commander and lower units intelligence officers,the collection managers capability of managing assets optimally ,the capacity of the intelligence manager to synchronize reconnaissance and surveillance with the intelligence parameters,and all other capabilities/faculties of intelligence officers and personnel which should be developed to the full.

• Keeping the above in perspective , familiarize with the procedures resorted to by the intelligence/operations staff to meet the intelligence systems expectations in order to make it run at its peak performance.

• Thoroughly understand the prime need of intelligence in planning and demonstrate this fact.

• Intelligence needs to be thoroughly integrated with operations.It drives Ops.

Professional Military Education for Commanders for Commanders

Must study our present intelligence system , understand his role in the system , and how the current system fulfills his expectations and what is expected of him from the intelligence system.

What is expected from his staff , Intelligence , Operations meet those expectations and how.

Must understand how others are responsible to the intelligence system.

Must understand how to utilize intelligence in Planning

Must understand the concept of Intel-Ops dynamic thoroughly. To this end he should familiarize himself how he may assist the Staff (Intel and Ops,) or the Unit intelligence officer to integrate operations with intelligence in order to increase performance.

Commanders must thoroughly understand the following:

1. Our intelligence systems structure, its limitations , its capabilities.

2. Commanders must understand that intelligence operations need direction , focus and that can be achieved if requirements are clearly defined and prioritized.

3. Commanders must always utilize intelligence while planning. Any military decision making process needs intelligence inputs on a continual updated basis.The importance of intelligence during military planning just cannot be overemphasized.An operations/missions success is predicated by sound intelligence.Timely , specific and accurate.

4. Intelligence not only drives operations , intelligence is not separately involved but rather it resides inside the operations cycle .Intelligence and operations ned to be integrated.Commander must clearly know how to utilize intelligence to drive operations and how operations can lead to more intelligence that can be further exploited.This intelligence-operations dynamic is what in essence the benchmark for success in a military operation.

5. The last part of intelligence cycle is not dissemination but utilization.What matters more is how the disseminated intelligence products are utilized by the end users like the Commander or policy makers.

6. Clearly defining intelligence requirements should be the starting point in planning.Prioritizing these requirements can only help in focusing intelligence on operations.Poorly defined and prioritized intelligence requirements can cause wastage in intelligence resources , as well as time and effort.

7. Intelligence is as important as other battlefield functions like fire and maneuver and needs to be thoroughlky synchoronized with operations.

8. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield or area of operations. This is extremely important before any planning activity.

9. How to integrate intelligence in battlefield function training exercises.

(c) Demonstrate how intelligence supports the commander.