Saturday, October 03, 2015

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS AT ACCESS POINT TO INSTALLATION

for

CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE

FORT WILLIAM

BY KESHAV MAZUMDAR  ATO , DIR CFET

PART 1

Regulate Access to a Military Installation

Prerequisites: In a situation in which an individual is seeking to access an installation by either a truck or as a pedestrian, standard army equipment and unit SOPs come into play. The directives in such cases empower the military installation access point supervisor to regulate all incoming and outgoing traffic , material and personnel with emphasis on careful examination of those vehicles which do not bear Army Decal or where individuals/personnel fail to produce proper authorization/photo ID cards. Such directives are issued by the Installation Commander. In special cases where the visitor/vehicle has to be allowed despite lack of authorization/ID Card or no display of Army Decal , local SOPs relevant to such issues apply. But whatever be the case standing orders dictate that the necessary prerequisite for access/entry to a military installation/area is that all pedestrian-carried packages and trucks that do not possess DOD decal be checked .

There should be provision for another standing instruction that if any vehicle whose occupant/driver is unable to produce a legitimate ID proof should be diverted into a vehicle inspection lane and the vehicle and occupants searched thoroughly. To gain access the individual without legitimate identity must be matched against the barred person(s) list and must get the approval of an individual with a legitimate ID to stand as a surety before issuing entrance into the installation.

– Standards: Military installation safety, government property protection, and obstruct illegitimate personnel, packages, and/or truck from coming into the installation.

A . FOR INCOMING VEHICLES

Performance Steps         

1.As the vehicle approaches , speed limited by a speed breaker , observe its exterior carefully.Approach the vehicle normally without raising any suspicion or fear or else in case the vehicle occupants are terrorists/criminals they might escape.

2.  Using hand and arm signals to restrict truck/Veh.

NOTE:  Be very clear in view to the driver and position yourself so that you can see most of the vehicle and its occupants as best as possible.Do not stand in front of the approaching vehicle signaling it to slow down or stop.

3. Interview driver and vehicle occupants.

– The license plate , decal should be observed and there should be no mismatch with the blue book and the decal should be legitimate. License should not be an expired one. Photograph should match with driver. There should be no blemishes suggesting forgery in the license. Pay particular attention to military ID card and Decal.IDs should always be valid. Note the issuing authority and issue/expiry dates.

– See to it that the Decal belongs to DOD and should not have expired.

– All through the interview keep eye contact with the driver to note any nervousness , stammering or any suspicious behavior not warranted for a vehicle driver with normal entry intent.

NOTE:   The military installation access point is the most important security parameter and the MP manning the MIAP should act as a sentinel protecting the installation/military property and has full powers to initiate a search , detain the driver and occupants or send them to the interrogation cell.

4.  If vehicle and occupants  bear no authorized Decal or papers , they must be sent to the vehicle inspection area immediately.

5. When the vehicle has crossed into the military area and proceeds for inspection or comes to a halt for driver interview the security elements at the access point (inf soldiers) should keep a constant vigil and so must the assault teams inside the perimeter and hidden from view.

NOTE:   SOP will determine if an initial pass will be issued once the inspection is over. See the  SOP for further clarification.

6. The MP should always have a mentality of disallowing any entry. This will make him more proactive , cautious , investigative and on the alert.

7. In cases where the individual (pedestrian) or occupants of a vehicle without any Govt Decal is unable to furnish proof of identity or ant satisfactory reply to the initial screening interview , he should be immediately escorted to the visitors room for a full physical check of his person and belongings and if still there is a doubt , he be handed over to int elements for interrogation in the interrogation cell.

8. But do not mishandle him or be high-handed as this is a security measure to get proof. Legal measures to obtain  proof involve prosecution measures once a doubt arises and evidence is there to support it.

– NOTE:  It can happen that the driver and occupants of the vehicle are under duress due to the presence of someone inside the vehicle. SOPs should contain directives/policies which will enable the access control MP to detect such behaviour.If so immediately take appropriate security measures.

 9.Grant or Deny Access to the installation using hand and arm signals.

– If everything is in order , ID cars , decal , reason for entry , you may grant access to the installation.

– If not and if the driver refuses to be taken to the vehicle inspection section or the visitor refuses to undergo a search , disallow entry and also detain as such behavior are possible indicators of forced entry /enemy  intent. After detention report the matter to the counter int unit immediately. Alert the security elements and radio the assault teams.

B. PEDESTRIAN

– Watch him carefully as he approaches. Dressed inappropriately? Any bulges in his clothing? Wearing thick clothes in winter , any bulges prominent?

– Check thoroughly any baggage/item he is carrying by hand.

– If he fails to prove he is military personnel , frisk him for concealed weapons.

– There is a certain behavior characteristic of terrorists –the ‘’fight or flight’’ mechanism. This can take the form in audible/vocal mode or physical mode. The MP and security elements must be trained to detect this early. For this force protection training is very essential.

The primary intent should be to detect any anomaly in the external behavioral characteristics and appearance BEFORE the visitor crosses the line of entry to the installation.

There should always be two HUMINT and one CI element at the access point.

10. Interview the Individual.

– Same as what was done with the driver and occupants in the VEHICLE case.

– Any briefcase , package , container with the individual  , if on inspection , produces documents , material worthy of int exploitation –should be referred to the intelligence personnel at the access point and clarifications sought from the visitor as to why he is carrying them in his possession.

– Maintain eye contact with the person during the interview period and report any suspicious behavior to your supervisor.

11.Determine if individual has authorized access.

– If the pedestrian cannot furnish or refuses to furnish ID cards or authorization documents immediately escort him to the visitor’s room for further interrogation and search. There should always be a ‘’barred personalities’’ list with photographs and brief past history , addresses and other profile characteristics. The individuals identity should be matched with this list. This is very important.

– If and only if any military person from within the installation vouches for the person or states he has called him , then the individual may be granted access. OR ELSE NO.

– The MPs response is either to allow or deny access.Thats it. He is not there to procure legal evidence to disallow entry. But at the same time the intelligence personnel , especially the counterintelligence personnel—their duty is to detect , deter , prevent  terrorist , subversive , insurgent activity and be on the lookout for enemy agents and from this perspective they can step in for further interrogation , document and material exploitation. These twin roles of the MP and the intelligence elements should be deconflicted , with proper delineation of functions and perfect understanding between the commanding officers of the MP unit (ECPU/BAPU) and ECCIU.

• NOTE:  Local SOP will dictate whether a temporary visitor's pass is issued.  See local SOP for further guidance.

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12. Grant or Deny Access to the installation.

• In cases whereby person has been identified with an authorized government issued photo ID and has he/she is without  bag, or container to search, access should be granted to the installation.

• In cases whereby person is not identified and refuses to report to the Visitor's Center, access to the installation should be denied.

PART II

Supervise an Access Control Point

• Conditions: Given an Access Control Point, personnel, appropriate equipment, current force protection threat level, Local SOPs, access control rosters, 

• Standards: Access Control Personnel should be supervised at an installation access control point.

PERFORMANCE STEPS

• 1.  Ensure that the Special Guard Orders include execution instructions for such items as:

– Sign-in procedures.

– Access rosters.

– Emergency vehicles.

– Processing of authorized identification card holders.        

– Contact roster for key personnel.

– Map of installation.

– Phone numbers for the key organizations of the installation being guarded.

– Random Antiterrorism  measures for THREAT LEVELS guidance.

– Use of force guidance.

– List of personnel barred from the installation.

• 2.  Guard Mount. The Assault elements placement/manning.

• 3.  Before assuming duty after the end of a shift ascertain all communication lines with the MP Desk, Assault teams , ECCIU ,  both telephonic  and radio , are in order. Ensure the CCTVs are in working order.

• 4.  Conduct a proper inventory of existing equipment and immediately report ant discrepancies. This should be done prior to taking charge of the inventory.

• 5.  Ensure the traffic control devices are employed 

– Barriers.

– Directional signs.

– Illumination

– Traffic cones.

• 6.  Inspect conditions of the facilities (gate house, visitor’s center) and  surrounding areas.

– Are all component parts functioning properly. Doors , windows , AC , sitting arrangements , lighting. The appearance should appeal to the eyes , neatness and being organized being the military dictum.

– Ensure surrounding areas are properly maintained, free of debris

• 7.  Ensure all gate discrepancies and facility deficiencies are annotated for record or reported.

– Communication failures.

– All work orders.

– Immediately report all deficiencies that affect access control operations.

• 8. If there is any documentation in form of investigation reports on violations detected and identified by the MPs then supervise them.

• 9.  Ensure appropriate interaction by personnel with the public.

– Idle conversation (guards and MP , between guards , MP and visiting colleagues) is impeding the flow of vehicle or foot traffic and causing the guards and MP to lower their alertness.

– MPs maintain proper courtesy and military bearing.

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 10.  Supervise immediate gate closure procedures.

– Alarm activations.

–  Threat levels level and SOP.

• 11.  Ensure gate equipment inventory was conducted, and facility inspected prior to the end of the shift.

Access Control Conditions

THREAT LEVEL BRAVO

When intelligence reports allude to heightened civil criminal activity near the installation or an increase in threat levels  , moderate , in the threat estimate  we have threat condition BRAVO. In such a situation there is no immediate need to deploy personnel and resources save a heightening in alert level and such a condition may continue for weeks/months.

In such a case ACCESS/ENTRY TO THE INSTALLATION IS CONTROLLED.

THREAT LEVEL CHARLIE

This threat level arises when intelligence reports indicate very heightened terrorist movements and indicators of near-future attack and which warrants urgent anti-terrorism measures. This level of threat continues for a short time , demands heightened threat perception on the part of soldiers , MPs manning the access point and moderate force protection measures deployed at the point. Unit activities and personnel movements are not hampered.

IN SUCH A CASE ACCESS/ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY SECOND HIGHEST LEVEL OF SECURITY MEASURES.

THREAT LEVEL DELTA

This is a situation when the installation is under a terrorist attack , or impending attack or if there is any direct terrorist attack in the vicinity of the installation. It is not practicable to continue this level for a long duration as this forces hardship on the MPs , soldiers  and the unit. In such a situation tactical combat teams are already engaged so as to bring the situation to control rapidly and the ACCESS/ENTRY IS GOVERNED BY DIRECTIVES/MEASURES  RELATING TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF SECURITY