This chapter discusses
terrorism and efforts by the commander to deter the threat of terrorism. It
also presents measures and precautions that should be enforced across the
operational continuum. The major focus must be on stopping a terrorist act
before it happens. Vulnerability must be reduced by providing conditions
unfavorable to the terrorist. The commander achieves success by not having a
loss of life, equipment, or material through an act of terrorism. (
To counter terrorism, the
commander must understand terrorism. Also, he must know the countermeasures
that reduce the chance of a successful terrorist attack against installations,
units, and personnel.
The DOD defines
terrorism as "the unlawful use--or threat--of force or violence against
people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to
achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives." A terrorist's
activities do not conform to rules or laws of warfare. His methods include hostage
taking, hijacking, sabotage, assassination, arson, hoaxes, bombings, raids,
seizures, use of NBC weapons, and so on. Victims are often noncombatants,
symbolic persons and places, and political/military figures. Often the victims
have no role in either causing or correcting a terrorist's grievance.
The use of terrorism is
not limited to the early stages of a conflict. It can and probably will occur
in any level of conflict from peace through general war. Terrorist tactics are
described as elusive, surprising, and brief violent actions.
The common strategy of
the terrorist is to commit acts of violence. These acts draw the attention of
the people, the government, and the world to his cause. The media plays a
crucial part in this strategy by giving terrorists international recognition.
The danger is that this kind of attention tends to incite acts of violence by
other terrorist groups.
a. The victim of the
terrorist is seldom his target. The target, or focal point, more often includes
the general public, government, or perhaps the business sector.
b. Some common tactics
terrorists use include the following:
(1) Bombing. The tactic common to most terrorist
groups is bombing. Of all terrorist incidents recorded during the 1980s, 67
percent resulted from the terrorist bomb. The bomb is a popular weapon, because
it is cheap to produce, easy to make, has variable uses, and is difficult to
detect and trace after the event. The increase in bombing activity and the
sophistication of devices used caused the NATO EOD Standardization Committee to
classify all terrorist bombs as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The term IED is now used by many law enforcement
agencies as well as military forces. Some IED subclassifications
include:
(a) Delivery means. Methods of getting the bomb to the target.
§
Vehicle bombs--booby-trapped vehicles, attached devices, and car
bombs (cars filled with explosives).
§
Laid charges--bombs placed by hand.
§
Projected bombs--bombs thrown by hand or projected by a mortar
device.
§
Postal bombs.
§
Bicycle bombs.
(b) Activation means. Three ways to activate an IED.
§
Command activation--by radio, electric leads, pull wire/mechanical
strikers.
§
Action by the subject/target--trip wire, pressure device, light
sensitive device, electric.
§
Time delay--clock, burning fuse, chemical delay, atmospheric
pressure.
(c) Usage. Two broad classifications.
§
Tactical improvised explosive devices (IED)--normally regarded as
being those used against an individual. These include nail bombs, claymore
devices, and covert bombs. In fact, any IED can be classified as a tactical
IED.
§
Strategic IEDs--considered to be those
used indiscriminately to gain world attention--for example, in crowded shopping
centers, on aircraft, and so on. They are those bombs designed to strike at
society, the government, and the present system.
(d) Hoaxes. Whatever the type of IED, the terrorist often uses it
to gain recognition and to show he is serious. Once he has established himself
as a bomber, he can continue to disrupt, though not destroy, by using well-made
and wellplaced hoax bombs. The use of hoaxes with
live IEDs can keep security forces occupied and
disrupt counterterrorist operations.
(2) Arson. Although not a popular tactic among
terrorists, arson can destroy and disrupt such targets as public utilities,
political headquarters, and, more commonly, economic/industrial targets (shops,
factories, hotels). The most popular method of starting fires is with
time-delay incendiary devices, often carried in a cigarette packet or cassette
tape container. These devices are easy to conceal and difficult to detect. As
with bombing, incendiary devices are cheap and easy to make.
(3) Hijacking. Hijacking and skyjacking were common
during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. Hijacking of vehicles carrying staple
foods was a favored tactic of the Supemaros and
suited their style of armed propaganda. The hijacking would be followed quickly
by the free distribution of the vehicle's cargo to the poor and needy along
with terrorist propaganda that advertised the terrorists' cause. In any
continuing terrorist activity, such as in Spain or Northern Ireland, the
hijacking of a vehicle will likely be associated with a future atrocity. For
example, a hijacked gasoline truck may appear later as a 50,000-pound benzine bomb wired with explosives. Also, hijacked
"legitimate" vehicles give the terrorist an easy means to gain entry
to a closed military post.
(4) Ambush. Well-planned ambushes seldom fail.
Ambushes usually include the use of diversions and early-warning teams.
Properly rehearsed, they are executed with precision. The terrorist has time on
his side and spends weeks or months preparing for an operation and waiting for
the right opportunity. The terrorist can chose his own time and place of
operation and, if his intended victim habitually uses the same route, the
terrorist can conduct countless rehearsals before execution.
(5) Kidnapping. Not all ambushes are designed to kill
the principal. Kidnapping for ransom accounted for 7.9 percent of terrorist
incidents in the last decade and must still be viewed as a serious option for
terrorist groups. The kidnapper confines his victim in a secret hideaway and
makes material demands (money, weapons, exchange of personnel, and so on). A
failed kidnapping may result in hostage taking.
(6) Hostage
taking. The
difference between hostage taking and kidnapping is minimal. The hostage taker
normally confronts authorities and openly holds his victims for ransom. The
hostage taker demands more than just material things-- political concessions
are often demanded in exchange for the lives of the hostages. Hostage taking is
a new and popular terrorist tactic. By its nature, hostage taking attracts the
media; the fact that live hostages are involved increases the drama of the
event. The hostage is a tangible asset with which to bargain. Therefore,
terrorists can apply pressure to force concessions that otherwise might not be
made. Through kidnapping and hostage taking, terrorists can acquire large gains
at minimal cost, although risks are involved.
(7) Assassination. Assassination is perhaps the oldest
terrorist tactic and is still used today. Targets are often predictable, and
terrorist groups claim them after the event. Targets include government
officials, corporate executives, police, military personnel, and security
officials.
(8) Other
tactics. Whatever
tactics terrorists use, they are simple to apply, dynamic in effect,
hit-and-run by nature, and designed to strike their objective rather than the
victim. Terrorists will always do a thorough reconnaissance and a detailed
plan. Time is not a factor. Commanders must be aware of the tactics of
potential terrorists in their AOR. Other possible tactics include the use of
chemicals, harassment, raids, sabotage, seizures, and maimings.
Terrorist groups today
do not operate alone and ignorant of one another. An international network
exists that provides great benefits for those who have paid their
"membership fee." It is not suggested that some international
headquarters plans terrorist acts across the globe. However, it is proven that
a type of international terrorists' support network does exist. The benefits
gained from such a network seem endless: arms, ammunition, money, intelligence,
explosives, safe houses. Most important is the experience and assistance given
in training and support facilities. Along with the resultant trained manpower,
the network grows.
A terrorist group's choice
of targets and tactics is also a function of the group's government
affiliation. They are categorized by government affiliation. This helps
security planners foresee terrorist targets, and his sophisticated intelligence
and weaponry. Terrorist groups are divided into three categories:
a. Nonstate
supported--a terrorist group that operates autonomously, receiving no
support from any government.
b. State supported--a terrorist group that
operates alone but receives support from one or more governments.
c. State directed--a terrorist group that
operates as an agent of a government, receiving substantial intelligence,
logistic, and operational support.
The immediate objective
of any terrorist attack normally complies with one or more categories. The
goals may be either immediate or long range. Terrorists demonstrate group
power, demand revenge, obtain logistic support, and cause a government to
overreact. They are recognized by coercion, intimidation, and provocation. At
the same time, terrorists gain support for themselves or an insurgency.
a. Immediate Goals.
(1)
Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause.
(2) Force government
reaction, overreaction, and repression leading to immediate public dissension.
(3) Harass, weaken, or
embarrass government, military, or other security forces.
(4) Obtain money or
equipment.
(5) Show a government's
inability to protect its citizens.
(6) Disrupt or destroy
primary means of mobility or communications.
(7) Demonstrate power or
threat credibility.
(8) Prevent or delay
decisions or legislation.
(9) Cause strikes or
work slowdowns.
(10) Discourage
impending foreign investments or foreign government assistance programs.
(11) Free prisoners.
(12) Seek vengeance.
b. Long-Range Goals.
(1)
Cause dramatic changes in government such as revolution, civil war, or war
between nations.
(2) Disrupt and
discredit an established infrastructure in support of an insurgency.
(3) Influence local,
national, or international policy decision making.
(4) Gain political
recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic or national group.
Anyone or anything can
be a target or victim of a terrorist act. However, to the terrorist, the
military represents a source of arms and material as well as a political or
national body. This places the military at great risk. The list below contains
some possible military targets of terrorists; it provides some areas of
concern. Targets may change as security is increased.
§
Sensitive night vision and communication items.
§
Arms.
§
Ammunition.
§
Command and control facilities.
§
Explosives.
§
Military officer training facilities.
§
Areas catering to personal needs (mess halls, barracks, post
exchange, commissary, gyms, religious activities, bars, community centers).
§
Hydroelectric plants, dams, gas pipelines, nuclear facility sites.
§
Communication lines/facilities, computer facilities.
§
Chemical storage sites.
§
Equipment warehouses.
§
Transportation centers, parking lots, airports, railheads, bus
depots, rail lines, shipyards.
§
Members of military force and their dependents.
§
Key leaders of the military.
§
Post offices and mail trucks.
Combatting terrorism consists of
two major categories. The commander must develop a plan that includes the
aspects of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The plan should reduce the
vulnerability of installations, units, and personnel during peacetime, predeployment, deployment, and redeployment. It should also
include measures for preventing, deterring, and responding to terrorism.
Installations, units,
and individuals employ antiterrorism measures to reduce the chance of falling
victim to a terrorist act. These measures are considered both active and
passive, designed to prevent a terrorist incident. They must involve each
member of the military community-- military, civilian, and family members. The
cornerstone for this program includes collecting and disseminating timely
threat information, conducting information awareness programs, and implementing
sound defensive measures. Three types of security measures to consider are
physical security, OPSEC, and personal security.
a. Physical Security. Physical security measures protect information, material,
and persons, as well as prevent criminal acts. Although terrorist activities
are criminal acts, there are some differences that must be considered when
providing physical security against terrorists. Terrorists are likely to be
more organized, better trained and educated, and more highly motivated than
other criminals. They are heavily armed and sophisticated in their ability to
defeat physical security measures. To provide physical security against
terrorists, leaders must consider the terrorist whose goal may include his own
self-destruction. This is different from security against other criminals or a
conventional enemy. Several actions can help determine what physical security
measures are needed.
(1)
Review crime-prevention surveys/inspections. These surveys consider the entire installation
as well as the effect on the surrounding civilian locale.
(2) Provide photos of
known terrorists to key personnel. These photos can be obtained through local
civilian and military authorities. The photos can also be prominently displayed
in common areas so that all personnel have access to them.
(3) Review physical
security surveys/inspections. This survey recommends action as a result of
on-site inspection of barriers, guard forces, communications, transportation,
contingency support, protective lighting, intrusion lighting, intrusion
detection system, and other physical security measures. These actions protect
installations from loss, theft, destruction, sabotage, or compromise.
(4) Review status of
work orders; establish the priority of work based on threat assessment.
(5) Determine if the
installation is closed or open. It is closed if ground and water access is
limited by a perimeter fence, controlled entry points, or other physical
barriers. If not, the commander must compensate by designating restricted
areas, providing entry control, and maintaining contingency plans to secure or
close all or part of the installation.
(6) Consider physical
security aspects.
§
Protective obstacles and barriers.
§
Electro-optical and night vision equipment.
§
Bomb threats.
§
Closed-circuit television.
§
Communications.
§
Entry control.
§
Intrusion detection systems.
§
Lighting.
§
Lock and key control.
§
Package and mail control.
§
Personnel reliability.
§
Location of restricted areas.
§
Inspection of water and food.
§
Inspection of key personnel vehicles.
The physical security
plan must be balanced in its orientation, with equal emphasis on preventing
criminal acts as well as terrorist acts. The commander must update his plan
continuously based on threat assessment.
b. Operational Security. Protecting information is the cornerstone of the OPSEC
program. The OPSEC program coordinates all actions needed to prevent an enemy
or terrorist from learning about plans and operations. Techniques of deception,
physical security, SIGSEC, and information security are interrelated and occur
at the same time. All planning must include measures to keep the potential
terrorist from obtaining information that could aid in a terrorist incident.
Four areas of information that terrorists can exploit are as follows:
(1) Human
intelligence. HUMINT involves using people to gather information
about military abilities and intentions to include installation day-to-day
activities. HUMINT sources can include seemingly unimportant bar or restaurant
conversations concerning operations, or the release of phone numbers and
addresses of key personnel. This threat can be countered by adhering to
physical security and information security practices, and by using countersurveillance and counterintelligence activities.
(2) Signal
intelligence. SIGINT concerns all forms of communications and
signal emission equipment. Terrorists may not be able to compromise
sophisticated equipment, but they can affect routine day-to-day communications
activities. For example, police or fire department frequencies are not changed
when radios are stolen, or telephones in sensitive areas are not checked for
bugging devices. This threat is countered by establishing communications
security and information security.
(3) Photo
intelligence. Terrorists use PHOTOINT to gain information through
coverage from aircraft, high terrain features, automobiles, and so on. PHOTOINT
can be countered through counterintelligence and countersurveillance
programs.
(4) Operational
patterns. Operational patterns of military organizations provide
information to a terrorist. To counter this threat, leaders must eliminate
patterns when possible. Otherwise, they should use deception measures to mask
the established pattern.
c. Personal
Security. No
person is immune to the threat of terrorism. Representatives of the US
Government are possible targets of terrorist activities. Terrorists may preselect offices, manufacturing plants, or other
installation assets as targets for bombing, sabotage, demonstrations,
abductions, and murders. Who occupies these buildings may be of little concern
to the terrorists. Measures that may be useful in deterring such acts are as
follows:
(1)
Control access to sensitive areas and command offices, both day and night.
(a) Prevent direct access to sensitive areas most likely to be
targets of terrorism. Do not locate command offices on the ground floor.
(b) Equip entrances to
sensitive areas and command offices with an alarm.
(c) Have an access
roster; escort visitors.
(d) Ensure
direct-security force personnel check command areas in their after-hours tour.
(e) Lock all restrooms
on floors where command offices are located (as well as others in a multistory
office building) to deter public access.
(f) Lock doors to
janitorial and other maintenance closets at all times.
(g) Lock doors to
telephone and electrical equipment rooms. Give access to maintenance and
telephone personnel only when they have such need.
(2) Select an interior
safe room for use if terrorists attack; do not identify it as a safe room.
(3) Maintain emergency
supplies such as first-aid equipment, bomb blankets, candles, rations, water,
lanterns, and so on. Inform key personnel as to where supplies are kept, and
the location of emergency exits and escape routes.
(4) Restrict the
personal history data on key personnel since this information could be used by
terrorists to select victims or to identify their homes and families.
(5) Recommend key
personnel parking areas not be identified by name but rather by number.
(6) Limit information on
travel agendas and plans of command or key personnel to only need-to-know
personnel.
(7) Increase the effect
of command and key personnel protective measures by encouraging them--
(a) To maintain a low profile.
(b) To be taught to
recognize the signs of surveillance by strangers.
(c) To use simple,
effective, verbal code signals to alert family or organizational members to a
physical threat.
(d) To vary routes to
and from work.
(e) To attend defensive
and evasive driving school.
(f) To inspect vehicles
before moving.
(g) To use protective
vests.
(h) To avoid likely
terrorist targeted areas.
(i)
To drive with windows closed and doors locked.
(j) To know key phrases
in the native language.
(k) To carefully screen
all domestic help.
(l) To know terrorist
techniques and methods of operation.
(m) To perform roadmap
reconnaissance to avoid suspected terrorist concentrations when traveling to
new destinations (restaurants, hotels, shopping, and so on).
The following terrorist
threat conditions describe progressive levels of terrorist threat to US
military facilities and personnel. As Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved
terminology, these terms, definitions, and security measures implement a
standardized terrorist alert system throughout the DOD. MACOMs
and subordinate commands are not authorized to change the basic system;
however, supplements to the system may be published. The selection of
appropriate responses to terrorist threats remains the responsibility of the
commander having jurisdiction or control over threatened facilities or
personnel.
a. Threat Condition
Alpha(Low).
(1) Definition.
A general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations and
personnel, of unpredictable nature and extent, when circumstances do not
justify full implementation of measures contained in a higher threat condition.
Selected measures from higher threat conditions may be implemented as needed.
(2) Measures
To Be Taken.
(a) At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including
dependents, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly
those carrying suitcases or other containers; to be alert for unidentified
vehicles on or near US installations; and to be alert for abandoned parcels or
suitcases, or for any unusual activity.
(b) Keep the duty
officer or other appointed personnel available to evacuate buildings and areas,
and to seal off areas where an explosion or attack has occurred. Keep key
personnel on call to implement security plans.
(c) Secure buildings,
rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
(d) Increase security
spot checks of vehicles and persons entering installations and nonclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the US
command and agency.
(e) Limit access points
for vehicles and personnel.
(f) As a deterrent, apply
one of the following measures from threat condition Bravo individually and
randomly:
§
Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage
areas not in regular use.
§
At the beginning and the end of each workday, and at other regular
and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in
regular use for suspicious activity or packages.
§
Check all deliveries to installation activities and advise
dependents to check all home deliveries.
§
As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic
accommodations (schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets) to improve
deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among the staff and dependents.
(g) Review all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic
requirements related to the introduction of the higher threat condition.
(h) Review and implement
security measures for high-risk personnel.
b. Threat Condition
Bravo (Medium).
(1) Definition.
An increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no
particular threat has been identified.
(2) Measures
to be Taken.
(a) Remind all personnel to be cautious and inquisitive about
suspicious persons, vehicles, and activities. Warn personnel of any form of
attack to be used by terrorists.
(b) Keep all personnel
on call who are involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans.
(c) Check plans for
implementing measures contained in the next threat condition.
(d) Where possible, move
cars and other objects at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly those
buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Consider the use of centralized
parking.
(e) Secure and regularly
inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
(f) Make regular and
frequent inspections of the interior and exterior of buildings for suspicious
packages.
(g) Thoroughly examine
all mail for letter or parcel bombs.
(h) Check all deliveries
to installation activities and advise dependents to check all home deliveries.
(i)
As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations
(schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets) to improve deterrence and
defense, and to build confidence among the staff and dependents.
(j) Keep the staff and
dependents informed of the general situation to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary
alarm.
(k) At an early stage,
inform members of local security committees of any action being taken and why.
(l) Upon entry of
visitors to the unit, physically inspect them and a percentage of their
suitcases, parcels, and other containers.
(m) Wherever possible,
operate random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.
(n) Protect off-base
military personnel and military transport in accordance with prepared plans.
Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of
checking before they enter and drive a car.
(o) Implement additional
security measures for high-risk personnel.
(p) Brief personnel who
may augment the guard force on directives and regulations concerning the use of
deadly force.
(q) Conduct a random search
of vehicles entering the installation.
c. Threat Condition
Charlie (High).
(1) Definition.
A terrorist incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating
that some form of terrorist action is imminent.
(2) Measures
to be Taken.
(a) Continue all threat condition Bravo actions or introduce those
not already implemented.
(b) Keep all personnel
on duty who are responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans.
(c) Limit access points
to absolute minimum.
(d) Strictly enforce
control of entry and search all vehicles.
(e) Enforce centralized
parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.
(f) Issue weapons to
guards. (Local orders should include specific instructions on issue of
ammunition.)
(g) Increase patrolling
of the installation.
(h) Protect all
designated vulnerable points and give special attention to vulnerable points
outside military establishments.
(i)
Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.
d. Threat Condition
Delta (Imminent).
(1) Definition.
Terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been
received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally,
this threat condition is declared as a localized warning.
(2) Measures
To Be Taken.
(a) Continue or introduce measures listed for threat conditions
Bravo and Charlie.
(b) Augment guards, as
needed.
(c) Identify all
vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support
areas.
(d) Search all vehicles
entering the complex or installation as well as vehicle contents.
(e) Control all access
and implement positive identification of all personnel.
(f) Search all
suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into the complex or on the
installation.
(g) Enforce measures to
control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the US command or agency
concerned.
(h) Check often the
exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
(i)
Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.
(j) Consult local
authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities that might
make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attack.
e. Threat Assessment
Guidelines. The following general
guidelines provide for uniform implementation of security alert conditions.
Assessment factors are defined as--
(1) Existence.
Applies when a terrorist group is present in an area of concern. The group need
not have posed a threat to US or DOD interests in the past.
(2) Capability.
Applies when a terrorist group has the ability to implement an operation
against US interests in areas of concern. This includes resources such as
intelligence, mobility, personnel, and equipment (explosives, arms, and
ammunition).
(3) History.
Applies when a group's history of terrorist acts and behavior reflects an
anti-US stand or includes previous attacks against US interests.
(4) Trends.
Applies if the group has, over the past year, displayed terrorist activity that
appears to be continuing or increasing. Activity need not have been violent;
terrorist attacks against US or DOD interests may be merely threatening
statements.
(5) Targeting.
Applies if there are known plans or confirmed intentions of a terrorist group
to target US or DOD interests. Targeting can be either specific or nonspecific.
If targeting is not against US or DOD interests, this factor should not be
considered.
A combination of
positive answers to any or all of the above assessment factors will produce a
threat level of either low, medium, high, or imminent. These guidelines apply
only to the assessment of terrorist threat against US or DOD interests.
f. Threat Condition
Reporting Procedures. Department of the Army
requires MACOMs that own installations to implement a
reporting system within their respective commands. This system will provide DA
and senior Army leaders current information on the antiterrorist posture so
that resources are dedicated where they are most needed. (See applicableregulations for reporting procedures.)
Counterterrorism
includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to
terrorism. This is the final phase in combatting
terrorism. It is reactive and validates the extensive preparation, planning,
and response measures established in terrorism counteraction plans. The type of
forces and command and control relations used in counterterrorism operations
depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. Force
selection criteria are governed by legal and political constraints. Some
military operations executed by US forces in response to terrorist acts may be
carried out by conventional forces, However, usually these forces provide
support to a specially organized, equipped, and trained counterterrorism unit.
In executing counterterrorism actions, leaders should ensure organizational
planning addresses the following tasks:
a. Intelligence. A well-planned, organized, all-source intelligence program
is vital in order to identify the threat and to provide timely threat
intelligence. (See Chapter 6.) This includes evaluating terrorist
abilities, tactics, and strategy.
b. Hostage Negotiations. Due to jurisdictional considerations, hostage negotiations
are normally the responsibility of another US government agency or the host
nation.
c. Hostage Rescue. Specially organized, trained, and equipped personnel and
units are maintained to rescue and protect hostages.
d. Assault of Terrorist
Positions. An objective of national
policy is to deter the terrorist through the threat of retaliation. When this
becomes necessary, US military personnel normally conduct the operation. This
mission could be assigned to either special operations forces, conventional
forces, or both. If SOFs are used, the US military
commander must still plan to establish an inner security perimeter of MP units.
He also establishes an outer security perimeter of soldiers and a special
reaction element to respond to other isolated incidents within the AOR.
Commanders must take
action to counter terrorists. During peacetime, they must develop and employ
antiterrorist plans. The measures to deter, prevent, and respond to threat are
based on the terrorist threat conditions. The plan must correspond to and be
included in the security plan. This includes physical security, OPSEC, and
personal security. As the unit deploys for COIN operations, PKOs,
or PCOs, the chances of a terrorist act increases.
Based on the threat, commanders must guard unit personnel and equipment.
A commander with a
deployment mission must reduce the vulnerability of his unit to terrorist
attack. These precautions must be included during predeployment,
deployment, and redeployment.
a. Predeployment. The commander must develop his unit's security to complicate
the terrorist's decision making. As he plans his concept of the operation, he
assesses the threat. From this, the operational plans, equipment, and special
skills can be chosen that increase risk to the terrorists.
(1)
The concept should--
(a) Include security against terrorism in all orders, plans, and
training.
(b) Include security in
the commander's guidance.
(c) Deter or create risk
for the terrorist through security programs.
(2) The planning process
must include--
(a) Mission analysis.
§
How can the mission be affected by a terrorist attack?
§
What are the security aspects of both specified and implied tasks?
§
Continue to review unit weaknesses throughout predeployment,
deployment, and redeployment.
(b) Threat assessment.
§
Identify terrorist groups operating in the deployment area.
§
Develop a list of PIR: methods of operation, attack methodology,
and preattack indication.
§
Identify sources of information on terrorist groups; know how to
access them quickly and routinely.
§
Routinely include threat assessment in intelligence estimates.
(c) Combat service support considerations.
§
Procurement of special security equipment
§
Protection of storage and distribution areas.
§
Maintenance of special equipment.
§
Security of maintenance unit if separate from main body.
§
Security during movement (based on threat).
§
Security in staging areas.
§
Liaison with security agencies that support the move or with
controlling areas that move (host country).
(d) Combat support considerations.
§
Engineering priority of work based on the mission and terrorist
threat.
§
Special engineer equipment for conducting countermine and EOD;
protective obstacle emplacement; constructing roadblocks; critical site, asset,
and troop protection.
§
Special engineer equipment.
§
Engineer training to maneuver units on visual
detection/recognition of mines/booby traps.
§
MP check/inspect/improve unit physical security.
§
MP liaison with local police/security personnel.
§
MP assist in security planning and training.
§
Host nation security forces assisted by MP screen civilian and
host nation employees.
§
No hiring of civilian employees, if possible.
§
If employed, special security procedures for screening and
monitoring civilians.
§
In many countries, a fee for information is expected. Coordinate
with the State Department for a means to pay for information.
(e) Operational considerations.
§
Unit plans. Include security in each plan, SOP, OPORD, and
movement order.
§
Security plans. Prepare, review, and update unit security plans
(physical security, crime prevention, and so on), and individual security plans
(guard orders).
§
Security programs. Develop specific security programs such as
threat awareness and OPSEC.
§
Special teams. Due to the terrorist threat, consider a different
task organization (search teams, special reaction teams, protective service
teams).
§
Special skills. To counter the terrorist threat, add special
skills to units (interrogators, linguists, FAOs, EOD
personnel, public affairs, SOF liaison, CA officer). Some may need to go with
advanced parties.
§
Command and support relationships. These may differ from the
routine (State Department, host nation, country team, SOF teams). Resolve
command and support relationships between the advance party of the JTF and the
brigade and other agencies before deployment.
(f) Specialized skills training. Institutional training for
specialized skills (instructor qualification, evasive driving, special reaction
teams, threat awareness, search techniques, hostage negotiation, roadblocks,
sentry duties, joint police action with host country).
(g) Transit to
deployment area.
§
Consider overall security of the unit throughout the entire
movement: emergency action procedures, alternative routes or diversions, and
organic security teams with each movement element.
§
Implement en route planning and training.
§
Immediately update intelligence/threat assessment before arrival.
b. Deployment. Deployment is the second stage of the mission. As units move
and establish operation bases, commanders must not create lucrative targets.
(1) Advanced
party considerations.
(a) Composition. More personnel are needed for security and
liaison with host nation security agencies, because a means for added
intelligence on terrorism is required.
(b) Deployment. The
primary security consideration for the advanced party is whether it should be
standard or low profile (uniform or plain clothes, military or civilian
transport).
(c) Validation. The
advanced party must validate the mission and PIR. Required tasks include
determining if the terrorist threat assessment tracks with actual threat and if
the threat from in country affects the accomplishment of the mission; and,
discovering the mission, if it is the same as the commander's.
(d) Rules of engagement.
The advanced party must confirm planned rules of engagement. It must determine
if they are the same as those during the predeployment
phase. Problems must be resolved before the main body arrives.
(2) OPSEC
measures in deployment.
(a) Avoid making known the time and place of arrival; otherwise,
increase security.
(b) Avoid setting
patterns of behavior/operation.
(c) Set up secure
communications with main body and advanced party.
(3) Pass
policy. On extended operations, the morale of soldiers must be
considered. A pass policy may be established in the mission area. However,
soldiers must keep a low profile. Commanders should do the following:
(a) Provide troop information briefings on the threat.
(b) Establish pass
policies using the buddy system.
(c) Establish off-limits
areas.
(4) Force
protection. In setting up operating bases and in day-to-day
operations, commanders must consider the security of his forces. This is a
major concern when the rules of engagement are restrictive. Some considerations
are as follows:
(a) Coordinate with security forces that protect forces (MP, host
nation forces, directing staff). (b) Avoid providing lucrative targets (troop
concentrations, motor pools, large static logistic installations).
(c) Transit within
deployment area.
(d) Continue threat
assessment along routes for each movement.
(e) Include security in
all movement orders.
(f) Provide security at
departure and arrival points.
(g) Employ security
forces during transit.
(h) Establish liaison
and coordinate with all security agencies along route.
(5) Security
enhancement. Commanders should use TOE and specialized equipment to
provide security based on threat assessment.
(a) Assign the provost marshal or a military police officer the
responsibility for physical security.
(b) Ensure all personnel
know the governing regulations (guard orders, rules of engagement, local
restrictions).
(c) Stay aware of
training and the troop information program.
(d) Include force/base
protection when arranging unit positions (good defense/barrier plan, dispersion
of high-value targets away from access roads, perimeter fences).
(e) Maintain a low
profile (restrict passes).
(f) Restrict access of
unassigned personnel to the unit's location. Restrict the number of vehicles
within perimeters and keep parking away from buildings. Perform stringent
identification checks.
(h) Constantly portray
an image of professionalism and readiness.
(i)
Continue to reassess the environment.
c. Redeployment. During the redeployment phase, preparing for a terrorist
attack is as vital as during the other phases. In fact, units tend to relax
after an operation. Redeployment depends on the mission, the publicity, and the
international reaction. It may be the most vulnerable phase for aterrorist attack.
(1)
The advance party must keep a security alert and awareness posture until all of
the unit has returned. The advance party should develop PIR for return to home
station.
(2) Stay-behind
personnel are most open to terrorist attack since the armed presence is less.
They must keep a security posture that reflects the chance of a greater threat.
Actions include maintaining liaison with security forces, adding to security
measures, and keeping tight controls on personnel.
(3) The following should
be considered for reverse deployment:
(a) The security of the port of entry and lines of communications
for the return trip.
(b) If the mission has
changed the situation at home. An unpopular political decision may expose the
unit to a threat upon its return to the US.
(c) To adopt the
security measures used during transit to, and movement within, the deployment
area. Coordinate reaction ability with security agencies along the route.
(4) A coordinated PAO
policy should be developed to incorporate the following:
(a) Control of information released to the media ensures accuracy
and completeness.
(b) Troops should be
briefed as to release of information to outside agencies. Only public affairs
personnel have release authority.
(5) Debriefing should be
conducted. The stress increase in soldiers during intense deployment operations
must be allowed to subside. This helps to adjust back into a peacetime
environment. These debriefings include:
(a) Briefing soldiers to change their orientation from LIC duty
back to peacetime.
(b) Updating soldiers
regarding new policies, incidents, or threats that developed since the
deployment operation.
(c) Inspecting soldiers
for maps, souvenirs, ordnance, and weapons.
(6) A thorough
after-action report should be prepared. It provides two vital services for
units that conduct future operations. It provides future commanders a benefit
from lessons learned. Also, it serves as a resource for validating terrorism
counteraction procedures for future operations.
Combatting terrorism, more than
any other form of warfare, requires knowledge of the enemy's goals and
abilities. Intelligence officers, supporting a deploying unit, must always
consider the terrorist's concerns when developing EEIs
and a list of local terrorism indicators.
a. Priority Intelligence
Requirements. The following terrorist
concerns can assist the intelligence officer in developing PIR:
§
Organization, size, and composition of group.
§
Motivation, long-range goals, and short-range goals.
§
Religious, political, ethnic affiliation, or a combination of
these.
§
International and national support (moral, physical, financial).
§
Recruiting methods, locations, and targets (students).
§
Identities of group leaders, opportunist, and idealists.
§
Group intelligence abilities.
§
Sources of supply/support.
§
Important dates (religious holidays, martyrdom anniversaries).
§
Planning competence.
§
Degree of discipline.
§
Preferred tactics and operations.
§
Willingness to kill.
§
Willingness for self-sacrifice (professed or demonstrated).
§
Group skills (sniping, demolitions, masquerade, forged documents,
industrial sabotage, airplane/boat operations, tunneling, underwater electronic
surveillance, poisons/contaminants).
§
Equipment and weapons on hand and required.
§
Transportation on hand and required.
§
Medical support available.
§
Freedom of access to media and skill in using it.
b. Local Terrorism
Indicators. Some conditions that may
indicate politically motivated violence in certain locations are as follows:
(1)
Dissent for political, social, or ethnic reasons. Charges brought against local
government.
(2) Formation of radical
groups, branches of national subversive groups, or secret societies.
(3) Antigovernment,
anti-US agitation; identification of government or US as the root of the
problems.
(4) New spokesmen for
the people's causes emerging; out-of-town organizers arriving.
(5) Meetings, rallies,
and demonstrations being organized; grievances taking political overtones;
inflammatory speeches and charges made; provocation of authorities to
intervene, or overreact; police or military brutality charged.
(6) Appearance of
antiestablishment posters, leaflets, underground press; taking people's concern
into political arena; politicization of social causes.
(7) Use of known
personalities as draws for rallies, especially those that have been identified
with radical causes.
(8) Demonstrations,
civil disobedience, or protest marches with causes overshadowed by political rhetorics.
(9) Increased
recruiting, by known front groups and radical organizations; support sought
among workers.
(10) Increased activism
in political spheres at colleges and universities.
(11) Speeches and
communications stating violence as the only means of solution.
(12) Identification of
foreign influence or aid.
(13) Threats against
public works, utilities, or transportation; threats of violence against
prominent personalities.
(14) Agitation in
refugee, minority, or foreign communities; polarization; arming segments of
society.
(15) Reports of stolen
firearms and explosives; raids on armories, and sporting goods stores.
(16) Violence against
property, looting, destruction, and arson; mainly during demonstrations,
marches, or mob actions.
(17) Violence against
persons, murders, attempted murders, beatings, threats, abductions, or public
targeting of people.
(18) Increased purchases
of high-performance weapons; appearance of automatic weapons, mainly of foreign
manufacture.
(19) Discovery of
weapons, ammunition caches, and explosives; indication of terrorist training;
increased terrorist surveillance.
(20) Open attacks on
police, military, and other authorities.
(21) Reports of stolen
identification cards, membership cards, and so on.
Commanders can implement
certain measures to avoid stereotyping and to deny intelligence information to
the enemy.
a. Commanders should
adhere to the following OPSEC measures:
(1)
Use EEFI to guide the OPSEC program. Develop EEFI--those items/activities of
planning that terrorists can use.
(2) Present random
action in unit operating procedures (change patrol schedules, routes, check
points, sentry, or guard positions.
(3) Avoid any set
pattern for commanders, meetings, meal schedules, resupply
activity, religious services, or sentry or guard reliefs.
(4) Employ protective
obstacles (perimeter and internal).
(5) Check identification
of all personnel entering and leaving the perimeter or installation.
(6) Employ added
security to restricted areas (communications posts, communication centers,
motor parks, high-density troop areas).
(7) Control distribution
of itineraries of VIPs/high-risk personnel.
(8) Establish dismount
points and parking areas away from buildings. If possible, these should not be
seen from outside the base.
b. The following are
examples of intelligence indicators that might assist a terrorist in gathering
intelligence on a unit. This is a sample listing and should not be construed as
all inclusive.
(1) Operation
Indicators.
(a) Troops restricted to the post before a move or operation.
(b) Increased
patrolling/air reconnaissance.
(c) No patrolling at
all.
(d) Increased movement
between locations caused by task organizations before an operation.
(e) Special requisitions
to increase rations, transport, and ammunitions.
(2) HUMINT
Indicators.
(a) Newspaper or other media coverage.
(b) Farewells and
last-minute visits by VIPs or senior officers.
(c) Church services the
night before an operation.
(d) Bulletin notices
stating that enforced rest is required; dispensary hours are changed.
(e) Public signs
announcing changes in procedures (restricting civilian travel/access).
(f) Photography
developed by local contractors showing in-camp scenes and preparations.
(3) Communication
Indicators.
(a) Change in call signs and frequencies before an operation.
(b) Movement of
auxiliary communication equipment (new aerials) to a new area.