Military School

INTELLIGENCE PROJECTION

After an area of operations is identified inhabited by an asymmetric enemy in a complex terrain
with weak transportation and logistical infrastructure. We need to deploy an interim combat team
complete with HUMINT/, CI/. SIGINT assets which will act as an early combat team, mounted
infantry organization with the capability to rapidly assess the environment, physical terrain,
community, cultural and political and conduct an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by
assessing the enemy’s strength, capabilities, disposition, TOE thus enabling the striking force to
project itself before deployment. The primary intent here is to develop a situational
understanding of an unknown area inhabited by an enemy against the backdrop of distributed,
asymmetric, nonlinear simultaneous operations. Here the problem is to determine the OB of an
enemy that doesn’t have a conventional standing force nor is easily identifiable. We don’t see
any typical military structure, units, rear and forward areas or logistical networks characteristic
of conventional enemy forces. It is a big question how to deploy ISR assets for collecting
intelligence or conducting reconnaissance or for that matter determining the center of gravity of
the enemy.
Without sending in the interim combat team to gain a situational understanding it is totally
impracticable to deploy the striking forces. What we need is a interim combat force with
reconnaissance, surveillance and target nomination capabilities—all these facilitated by an
organic MI company with organic intelligence assets.
The recce platoon, in addition to reconnaissance and surveillance should also engage in
HUMINT activities for thorough situational understanding. The situation in asymmetric warfare
is different. Here the recce platoon can conduct HUMINT operations. The reconnaissance
platoon should be equipped with CI capability. This heightens its HUMNINT collection ability.
The HUMINT teams (4 teams) are in effect Tactical HUMINT Teams each with 3 HUMINT
collectors and one CI agent. Once deployed, the teams report their information to an operational
management team (OMT), which collates intelligence data gathered by the tactical teams. The
information is then passed on to the brigade INT section for further analysis and integration into
the brigade's collection plan.

The early entry force, the interim combat team along with HUMINT/CI capability executes
both an operational mission and intelligence endeavour.It shapes the battle space before the
strike force moves in, makes conditions disadvantageous for the enemy in the initial stage ,
facilitates the arrival of the strike forces. It also conducts a preliminary intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, makes a human terrain study and interacts with local populace
using tactical questioning and elicitation to identify threats. In other words it helps in
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMPANY
The targeting process is the culmination of another involved process, beginning from sensor
collection activities, sent higher up to the intelligence section where collation, analysis is done,
the finished intelligence product now being routed for dissemination to the targeting platform.
Information flow is from down-up preceded by request for information from the troop level. All
this entails time and intelligence is perishable, in that it is needed to be not only accurate and
specific but also timely. To avoid this time delay or to put it this way: to reduce the time between
sensor collection to targeting, we need to distill the targeting process down to the company or
platoon level. If collation and analysis can be pushed down to that level, a great deal of
enhancement in situational awareness and operational efficiency would result. One of the most
effective of these was the distillation of the targeting process into a Troop/Company-level tool.
We can have a Company intelligence support cell which will help in the creation of Company
and platoon level intelligence teams or grant assistance to units who have no organic intelligence
capability.
The squads or platoons at ground level usually accost the enemy in rapidly changing
environments with the element of surprise against them. In such situations the soldiers have to
adapt real fast and there is no time for sending information requests to Bn Intelligence officer or
higher up and waiting for intelligence...timely specific and accurate intelligence that is. Here
‘’timely intelligence’’ is crucial. Troops on most occasions find themselves operating unilaterally
against insurgents conducting IDF, DF and IED attacks and have to adapt quickly. It is here that
the intermediate level Company intelligence support cell can help by creating a squad targeting
process by supporting the squads with raw operational intelligence by fielding its HUMINT and
CI assets with the squad itself. Later it will be detailed how the HUMINT and CI enabled
platoons are formed with the CLIC in the lead.
In the absence of the CLIC the usual intelligence summary report briefed to the Bn and Bde
commanders omits the ground critical information need of the squad/platoon. The picture usually
presented takes into account the operational success/failures as a whole and dwells on the
priority intelligence requirements, not the immediate intelligence requirements of the tactical unit
on the ground involved in combat. But if we have the CLIC setup, then the CLIC can increase
the situational awareness at higher levels by sending in intelligence reports through the lens of
the squad firefight.
SIGINT resources required to conduct effective personality-centric targeting are not available at
the Company or Troop level.
All the information collected at the troops level is exploited where proper categorization and
collation is executed. It is at the exploitation stage that the soldiers work is evaluated and decided
who needs further training to collect information properly. Because the correct manner of
collection of information is very important at the troop level. It must be duly ensured that he has
properly conducted tactical exploitation of the area , of the captured materials, and of the human
terrain. It must be seen to it that his knowledge of tactical questioning is thorough. All these
performance indexes are reflected when the platoon intelligence unit or company intelligence
unit submits their intelligence reports. This exploitation phase will require a great deal of
administrative functions to assess the soldier’s capability and also to assist in the collation of all
collected information. Although at this phase nothing strong is produced against the insurgents,
but further operations tend to be driven with the collected intelligence. This is where the Bn
Intelligence officer or the Company intelligence officer decides on the technical control aspects
of the collection being done by line soldiers and ensuring that they adhere to it now and in the
future.
It can very well be that the projecting intelligence capability option is used where it is not
practicable for having own intelligence unit. There can be the Company intelligence support
unit/s, modular and available to all the Companies operating in the area of operations. These
units can for example debrief returning patrols of the company. Returning patrols are a very
important source of intelligence—this fact should be understood clearly. Now just coming and
telling the Platoon section headquarters or the Company headquarters intelligence officer what
information they have will not suffice the purpose. This information needs to be sent to higher
echelons and that too systematically after being entered into the Company’s knowledge
management system, collated and analyzed. It is not that difficult as a computer system can be
set up and today dozens of map tracking or link analysis softwares are available together with
database management system software for small units.
The debriefs of the patrols should include what they have observed about the local population –
any changes from earlier situations perhaps?—pictures taken, any information to satisfy the units
intelligence requirements, any engagements with the enemy and if so where, any information
from any civilian upon being questioned etc etc.
One thing that can and should be incorporated in a COIN environment is the ground level or
company level intelligence units biometric collection and exploitation capability. If the soldiers
can properly take DNA samples from members of the population enrolled in a DNA collection
scheme and then all biometric information recorded in the database, in any future case of
insurgent attacks all biometric evidence can then be cross-referenced with that contained in the
database , thus if there are matches insurgent personalities get identified , driving further
operations , kinetic or arrest and prosecution. ..NEXT